

Anti-Semitism and the Foundations of Christianity

Twelve Christian theologians explore
the development and dynamics of antisemitism
within the Christian tradition.

Edited by
Alan T. Davies



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
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Antisemitism and the
foundations of Christianity /

Earl C. Rife

ANTISEMITISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIANITY

Edited by
Alan Davies



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Preface

Je n'approuve pas l'antisémitisme, c'est une conception étroite, médiocre et incomplète, mais j'ai tenté de l'expliquer. Il n'était pas né sans causes, j'ai cherché ces causes. Ai-je réussi à les déterminer, c'est à ceux qui liront ces pages d'en décider.

(From the Preface to Bernard Lazare's *Antisémitisme*)

Now, seventy years later (for this famous work was published in 1894—the year of the condemnation of Alfred Dreyfus) it is possible to say that the long search for an explanation is at last completed, but it is wholly other from that seen by Lazare and his successors. Because he considered that, where there were Jews, they always aroused hostility, he wrote in his first chapter: “il faut donc que les causes générales de l'antisémitisme aient toujours résidé en Israel même et non chez ceux qui le combattirent. Ceci n'est pas pour affirmer que les persécuteurs des Israélites eurent toujours le droit de leur côté . . . mais pour poser en principe que les Juifs causèrent—en partie au moins—leurs maux.” Such an admission would not be made today without the insistence that those characteristics which the non-Jew found objectionable—clannishness, financial trickery and so on—were themselves the product of hostility toward his ancestors and not inevitably “Jewish.” The Holocaust has made this observation important. It is interesting that when my Penguin book *An Enemy of the People: Antisemitism* was selected in 1948 by the occupying Allied Governments to be translated into German, passages which suggested a Jewish share in responsibility were omitted as providing no basis for the creation of so evil a thing as Nazi beliefs or activities. The *Jude* of Nazi pornography was entirely a creature of Nazi pornographic imagination.

Because antisemitism was universal not only in a geographical sense, but also continuous in terms of time, Lazare considered (and this is still held by some scholars), that all hostility to Jews comprised a single historic movement. But this would suggest that Christian anger at the rejection of Jesus by the bulk of the Jewish people, and his death at the initiative of the Jewish authorities (as the Gospels present it), was not at

the very heart of the attitude to Jewry wherever Jews lived as a minority in a Christian country. The latter had nothing to do with the clannishness which was the main reason why they annoyed the ancient world. "Clannishness" was never a Christian accusation; "deicide" had a totally different implication.

It was in an apparently secularized world that a century ago the Jews of Western Europe became citizens. The Jews of Eastern Europe (Tsarist Russia and Rumania), where religious prejudice was still active, did not. But suddenly and unexpectedly a more virulent hostility than they had ever known burst out in both Eastern and Western Europe alike. On the surface, these late antisemitic movements seemed to be rooted only in social, economic, and political issues, so that some writers continued to trace them back to pre-Christian origins. New circumstances might create new forms, but antisemitism was still seen as primarily a non-Jewish reaction to the activity or outlook of the Jewish community concerned. Beneath the surface, however, this dogma was less convincing. For example, in France the racial element due to the now popular distinction between the noble Aryan and the contemptible Semite was frequently mixed up with religious and theological language making the same contrast. In Russia and Germany the Jews became religious as well as political scapegoats, used by the Russian bureaucracy after the murder of Alexander II in 1881, and by Bismarck two years earlier, when he wanted to break with the powerful National Liberal Party which had among its leaders two Jewish figures, Edward Lasker and Ludwig Bamberger.

The Christian tradition seemed to have little to do with the leadership of such movements. None were initiated officially by a Church council or primate. But a closer analysis of the personalities involved in creating and leading antisemitic movements reveal that in *all* of them clerics were prominent; and in most of them they obviously dominated, both as writers and as rabble-rousers; and in one, the Russian (and among other Orthodox believers in the Balkans), medieval accusations, especially the charge of ritual murder, determined the actual form of popular attack on the Jewish community. In Western Europe one can say with certainty that the politicians would not have created such vast and successful popular movements, had not members of the national Church taken a prominent part in their support.

In Bismarck's Berlin, when a permanent antisemitic programme was launched in the Reichstag, it was a Lutheran Court chaplain who created and led the party. In Austria-Hungary, it was as rabble-rousers that clerics took the leadership. The most prominent was Canon Augustus Rohling, who acquired fame with a scabrous work entitled *Der Talmud-Jude*, which claimed ritual murder to be a religious obligation for an orthodox Jew. In

this claim he had the support of Father Deckert, one of the most influential clerics in Vienna itself, where the openly antisemitic mayor, Karl Lueger, was able to obtain a papal blessing on his programme.

In France the rabble-rousing of political antisemitism had an earlier opening with Toussenel's *Les Juifs, Rois de l'Epoque* in the '40's, and Gougenot des Mousseaux's horrifying *Les Juifs, le Judaïsme, et la Judaisations des Peuples chrétiens* in 1869. This work might well claim the prize for antisemitic fiction, since it stated that, to retain his orthodoxy, every Jew was required to have Christian blood in his unleavened bread for Passover. The work was specially commended to the Catholic reader by the Directeur du Seminaire des Missions Etrangères. All this came before the Affaire Dreyfus, with its Catholic support symbolized in *La France Juive*, an amazing farrago of lies by Edouard Drumont. The reply to this defamatory fiction also came from France—in the work of the writer already quoted. Bernard Lazare wrote *Antisémitisme: son Histoire et ses Causes* in 1894. He died before he was forty in 1903.

This is a record which justifies one in ascribing to Christian history and metaphysics some special anti-Jewish tradition; and it is the exposure of this tragedy that inspired Rosemary Ruether's challenge in writing *Faith and Fratricide*.

My own concern with antisemitism began in 1925, and to some extent my successive books, or portions of books, illustrate the deepening of my understanding and concern with a very evil thing. They illustrate also, I must admit, how much one specialist depends on another for corrections and complementary researches. But I have the excuse on this occasion for quoting myself, because Ruether's quotations from my book, *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue* (including more than a dozen used successfully by two enterprising American students to obtain doctorates) amount to over forty.

In 1928 I went to be Secretary of "Cultural Co-operation in the International Student Service" which, under its original name of European Student Relief, had saved the universities of Europe after the first world war. By 1928 physical relief was almost at an end, but the student world asked the one international organization they all trusted to help them overcome their bitter divisions. I soon found that antisemitism was the bitterest and most widespread, and in 1930 I produced *The Jew and his Neighbor: a Study of the Causes of Antisemitism*. It was a short work, meant for ordinary people, and it began with the massacres of Jews in Western Europe which accompanied the first crusade in 1096, for, as I explained on pages 50f., it was in the eleventh century that hostility began to be a common phenomenon.

At the back of my mind was a puzzlement as to why Jews, who had lived peaceably in the Rhineland for a thousand years—as I understood—should suddenly become victims of such outrageous and inexplicable behavior. So, when I realized I could not work on a controversial problem in Central and Eastern European universities without the minimal authority of being Herr Doktor, I thought I would kill two birds with one stone by getting an Oxford Doctorate of Philosophy while answering my question as to what lay behind the massacres of the first crusade. The result was *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue*, published in 1934, and it is impossible to exaggerate the shock and horror that I felt as the grisly picture of Christian hatred unrolled from New Testament times onward. There is no inkling of its facts in *The Jew and His Neighbor*, though I had read everything I could find on the subject.

A book that escaped my attention until several years later, though it was published in New York in 1933, was *The Christian-Jewish Tragedy: A Study in Religious Prejudice* by Professor Conrad H. Moehlman of the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School. When I did read it, I found it too emotional to be convincing. It was a direct appeal to Christian scholars to face the fact that the accusation of deicide made against the Jewish people rested on false accounts of the last days of Jesus in the gospels and the creation by Mark—or his sources—of a non-existent trial and condemnation by the Sanhedrin. From the fact that this unfortunate author's name does not even occur in the "Index of Modern Authors" in *Faith and Fratricide*, I imagine that the work made little impact. This is a great pity, for it might have magnified the Christian sense of responsibility at the very moment when the Nazis came to power.

I was equally unsuccessful with my own next activity, which was in an identical field, the New Testament. In *Jesus, Paul and the Jews*, I examined every passage in the synoptics which referred to things Jewish, as well as making a brief study of the Fourth Gospel, and a much more detailed analysis of the apparent conflict between the Paul of the letters and of his speeches in Acts after his arrest. The Student Christian Movement Press finally accepted it after a good deal of head-scratching, and it came out in 1936, but made no impression.

Meanwhile, the Nazis were in control of Germany, and their antisemitic programme was being openly practiced. So my next task was to revise *The Jew and His Neighbor* in the light of National Socialism in both theory and practice. One minor, but significant, result was that henceforth the disease had to be deprived of its capitals. It was not racial; it had nothing to do with an imaginary "Semitism"; and in all my work it is henceforth "antisemitism," an English translation of *Judenhass*.

The Holocaust still lay in the future, but during the war I was a

member of a team collected by the Royal Institute for International Affairs to prepare for a hypothetical peace conference. It was my task to survey everything in which Jewry might be involved; and that meant an exposé of antisemitism. In *The Emergence of the Jewish Problem, 1878–1939*, published in 1946, I sharply distinguished pre-1914 antisemitism, which had *some* relationship to the actualities of the religious, political, and social scene, from that created by Hitler and National Socialism, which rested on complete invention, with the fantastic plagiarism—or forgery—of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* as its “evidence” of the Jewish menace. The book was completed too early to contain any picture of the Holocaust, and in any case I was too much under the control of official views to be able to contradict the government’s refusal to accept the figures that were already being circulated by the World Jewish Congress.

In view of the purpose of the book, my emphasis was naturally on the political rather than the religious or theological aspect of the problem. But, while I was going into the contemporary situation, Marcel Simon, Professor at Strasbourg, was covering the key period of the first four centuries of Christianity, but from the point of view of the development of Judaism under the stress of Christian hostility. *Verus Israel* remains one of the key books in the field. But while these two books were being written in a scholar’s normal security, a much more epoch-making work was being written in hiding, and the constant need to find a fresh refuge, by Jules Isaac in Nazi-occupied France.

Jules Isaac had been in charge of the teaching of history in the French school system, and took as his subject the false teaching about Jews and Judaism that ran through all the school books, as well as books for the education of the young Catholic or Protestant. He thus brought into the field the important fact which Moehlman had missed, that the danger of antisemitism lay in its influence, not over politicians and scholars, but over ordinary people, *and from their childhood*. Jules Isaac was compelled to work in secret and in homelessness, and the same was true of German writers, like Hans Joachim Schoeps, but I am not including this equally important German development, only because it would make this essay too long.

So far I have been dealing with books written by authors who could not have had an accurate knowledge of the Holocaust, but I would issue a caution here. I myself wrote two books in full knowledge of the facts, *A History of the Jewish People*, published in 1962, and *Antisemitism*, published in 1963. Both have—I trust—good indices, but in neither would you find “Holocaust.” The crime was still known by its Nazi name, *Final Solution*. The *History* was clearly written at a moment when the National Front, and other revivers of Nazism, were publishing pamphlets denying

that six million Jews had been butchered, for I took pains to point out that there is evidence that the Jews were less than thirty percent of Hitler's victims murdered in cold blood.

Out of the authors of the last ten years who lead directly up to the challenge of *Faith and Fratricide*, I want to concentrate on two, Alan Davies of the University of Toronto and A. Roy Eckardt of Lehigh University, Pennsylvania, for both deal with the penitence which any genuinely Christian writer must show in dealing with the post-Holocaust situation, and both also have the courage to probe deeply into its ultimate effects. In 1967 Roy Eckardt in *Elder and Younger Brothers* took up the issues raised by Moehlman in 1933, myself in 1936 and Isaac in 1948, and demanded that Christendom accept the appalling fact that the foundations of antisemitism, and the responsibility for the Holocaust, lie ultimately in the New Testament.

Eckardt followed up this book in 1974 with an appropriate successor, entitled *Your People, My People*, in which he carried further the fascinating pioneering study of Alan Davies—*Antisemitism and the Christian Mind: The Crisis of Conscience after Auschwitz*, published in 1969. In this book, Davies examined the theology of those Christian writers who had expressed repentance for the Christian share in responsibility for the Holocaust, and found that with pitifully few exceptions they had not faced the fact that such repentance was shockingly superficial if it did not involve a fundamental re-examination of their basic theological attitudes to Jewry and the Scriptures, explicit in the presence of Jews and Judaism as contemporary facts.

Eckardt took two examples of that repentance and analyzed them in detail, one Roman Catholic, in the work of Cardinal Bea, and the other Protestant, in the Declaration of the Dutch Reformed Church. *Your People, My People* contains the most exhaustive and comprehensive background to the study of *Faith and Fratricide*. My criticism of the latter work is two-fold. The wholly admirable definition of the necessary reforms of our traditional curriculum of theological training comes too late. It is on page 259 and the book ends on page 261! It should be given much more emphasis, and that leads to my second criticism: it is possible for a rapid or careless reader to fail to see the terrific implications of her sixth point—"Above all, courses on preaching and Christian education must work conscientiously to overcome anti-Judaic language in their hermeneutics and in the educational and *liturgical materials which teach Christianity to the people*" (my italics).

Surely in that last phrase Ruether has condemned the whole lectionary in use in all the churches, whereby day by day, week by week, year by year, century by century, the New Testament is read as "the word of God"

without omission or comment. Is not this the reason why Jews are treated differently from others, why protest is not made which would be made for any other people? It has sunk into the sub-conscious—or unconscious—of Christians that “after all, Jews ought to have become Christians, and, if they don’t see it, they can fairly be expected to take the consequences.” Their conduct two thousand years ago is constantly brought before us: they are never shown as a normal, contemporary people with a normal contemporary religion.

It is her insistence that we face this fact that justifies the existence of *Faith and Fratricide*. As a book it is written too hastily, and as a scholarly work, it is too slipshod. It is not surprising that its enemies can have a lovely time, pointing out these failings. But the courageous challenge that she issues is unaffected by them. And the truth of her challenge they cannot deny. It is dishonest henceforth to refuse to face the fact that the basic root of modern antisemitism lies squarely on the Gospels and the rest of the New Testament.

James Parkes
Iwerne Minster,
Dorset, England

*To James Parkes,
a Great Pioneer of this subject
And a courageous foe of antisemitism
on the occasion of his eightieth birthday*

Introduction

The vast killing enterprise of the German Third Reich, exposed when the allied armies overran Hitler's domains in 1945, still stirs horror over three decades later, and will not cease to haunt humankind as long as its memory is not suppressed. The European Jews were not the only victims of Nazi mass murder, but they were its special victims, and their destruction, and the manner in which it was conceived and executed (chronicled by Raul Hilberg and others)¹, is both a dreadful judgment on our past and a sinister portent of our future. Out of the past, like a misshapen monster, the idea of genocide was born. What lies in the future? Richard L. Rubenstein has written recently on this question, and his speculations are chilling.² Here, however, we are still engaged in weighing the past, especially the Christian past, for Auschwitz remains as an apparent surd in a society nursed in its infancy by the Christian Church, and even in its post-Christian maturity (or old age?) at least formally attached to Christian symbols, concepts and values. Admittedly, the Christian religion is not the only aspect of Western culture to be implicated; the various rebellions against Christianity and religion itself stemming from the secular Enlightenment are also under indictment, for the *philosophes*, no less than the churchmen, contributed much to racism and antisemitism in modern times. Other trends also, notably the rise of bureaucracy and technocracy, drove Europe toward the "final solution." But this symposium is concerned with Christianity, and with the shadow cast over its scriptures, theology and morality by the Holocaust. We post-Auschwitz Christians stand today in that shadow, and perhaps will stand there always, or until our faith is purified of its ancient contamination.

Prior to 1945, few Christians were troubled by antisemitism as a social evil with serious implications for the *Christian* as well as the Jewish community, since it was easy to blame the persecutions of former eras on reactionary forces in Europe. Antisemitism was typically seen as a Jewish rather than a Christian problem. Only occasional prophetic Christians (James Parkes is the greatest) then discerned any really grave nexus between antisemitism and Christianity. Since 1945, however, it has become

in a different sense a Christian problem, not only because of the extent to which the German churches entangled themselves in the Nazi revolution, but also because the Holocaust by its sheer magnitude no longer rendered the old explanations credible. Germany was the land of the Reformation and the heart of European civilization: must not the roots of the Holocaust extend back into the Christian ages? This question has been slow in rising, and even today truly self-critical Christians are a minority. Yet, in spite of resistance, their influence has been increasing, as the proliferating literature and conferences on Jewish/Christian relations and the Holocaust studies at the present time indicate. Moreover, Christian writers who speak of the Holocaust as an "alpine event" in *Christian* history, comparable to Golgotha and the fall of Rome,³ are now listened to more seriously. Even the dissent stirred often seems to betray a measure of uneasiness—the sign of a profound anxiety.

At the same time, those Christians who sense a crisis of faith in the wake of Auschwitz disturbing the foundations of Christianity do not agree among themselves as to what extent these foundations have been shaken. Is Christianity (to vary the metaphor) blemished only on the surface, or is antisemitism embedded in its core? Does the disease require only minor surgery, or does it involve the vital organs, requiring a major operation? Jules Isaac, who did so much to awaken his generation to a fatal link between antisemitism and Christianity, nevertheless did not think that the Christian religion when it is true to itself had anything to do with antagonism to Jews and Judaism: "Le christianisme en son essence exclut l'antisémitisme."⁴ Others, including some Christians, are less certain, depending on how the "essence" of Christianity is defined. In the larger sense, of course, all Christians would have to accept this proposition, or else cast off their faith as hopelessly derelict and irreformable. But if the essence of Christianity is defined strictly in terms of the *classical* christological formulations of the Church about Jesus, or later orthodox interpretations of what these classical statements were intended to mean, it is not impossible that "essential" Christian beliefs contain an antisemitic principle that has warped the Christian mind on the subject of Jews since early times. This is a notion that unself-critical Christians are unwilling to consider, even when strongly opposed to antisemitism, for it seems to threaten the faith itself and thus their entire religious being. How could the Church survive the dismantling of its ancient time-honored affirmations surrounding the self-revelation of God in Jesus the Christ? But, if the trouble really lies somewhere in these affirmations, how could the Church survive a failure to probe the deepest roots of such a spiritual and moral disorder, especially after Auschwitz?

The documents that comprise the Christian New Testament illustrate

this dilemma. Here lie the biblical foundations of Christianity that, in traditional piety, have been surrounded with a sacrosanct aura. Can the scriptures themselves be tainted with antisemitism or, at the very least, with a polemical anti-Judaism which has not only played an insidious part through liturgy and teaching in the drama of Jewish suffering, but which has also distorted the Church's understanding of its own religious patrimony? Gregory Baum, one of the contributors to this symposium, has elsewhere recorded his change of mind on this matter.⁵ Such an admission is not made easily by a Christian for whom the written witness of the life of Jesus still retains a unique character elevating the Bible above all other books. The issue, however, must be faced, and, for this reason, the early essays in this volume are addressed to biblical (i.e., New Testament) problems, as well as to their historic background in ancient religion and society. Since the question of anti-Judaism is more than a question of a few notorious Matthaean, Pauline and Johannine passages, but deals with the basic structure of New Testament theology itself, these essays examine the emergence of the Christian faith in the polemical and tumultuous atmosphere of the ancient world. The interplay of Christian, Jewish and pagan attitudes is brought into relief in order to shed light on a complex process. If a common motif in these essays can be described, it is the conviction that Christians need not choose between an ideological defense of their scriptures that wards off damaging criticism and the sad conclusion that the New Testament is so wholly contaminated by anti-Jewish prejudice as to lose all moral authority. Instead, through careful study, Christians can isolate what genuine forms of anti-Judaism really color the major writings, and, by examining their historic genesis, neutralize their potential for harm.

The same holds true for the later essays which concentrate on the theological, historical and moral sides of the dilemma. Can Christian theologians find a satisfactory way of expressing the salvific meaning of the great central symbols of their faith that possess religious power without lapsing into the anti-Jewish overtones of the past? It would be a melancholy result if one had to answer this question in the negative, and no contributor does so. Surely the symbols of cross, resurrection and parousia are rich and deep enough to be explored afresh, and, as the essays suggest, there may be neglected resources in the theological tradition itself which can help us in this task. The shadowy outline of a more adequate christology appears as the book unfolds. This christology seeks to avoid the hubris of claiming too much, i.e., all absolutistic and triumphalist assumptions that Christians own a "truth" that exalts their religion (and, even worse, their religious institutions) above other religions, and especially above Judaism, with the attendant evils that such illusions breed. To disengage Christianity from Christendom is certainly painful and hard, but it is the

premise of this symposium that it can be done. Theology alone, however, is insufficient to distill the religious essence from its cultural malformations; hence, historical and ethical criticism must also be employed.

The symposium takes its point of departure from the original and powerful study of the Christian roots of antisemitism *Faith and Fratricide* by the American Catholic theologian Rosemary Ruether: a book now translated and soon to be published in German. Whatever its defects (criticized in these pages and elsewhere), this work has succeeded in raising a host of biblical, theological and historical issues for Christian reflection through the daring and radical nature of its thesis: that anti-Judaism is the "left-hand" of classical christology. In my judgment, it is Ruether's special contribution to have defined these issues in a manner that has redefined the problem itself. Thus the present volume is a response to *Faith and Fratricide* and a wide-ranging debate with its author. For this reason, and out of fairness, since her analysis is both praised and criticized throughout, the epilogue has been reserved for Ruether as a kind of final—although not really final—word. Her concluding essay succinctly restates her position and integrates the discussion as a whole in a brilliant and moving climax.

Another comment must be added. This is a symposium of Christian scholars, not a symposium of Christians and Jews. The omission of Jewish contributors may occasion some disapproval, but there exist several good published dialogues between Christians and Jews on this and related topics, and, rather than produce another work of this genre, something different has been attempted. The reason is important. Through Jewish-Christian dialogues, Christians, typically ill-informed on Jewish subjects, have not only learned much about Judaism and Jewish experience but also about the need to reappraise their own history and tradition. This process has been therapeutic for them, and now the time has arrived to carry it one step further: to reflect on antisemitism as a Christian problem, and to put their own house in order. The interfaith dialogue has now become an intra-Christian dialogue—an existential probing of matters of ultimate concern for the Christian believer. How successful this probing is, the reader must judge. Whether successful or unsuccessful, the kind of profound soul-searching which these essays attempt cannot be evaded or postponed.

This volume is dedicated to James Parkes, who has graciously consented to write a preface. We who think and speak on this subject today are in one way or another all his debtors, and, while not a *Festschrift* in the usual sense, the symposium is nonetheless in his honor. For our quest was his quest first, and his labors continue with a devotion that age has not diminished. Like Dr. Parkes, the scholars represented in these pages wish to extract Christianity from what the Canadian poet Irving Layton has

styled "Xianity": that false and evil religion that has bred *Judenhass* and murder for centuries, and which must now be exorcised once and for all:

Come back to us, Jeshua;
cast out the devil of Jew-hatred
in Xian and goy,
heal them of an ancient sickness.⁶

I know that Dr. Parkes does not agree with every idea expressed in this collection of essays, but I also know that he shares our concern for a purified faith and theology that does justice to Judaism and Christianity alike, and disdains the imperial banners of a world-conquering religion that has confused its own glory with the glory of the God who transcends every religious community and every theological system, including our own.

I wish to thank the generous and dedicated secretarial staff of Victoria College for their skill and patience in typing and retyping the large and complicated manuscript of the book, especially Margaret Imrie, June Hewitt and Elizabeth MacGregor.

Alan Davies
Victoria College
Toronto.

Notes

1. Raul Hilberg *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967); Nora Levin, *The Holocaust: the Destruction of European Jewry 1933-1945* (New York: Schocken Books, 1973); Gerald Reitlinger, *The Final Solution: The Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945*, (New York: A.S. Barnes, 1961); Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975).

2. Richard L. Rubenstein, *The Cunning of History*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

3. Franklin H. Littell, *The Crucifixion of the Jews* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

4. Jules Isaac, *L'Antisémitisme a-t-il des racines chrétiennes?* (Paris: Fasquelle Editeurs, 1960), p. 21.

5. See Baum's introduction to Rosemary Ruether's *Faith and Fratricide*, (New York: Seabury, 1974), pps. 1-22.

6. From Irving Layton's poem, "The Exorcist," *The Covenant*, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977).

As the Twig Was Bent: Antisemitism in Greco-Roman and Earliest Christian Times

John C. Meagher

The main occupational hazard of the historian is that, as other languages confess even more openly than our own, history is so close to story. The informing values of the story-teller's craft slide imperceptibly into the motives and work of the critical historian. Scholarly training does not eradicate the instinct for story: at whatever level of development in or removed from the techniques of historical scholarship, we retain a conatural preference for what is neat, what patterns satisfying, what resolves itself into a shape that is small and coherent enough for a single mind to hold. The historian's task is to reach for a deeper and more complex level of patterning against the constant temptation to enjoy a simpler and often more satisfying pattern that is not quite accurate. No historian who has attempted this on a large scale has ever arrived at an irreformable stage of discovery. Gaps in information, stiffnesses in imagination, mistakes in interpretation drag upon the work from one direction; but from another, the historian's virtuous intent stumbles over the habits of story—the longing for a tidy schema, the desire to support (or to confute) a common myth, the tendency to locate the process of events within a manageable but unnaturally simplified set of considerations.

The general subject of this book is one that has been particularly bedevilled by the temptation of storying. Traditionally, the historians of the West have alternatively cast the Jew in the role of Luke's Simeon, resigning from history with his definitive *nunc dimittis* once the first buds of the Christian dispensation had appeared, or in the role of Matthew's Herod, fiercely but hopelessly opposed to the emergence of the powers that would replace him and his world without remainder. The former characterization is not at issue in the present project (although it is worth more

study than it has been given, since it gives shelter to that subtle form of antisemitism that tries to make the Jews invisible after Jesus). To see the latter characterization as Herod, one can hardly do better than to read *Faith and Fratricide* as a chronicle of the way in which history was turned into an anti-Jewish story.

A third role for the Jew has emerged more prominently in modern times. It resembles that of Stephen in *Acts*—the brave witness murdered and martyred for fidelity to the truth by the malicious and powerful persons who opposed both him and it. To the extent that the understanding of history moves forward by a dialectic of stories, this version is superior to its dominant predecessors and is to be welcomed. In the face of the Holocaust, in the bonfire light of the scandalous oppression of Jews by non-Jewish societies through more centuries than one mind can readily hold, and in the presence of the accumulated weight of at least two millennia of destructive anti-Jewish ideology, there is no excuse for retaining the Jews in the roles of Simeon or Herod. There is an excuse for giving them the part of Stephen. It is closer to the mark, as stories go.

Ruether tends to cast the Jews in the role of Stephen, and to align the Christians, in dramatic reversal, with the mainly anonymous mob that stoned him. I believe her to be on the side of the angels of history, as well as the angels of morality. History is served because it is so susceptible to story, and her story is a powerful and apt corrective to the one that has hitherto prevailed. Morality benefits from her searing indictment of the casual evil against the Jews for which the Western world has never taken adequate responsibility, and which it has not yet adequately repudiated. But historically, it is not quite enough to be on the side of the appropriate angels: story betrays history, even when helpfully corrective of previous stories. Consequently, my response will be critical in the interests of history, where polemic (which I find she employs) is almost always distortion, where generalizations (which she inevitably makes) are always to be suspected, where abstract modes of development (including her underlying sense of dialectic) are implausible, and where an oversimplified sense of the routes over which history moves (which I believe she exhibits) falsifies the results. I do not mean to suggest that Ruether is a poor historian. That is decidedly not the case. But she bends toward storying at important points. Hence, I wish to take issue with her in the way that one historian does with another, in the interests of that next step beyond inevitably defective history to slightly less defective history, and in the interests of intellectual and moral justice.

I understand the main issue to be the assessment of Christian responsibility for antisemitism, both in its present form and in its historical genesis. The extent to which the grotesque forms that antisemitism has

taken in modern times has been formed under Christian auspices, or, on the other hand, under auspices that merely used the rubble of Christian culture and sensibility for constructions of their own, will be the responsibility of others contributing to this volume. It is my task to review the materials bearing on the earliest state of the question. I do so in the realization that I will undoubtedly perpetrate, unwittingly, some distorting story-telling of my own; but I do so in the hope that I may advance the accuracy of general understanding, and in appreciation of the extraordinary service that Ruether has performed in writing *Faith and Fratricide*.

The Jews and Pagan Antiquity

The historical self-understanding of those whose cultures are derived from the European peoples rests upon a common foundation in a story that begins with the Greeks and passes through the Romans. Historians less careful than Ruether commonly use the epithet "classical" to refer to the Greco-Roman cultures. The epithet is both true and false. It is true insofar as it registers the fact that the Hellenic, Hellenistic, and Roman civilizations produced materials—literatures, philosophies, laws, architectures, political organizations—that were regarded as important norms by the peoples of later Europe. Greco-Roman phenomena conditioned the history of Europe not just at the beginning, but through repeated subsequent attempts at imitation. The falsity of the epithet is implicit in the indiscriminating way in which the various forms of European "Renaissance" tended to leave Europeans with the impression that there is something especially authentic in whatever the culture of Greco-Roman society did, or something especially inauthentic in whatever it failed or disdained to do. The question of antisemitism in the ancient world has accordingly often held a concealed but important wild card. If the story of anti-Jewish attitudes can be founded in non-Christian Greco-Roman society, then to some observers these attitudes are legitimated in a particularly authoritative way: they become, in effect, classical. They also then become the responsibility of pre-Christian peoples, and Christian perpetuation of them becomes doubly excused as both the innocent continuation of established custom and a faithful adherence to a "classical" discernment. Antisemitic story gains subtly by locating its firm beginning among the Hellenistic and Roman worlds—and polemical counter-story gains accordingly if it can wrest the responsibility away from the pagans and place it essentially in Christian hands. History, I will argue, offers a more equivocal and less story-like alternative to both these versions.

Various modern publications have projected upon ancient documents the varieties of antisemitism peculiar to the modern world. In some

instances this was done through naive twentieth-century parochialism, and in others perhaps through deliberate, malicious intent, but generally it exploited the authority of the ancients. Readers of this book do not need to be disabused of the cruder forms of this misunderstanding: it is now well-known that ancient references to the Jews as a "race" (*genos*, *ethnos*, *phulon*, *gens*) do not carry with them the peculiarly modern conceptual implications that make racism intellectually possible; and that the modern occupational specializations associated with Jews did not obtain in antiquity, when Jews were in fact representatively distributed throughout the occupational possibilities; and that the Jews of antiquity were not thought to be especially wealthy, or morally malformed, or imperially conspiratorial. Here and there are to be found ancient texts which, if read selectively and tendentiously, can be exploited to provide a specious foundation for the retrojection of these modern myths; but the balance of evidence readily dispatches them all.¹

It may be useful, however, to register some of the more responsible conclusions that may be drawn from a reading of the evidence of Hellenistic and Roman times, if only to confirm or slightly to correct the informed reader's general sense of the matter.²

1. Antiquity recorded considerable expression of anti-Jewish sentiment. Modern attempts to redress the exaggerations of antisemitic readings of the evidence have sometimes tried to argue away the bald and awkward truth of that statement, but it must stand. Antisemitism, in the general sense, was not a Christian invention. Antiquity registers intermittently a romantic sense of the Jews, analogous to the positive side of the modern reputation of the Gypsies, and a more serious respect for them, analogous to the modern regard for religious India, but the bulk of surviving evidence is hostile, especially during the period of Christian beginnings.³ It ranges from the literary productions of the intelligentsia to the casual letters of ordinary folk, accidentally surviving on recently recovered papyri; it ranges from the nasty virulence of Apollonius Molon and his still nastier successor Apion, to the sneering contempt of Cicero, Tacitus, Martial and Persius. Occasionally, ancient documents lump the Jews indiscriminately together with the Syrians (or, ironically, with the Egyptians), but in general it may be said that the Jews were singled out for disdain.

2. The cardinal sin of the Jews, to the minds of pagan antiquity, was what Sevenster felicitously calls their "strangeness." Hellenistic culture had fostered a new dream of a universal *politeia*, a great commonwealth of divers peoples, which was further elaborated under the aegis of the *pax Romana*, but, despite the obvious virtues and civilized advance of this great vision of fellowship, the Jews kept stubbornly apart. Certainly,

many Jews joined the movement; motivated by a respectful appreciation of the ideal it proffered, or by a wish to enlist themselves among the sophisticated, or by a practical grasp of its social and commercial advantages, a large number of Jews over the centuries of the Hellenistic and Roman worlds were quietly assimilated into the prevailing culture and lost the brand of Jewishness. But the books of the Maccabees, which record the earliest substantial testimony of this tendency, show also the alarm and revulsion felt about the trend by those Jews who were more doggedly loyal to their ancestral traditions. As always, in the face of defection there was retrenchment. Conservative loyalists maintained that the faithful were to have as little as possible to do with the seductive gentiles, with all their works and pomps. Anyone who has not read the *Mishna* will probably have difficulty imagining the length to which faithful Jews were prepared to go in defining the boundaries of this pious *apartheid* in a world that found the Jews scattered everywhere among people who were religiously alien to them. To almost all of non-Jewish antiquity, this stance was flatly unintelligible. The religious integrity of conservative Judaism seemed to gentiles to express itself in a queer repudiation of a set of humane values of community which had formed one of the casual glories of recent history. Obviously, it was a great favor to a local cult to be reconsecrated by the religious engineers as a version of the universal worship of Zeus or of Jupiter, and a great blessing to the people to be allowed to share in the culture of gymnasium and symposium; the zealous Jewish resistance to these kindnesses seemed an extraordinary perversity. The systematic separateness of the Jew from gentile culture was a value paradox—to the Jew, the fulfillment to which he was called; to the Greek, a benighted misanthropy that made true fulfillment impossible.

3. Such "strangeness" was not, however, the only charge on which the gentiles indicted the Jews. Some of the remaining charges were functions of that policy, probably construed as separate items because of a gentile incapacity to grasp the essence of Jewish purposeful "strangeness." Jews were denounced as atheistic because of their flat denial of the received gods of the gentile culture. They were considered impious on account of their refusal to observe the religious customs of others, such as the standard decorous libation with which gentile meals commenced. They were known to be cliquish, banding together against the others, and thought to be barbaric and misanthropic, on account of their perpetuation of ethnic customs normally abandoned by other groups as they became more sophisticated, and their stubborn non-participation in the open-minded intercourse with others that was presumed to be the proper mark of those who were benevolently disposed to humanity. Other charges were not so directly dependent upon the Jewish principle of religious separat-

ism. The accusation of superstition was partially derived from a misunderstanding of the Jewish valuation of certain forms of ritual observance that seemed curiously primitive to the outsider—notably the dietary laws, the Sabbath regulations, and circumcision—and gained unfortunate support from the widely-distributed rumor, attested by writers from Manaseas and Posidonius to Plutarch and Tacitus, that Jews worshiped a deity with the head or form of an ass.⁴ The charge of superstition was also fed by the observation of practices of more dubious value which have mainly vanished from the Jewish world but were notoriously visible in antiquity: various Jews offered to exorcize, or tell fortunes, or deal in other forms of quackery;⁵ also, the Jewish devotion to angels, though it has never been adequately studied, is too widely attested in ancient evidence—Jewish as well as gentile—to be dismissed as a fanciful calumny.⁶ The Jewish reputation for rebellious temperament was largely dependent upon a misevaluation of the true history of Jewish revolt against intolerable oppressions, but appears to have had a legitimate basis in a tendency which, however well-earned by a history of abuse, brought the Jews of antiquity to look rather like the Irishmen of the nineteenth century; and the occasionally attested fear of the vindictive cruelty of the Jews cannot, in the light of the evidences bearing on the strife in North Africa in the reign of Trajan, be regarded as groundless.⁷ There were other minor contributions to Jewish disrepute that probably rode in the wake of the more characteristic ones: it does no credit to Marcus Aurelius to have sneered superlatively at the smell and the rudeness of Palestinian Jews,⁸ whom his predecessors had consigned to a disadvantaged poverty that could make the charge plausible, but his contempt undoubtedly made its mark among those who respected his judgment. Jews were thought ill of in various ways.

4. Once again: the Jews were occasionally regarded by ancient writers as an unusually philosophical people; as a people who pioneered a deeper religion; as a people whose customs were romantically interesting or arrestingly wise, or both. But on the whole, they received a bad press—a case strikingly analogous to the equally incoherent and unresolved attitudes of imperial Britain to the people of India. The main limp in the analogy, however, is that intellectual Britain was much more appreciative of the spiritual riches of India than cultured antiquity was of the Jews. The roster of ancient writers who expressed anti-Jewish feeling reads like a syllabus for a second-semester course in classics: Cicero, Tacitus, Martial, Horace, Juvenal, Persius, Dio Cassius, Marcus Aurelius, Apuleius, Ovid, Petronius, Pliny the Elder, Plutarch, Quintilian, Seneca, Suetonius.⁹ The record is disgraceful and embarrassing to those whose reverence for classical antiquity aspires to suppose that the “Greats” were above the

perpetration of petty injustices and the spreading of malicious gossip. But the record stands. There are virtually no corrective attempts among influential writers, and few praises for the Jews. A cultivated citizen of the Roman empire, if he took his signals from those who defined cultured opinion, was formed in an antisemitic mode. And if he should appeal from literature to history for his cues, what would he find? That the Jews had been expelled from Rome as early as 139 B.C.E.,¹⁰ and again under Tiberius; that they were again expelled under Claudius;¹¹ that they were specially taxed by Vespasian, that their converts were severely punished by Domitian, and that they were put under sharp restrictions by Hadrian, by Antoninus Pius, and even more so by Septimius Severus; that they had revolted in their homeland on the occasion of a harmless census in the days of Quirinius, and again over an inoffensive incident during the procuratorship of Pontius Pilate, and again during the reign of Caligula, and still more fiercely under Vespasian (put down by the eventual emperor Titus), and yet once more at the time of Hadrian—and that, in the meantime, they had rioted in Alexandria in 38, and in 41, and in 66, and spread a riot across North Africa for nearly three years in 115-117.¹² The average patriotic citizen does not inquire about whether or not a given rebellion against the government is well motivated, nor whether or not punitive measures taken by authority are justified. Nor does he question the snide verdict of respected writers on a people of whom he has little or no experience. The public, quasi-formal reputation of the Jews in the days of the Roman empire, and in its wake, was seriously disadvantaged by the thoughtless sneers of prominent writers and by a series of historical events that might readily be misevaluated, and often were. The evidences from the more obscure corners of history suggest that popular antisemitism, whether or not it actually took lessons from the major authors or the major incidents of the time, did in fact flourish in various times and places. The foundations for later injustices had unfortunately been rather widely laid by the time Christians came to contribute their own versions of antisemitism.¹³

5. Nevertheless, there is one major pattern of evidence that suggests that neither the rebellions of the Jews nor the disdain of the Romans was able entirely to defeat the intrinsic appeal of Jewish life and thought. For why did Roman poets complain so scornfully about their countrymen's adoption of the superstitious ways of the Jews? Why did some emperors impose severe penalties upon converts to Judaism? Evidently, it was because Judaism continued to attract Roman proselytes in substantial numbers, from the little people of the era to the aristocracy and the imperial court. It does not much matter how active Jews were in seeking proselytes—and the evidences are somewhat conflicting—since the public

advantages were few and the disadvantages not inconsiderable. I know no ancient text that accuses a gentile of proselytizing to Judaism for motives of worldly self-advancement. Whether actively invited or only hospitably received upon application, the gentile converts give testimony to the ways in which the Roman world positively valued Judaism despite the strife and the gossip that surrounded the Jews. The attraction may have been modestly assisted by the fact that Roman law, aside from periods of exasperated persecution, gave unusual privileges to the Jews to exercise their religion freely as a people apart—privileges that clearly incited the envy and annoyance of some gentiles, but may well have stimulated the respect and wonder of others. But at most, this could only have been a minor factor. It surely must have mitigated the reputation of the Jews that while writers at an emotional distance and with faulty information tended almost uniformly to condemn them, those who came much closer to their truth sometimes imitated and occasionally joined them.

I will return shortly to consider Ruether's general treatment of the evidences from pagan antiquity; but first I wish to particularize my critique by examining her treatment of a peculiar portion of the overall story: the Egyptian polemic.¹⁴ It is here, in my judgment, that her apologetic and polemical tendencies most clearly surface, and the characteristic flaws in her argumentation—the substitution of dialectic for evidence, the overvaluing of ideology, and the failure to make adequate discriminations—show themselves most clearly.

Ruether rightly distinguishes among the ancient evidences about the Jews "a special strain of anti-Judaism that has a specifically Egyptian provenance." The Egyptian priest Manetho was one of the earliest writers to record defamatory gossip about the Jews, and the Acts of the Alexandrian Martyrs form one of the most inflammatory anti-Jewish statements of the latter part of the period in question. Both Upper and Lower Egypt accumulated an unhappy record of violence against Jewish residents which, if not without parallel elsewhere in the Greco-Roman world, seems to have been more consistent and more savage than in other places. In word and deed, Egypt provided the Jews with a precarious place of sojourn.

Ruether's attempts to account for this are bent to an apologetic shape. The Jews, she remarks,

were settled in Alexandria in large numbers by the Ptolemaic rulers as a privileged minority and were used, as such immigrant groups are often used in colonial societies, as middlemen between the rulers and the subject population. This situation gradually inflamed a resentment against the Jews in Egyptian society that worsened in late Hellenistic and Roman times.

The story is much more complex than this. I do not know on what evidence she bases her characterization of the Egyptian Jews as thus "used," and the apparent implication that the Ptolemies are ultimately to blame for Egyptian anti-Jewish sentiment is both too simple and too misleading to stand as sound history. In what sense were the Jews "privileged," aside from their licensed exemption from the public cult? There are indeed evidences of popular resentment against the Jews in Egypt, from the *Letter of Aristeas*¹⁵ onward through progressively brutal strife between Jews and other residents of Egypt, but I know of no indication that the Jews ever had, let alone continued to enjoy, the kinds of advantages that lie at the root of such modern instances as the reaction of the descendants of colonized Northern Ireland against the descendants of the Scottish plantation. Egypt in general had many imported peoples, among whom the Jews do not appear to have had peculiar colonial status. Alexandria in particular was constituted in a fashion prone to popular reactions, since the native Egyptians had long been subject to the Greek founders of the city, who were in turn under the ultimate governance of Roman authority. The citizens of Alexandria were not Egyptians who had been oppressed by the Greek Ptolemies, but Greeks. Moreover, they were one of the city's minority groups,¹⁶ and if they tended as a body to hate the Jews (which appears to have been the case), the animus seems to have derived from a bitter resentment of Jewish *apartheid* and the cumulative history of clashes that this had occasioned, not from any socio-economic or political privilege that distinguished the Jews from the Alexandrian Samaritans, say, or Syrians. As the history of strife developed, the Jews gradually gained a reputation for being dangerously cruel and merciless to those enemies who fell into their hands.¹⁷ The reputation is no doubt exaggerated, but it is equally doubtless that it has foundation. Ruether's formulation of the troubles in Alexandria has a superficial plausibility, but I do not think it survives closer investigation. It satisfies the dialectical rhythms of story, but not the demands of evidence.

Ruether similarly attributes too much significance to the fact that "the Egyptians are the negative side of the Jewish salvation drama, a fact which one pagan critic was not slow to point out." It does not seem to me appropriate to say that "These areas of tension between Jews and Egyptians produced anti-Jewish riots in Alexandria," since this appears to attribute far too much power to a minor irritant, and to forget that, in the main, it was not the Egyptians but the Greeks who did the rioting. Religious and cultural polemicists might well take the Jews to task for such lore, and did indeed write testy rebuttals; but there is no reason to suppose that the Egyptian populace, let alone the Greek, was much

interested in this issue. Riots in Alexandria arose over meatier considerations. Even on the academic and intellectual side of the controversy, Ruether glosses too quickly over Jewish responsibility. Egyptian annoyance was not merely a function of a dissatisfaction with the role offered to Egypt in the *Book of Exodus*. What "Egyptian native intellectuals" were responding to included a literature (already extensive by about the time Manetho gathered together scurrilous gossip defaming the Exodus story) in which Jewish writers attempted to exalt Jewish history, culture, and general prominence at the expense of the Egyptians in both their ancient and their Hellenistic forms.¹⁸

Thus, according to Eupolemus, the alphabet was the invention of Moses, eventually transmitted to the Greeks via the Phoenecians.¹⁹ Artepanus—for whom Moses was identical with Musaeus and Hermes—claimed that the Jews were the teachers of the Pharaohs and the originators of important Egyptian learning.²⁰ Malchus derived the name of Africa (as well as that of Assyria) from sons of Abraham, claiming also that Hercules begot a son upon Abraham's granddaughter.²¹ An anonymous fragment from the same general tradition traces Abraham's lineage to the giants, and makes him the originator of astrology among the Egyptians and the Phoenecians.²² Aristobulus derived the whole of Greek philosophy—Linus, Homer, Hesiod, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and the Peripatetics—from the teachings of Moses.²³ Philo's confidence about the Jewish law's anticipation of virtually all important modern wisdom had a sequence of predecessors, all of whom might well provoke the annoyance of unfriendly polemicists. When Egyptian intellectuals took up their pens against the Jews, they were not merely being sensitive about *Exodus*: they were reacting to what they must perforce have regarded as preposterous claims made to the belittlement of Egyptian culture and history, and its Greek counterpart in which they now participated, by and in behalf of a minor and relatively undistinguished upstart people. It appears, however, that the exercise was largely academic on both sides. There is no evidence that these bold claims of Hellenistic Jews were taken very seriously by later writers, Jewish or gentile, or that they troubled the spirits of the contemporary populace. Josephus's vigorous response to Apion does not include the suggestion that the issue had moved, or was likely to move, beyond the exercise of polemical debate into anything more dangerous. Ruether's treatment of antisemitism in Egypt is too ideological, too dialectically schematized, and too conditioned by polemically apologetic intent to stand as critical history.

What then may be concluded in general about the ways in which non-Christian antiquity formed and transmitted thoughts and sentiments about

the Jews? And thus about Ruether's treatment of this phase of her study?

On the whole, the visible legacy of "classical" times was antisemitic in tone. The charges were often thoughtless, petty, unjust; but they were made by writers and rulers whose influence had considerable power not only in the ancient world but, through the peculiar position occupied by the relics of that era in subsequent European culture, also intermittently in the following centuries. If a somewhat uncritically romantic attitude toward Judaism continued to linger within the Roman empire, along with a more merited and convert-winning respect, it was more than counterbalanced by negative attitudes that had the advantage of a stronger public voice. The positive attitudes influenced many early Christians, to the vexation of such as Paul and Ignatius of Antioch; the negative ones undoubtedly influenced many others, and over a longer period of time.

Ruether is skillful at discrediting traditional false stories, but also in suggesting specious stories of her own. She rightly sets aside the thesis that "anti-Semitism is pagan, not Christian" and that "the Christian opposition to the Jews was benignly theological"²⁴ until the Christians wrongly (and unthinkingly?) took over gentile antisemitic views. But in her correction of this erroneous view—which is held in this form by virtually no serious writer—she leans inappropriately far in the opposite direction to say that "Historically, the relation is somewhat the reverse."²⁵ Her emphasis upon the Roman extension of legal privileges to the Jews is rightly taken, but she is less than fully candid about the Romans' own compromises and withdrawals of Jewish rights, in her effort to place the origins of this tendency in Christian hands. Counter-story replaces story. But more subtly, history is routed along the lines of ideology; for while Ruether is right in observing that the nastier forms of antisemitism developed only under Christian auspices, and in pointing out that various of the forms of pre-Christian antisemitism were not, and others could not, be directly adopted by Christian polemic, her argument does not sufficiently appreciate that history does not move cleanly along ideological tracks. Anti-Jewish sentiment became codified within the writings of post-apostolic Christianity in conjunction with ideas other than those of pre-Christian antiquity, but this does not demonstrate a discontinuity that lays the blame on specifically Christian developments and frees the Roman world substantially from having been the historical progenitor. That is to place too much faith in the continuity of ideas, and too little in the continuity of sentiment, in the tracing of historical lines of development. She writes that:

A certain repulsion against circumcision among the Greeks may add fuel to the negative interpretation of this rite by the Church Fathers, although the main source for this is Paul's view that circumcision is not a sign of election.²⁶

But, unless one holds with misleading strictness to the notion of "interpretation," I think that the relation is somewhat the reverse. Surely, it is the negative feeling that is mainly in charge in this development, not the idea: the latter is the belated rationale for the former, as it undoubtedly had been in a similar movement among Hellenized Jews from early in the second century B.C.E. Ideologically, it is largely true that "the motives of pagan dislike were not assimilable by the Church" and that "Christian anti-Judaism grew from a quite separate and distinct motivation." I believe this to be more importantly true than the qualification I wish to make; but the qualification is itself of some historical importance: the real motive, the actual structure of the energies that inform and sustain a cultural attitude, is often at a considerable distance from the explanation to which the culture attaches it. Christianity dropped some specific charges and added theologically-based rationalizations that undoubtedly enflamed antisemitism while redirecting its theory, but a more discriminating analysis will suggest a greater continuity between the forces of pagan antisemitism and those of its Christian counterpart than Ruether is disposed to see. And while it does not much exonerate early Christian forms of antisemitism to propose that they are at first essentially hardenings of inherited cultural attitudes, I think it more historically accurate to distribute the responsibility more evenly between the Christians' predecessors in the Roman world and their own progressively more virulent development of what had already been firmly, however unjustly and uncritically, established in public consciousness.

The Non-Pagan Foundations of Jewish-Christian Conflict

Greco-Roman history has often been bent to the purpose of propaganda and polemic; but the internal history of the Jews has, from the perspective of the historian, been treated still worse. From the outsiders has come the often-repeated caricature that tells of the decline and fall of Jewish religion under the domination of casuistic and hypocritical Pharisees—a bad story that started early in Christian history and was elaborated subsequently. If we turn to the traditions of the Pharisees themselves, however, we are not much better served. One of the oldest sets of traditions is preserved in the Mishna tract entitled *Pirke Aboth*, the "chapters of the Fathers," and the sketch of history in the first verse of that book is no less self-serving and inaccurate than the Christian alternatives. Both the Jesus movement and the rabbinic movement told tales intended to validate their respective positions by substituting fairy-tale story for history. Neither side is much to be trusted in either the adequacy of its information or the shape of its story. Both have contributed impor-

tantly to the confusion that continues to make critical investigation troublesome.

Modern Judaism stands in the tradition of the rabbinic movement; modern Christianity stands in the tradition of its repudiation. The historians of both have been careless about accepting the myths of their forebears. Both groups have developed stories that make them the legitimate heirs of the Hebrew Scriptures, in alternative classical myths of how it happened. Both myths are embarrassed by the evidences of "intertestamental" writings that bear witness to a more complex history than has been readily recognized by historians of Judaism from Flavius Josephus to the now classic work of George Foot Moore, or by historians of Christianity from Matthew to Moore's contemporaries. Both the Jewish and the Christian camps wish to present themselves as the orderly heirs of scriptural revelation. Neither has been eager to admit that their heritage was mediated by a variety of uncanonized developments that are partially represented in what R. H. Charles calls *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*. On the other hand, the tradition of Jewish historical scholarship has been inattentive to, and the tradition of Christian historical scholarship has been careless about, the once great tradition (ultimately uninfluential in the history of Judaism but a powerful presence in its time of ascendancy) in which Hellenized Jews attempted to interpret the Holy Scriptures in accordance with Greek philosophies—or to interpret Greek philosophies in accordance with the Holy Scriptures. Ruether is well aware of both the apocrypha and pseudepigrapha, and the most important forms of Hellenized Jewish reflection. She does not repeat the old stories that omit the evidences surviving from these complicating movements. But she does arrange her own story in a way that seems to me to oversimplify and to polemicize misleadingly, offering a mechanics of polarization and a dialectic of development that require correction. I take the following to be the essence of her argument:²⁷

Jewish religious understanding during the formative period in question can be divided into three principal parts. Rabbinic midrash (which ultimately prevailed in the defining of Judaism from the early second century C. E. to the present) was dominant in the Jewish homeland, and concentrated on a conservative interpretation of a law that was understood to be behaviorally and permanently binding on all observant Jews. Hellenistic midrash, practiced mainly in the Diaspora, attempted to interpret revelation in such a way as to bring it into maximum consonance with Greek philosophy, and thus emphasized through allegorical reading (a technique itself inherited from the Greeks) the spiritualized rather than the behavioral meanings that might be found in the scriptures. Sectarian midrash, fostered among the impatient heirs of the Maccabean revolution,

tended to be messianic in orientation, and to appeal to typology in order to discern a good news of imminent divine rescue. Christianity appropriated both the liberal spiritualizing midrash of the Hellenized diaspora and the sectarian midrash of Palestinian messianism (thus further discrediting both in the eyes of the rabbis) and used both to argue that what had become the dominant Judaism was insensitive to the truth of revelation. Angered and uneasy about the rabbinic intransigence, the Christians developed an anti-Jewish lore that largely bypassed the forms of pagan antisemitism and constituted a new version of it based upon theological rivalry, a version rooted in the Jewish rejection of Jesus and the Christian insistence on standing as the exclusive authentic dispensation of the Hebrew Scriptures.

Ruether's version of this passage of history is not grossly distorted. It is sufficiently sound as to make it seem pedantic to insist on adjustments, especially to those who are happy with its ideological implications. But I do not think that criticism is pedantic when an ideological issue of this magnitude is at stake. I do not mean to suggest that history automatically becomes ideology, or *a fortiori* that it ought to do so. I rather suggest that Ruether blurs the distinction between the two, and that, in arguing that a false Christian historicizing begot a false Christian antisemitic ideology, she substitutes a false history of her own, primarily as a support for a reverse ideology that is not really more correct or constructive than its predecessor. I wish to argue against her representations of (a) sectarian Judaism, (b) Pharisaic-rabbinic Judaism, and (c) Hellenized Judaism, and against her tendency to keep these three too neatly apart. I will then take issue with (d) her explanation of the origins of Christianity and (e) her sense of what was really at issue between the Christians and the Jewish matrix from which they had emerged.

(A) The Zealots are one of the best known of the Jewish religious movements around the time of Christian beginnings²⁸—but that leaves them only somewhat less obscure to the historian than other movements that are only dimly and scantily understood, “the various prophetic and baptist movements”²⁹ of the time. But these latter do not in the main seem to have shared the Zealot militarism; they seem rather to have remained quietly apart from the political scene. Ruether tends to blur and amalgamate the sectarian movements. They appear in fact to have been more various in thought and in behavior than her representation implies. They did not all share the dreams of Qumran communitarian documents, nor were they all apocalyptic by either literature or temperament. Those who expressed themselves in the apocalyptic mode, or found congenial the apocalyptic expressions of others, did not all suppose themselves enlisted in the armageddon foreseen by some: the literary evidences suggest that

many had despaired of human management of the besetting problems, and looked hopefully but unmilitaristically to a divine intervention that would accomplish what the Hasmonaeans had failed to bring about.

It is commonplace to refer to such expectations as "messianic." The term is not apt. Many scenarios envision a messiah who would lead the battle, or bring the subsequent peace into theocratic order, or, occasionally, merely preside decoratively over the resultant restoration.³⁰ But other scenarios offer no messiah, only the cataclysmic intervention of God and his angels. "Apocalyptic" and "messianic" are often used interchangeably, but should not be. Each can be found unaccompanied by the other. The *Psalms of Solomon* are messianic without being apocalyptic; the *Assumption of Moses* is clearly apocalyptic but in no careful sense messianic. Nor were the sects uniform in baptismal practices. Many sects offered a ritual washing as an important part of their special observance.³¹ But not all did so; nor can we say that those who did supposed it anything more than an appropriate ritual lustration: the alignment of sectarian baptism with the later rabbinic rite of proselytization is an anachronistic retrojection.³² The use of baptism does not imply the expectation of a messiah. Nor, to join a sectarian movement, was it necessary to retreat to the wilderness. The modern excitement over the Damascus Document and the Qumran scrolls has resulted in vivid appreciation of Josephus's testimony about the monastic form of the Essenes, but has left curiously unattended his observation that Essene groups were scattered through all the towns in Palestine.³³ In short, sectarian Judaism was a complex of movements, following no steady pattern. Ruether's picture oversimplifies, and the resulting story is disrupted by a closer and more differentiated view.

(B) Pharisaism, which gave rise to the rabbinic movement and eventually to the Judaism that became normative, was popular and powerful in the time of Christian origins, but it was in no way "official." The only form of Judaism that might have had a claim to official status was the scripturally mandated temple cult, with its concomitant priestly teachings about proper observance—largely the province of the Sadducees rather than the Pharisees. The rabbis, as they consolidated and redefined Judaism after the destruction of the temple, eventually adjusted their sense of history and covered much of their historical trail. It is accordingly easy to get the impression that they had always been as they later became. But evidences survive that require modifications in Ruether's picture of them. They were not, in early days, as separated from the Greek learning as in later generations. Ruether knows Lieberman's careful studies,³⁴ which show the assimilation of some Greek words and concepts into the language of rabbinic works, but she does not report some of the more impressive evidences. One of the early leaders of the movement bore the Greek name

Antigonus. Probul, Hillel's great legal invention, takes its name from a Greek phrase; even Sanhedrin is only a superficial semitization of the Greek *sunhedrion*. Later rabbis lamented the seepage of Greek influences into the heart of Jewish culture, and were undoubtedly right in supposing that Greek learning rendered Jews more vulnerable to being seduced away from their ancestral traditions into new and specifically Hellenistic ways (although some of the cherished traditions of the rabbis were not as ancestral, nor their Hellenized counterparts as new, as they believed). But what some later rabbis lamented, after history had delivered many grounds for regret, some earlier rabbis pursued with a zeal like that of scholastic theologians learning Aristotle. When Simeon ben Gamaliel reported that his father's Beth ha-Midrash contained five hundred students learning Greek wisdom,³⁵ he may have exaggerated the numbers but it is difficult to believe that he was seriously misrepresenting Gamaliel's acceptance of Greek learning.

Rabbinic learning eventually set its face against ideas of imminent eschatology; but in the period in question, this had not yet taken place. It simply is not true that the rabbis "would vehemently resist the suggestion" that typological realizations of revelation were taking place in their own time: Rabbi Akiba, who boldly recognized Simon bar Kochba as messiah, stands as a particularly dramatic refutation of such a generalization. Nor was apocalyptic literature exclusively the domain of other sects. The rabbis accepted the apocalypse of Daniel into their canon of scripture, including those portions that are not written in Hebrew—as well they might, since the book was undoubtedly composed and cherished by their spiritual forbears at the time of the Maccabean revolt. Some later apocalypses show evident contacts with rabbinic Judaism in considerable detail,³⁶ and there is no compelling argument against the hypothesis that the Pharisaic-rabbinic movement regularly entertained both apocalyptic and messianic tendencies in the period before the Roman wars. The later rabbis offer a deceptive sense of the history of their own origins, making the movement appear to have been much more uniform than it was, and to have anticipated later policies more firmly and thoroughly than had been the case. It is understandable that their story was revised in that fashion, and that Ruether's story conforms to it, but neither should be mistaken for history.

(C) The midrashic practices of the Pharisaic and rabbinic movements were not uniform; neither were those of the Hellenistic Diaspora. The latter are usually thought of in terms of the spiritualizing allegory by which Ruether characterizes them, most thoroughly known through the works of Philo, through which a rapprochement was secured between the scriptures and Greek philosophy. Allegory was not peculiarly "Hellenistic" (the rabbis' midrashic work included that of the *dorshe reshemoth* and

the *dorshe hamuroth*, practitioners of a symbolic interpretation that was at times fully allegorical),³⁷ nor was Hellenistic Judaism any more uniform within itself than other forms of Jewish religious thought and practice. Ruether, characterizing "Hellenistic midrash" in terms of Philo, claims that "Hellenistic midrash had no intention of abandoning the letter of the Law." Philo himself certainly had no such intention; but the "left-wing Hellenizers" whom he opposed are as entitled as he to be considered practitioners of Hellenistic midrash, and it is evident that some of these were precisely engaged in eliminating the letter of the Law, replacing practical precept with philosophizing allegory. Nor did Philo represent the only way of steering a middle course between literalism and theosophy. Surviving fragments of the work of Aristobulus show him to have worked in an analogous but different way, appealing to a different set of philosophical conclusions.³⁸ Through the Book of Wisdom, we can glimpse still another manner of midrash. There were undoubtedly many forms in the Hellenistic Diaspora. The Greeks had many wisdoms, many styles of philosophical, scientific and moral reflection that undoubtedly found their way into Jewish midrashic undertakings. The paucity of surviving evidence makes it impossible to reconstruct "Hellenistic midrash," and extremely difficult even to follow the faded trails of its practitioners; but we can be sure that it was not identical with the work of Philo. Ruether's story is too tidy and too tendentious.

(D) Ruether's characterizations of the forms of Jewish religion are helpful and intelligent, but they are misleadingly simplified and schematized. They lead, accordingly, to a story of Christian beginnings that is not satisfactory as history. On the brink of Christianity, the religious situation in both Palestine and the Diaspora was full of mixed possibilities, alternatives, and confusions. Earliest Christianity exhibits an eclectic borrowing, not a clear stream of development from sectarian messianism and a Hellenistic midrash. It can hardly be claimed that the *Gospel of Matthew* or the *Epistle of James* represent a strikingly un-rabbinic manner of thought, or that the *Apocalypse* shows disaffinity with Palestinian Jewish writing. It is true that Christian styles of scriptural interpretation became progressively more like what Ruether classifies as Hellenistic, but the process was gradual and far from uniform. It did not affect Syriac Christianity in the way in which it conditioned the Christianity of Alexandria, nor the Roman Christianity of I *Clement* (let alone that of the *Shepherd of Hermas*), nor the Antiochene Christianity witnessed by Ignatius. The *Acts of the Apostles* represents two early Christian groups in Jerusalem, one of which (under Stephen's leadership) used a form of Hellenistic midrash quite different from that of Philo and drew from it conclusions that were importantly different from those drawn by the more conservative group

under the leadership of James and Peter. The emergence of Christianity within the Jewish world did not have the kind of Jacob-Esau neatness about it that is suggested by Ruether's story.

Still less was it the story of Cain and Abel. Ruether's vision of a sectarian Judaism that willed to the early Christian movement "a vilification of official Judaism and its rank-and-file members as apostate" oversimplifies both the diversified doctrines of the sects and the passage of history through which the Christian movement borrowed from them, as it borrowed from all others. There was no official Judaism, and there was no clean theory of an apostate Israel. In the time of Christian emergence, the Pharisaic movement was powerful and popular, but it was not official and it was not uniformly reacted to by the Christians. It comes under heavy fire from Matthew, but is held in considerable respect by Luke; and neither of these gospels manifests a preformed notion of an apostate Israel to which the scandal of the crucifixion might be assigned, or by which the relative failure of the Christian mission among the Jews might be comfortably explained. Matthew seems vexed, and Luke benignly puzzled, by the failure of the Jews to recognize their messiah; and however subsequent readers may have interpreted this phenomenon, these early Christian witnesses do not seem to me to have had confident access to the sort of theological theory by which Ruether's thematization faults them. Their sense of history was more naive, probably because it was closer to the event. I do not think that the theological smugness to which Ruether supposes them to have succumbed was as much a part of their temptation or formation as she is inclined to represent.

Nor, when Christianity moved into the Diaspora, did it sweep all before it. I do not think that there are good grounds for maintaining, with Ruether, that the Jewish practitioners of Hellenistic midrash entered the Christian Church in substantial proportions. Paul laments their failure to do so; Acts represents Diaspora Jews as being generally unresponsive or positively hostile; and the body of early evidence suggests that the Jews, whether Hellenized or not, generally resisted the invitation of the Christian missions. Eventually highly Hellenized Judaism faded. Philo ceased to be influential in the Jewish world—his works were preserved by the Church rather than by the rabbis—and the Septuagint translation became the Christian Bible, having lost credit among the Jews. Some of this movement was conditioned by the spread of Christianity, as rabbinic Judaism distanced itself from its rival and enemy. Much of it, however, was simply a function of Jewish retrenchment, quite apart from Christianity: the Septuagint was properly judged inaccurate by the standards of rabbinic Hebrew scholarship, and ceded among Greek-speaking Jews to new Greek translations by Aquila, Theodotion, Symmachus;³⁹ the rabbis

probably let Philo go not because Christians were interested in him, but because his philosophy and science and quaint numerology did not teach them what they wanted to know—just as they also abandoned to the exclusive care of the Church the other non-canonical apocalypses, psalms and stories that did not serve their program of reform and consolidation. Christian origins were much more erratic than Ruether allows, and much less ideologically consolidated.

(E) While the main lines of Ruether's story are sound, they are imposed exaggeratedly on a history that was more complex and much less laden with ideological and moral implications, and are sometimes merely posited where evidence is thin or absent—witness her observation that "the earliest Christianity in Alexandria" (about which in fact we know nothing whatsoever) was "Gnostic-Essenic in coloring."⁴⁰ There remain two more adjustments that I would like to make in her picture of the interplay between the Jews and the new religion that had emerged among them. One adjustment concerns the nature of the dynamic and reciprocal relationship between these two parties that now contended for the right to define the meaning of biblical revelation and of God's purposes as begun through the history of the Jews. The other adjustment concerns the identification of the essential issue that divided them.

Ruether concentrates on two related factors: "the interreligious antagonism between Judaism and Christianity over the messiahship of Jesus" and the theologically abetted condemnation of the Jews by the Christians that resulted from this split. I believe that she has accurately described a movement that took place within Christian history, and accordingly sympathize with her polemical interest in placing a long-evaded blame at the charge of the Christians. Her report, however, is incomplete with respect to its representation of the Jewish side of the issues and of the deeds that resulted from them. There is more to blame within the Jewish camp than her story acknowledges; and there was more to the struggle between Christians and Jews than the issue of Jesus' messiahship.

I think it accurate to say that the failure of the Jews to accept the messiahship and lordship of Jesus was one essential motivation for Christian defensive vindictiveness, and that this vindictiveness took the protection of a theologically based self-justification. But to make sense historically out of this important passage, one must augment it by two corresponding points from the other side of the question. Christians were vexed by the Jewish rejection of Jesus, but there are no substantial evidences that Jews were importantly affronted by the Christian acceptance of him. Had Jewish anti-Christian feeling been based upon this contention, one might expect that subsequent Jewish literature would be seasoned substantially with vilifications of Jesus, arguments against his

messiahship, appeals to various forms of Jewish self-justification against this false faith. The indications are not that Jews were offended on this point. Nor, from previous history, should one expect them to be. Judaism tolerated a great deal of speculation and strange faith. But what had not been tolerated, when push came to shove, from the time of the outrages of Antiochus Epiphanes through the blunders of the Herodians and the Roman procurators and emperors to the compilation of the *Mishna*, was any serious tampering with the Law. James, the brother of the Lord, according to Hegesippus,⁴¹ kept the favor of the Jews to the time of his death, because he remained faithful to the commands of Torah. Whether or not Hegesippus had accurate access to earlier public opinion in saying so, the verdict has the ring of truth from the global weight of evidence. The Jewish test of religious authenticity was fidelity to the Torah of God, whatever might be the quirks of speculative interpretation. Critical interpretation of Acts currently tells the same story: those disciples of Jesus whose attitudes toward observance marked them as faithful Jews were safe from persecution. Those who, like Stephen and his followers, proclaimed release from the commands of Torah were *personae non gratae* among conservative Jews, and were themselves subjected to rigorous vindictiveness. It pleased Christians, insofar as extant writings testify to this time, to ascribe their sufferings to persecution on account of their acknowledgment of Jesus Christ. I do not think that they put their finger quite upon the Jewish pulse. They were persecuted for abusing Torah.

And it is to the point that they were persecuted. The fact should not, I think, be in dispute.⁴² It is attested nearly everywhere in early Christian sources, although it was obviously not of such moment as to be remembered in the relatively few Jewish writings that look to that time. To the Christians, this persecution was a problem and a threat; it needed a theological explanation, and it motivated hortatory admonitions to those who might be subjected to it—the former taking advantage not only from the parallelism with the sufferings of Jesus, but also from an increasingly despairing attitude toward the conversion of the Jews, which allowed an exploitation of the gentile sense of the peculiar narrowness and inhumanity of Jewish sensibilities. It is an unhappy passage in Christian history, but is comprehensible short of supposing that theology demanded it or that it was implicit in christology. For the Jews, early persecution of “Hellenist” Christians was plausibly little more than an indispensable disciplinary action against a potentially important betrayal of principles that drew the ultimate line of defense—hardly a novelty in the embattled experience of faithful Jews, and not likely to be noticed in their literary remains. For the persecuted, it was a matter of fidelity, and sometimes of life and death.

A priori, one would suppose that the gospel preached by Stephen and

that preached by Paul would meet with dogged resistance from zealous Jews. We have Paul's own testimony that he was frequently punished. Acts supplies plausible scenarios. What Paul preached was intolerable—not because of its exaltation of Jesus, but because of its trivialization of the Law. Within the people who accepted a gospel of Jesus he found a similar opposition: Paul did not have his way all at once, even among Christians. James may have kept the Law and favor of the Jews to the end. Peter may have lost favor gradually through his movement away from fidelity to the Law. The *Fourth Gospel* represents that the mere acknowledgment of Jesus may entail rejection from the Synagogue—but this is a shorthand. The Christians affected a martyrdom from this repudiation, and aligned it with their confession of Christ Jesus: the radical act of their persuasion. But the Christians who lived under the terms of the *Fourth Gospel* had already made a radical reinterpretation of Torah in the name of Jesus, that must perforce have struck loyal Jews as a gross infidelity. If Christians found themselves abused in Jesus' name, the Jews who persecuted them must have done so not in the name of Jesus but essentially in the name of Moses and the Law for which he stood. Jesus, for them, was likely to have been an incidental consideration.

The Christians retaliated against Jewish persecution and progressively gained the upper hand. Their communal memory of the Jews appeared to earn them the right to suppose the latter somehow hostile to the message which Christians thought was bound to save the world. Having progressively incorporated a repudiation of the Jewish understanding of Torah into the gospel itself, the Christian camp was understandably, though regrettably, insensitive to the urgency—even to the locus—of Jewish hostility. The pagan groundwork of anti-Jewish sentiment lay ready to hand, and was readily exploited. Annoyance over the “atheism” of the Jews was convertible into blame for the rejection of Christian revelation; contempt for their inhospitality and resistance to ready fraternity in a world that had learned to prize universalist values played into the hands of a movement that meant to persuade the world of a new general fraternity of salvation; amusement at the quaintness and oddity of Jewish customs could easily be digested into a polemic that mocked Jewish simplemindedness. Christian writers showed little discrimination in their efforts to take advantage of the situation, to belittle the Jews, to justify themselves, to establish a mythological base on which a destructive proto-racism could develop. Non-Christian antiquity had scarcely dreamed of such a development: theirs was the petty gossip and provincial nastiness that may embarrass contemporary or later admirers of Greco-Roman culture, but cannot account for the massive, rationalized and institutional persecution that gradually became the rule. Antiquity, on the whole, disliked Jews. It

was under the aegis of Christianity that the dislike was escalated into an ideological—often a casually, abstractly, and toyingly ideological—readiness to punish them personally.

If I think that Ruether's observations are to be corrected on various points, I nevertheless concur with her general intent as well as her general outline. I think that she has, for honorable motives, tended to exaggerate the grounds, and the groundlessness, of the Christian polemic that was, and continued to be, posed against the Jews. There are some respects in which I think she has tried to move toward the redressing of the balance by offering a counter-polemic that can claim as much authority as the one it opposes. I do not wish to fault her book for being polemical: that is not inappropriate. I wish only to claim, out of my own assessment of the evidence, that when we (as I dearly hope we shall) move from a polemical to a more detached assessment of the evidence, we shall discover that there is little righteousness in either the Christian or the Jewish part in the story—that it has been a bad piece of business on both sides. The hostility of both is understandable: each contended with a rival religion that made (unlike the more modest pagan cults) total claims on human life and human destiny; each seemed to the other a grotesque parody of the truth. Their mutual intolerance was as inevitable as historical eventualities can be said to be. The Christians came into power, and worked their will. The record of Jewish treatment of and attitude toward Christians⁴³ in the meantime does not establish confidence that the results would have been edifying had the power gone the other way. But as it happened, the Christian side amassed far more demerits than the Jews had opportunity for. I do not think that sound argument can fault Ruether's conclusion that the scattered seed of pagan anti-Jewish dispositions had to fall upon Christian soil before it could bear such thirty-, sixty-, hundred-fold fruit.

Whatever made this exponential difference, it was certainly, as Ruether claims, deeply abetted by the theological ideology that Christians brought to its aid. Roman exasperation with and abuse of the Jews is not to be dismissed as trivial—consider the expulsions from Rome, Caligula's deliberate attempted outrage, the destruction of Jerusalem and of the temple, the permanent eviction of the Jews from their holy city, the proscription of circumcision throughout the empire, and the imposition of the death penalty for proselytization to the Jews. Indeed, in antiquity, the Romans clearly outdistance the Christians vastly in actions against the Jews, and laid a groundwork and pattern that certainly made Christian anti-Judaism easier in both conscience and procedure. Up until the middle of the second century, it is not improbable that Christian abuse of Jews ran a distant third in this competition, well behind non-Christian anti-Judaism and barely edged out by Jewish abuse of Christians. But it was undoubt-

edly the theological enmity that gave Christian animus such ideological staying and growing power, in a fashion analogous to the enduringly bitter relations between the Jews and the Samaritans. The latter pair, however, were on approximately equal theological footing—direct rivals, with parallel cults and rival temples. The Christians and Jews were not direct parallels with one another, and in the theological contest, I should say that the Christians were more greatly at fault. Judaism could not afford to tolerate Christianity as easily as the reverse. Christians claimed to be the heirs of all that Judaism offered, and more—and claimed that the inheritance could be come by more readily through their way than within Judaism in its best days, and further claimed that Judaism was quite obsolete. When the movement was small, the Jews could look upon it as merely odd; but once it began to sweep the gentile world, it was an affront and a danger. But what danger did Judaism pose to Christianity? Had the religious decisions of the ancients been conducted according to sound academic procedures, Judaism would have been a substantial embarrassment to the Christian world. As it was, I do not think this to have been the case. I do not see the basis of Ruether's contention that Judaism "was dangerous to the Church" or her suggestion that Christians feared Judaism as potentially able to "call into question the very foundations of the Christian claim." Once protected from Jewish persecution, Christians might have coexisted with Jews at least as easily as Catholics and Protestants have done over the last two centuries. Once they had a clear upper hand, Christians might have settled for wary tolerance and friendly persuasion. There is no good excuse for their not having done so, and the excuse they used, appealing to the heart of their theology and of their history, will not bear the deeds it was used to authorize.

That is to say: I do not believe that theology logically brought Christians to their unconscionable treatment of the Jews. I believe that it was used to whitewash and justify an antagonism that sprang mainly from other sources. But it was itself such a powerful agent that it helped transmute the inherited Samaritan, Egyptian, Greek, and Roman anti-Jewish feeling into a permanent and virulent force. I agree with Ruether that there is something importantly amiss in Christian theology's theory of the Jews, and that it is closely related to received christology. I agree that this theological fault has made a grave difference. I believe that it can and should be corrected. I do not believe that the correction would make the problem atrophy, for it runs deeper than theology penetrates into the social psyche; but it would be a useful contribution. In the meantime, Ruether has made another useful contribution in reminding us once more of the falsity of many standard modern myths about the historical origins and ancient character of antisemitism. To look well to history is to

dissolve, at least momentarily, the authority of the symbols that have been taken from it to support our stories, and to regain the capacity, at least momentarily, to make a more critical choice of historical symbols and their meanings—to correct our stories to a condition that improves both their moral and their intellectual justice. Ruether's treatment is a powerful impetus to such a correction.

Notes

1. The main body of relevant texts may be found collected in Theodore Reinach, *Textes d'auteurs grecs et romains relatifs au judaïsme*, 1895 (reprinted 1963). This may be helpfully supplemented by the more recent discoveries collected in the volumes of Victor A. Tcherikover and Alexander Fuchs, *Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum*, 1957f. (see also M. Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism*, Jerusalem, 1974f.)

2. In addition to the standard works cited by Ruether—especially Marcel Simon's *Verus Israel*, Jean Juster's *Les juifs dans l'empire romain*—the reader may consult J. N. Sevenster, *The Roots of Pagan Anti-Semitism in the Ancient World*, Leiden, 1975.

3. It is notable that the more admiring observations come mostly from the pre-Roman period. Clear antisemitism emerges in surviving evidence from the second century B.C.E. onward, among Greeks, Syrians, Romans, Egyptians and Samaritans—though there is virtually no sign of it surrounding the extensive Jewish presence in the Babylonian area. During the Roman period, there are evidences of considerable Jewish proselytization and of the affectation of Jewish customs by non-converts, but few texts survive that speak eulogistically of the Jews.

4. Reinach, *Textes*, pps. 50, 58, 121, 131, 139, 305; Sevenster, *The Roots*, pps. 8-9.

5. Juvenal, Sat. VI, 542-547; Reinach, *Textes*, pps. 292-293. Josephus speaks respectfully of the abilities of the Essenes to tell the future (*War* II, 159) and observes that at least one skillful practitioner taught his art to disciples (*Antiquities* XIII, 311). There were evidently also successful Jewish practitioners of exorcism, as amply evidenced through various New Testament texts. But both practices were obviously open to both contempt from skeptical outsiders and abuse by charlatans—hence their contribution to Jewish disrepute.

6. Josephus' remark concerning the Essene preoccupation with angels (*War* 142) has long been well known. Other data are scattered among the intertestamental writings (and may conveniently be retrieved through the index to R.H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, Oxford, 1913, and reprints). The mediatory function of angels is widely recognized here and in Rabbinic writings as well. Whether reverence to angels ever passed over into actual worship is unclear, but certainly possible; and some such rumor had evidently reached the ears of Theophrastus and of Juvenal. Further materials may be found in Jean Daniélou, *The Theology of Jewish Christianity*, 1964, pps. 117-146, 181-187.

7. See Sevenster, *The Roots*, pps. 163-164, 16-29.

8. Cited by Ammianus Marcellinus: see Reinach, *Textes*, p. 353.

9. See Reinach, *Textes*, *passim*.

10. Reported by Valerius Maximus, although well over a century later: see Reinach, *Textes*, pps. 258f.

11. Reported in Suetonius, *Claudius* 25. This is sometimes questioned on account of the paucity of other evidence, and the possibility of a confusion over *Chrestus*—but the latter does not affect the fact, and it is reasonable to suppose that Suetonius may be right. The expulsion under Tiberius is well attested by Josephus, Tacitus, Suetonius and Dio Cassius.

12. For documentation, see standard histories, especially Juster, *Les juifs*, vol. II, pps. 182-201, and Sevenster, *The Roots*, *passim*. The provocations of the census and of Pilate's introduction of military standards in Jerusalem were of course far from trivial from the Jewish point of view: the language of my text is meant only to imitate the perspective of the ordinary uncomprehending Gentile.

13. "Rightly it is said that there were several centres of conflict, primarily. . . Alexandria, Antioch, and Rome. The sources contain sufficient evidence, however, that outbursts of anti-Semitism were not confined to those cities. . . friction between Jews and non-Jews had been recurring frequently in the cities of Asia Minor. Josephus informs us about conflicts in Palestine and the cities surrounding it. Apart from the centres of conflict about which we are somewhat better informed, therefore, there were many other cities where anti-Semitism found expression, more or less violently, in word and deed" (Sevenster, *The Roots*, p. 190).

14. *Faith and Fratricide*, pps. 24-25.

15. So I infer from *Aristeas* 37: Ptolemy's letter claims that "if ever evil has been done to your people through the passions of the mob, I have made them reparation" (R. H. Charles, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 99).

16. See M. Rostovtzeff in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, Vol. VII, 1954, p. 122.

17. So Sevenster shows from recently discovered papyri, along with other evidences: *The Roots*, p. 17f.

18. See Norman Bentwich, *Hellenism*, 1919, and Wallace Nelson Stearns, *Fragments from Graeco-Jewish Writers*, 1908.

19. Stearns, *Fragments*, pps. 29-41.

20. Stearns, *Ibid.*, pps. 42-56.

21. Stearns, *Ibid.*, pps. 60-66.

22. Stearns, *Ibid.*, pps. 67-73.

23. Stearns, *Ibid.*, pps. 77-91.

24. *Faith and Fratricide*, p. 23.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

27. *Ibid.*, pps. 31-63.

28. Martin Hengel, *Die Zeloten*, 1961; S.G.F. Brandon, *Jesus and the Zealots*, 1967.

29. *Faith and Fratricide*, p. 41.

30. Examples are, respectively, the *Psalms of Solomon*; *2 Baruch*; *Enoch* ("The Dream-Visions," 83-90); *The Assumption of Moses*.

31. See Joseph Thomas, *Le Mouvement baptiste en Palestine et Syrie*, 1935.

32. See T. M. Taylor, "The Beginnings of Jewish Proselyte Baptism," *NTS* 2, 1955, pps. 193-198.

33. *War* II, 124.

34. To his *Greek in Jewish Palestine*, 1942, and *Hellenism in Jewish Palestine*, 1950 (cited by Ruether on p. 264) may be added "How Much Greek in Jewish Palestine," reprinted from 1962 in *Texts and Studies*, 1974.

35. Sotah 49b, Baba Kamma 83a.

36. G. F. Moore observes of the Apocalypse of Baruch and of Fourth Esdras that "The visions of the messianic age and the eschatology exhibit the same scheme, and . . . it is the same which through the Tannaim became the standard conception of Judaism. Nor is this the only thing in which these apocalypses are closely related to what we call the rabbinical sources. The authors had the learning of the schools. Baruch has a wealth of Haggadah which in almost every point is verifiable in the Midrash" (*Judaism*, Vol. II, p. 285). Daniel was, of course, even in its Aramaic apocalyptic portions included in the Rabbinic canon.

37. See Jacob Lauterbach, "The Ancient Jewish Allegorists in Talmud and Midrash," *JQR* 1910, pps. 291-333, 503-531.

38. Stearns, *Fragments*, pps. 77-91.

39. Even the Church rejected parts of the Septuagint on account of inaccuracy: Theodotion's version of Daniel replaced the LXX version in Christian as well as Jewish circles.

40. *Faith and Fratricide*, p. 52.

41. As cited in Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History*, II, xxiii.

42. Robert Wilde (*The Treatment of the Jews in the Greek Christian Writers of the First Three Centuries*, Washington, 1949) gives the impression that the Jewish persecutions of Christians were sustained over several generations, but the evidence he cites does not seem to me to support this allegation: some of his later texts do not appear to be dealing with any such subject, and others are clearly looking back to the Apostolic Age.

43. One need look no farther than the well-known twelfth benediction of the *Shemoneh 'Esreh*, with its plea that the Christians perish and be damned.

The Rejection of the Jews in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts

Douglas R. A. Hare

Rosemary Ruether's greatest contribution in her deeply disturbing study *Faith and Fratricide* is her insistent demand that Christian theology be reconstructed in such a way that theological space be granted to Judaism as a valid way of worshiping the God of Abraham, Moses and Jesus.¹ It is imperative that this demand be accorded the serious hearing it deserves, and that efforts be made to initiate this reconstruction. It is to be hoped that the present volume of studies will both augment her challenge, and contribute toward a Christian theology that gladly acknowledges the continuing covenant between God and Israel.

Ruether is correct in claiming that the *Synoptic Gospels* and *Acts* were drawn upon by that triumphalist theology which taught that the Jews, by refusing to believe in Jesus, had forfeited their place in God's plan of salvation and could no longer be regarded as his chosen people. As we shall see, Matthew is particularly susceptible to such an interpretation. Later in this chapter, an attempt will be made to present a hermeneutic by means of which anti-Judaism of this kind can be acknowledged exegetically while negated theologically.

Is there a relationship between christology and anti-Judaism?

While acknowledging the undeniable anti-Judaism of the *Synoptic Gospels* and *Acts*, we may nonetheless take issue with the basic thesis by which Ruether seeks to organize and interpret the data. The section dealing with these four writings begins with the following statements:

In the synoptic tradition, messianic and anti-Judaic midrashim arose as two sides of the same development. The character of anti-Judaic thinking in the Christian tradition cannot be correctly evaluated until it is seen as the negative side of its christological hermeneutic (p. 64).

These statements are misleading, because the very next sentences acknowledge that christology and anti-Judaism are in fact *two separate phenomena*, deriving from two very different experiences:

This reciprocal relationship between messianic and anti-Judaic midrashim was rooted in the Church's evangelical experience. As the Church developed its christological exegesis and found this opposed by the traditional midrash of the priestly and scribal classes . . . an anti-Judaic midrash grew up to negate this negation given to the Church's messianic interpretation of the Scriptures by official Judaism (p. 64).

That is to say, these are two distinct quarryings of biblical texts to explain two facts of Christian experience, first the execution of Jesus as king of the Jews, and second, the refusal of Jewish religious leaders to accept the Christian claims regarding Jesus. They are not reciprocal or mutually dependent. They simply offer parallel instances of the practice also evidenced in the Qumran community, whereby the scriptures are diligently quarried to explain both pleasant and unpleasant facts in the sect's experience. As Ruether also acknowledges, the scriptures were again quarried in response to the unexpected fact that large numbers of gentiles accepted the gospel (p. 84). Still later, when gentile persecution threatened, the sacred writings again provided texts which explained the bitter facts of history. Consequently, it remains to be proved that the appropriation of biblical texts to validate the failure of the mission to Israel is directly correlative to the messianic exegesis of the *Synoptic Gospels* and *Acts*.

This point is not inconsequential for Ruether, because her fundamental assumption is that christological hermeneutic is the ultimate cause of Christian antisemitism (p. 116). Indeed, one could—mistakenly—get the impression that, for Ruether, Christian antisemitism, the deadly vine entangling and devitalizing Christian theology, has but one tap root: christological midrash; if we could but succeed in cutting this root, the whole vine would wither away and theology would be freed for luxurious growth. This is assuredly a mistaken impression, because Ruether is too sophisticated to be guilty of such reductionism. The phenomenon of Christian antisemitism is too complex to be explained or cured in terms of one factor alone. Nevertheless, the question is worth asking! Is there a causal relationship between christology or christological hermeneutic and antisemitism? Can such a relationship be demonstrated in the *Synoptic Gospels* and *Acts*?

Three Kinds of Anti-Judaism

Let us begin by distinguishing three kinds of anti-Judaism which are evidenced in early Christian literature.

1. *Prophetic Anti-Judaism.* Some kind of anti-Judaism was to be expected, simply because the Jesus movement, like that of John the Baptist before it, was from the beginning a conversionist sect within Judaism. The presupposition of Jesus' preaching was that God was not pleased with Israel, and that individuals must respond in faith and practice in order to "enter the kingdom of God." This *prophetic anti-Judaism* was, of course, a hallowed tradition in Israel.² It often involved powerful invective. Jesus' statements about a "wicked and adulterous generation" seem to have been considerably milder than the language employed by Ezekiel (e.g., in Ezek. 23). The basic assumption, however, is that God has not and will not finally abandon Israel to her sin, but will open up a way of reconciliation, even if only for a remnant.

It must be noted that this form of anti-Judaism belonged to the essence of the Jesus movement from its inception, and had nothing to do with christology.³ In terms of historical sequence, anti-Judaic midrash preceded messianic midrash. There is no need to argue the authenticity of various citations of scripture attributed to Jesus. It must simply be granted *a priori* that Jesus, like others caught up in the eschatological expectations of his day, found support in the sacred writings for his interpretation of the current state of affairs. If he charged his contemporaries with adherence to a wicked and adulterous generation, he undoubtedly found this predicted in scripture.

A secondary development of this form of anti-Judaism was constituted by Jesus' negative reaction to the priestly and proto-rabbinic leadership because of their non-response or opposition. From a careful study of the development of the synoptic tradition, it is clear that "scribes" and or "Pharisees" or "high priests" have been added to controversy stories in which the opponents of Jesus were originally unspecified.⁴ Nevertheless, there seems to be an irreducible minimum of authentic material in which Jesus castigates some (at least) of the religious leaders of his day for their failure to lead Israel to repentance. This form of anti-Judaism, is, again, a well-established tradition of prophetic religion; it is commonplace for the prophets to accuse priests and teachers of the Torah, including other prophets, of special responsibility for Israel's apostasy. This form of anti-Judaism likewise has no relationship to christology of the kind suggested by Ruether.

2. *Jewish-Christian Anti-Judaism.* A second form of anti-Judaism emerges for the first time after the death and resurrection of Jesus. For want of a better term, we will refer to it as *Jewish-Christian anti-Judaism*. It takes up both sides of the prophetic anti-Judaism described above, but adds a new element: Israel manifests its apostasy not only by failing to repent and return to God in ways prescribed by the prophet Jesus, but also

by refusing to acknowledge the crucial importance for salvation history of the crucified and risen Jesus.

Despite the addition of this important motif, Jewish-Christian anti-Judaism retained the basic assumption of prophetic anti-Judaism that repentance was possible because God had *not* rejected his people. Precisely because of this assumption, Jewish-Christian missionaries doggedly persisted in their efforts to convert an unwilling Israel despite the spectacular failure of these efforts and the accompanying suffering, physical and emotional, that they experienced as a result.⁵ The mission persisted until disciplinary action on the part of the synagogue authorities, social ostracism and the *Birkath ha-Minim* made further evangelistic work impossible.

Optimism concerning the possibility of converting at least a significant minority in Israel was evident at the time of the private conference involving Paul and the leaders of the Jerusalem church. At that time (probably the mid 50's), it was mutually agreed that Peter should continue to lead the mission to the Jews while Paul headed the mission to the gentiles (*Gal.* 2:7-9). Yet the lack of response to Peter's side of the two-fold mission is clearly reflected in *Romans* 9-11, written perhaps two or three years later. In retrospect we can say that Paul's pessimism was more responsive to the historical evidence than Peter's optimism, and in view of this we must assume that the optimism was *theologically grounded* in the intensely held conviction that the God whose eschatological messenger had been refused by Israel had nonetheless *not* abandoned his people.⁶

Was it the addition of this motif of the rejection of God's ultimate messenger that produced an anti-Judaism which granted no theological space for a continuing Judaism? The answer is clearly no. The negative stance toward "establishment" or rank-and-file Judaism had already been assumed before Jesus' death. As Ruether herself observes, it was characteristic of Jewish messianic sects, such as the Essenes, to regard unconverted Jews as outside the covenant (p. 55). Had either the Qumran community or Jewish Christianity acknowledged the authenticity and continuing validity of the religion of the majority, it would immediately have lost its character as a conversionist sect and therewith its original *raison d'être*.

It is therefore beside the point for Ruether to suggest that "A Jewish Christianity which did not define itself as a new covenant . . . might have remained as a form of Judaism" (p. 56). If she means that such a Jewish Christianity would have been tolerated more easily by the majority, we will of course agree, and point to the evidence that a Christian sect persisted on the fringes of Judaism for three or four centuries.⁷ If, however, she means that such a Jewish Christianity would have been more tolerant of Judaism than were the writers of the New Testament, we must disagree.

Had circumcised Christians become the majority in Jewish Palestine and obtained coercive power, it is not unlikely that they would have exercised repressive force against the synagogues of rabbinic Judaism. As a conversionist sect, it could grant validity to the religion of its opponents as little as today's Jehovah's witnesses can acknowledge the authenticity of the established churches.

Just as it was not christology that produced the anti-Judaism which denied a place in the covenant to unconverted Jews, so it was not christology which produced the parting of the ways. Ruether is mistaken, I would argue, in maintaining that:

It was the raising up of faith in Messiah Jesus as a supersessionary covenantal principle—the view that one was not within the true people of God unless one adopted the faith in this form—that caused the break between the Church and Israel (p. 56).

The Jewish community has always shown itself able to tolerate a wide variety of haggadic and halakic nonconformity within its midst, albeit with vigorous protest and healthy disagreement. Intolerance has been severe only when the majority felt that nonconformists were eroding Israel's sense of identity in a way that would lead to gentilization and assimilation. Consequently, it was not the conversionist anti-Judaism with its insistence that faith in Jesus was essential to participation in God's eschatological people that caused the parting of the ways. It was rather that this troublesome thorn in the side of Judaism seemed to challenge the central symbols of the nation's identity. It was not Peter's sermons demanding faith in Jesus, but rather his practice of eating with gentiles that endangered the church in Jerusalem.⁸ It was not Paul's proclamation of Jesus that aroused the deepest animosity against him in Jerusalem, but the report, perhaps largely untrue but not entirely without basis, that he was teaching Jews in the Diaspora "to forsake Moses, telling them not to circumcise their children or observe the customs" (*Acts* 21:21). The customs here referred to, we must assume, were those that were felt to constitute the irreducible minimum needed as protection against the ever-present threat of assimilation.

Early Christian preaching, with its christological exegesis of the scriptures, may have aroused ridicule and/or disgust in Jewish hearers, but in itself it was not designed to produce that kind of hostility which resulted in the *Birkath ha-Minim* and the total separation of church and synagogue. The causes of that hostility were multiple, but they converged around the central issue of Jewish distinctiveness in an alien world. By subordinating all the primary symbols of Jewish identity—Torah, temple,

circumcision, Sabbath, food laws—to a rank below the central Christian symbol of the crucified and risen Jesus, Christian Jews challenged ethnic solidarity too severely to be tolerated. By accepting gentiles as brothers and sisters in the faith apart from circumcision and Torah, these Jews appeared to the majority as apostates who were breaching the dike that had been so painstakingly erected against gentilization and assimilation. Ruether is correct in relating the hostility to the central symbol of the Christian faith, but her claim that “the crux of the conflict lay in the fact that the Church erected its messianic midrash into a *new principle of salvation*” (p. 78, italics in original) must be carefully qualified. The social ostracism that effectively terminated the mission to Israel may have been strongly encouraged by religious leaders on theological grounds such as this, but in all probability it would not have proved so effective had it not been for the fact that ordinary Jews correctly perceived that Christianity constituted a genuine threat to Jewish identity.⁹

3. *Gentilizing Anti-Judaism*. The third kind of anti-Judaism will be designated with the adjective “gentilizing” rather than “gentile,” because it is manifested not only by gentiles who have never belonged to Israel but also by Jews and proselytes who have renounced their Jewish identity. Gentilizing anti-Judaism takes over prophetic and Jewish-Christian forms of anti-Judaism, but adds thereto the conviction that Israel’s apostasy is incurable and that God has finally and irrevocably rejected his people. It finds scriptural support in those prophetic texts that seem to speak of Israel as incurably obdurate, and which can be taken as suggesting that God will create a new people for himself.

Gentilizing Anti-Judaism only in Matthew

Does this gentilizing anti-Judaism, so prominent in Barnabas, Justin and subsequent Christian writers, have a genuine canonical basis in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts? Let us examine the evidence.

Mark. The Gospel of Mark contains remarkably little anti-Judaism of any kind. In view of the fact that the bulk of the material presumably originated in the conversionist mission to Israel of Jesus and his followers, we would expect to find prophetic anti-Judaism, but this gospel contains almost no castigation of the wickedness of Israel (“This generation” in 8:12 is not modified by “wicked and adulterous” as in the parallel in *Mt.* 16:4; “faithless generation” in 9:19 seems to be addressed as much to Jesus’ own followers as to the crowd).

Anti-Judaism has sometimes been seen in the passage which purports to explain Jesus’ use of parables (*Mk.* 4:11f.): “To you has been given the mystery of the kingdom of God, but to those outside everything is in

parables, in order that seeing they may see and not know, and hearing they may hear and not understand, lest they turn and I heal them”¹⁰ Certainly, there is prophetic anti-Judaism in *Isaiah* 6, the passage from which this citation is taken, but the explicit anti-Judaism has here been removed by Mark or his source. The contrast presented by Mark opposes not believing Christians and unbelieving Jews, but simply insiders and outsiders. The Isaianic passage is employed merely to explain the fact that some are destined not to respond to the gospel. “Those outside” can, in Mark’s view, refer just as well to gentiles who refuse the gospel as to Jewish unbelievers. This is supported by the fact that the Markan interpretation of the parable of the sower, which immediately follows, was presumably intended by Mark as an explanation of the successes and failures of the gentile mission for the benefit of his gentile readers.

Another passage which has sometimes been regarded as anti-Judaic is the narrative of the cursing of the fig tree, which, in Mark’s version, is presented in two sections bracketing the cleansing of the temple (11:12-25). It has been suggested that Mark intends that his readers interpret the temple-cleansing with the help of the accompanying narrative: the Jewish people ought to have produced the fruit of appropriate worship of God (including the expansion of Jewish worship to include the gentiles, 11:17), and, because it has proved sterile, God has cursed it through the agency of the messiah Jesus; its destiny is simply to wither away.¹¹ Whether or not such an interpretation was present in Mark’s source, it is clear that anti-Judaism is not explicitly communicated in the version Mark gives us. Indeed, he distracts the readers from this interpretive possibility by appending material concerning praying with faith (vv. 22-25). The cleansing of the temple, moreover, is a positive act for Mark, not an act of judgment prefiguring the destruction of the temple: the religious leaders want to destroy Jesus because they fear him, for the whole crowd is amazed at his teaching (v. 18)—i.e., Jesus’ teaching, which here includes his act of cleansing the temple, receives a positive response from Israel, represented by “the whole crowd.” If, then, Mark subtly intends the narrative of the fig tree to underline a negative, judging element in the bracketed passage, this element must be the implicit condemnation of the religious leaders who are held responsible for the improper functioning of the temple worship, and who refused to heed the teaching of Jesus.

That it is the religious leaders whom Mark castigates, not Israel as a whole, is explicitly indicated in his presentation of the parable of the wicked tenants (12:1-12). The opening phrases of the parable may well have constituted a conscious allusion to the Septuagint version of *Isaiah* 5:1-7, in which is contained one of the most powerful expressions of prophetic anti-Judaism to be found anywhere in Jewish literature. In its

Markan setting, however, the parable castigates not Israel but its religious leaders for their failure to respond to the prophets and Jesus: "And they (i.e., the chief priests and the scribes and the elders of 11:27) sought to arrest him, and they feared the crowd, for they knew that he spoke this parable with respect to them" (v. 12).¹²

This contrast between the religious leaders who oppose Jesus and the ordinary people who gladly listen to him persists in the passion narrative. Pilate asks the crowd if they wish him to release to them "the king of the Jews," "for he knew that it was because of envy that the high priests delivered him up" (15:10).¹³ It is only because the high priests stir up the crowd to ask for the release of Barabbas that Pilate's suggestion that he release Jesus is not accepted (15:11). This simply reiterates the conviction already made explicit in the two longer passion predictions (8:31, 10:33) that it is the religious leaders, not Israel as a whole, who are primarily responsible for Jesus' death. The crowd is implicated in 15:13-15 with its repeated cry "Crucify him," but the weight of responsibility is clearly placed with the religious leaders, not Israel as a whole.

The same contrast can be observed in the extended controversy-narrative concerning the traditions of the elders (7:1-23). An anti-Judaistic note seems to be contained in the allusion to "this people" in the quotation of *Isaiah* 29:13, but, despite the prophetic anti-Judaism of the source, Mark refused to exploit the text in an anti-Judaic fashion; it is specifically applied to the "hypocrites," i.e., the Pharisees and some of their scribes (v. 1) who, it is alleged, substitute their traditions for the commandments of God (vv. 6, 8). From Mark's perspective, Jesus' attack on the way Torah was being practiced by a portion of the population was not at all to be seen as a rejection of Judaism as such. In subordinating the Sabbath law to matters of human need (2:23-3:6), strengthening the marriage covenant (10:1-12) and dispensing with the rigors of the food law (7:1-23), Jesus represents for Mark not the destroyer of Israel's uniqueness as the people of the Torah but rather the eschatological reformer whose teaching reestablishes the Torah in accordance with God's original intention.

Why does Mark not take "the next logical step" and dissolve the distinction between the wicked leaders and the people as a whole? Is it not perhaps because he wrote at a date before the failure of the mission to Israel required theological explanation? It is instructive to compare Mark's version of the mission of the Twelve with the parallel in Matthew (*Mk.* 6:7-13, *Mt.* 10:1-42). Although Mark recognizes that some places will not receive the Christian evangelists (6:11), the mission as a whole is reported in optimistic terms (6:12f., 30), whereas the primary thrust of Matthew's version is that the missionaries must expect persecution and rejection to be their lot (10:16-33).¹⁴ It would appear that Mark, writing perhaps twenty

years before Matthew, represents the earlier optimism of Peter, John and James the brother of Jesus, as reported by Paul in *Galatians* 2:7-9. There was no need to imply that Israel as a whole was incurably reprobate, because it was still hoped that the gospel would be accepted by Jews. Thus, although the destruction of the temple is clearly prophesied in *Mark* 13:1f., this event is seen as the first of the eschatological catastrophes which will soon overtake the world, not as a this-worldly judgment upon apostate Israel. In the same context, it is prophesied that before the series of catastrophes reaches its culmination the gospel must be preached to all the gentiles. Here Mark's redaction shows that he concurs with the missionary strategy of Paul, without accepting Paul's pessimistic view that only an eschatological miracle will effect the conversion of Israel.¹⁵

We must conclude, therefore, that Mark contains only the barest traces of prophetic and Jewish-Christian anti-Judaism, and not the slightest evidence of that gentilizing anti-Judaism that was later to dominate Christian theology.

Luke-Acts. A great deal of material in Luke-Acts expresses prophetic anti-Judaism. Not only is invective directed against the people as a whole (e.g., *Lk.* 3:7f., 7:31-4, 11:29; *Acts* 2:40), but also there is frequent allusion to the popular theme that Israel has always resisted and persecuted God's prophets (*Lk.* 6:23, 11:47-51, 13:33f.; *Acts* 7:52). We must disabuse ourselves of the opinion that this is a *Christian* theme.¹⁶ It is a common motif in Jewish pseudepigraphical literature and rabbinic haggadah, but it has its origin in the canonical writings. The story of the murder of the prophet-priest Zechariah, son of Jehoiada, in the temple court is offered by the Chronicler as an illustration of the general truth: "Yet he sent prophets among them to bring them back to the Lord; these testified against them, but they would not give heed" (2 *Chron.* 24:19; the narrative follows in vv. 20-22). The same generalization is repeated in the final chapter in even stronger words (2 *Chron.* 36: 15f.). The statement attributed to Stephen in *Acts* 7:52 perhaps exceeds in intensity that which is found in the non-Christian parallels, but is clearly on the same trajectory.¹⁷ Just as the Chronicler saw the first destruction of Jerusalem as the punishment for Israel's rejection of the prophets, so does the author of Luke-Acts treat the second destruction. He undoubtedly saw the Wisdom-saying of Luke 11:50f. as finding its fulfillment in 70 C.E., for in 21:22-4 he includes material, apparently taken from Jewish apocalyptic, in which the destruction of Jerusalem is seen as "days of vengeance, to fulfill all that is written" and "wrath upon this people." The accompanying statement, "and Jerusalem will be trodden down by the gentiles until the times of the gentiles are fulfilled" (v. 24), is surely to be seen as prophetic rather than as gentilizing anti-Judaism. Jewish-Christian anti-Judaism, although readily available to

the author, was not introduced into this eschatological material to explain the destruction of Jerusalem as a punishment for the murder of the messiah.

Jewish-Christian anti-Judaism does appear in the Lukan passion narrative. Whatever the origin of the oracle concerning the daughters of Jerusalem in *Luke*. 23:28-31, Luke undoubtedly takes it as a prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem. Even here, however, the notion that the catastrophe of 70 C.E. results from the execution of Jesus is implicit only, if present at all to Luke's mind. He stops short of blunt statement. Luke clearly goes beyond Mark in laying responsibility for Jesus' death upon the entire Jewish people: where Mark has "the crowd" (*Mk*. 15:8, 11, 15), Luke substitutes "the people," *ho laos*, the term so often used to designate Israel as a whole (*Lk*. 23:13), and he omits Mark's statement that it was the chief priests who stirred up the crowd to ask for Barabbas instead of Jesus. The theme that Israel as a whole is responsible for Jesus' death receives repeated mention in *Acts* (2:36, 3:13, 15, 13:27f.; cf. 10:39). Nevertheless, Luke is careful to soften this accusation in three ways. First, he introduces into the crucifixion narrative the motif of remorse or grief, totally absent from Matthew and Mark. He reports not only that women "bewailed and lamented him" prior to Jesus' death (23:27), but also that following Jesus' expiration the Jewish multitudes "returned home beating their breasts" (23:48). Secondly, he expresses the view that the Jews of Jerusalem demanded Jesus' execution "in ignorance" (*Acts* 3:17). If *Lk*. 23:34, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," is not an interpolation, it provides further evidence of this Lukan motif. Thirdly, Luke lightens Israel's responsibility by stressing that the death of Jesus had been divinely predetermined. The ignorance to which Luke refers is ignorance of God's plan of salvation, for the very next verse states: "But what God foretold by the mouth of the prophets, that his Christ should suffer, he thus fulfilled" (3:18). The disciples had been characterized by the same ignorance prior to the resurrection; it was the risen Jesus himself who had instructed them concerning the necessity of the messiah's suffering (*Lk*. 24:25-7, 44-6). Thus in *Acts* 4:27f., where the various actors in the drama of the crucifixion are named—Herod, Pontius Pilate, the gentiles and the peoples (*sic*) of Israel—it is explicitly indicated that their function in the drama was "to do whatever thy hand and thy plan had predestined to take place."

Why does Luke lighten Israel's responsibility in these ways? Is it not because he wishes to make it easier for Jews to accept the gospel? It has sometimes been proposed that in *Acts* the gospel is presented to Jews only to confirm their guilt; i.e., the narrative shows no real expectation that Diaspora Jews will respond favorably to the gospel, but assumes that it must nonetheless be preached to Jews everywhere so that they will be

without excuse.¹⁸ This is probably a misreading of the evidence. Although Luke presents the rejection at Nazareth as the first major event of Jesus' public ministry (*Lk.* 4:16-30) so as to prefigure the general failure of Jews to respond, a theme that runs through both Lukan writings, he is also careful to show that a significant minority of Jews do in fact respond favorably to Paul's synagogue sermons and became Christians (*Acts* 13:43, 14:1, 16:1, 17:4, 12, 18:8). It is clear that the picture Luke wishes to present is not that the mission to Israel has proved a total failure, but rather that it has produced schism within the Jewish community. Not to be ignored is the climactic statement in the concluding narrative concerning Paul's presentation of the gospel to the Jews of Rome: "And some were convinced by what he said, while others disbelieved. So, as they disagreed among themselves. . ." (28:24f.).

The following statement, citing *Isaiah* 6:9f. to explain the refusal of the majority of Israel to believe in Jesus, is employed to justify Paul's gentile mission (28:25-8). At first sight, it appears as an expression of gentilizing anti-Judaism, according to which Israel has no further place in God's plan of salvation. That this is not Luke's intention is indicated by the preceding statement concerning the schism created by the gospel in the Jewish community. That is to say, there is nothing in this concluding passage or elsewhere in the Lukan writings to suggest that the author is not in agreement with Paul's perspective on the gentile mission: "Inasmuch as I am an apostle to the gentiles, I magnify my ministry in order to make my fellow Jews jealous, and thus save some of them" (*Rom.* 11:13f.).

Is contrary evidence provided by the parable of the unfruitful fig tree in *Luke* 13:6-9? It is possible to regard the threatened cutting down of the tree as foreboding the termination of special status for Israel, but this interpretation is far from explicit in the text and is probably to be rejected on the basis of the context. The preceding paragraph predicts destruction for those who refuse to repent (13:1-5). That is to say, Luke adds the parable at this point to support the call for repentance, not to intimate that Israel will forfeit its status as God's people.

Further support for the claim that Luke manifests a positive attitude toward Israel is to be seen in his treatment of the Torah. Although he regards it as a heavy yoke which even Peter and his associates had not been able to bear (*Acts* 15:10), and through which salvation was not possible (13:39), he finds it quite appropriate for Paul to circumcise Timothy (16:3), and insists that Paul was innocent of the charge that he had campaigned against circumcision and other Jewish customs (28:17).¹⁹ That is to say, there is not the slightest hint that Luke believes that Jews must become gentiles in order to be fully acceptable members of the Church!

There is, however, one form of expression in Acts which verges on

gentilizing anti-Judaism. All too frequently we find the term "the Jews" used negatively to denote the enemies of the Christian mission, who revile Paul and his colleagues, plot against his life, and finally secure his arrest (9:22f., 20:3, 19, 23:12). Like the author of the *Fourth Gospel*, Luke seems to be oblivious to, or unconcerned about, the impression such usage must make on the reader, and yet it would be unfair to conclude that Luke is as anti-Jewish as this impression suggests.²⁰ His total work shows that he does not despise Jewish customs (*Acts* 16:2, 21:20-24), does not regard the Jewish people as incapable of humane feelings (*Lk.* 23:27, 48), and is still optimistic concerning the possibility that at least a minority of Jews will continue to respond positively to the gospel.

Matthew. It is not until we reach the Gospel of Matthew that we find strong evidence of gentilizing anti-Judaism. Matthew greatly intensifies the Jewish-Christian anti-Judaism of his sources relative to Israel's responsibility for the death of the messiah: *the whole people (pas ho laos)* assumes this responsibility, rendering Pilate innocent, with the cry that has haunted Jewish-Christian relations for nineteen centuries, "His blood be on us and on our children" (27:25). In Matthew's defense, it must be asserted that it is very unlikely that he would have countenanced the use of this statement as grounds for Christian persecution of the Jews. It is probable that the inclusion of "our children" was intended by Matthew as an allusion to the generation which, approximately four decades after Jesus' death, had to bear the terrible suffering of the war with Rome (cf. 22:7). Moreover, it is Matthew who applies Jesus' teaching concerning love for enemies, which originally referred primarily to political enemies, to the situation of Jewish persecution of Christians.²¹ Although Matthew may have had difficulty fulfilling this injunction, he surely would not have approved the degradation and suffering imposed on Jews by the post-Constantinian church in alleged obedience to *Matthew* 27:25. In and of itself, this verse says no more than the various statements of Luke-Acts which place responsibility for Jesus' death on the Jewish people and find therein the basis for the most urgent call to repentance.

Evidence for the gentilizing anti-Judaism of Matthew is to be seen rather in those passages which suggest that the Jewish people, because it has persistently rejected God's messengers, more especially because it has rejected Jesus and his missionaries, has now been rejected by God. This view is communicated in three Matthean passages: 21:43, 22:7f. and 23:37-9.

The first of these is an addition to the Markan parable of the wicked tenants: "Therefore I tell you, the kingdom of God will be taken away from you and given to a nation producing the fruits of it." The reference to a nation, *ethnos*, makes it clear that for Matthew the wicked tenants represent Israel as a whole, not its religious leaders only as in Mark. What

is taken away, therefore, is not the privilege of leadership but the status of being God's special people. Here "the kingdom of God" refers not to the eschatological kingdom of heaven which for Matthew is a future reality, but rather that special relationship to God's rulership which has been Israel's most distinguished privilege. Israel, because of its failure to respond to God's will (21:28-32), manifested supremely in the killing of the messiah (21:39), is now to be deprived of this privileged status, which will be transferred to a different nation. This other nation is not the gentiles, however, but a new corporate reality, the *ekklesia* of Jesus Christ, whose members are Jews and gentiles but which is in effect what later apologists were to call a third race.

Matthew 22:7 is an inappropriate addition to the parable of the marriage feast for the king's son: "The king was angry, and he sent his troops and destroyed those murderers and burned their city." The destruction of Jerusalem is here presented as the punishment inflicted on Israel by God because of the rejection of the gospel and persecution of its missionaries. "Those invited were not worthy" (v. 8), and consequently the gospel must be addressed to others, i.e., non-Jews. In view of the fact that Matthew's church undoubtedly contained a significant number of Jews, the reference here is not to individuals of Jewish origin but to Israel as a corporate whole.

The capstone of Matthew's carefully constructed valedictory to the Jewish nation adds the Jerusalem saying, used by Luke in a very different context (*Lk.* 13:34f.), to the climactic woe against the "hypocrites" and the appended Wisdom-saying concerning Israel's murder of the prophets (cf. *Lk.* 11:47-51). The latter, with its reference to "this generation," provides the necessary transition from the attack upon the Pharisaic party to the denunciation of Israel as a whole. The Jerusalem-saying makes this even more explicit. Jerusalem, representing the Jewish nation, is informed, "Behold, your house is forsaken and desolate. For I tell you, you will not see me again until you say, 'Blessed be he who comes in the name of the Lord' " (23:38f.). In Matthew's intention, this means that God is abandoning his people.²² This abandonment is then symbolized by the removal of Jesus and his disciples to the Mount of Olives, outside the city, from which point the messiah-designate predicts the destruction of the temple (24:1-3). He will not again speak positively to Israel; henceforth Israel will know him only as judge. At that time those who have prided themselves on being "sons of the kingdom" will be cast into outer darkness (8:11).

Because Israel has proved unworthy of the gospel, Matthew has abandoned the two-fold mission ("to the Jew first, and also to the Greek" *Rom.* 1:16) in favor of a single mission to the gentiles. The "Great Commission" with which the First Gospel ends must be taken with all

seriousness as expressing Matthew's considered opinion concerning the future of the Church's mission: "Go, therefore, and make disciples of all the gentiles . . ." (28:19). The phrase *panta ta ethnē*, here as always in Matthew, refers to non-Jewish individuals; it does not mandate a mission to "all the nations of the world, including Israel."²³ Although individual Jews are not to be refused a place in the Church, the gospel is henceforth not to be offered to Israel.

Matthew's pessimism is unrelieved. There is no doctrine of a holy remnant which constitutes "true Israel" (*Rom.* 9), nor is there any expectation of an eschatological miracle by which wickedness will be banished from Israel (*Rom.* 11). There is nothing corresponding to the anguish over God's irrevocable covenant with Israel exhibited by Paul in *Romans*. For Matthew, Israel has been "deselected" and a new nation has been created to take its place as God's chosen people.

This harsh pessimism seems to have issued from the painful experience of Jewish Christian missionaries who over the decades had suffered vilification, judicial floggings and mob violence in the synagogue communities of Palestine and the Diaspora because of their persistence in preaching the gospel to an unwilling audience. Matthew wrote at a time when the separation between Church and Synagogue was almost complete, and represents the attempt on the part of Jewish Christians to explain the situation theologically.²⁴ Reluctantly, Matthew concludes that Israel is not worthy of the gospel, and that it is God's will, communicated to the Church by the risen Jesus, that the gospel should henceforth be offered to gentiles only.

Returning to the Question: Is there a Relationship between gentilizing Anti-Judaism and Christology in Matthew?

Ruether, I believe, muddies the waters by attempting to explain gentilizing anti-Judaism as the necessary corollary of christology and/or christological midrash. Matthew gives no evidence that his anti-Judaism is *intrinsically* related to his christology. Such a situation occurred later in Marcion's portrayal of Jesus as the gnostic redeemer who reveals the unknown God, and discloses that the God of the Jews is demonic. Matthew, however, presents Jesus in such a way that it is not necessary for a Jew to cease being a Jew in order to accept the martyred prophet from Nazareth as the one appointed by God to perform the yet-to-be-fulfilled functions of the messiah. That is to say, Matthew does nothing to shock Jewish monotheistic sensitivities by depicting Jesus as a god dressed up in human clothes. His christology is functional, not ontological.²⁵ The narrative of the virgin birth and the Emmanuel text, for example, are employed

not in support of a "high" incarnational christology such as we find in Paul and John, but as means to communicate the salvation-historical uniqueness of Jesus.²⁶ That gentilizing anti-Judaism and a relatively "low" christology cohere in the same gospel is a historical accident. There is no essential relationship between the two.

Ruether's point seems to be that, whether or not there is an essential relationship in terms of content, the accidental relationship itself must be of deep concern to us. That is, the take-over by Christians of a key Jewish concept, "the Messiah," accompanied by a radical reinterpretation, *necessarily* involves hostility toward the Jews who refuse to acknowledge the validity of the Christian use of the concept. That this necessary anti-Judaism assumed different forms in the various New Testament writers is accidental, but anti-Judaism must remain an intrinsic element of Christianity as long as christology is rooted in this first-century take-over.

As long as "the Jews," that is, the Jewish religious tradition itself, continues to reject this interpretation, the validity of the Christian view is in question (p. 94).

Consequently, Jews "must be kept in the status of 'enemies of God' " (p. 95). This, apparently, is the meaning of her later statement that "For Christianity, anti-Judaism was not merely a defense against attack, but an intrinsic need of Christian self-affirmation" (p. 181; cf. p. 228).

Psychologizing of this kind is difficult to deal with. The assumption seems to be that there is a built-in defensiveness in Christianity which must inevitably express itself in a theological damning of the Jews, and that this psychological problem cannot be cured except by a renunciation of the original illegitimate take-over. If we speak of the psychological phenomenon in historical terms, there is ample empirical evidence that special hostility is directed by a secessionist group toward that religious tradition from which it broke away. We are not surprised that virulent anti-Catholicism was displayed by the Protestant Reformers. It is quite another matter to assert *a priori* that this hostility must persist as long as the parent religion remains as a challenge to the validity of the offspring. Empirically speaking, it is much more likely that this kind of defensiveness will recede with the passing of time unless other factors enter the situation to exacerbate the situation.

If, on the other hand, Ruether means simply that there will always be tension between Jews and Christians as long as Christians insist that hopes and expectations articulated in the Hebrew Scriptures find some kind of fulfillment in Jesus of Nazareth and the movement issuing from him, then, of course, we must concur. In this very limited sense, there will always be

essential anti-Judaism in Christianity, just as there will always be essential anti-Christianity in Judaism. While Jews remain Jews and Christians remain Christians, this tension will inevitably persist, but it need never become fratricidal. Ruether, however, seems to be of the opinion that this tension is in fact the root of modern antisemitism and must be eradicated:

There is no way to rid Christianity of its anti-Judaism, which constantly takes social expression in anti-Semitism, without grappling finally with its christological hermeneutic itself (p. 116).

That is to say, Christians must renounce their expropriation of the Hebrew Scriptures for the purpose of articulating the meaning of Jesus. Since the kind of christological interpretation of the Old Testament so popular in earlier centuries has already been largely given up, her objection refers primarily to the way the typical Christian "... continues to assume that the 'New' somehow 'fulfills' the 'Old,' despite the fact that the entire midrashic structure that once supported this claim has mostly been scrapped by Old Testament scholars themselves" (p. 229).

This is not the place to enter into a full-scale discussion of the concept of promise and fulfillment as it is employed within the Old Testament, and its function in the thought of New Testament writers, but I suspect that few biblical theologians will agree with Ruether that "the bridge that once linked the two testaments has broken down" (p. 229) simply because the cruder forms of christological midrash have been abandoned. It is entirely possible, for example, for a Christian scholar to concur with Jewish colleagues that the suffering figure of *Isaiah* 53 represents Israel as a whole, not the messiah, in the intention of the original author. This does not in the least prevent the Christian from seeing a fulfillment of this hope in the life of Jesus, the obedient Israelite. The Christian does not expect Jewish scholars to concur with this appropriation of the Isaianic hope, nor will he/she hate them for their refusal! If Ruether really means that Christians should refuse to appropriate Old Testament texts as a means of illuminating the event which gave birth to Christianity, she is asking too much. At stake here is the nature of Christianity as a religion in which salvation-history manifests the character of God. The pedestrian reduction of this enormous experience to "grace and good deeds" may be as common as Ruether supposes (pp. 224f.), but not for that reason adequate.

We must assume, however, that, in the last analysis, this is not really what Ruether is campaigning for, but rather something far more modest, more attainable, and in that sense more important. In her concluding section, "Education for a New Relationship," she proposes that Christian seminarians be confronted with the fact that the writings cherished by

Christians as the "Old Testament" constitute the living scriptures of Jews, and that Christians may learn much concerning the meaning of those writings from Jewish interpreters (p. 258). This would mean coming to grips with Judaism as a vital religion, which has at least as much right as Christians to appropriate the biblical texts as a way of articulating its own religious experience. It is obvious that what is intended here is not that Christians can or should renounce their own interpretations and simply assume Jewish ones, for the histories of the two sibling rivals are very different. What is needed is greater respect for the genuinely religious commitment of the other brother in his appropriation of the common scriptures.

We must conclude, therefore, that not only is there no essential relationship between anti-Judaism and christology in Matthew, the most anti-Judaistic of the writings we have examined, but also that the theological goal of providing positive theological space for Judaism can be accomplished apart from the total dismantling of christology and the renunciation of Christian appropriations of the Hebrew Scriptures.

Toward a Hermeneutic of Matthean Anti-Judaism

If Christian antisemitism is to be eradicated, we must find a way to neutralize the acid of Matthean anti-Judaism. How is this to be done?

Although we may sympathize with Dagobert Runes' proposal that the *Gospel of John* be drastically expurgated to remove anti-Jewish material, such proposals are really not to the point.²⁷ There is much in the Hebrew Scriptures that is repugnant to modern sensitivities, but it would be a tragic mistake to attempt to solve the problem by radical surgery. Religious literature that belongs to the constitutive era of a religious community is to be preserved in its wholeness and *interpreted* anew for each succeeding age. Demeaning statements concerning women and slaves, for example, are not to be simply expunged. They must be recognized for what they are: temporally conditioned statements made by men who were moved by the Spirit of God but who were nonetheless limited by the historical realities of their times. The statement of 1 *Timothy* 2:12, "I permit no woman to teach or have authority over men; she is to keep silent," must be interpreted in the light of texts more fundamental to Jewish and Christian anthropology, such as *Genesis* 1:27, "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them." The authority of the concrete injunction is in effect annulled by the authority of the over-arching principle. By this process of subordinating one text to the authority of another, innumerable biblical texts have been reinterpreted in both Jewish and Christian tradi-

tions when the pressure of an uneasy conscience has caused religious people to raise questions concerning the normative value of the literal words of scripture. The statements in Matthew are subject to the same process of reevaluation and reinterpretation.

We may begin by observing that there is a way of affirming Matthew 28:19 that is positive rather than negative toward Judaism. Just as the Greek Fathers took this verse to mean that the gospel was to be offered to the gentiles only, *not* to the Jews, so we can affirm that in a very profound sense the Christian gospel is for Non-Jews, not for Jews. There is no need for evangelistic campaigns to tear Jews from their rich religious tradition. Jewish worship of the One God and acts of obedience to him are authentic responses to the revelation which found literary form in the Torah, Prophets and Writings.

Another possible way of escape from Matthew's unrelenting anti-Judaism is provided by an inconsistency in Matthew's presentation of the matter of accountability before God. On the one hand, Matthew is certain that accountability is related primarily to faith, more specifically to faith that Jesus is the Son of God. Christians who deny Jesus before men will be denied before God (10:32f.). The centurion of Capernaum, because of his faith, symbolizes the gentiles who will come from East and West and sit at table with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven, while the sons of the kingdom will be thrown into the outer darkness (8:10-12). On the other hand, Matthew is too much a Jew ever to forget that the God of Israel is a moral God who demands mercy rather than sacrifice (9:13, 12:7, citing *Hos.* 6:6). It is not those who call Jesus "Lord, Lord" who will enter the kingdom of heaven, but those who *do* the will of the Father in heaven (7:21). Consequently, it is not surprising that the "Great Commission" which concludes Matthew's gospel emphasizes not the first but the second of these two kinds of accountability: "Go, therefore, and make disciples (i.e., learners, not worshipers) of all the gentiles, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, *teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you . . .*" (28:19f.).

The tension between these two kinds of accountability is apparent only in unusual circumstances, such as the case of gentiles who have never had the opportunity of hearing and responding to the gospel. Is it right that they should be condemned for failing to have manifested faith in the Son of God? Matthew's so-called parable of the sheep and goats deals with this situation very sensitively. Matthew believes that just as there are three kinds of humanity—Jews, Christians and pagans—so there will be three separate judgments. This passage deals only with the third of these.²⁸ The pagans are judged simply on an ethical basis (even the question of idolatry is quietly ignored!): "Inasmuch as you did it to one of the least of these my

brethren, you did it to me" (25:40). The love that they had not been able to render to the King they had in fact bestowed on him unknowingly through their love for fellow human beings, because in this way they were indeed disciples of Jesus incognito, doing what Jesus had commanded.

There is here, inconsistently, a kind of universalism that recognizes that faith in Jesus is not the only door into the kingdom of heaven. Could Matthew retain this vision of another fold whose sheep are precious to the King without granting in principle the possibility that Jews too, while refusing to call Jesus "Lord, Lord," nonetheless do the things which were important to him—feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, healing the sick and caring for the imprisoned—and are consequently to be reckoned among the blessed of the Father?

Although such treatments of Matthean texts may be of limited help, in the end Matthew's extreme pessimism concerning the Jews must be neutralized by Paul's unflinching optimism. Even though Paul's assessment of non-Christian Judaism is almost wholly negative (he grants that his former co-religionists "have a zeal for God," *Rom.* 10:2), he cannot bring himself to the point of considering Jews who refuse the gospel as identical in status with unbelieving pagans. In *Romans* 11:28, Paul intimates that at the present time the Jews are in a state of suspended animation; because they have refused the gospel they appear to be "the enemies of God," but this appearance of enmity has a salvation-historical function, for through their refusal the gentiles received the gospel ("they are enemies of God for your sake"). It can even be said that *God* gave them a spirit of stupor (11:8), so that they have not really "stumbled so as to fall" (11:11). Thus, despite the appearance of enmity, "as regards election they are beloved for the sake of their forefathers." Behind this conviction is Paul's doctrine of the unchanging character of God: "For the gifts and the call of God are irrevocable" (11:29). For Paul the special relationship between God and Israel was as valid in the time of the refusal of the gospel as it was in the time of Abraham and Moses.

Paul's inconsistency on this issue is notorious, but today's Christians can be grateful that in his inconsistency he has made a way through the theological sea so that we can escape from our bondage to anti-Judaism. Whereas Matthew insists that Israel as a corporate reality has no further positive relationship to God, Paul just as emphatically maintains that Israel is still God's elect people. Even though unbelieving Jews appear to be "enemies," they are in reality "beloved."

What does this mean? At the very least it means that Christians, recognizing that the people called Jews are still in a positive relationship with God, must desist from demeaning allusions to the poverty of Jewish legalism. Paul's rebuke, intended for a different context, is nonetheless

appropriate here: "Who are you to pass judgment on the servant of another? It is before his own master that he stands or falls" (*Rom.* 14:4). At the most, it means that Christians must embrace Jews as brothers and sisters who share the same household of faith, because they are beloved by the same Father.

Rosemary Ruether has helped to move us toward this goal.

Notes

1. This statement reiterates the opinion I expressed in a review of *Faith and Fratricide* in *Religious Studies Review* 2 (1976) p. 21. The present study will reveal that I have qualified my support of Ruether's theses at a number of points.

2. Cf. Gregory Baum, *Is the New Testament Anti-Semitic?* rev. ed. (Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1965) pp. 69-74.

3. One could even argue that in terms of historical causality the Church's christology derived from its prophetic anti-Judaism rather than the reverse. Had Palestinian Jews and their religious leaders responded *en masse* to Jesus' prophetic appeal for repentance and non-violence, voiding the necessity of his crucifixion by the Romans, there might have been no appropriation of the category "messiah" to interpret the meaning of Jesus.

4. Cf. R. Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition*, trans. J. Marsh (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963) pp. 52f.

5. Cf. D. R. A. Hare, *The Theme of Jewish Persecution of Christians in the Gospel According to St. Matthew* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) pp. 146f.

6. The less probable alternative is that Peter and others involved in the mission to Israel were afflicted with a theologically grounded persecution complex, according to which it was necessary to continue to evoke the evidence of Israel's apostasy manifested in the persecution of the prophets.

7. Cf. H.-J. Schoeps, *Jewish Christianity*, trans. D. R. A. Hare (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1969) pp. 36f., 136f.

8. Cf. G. Dix, *Jew and Greek: A Study in the Primitive Church* (London: Dacre Press, 1953) p. 43, with reference to Gal. 2:12.

9. Cf. *Persec. in Matthew*, pp. 1-18. Ruether's analysis of Judaism's Great Refusal (p. 245) is likewise conceived too narrowly in theological terms, ignoring sociological categories such as the concern for ethnic identity.

10. Cf. A. E. J. Rawlinson, *St. Mark* (London: Methuen & Co., 1925) p. 51.

11. Cf. E. Hoskyns and N. Davey, *The Riddle of the New Testament* 3rd ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1947) p. 124: "In its present setting . . . this story clearly declares the rejection of Israel because it had failed to bear the fruit which the messiah expected to find." P. J. Achtemeier, *Mark* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975) pp. 23-6, argues that the bracketing indicates that for Mark Jesus' prophetic act symbolically *terminates* the temple cultus, which has not borne its proper fruit. If Achtemeier is correct, this material reflects not gentilizing anti-Judaism but rather that *intra muros* debate concerning the validity of the cultus which is found in the prophets, at Qumran, and in Diaspora Judaism.

12. If 12:9 is to be taken allegorically, it must refer not to the destruction of Israel's national existence but rather to the termination of the leadership role of the high priests, scribes and elders; cf. Baum pp. 58f.

13. Cf. Baum, p. 41. The parallel in Matthew 27:18 omits the explicit reference to the high priests.

14. Cf. *Persec. in Matthew*, pp. 96-114.

15. Cf. J. Munck, *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind*, trans. F. Clarke (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1959) pp. 40f.

16. The Lives of the Prophets, an early Jewish apocryphal writing, reports the martyrdoms of five of the literary prophets, all at Jewish hands (Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Micah and Amos), and, where possible, gives the location of the grave. We must assume that the graves of these prophets were much sought out by pilgrims.

17. L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1947) vol. 4, p. 295, cites a haggadah in which the youth Jeremia declares: "O Lord, I cannot go as a prophet to Israel, for when lived there a prophet whom Israel did not desire to kill?"

18. Cf. Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971) p. 535, commenting on 18:6, "As in 13:46 and 28:28 this renunciation makes it clear to the reader that Israel by her own fault has forfeited salvation and made the proclamation to the gentiles necessary, so that now Paul can go to them with a good conscience." An excellent study of Luke's perception of Israel is provided by J. Jervell, *Luke and the People of God* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1972).

19. Only Luke reports that Jesus was circumcised on the eighth day (Lk. 2:21)! The attitude of Luke to the Torah is studied by Jervell, pp. 133-51.

20. Ruether, 89f., notes that in Acts the term "the Jews" is used primarily in a negative sense. Cf. also H. Conzelmann, *The Theology of St. Luke*, trans. G. Buswell (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1960) p. 145.

21. Cf. *Persec. in Matthew*, pp. 162f.

22. Cf. W. Trilling, *Das Wahre Israel*, 3rd ed. (Munich: Kösel-Verlag, 1964) pp. 86f.

23. Cf. D. R. A. Hare and D. J. Harrington, "'Make Disciples of All the Gentiles' (Matthew 28:19)" *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 37 (1975) pp. 359-69. Arguments in favor of the traditional interpretation are presented by J. P. Meier, "Nations or Gentiles in Matthew 28:19?" *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 39 (1977) pp. 94-102. Despite scholarly disagreement concerning Matthew's intention in his use of the phrase, it is important for the present study to note that the Greek fathers understood the text as excluding the Jews; cf. Hare and Harrington, pp. 367f.

24. I would disagree with Ruether's contention, p. 94, that this extreme position regarding Israel was reached by the early Church prior to Paul's letters. P. Richardson, *Israel in the Apostolic Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) pp. 188-94, argues that even for Matthew the break between Church and Synagogue is not complete, and that Matthew's polemic is directed primarily against the Pharisaic party, not Israel as a whole.

25. A good discussion of this distinction is provided by R. H. Fuller, *The Foundations of New Testament Christology* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965) pp. 247-50.

26. Cf. D. Hill, *The Gospel of Matthew* (London: Oliphants, 1972) pp. 78-80.

27. D. D. Runes, *The Gospel According to St. John* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1967) pp. v-vi.

28. Cf. Hare and Harrington, pp. 364f.

Paul and the Torah

Lloyd Gaston

James Parkes has devoted his life to the issue of Christian antisemitism, often as a rather lonely voice in the wilderness. The Holocaust and the refounding of the state of Israel have opened some startled eyes, but in general theology has gone on as if nothing had happened. Now Rosemary Ruether has posed in all its sharpness what must surely become *the* theological question for Christians in our generation. "Possibly anti-Judaism is too deeply embedded in the foundations of Christianity to be rooted out entirely without destroying the whole structure" (p. 228). It may be that the Church will survive if we fail to deal adequately with that question, but more serious is the question whether the Church ought to survive. A Christian Church with an antisemitic New Testament is abominable, but a Christian Church without a New Testament is inconceivable. Many would add that a New Testament without the Christ-event as its material center and the Pauline corpus as its formal center would not be the New Testament at all. And yet, whatever the general effect of the gospels, it is Paul who has provided the theoretical structure for Christian anti-Judaism, from Marcion through Luther and F. C. Baur down to Bultmann, in a manner even more serious than Ruether indicates in her brief discussion of Paul. Here then is the dilemma.

For me, as a Calvinistic Protestant, the dilemma is posed from perhaps a slightly different perspective than it is for Ruether. It has been said that Protestants tend to study movements from the perspective of origins and Catholics from the perspective of development. In any case, Ruether's Paul sounds quite patristic. The insight that Platonic dualism replaced eschatological dualism (p. 95) is exceedingly fruitful, but surely this is a post-Pauline development. The view that the Mosaic covenant belongs to "a people who were apostate from the beginning" (p. 104, cf p. 76) sounds more like the *Epistle of Barnabas* than Paul, and I wonder if there really is that much of an "affinity between Marcionite and Pauline thinking" (p. 50). "The Christological midrash and its anti-Judaic left

hand" is characteristic of Justin¹ and the *adversus Judaeos* literature, but is it really the "foundation" on which Paul builds (p. 95)? Pauline anti-Judaism does not arise as the left hand of his christology, but rather as a right-handed spear aimed straight at the heart of Judaism, viz. Torah. To be sure, there is a close relationship between Paul's christology and his teaching on the law, but his midrash seems to be halakhic and direct rather than haggadic and christological. Hence, I am going to shift the discussion from Ruether's Paul to Luther's Paul. The shift is only one of emphasis, but it allows me to deal with one specific issue which has most offended Jewish readers of Paul.

The Polemic against Legalism

Paul seems to speak not incidentally but fundamentally about the nature of Judaism. He does not disagree with individual Jews but with Judaism itself,¹ saying that Christianity has replaced it. By attacking the law as such, Paul appears to attack the very essence of Israel, and he does so from a position of knowledge. Paul the Pharisee, the disciple of Rabban Gamaliel, has experienced the best that Judaism has to offer and has rejected it completely, so much so that Wellhausen could call him "the great pathologist of Judaism."² It almost seems that Paul is able to proclaim his gospel of grace only against the dark foil of Jewish legalism. The Judaism which is reflected in his polemic is a joyless, hypocritical, nationalistic means of earning salvation by mechanically doing the works of the law. The God of the Jews is a remote, gloomy tyrant who lays the burden of the law on men, and their response is twofold: they either become proud and self-righteous hypocrites who are scrupulous about food but ignore justice, or they are plunged into guilt and anxiety, thinking themselves accursed for breaking a single commandment. Schürer speaks of "the fearful burden which a spurious legalism had laid upon the shoulders of the people."³ Against this kind of background the gospel of freedom from the law is good news indeed, and only a stiff-necked stubbornness has kept the Jews from welcoming it.

From one mountain peak it is possible to look over to the brilliance of another mountain peak and then down into the cloud-covered valley between them. From the perspective of Luther's rediscovery of the gospel of grace it was possible to look back to the Pauline proclamation he had revived, and, in between, to see the dark valley which henceforth was to be called the "Middle Ages." Similarly, Paul's gospel of justification by faith alone could be seen as a revival of the faith of Abraham, who "believed and it was reckoned to him as righteousness," who became the father of Jews and proselytes, and who lived 430 years before the law. In between

were the dark middle ages of the Torah, which had intruded into history in order to increase sin (*Gal.* 3:19, *Rom.* 5:20), which was given not by God but only by angels (*Gal.* 3:19f), and which functioned at best as a pedagogue and at worst as a jail-keeper (*Gal.* 3:24) until Christ should come to revive Abraham's life of faith. Even if the law were interpreted positively as a means of salvation whereby man might be justified, it had failed, for "by the law no one is justified before God" (*Gal.* 3:11, *Rom.* 3:20), and now "Christ is the end of the law" (*Rom.* 10:4). Paul's view of history, like Luther's, was apparently determined by his own personal past, i.e., the contrast between the old and new life of the convert. Such a view remains the common understanding of Paul's relationship to Judaism in most Christian circles today, implying that the complete elimination of an Israel faithful to the Torah is the ultimate goal of the Church. Is it then inevitable that a Pauline Christian be essentially antisemitic?

Perhaps I should make clear what I mean when I speak of antisemitism or anti-Judaism in this connection. Just as individuals can be relatively free of personal prejudice and still participate actively in a system of racism, so anti-Judaism has to do with words and their objective effects whether or not the people who speak them subjectively hate Jews. This underlines the seriousness of Ruether's point that theological anti-Judaism is the fundamental root of later cultural and political antisemitism. If the three pillars on which Judaism stands are God, Torah and Israel, then a fundamental attack on any of the three would be anti-Jewish, i.e., a denial of the right of Jews to exist in terms of their own self-understanding. Is Paul guilty? Although many of his interpreters from Marcion to Harnack made a distinction between the God of the Old Testament and the God of the New, this surely does not hold for Paul himself. Yet, with respect to Torah, did not Paul declare that "Christ is the end of the law" (*Rom.* 10:4), so that one can say, "Saint Paul . . . now feels that he has a superior revelation in whose light the Jewish Torah becomes reduced to a demonized revelation and negative power on the level of those evil Powers and Principalities which reign over the imprisoned cosmos?"⁴ And, with respect to Israel, does not the logic of Paul's position mean that it has been replaced by the Christian Church, called from Jews and gentiles, who appropriate Israel's responsibilities, privileges, scriptures and name? Although Paul explicitly denies these charges ["Do we then overthrow the law by this faith? By no means" (*Rom.* 3:31); "Has God rejected his people? By no means" (*Rom.* 11:1)], it is typical that C. H. Dodd, for example, has to scold Paul for inconsistency in his commentary on those passages.⁵ According to the almost universal interpretation of Paul, he is plainly guilty of these two charges, so that, wittingly or unwittingly, his theology has become a major source of Christian anti-Judaism.

Beginning from the second century, it has been the displacement theory—the view that the Church has supplanted Israel as the people of God—which has been the greatest obstacle to the Christian understanding of Jews. To be sure, Paul does not cite the standard rejection texts (*Is.* 6, *Ps.* 118, etc.); he never applies the honored name of Israel to the Church;⁶ the phrase “Israel according to the flesh” is not used negatively,⁷ and, in spite of many interpreters, is never counterbalanced by the phrase “Israel according to the Spirit”; and he seems to affirm the continued election of Israel (*Rom.* 3:1; 9:3-5; 11:28f, etc.). Nevertheless, it is very salutary for Ruether to point out that interpretations of *Romans* 9-11 offered to date continue to deny to Israel any positive significance according to its own self-understanding for the period between resurrection and parousia.⁸ But, these points aside, the displacement theory is so bound up with the understanding of the continuing validity of the Torah, that, for Bultmann and his followers, the end of the history of Israel as the people of God is paradigmatically expressed in *Romans* 10:4, “Christ is the end of the law.” Again, the Pauline concept of *Torah-nomos* is the heart of the matter.

It is Paul’s abrogation of the law which most disturbs Jewish interpreters and those who know something of the concept of Torah in Jewish thought. Paul’s invective disturbs them less than his ignorance. For anyone who understands rabbinic Judaism, Paul’s attacks are not merely unfair—they miss the mark completely. The rabbis never speak of Torah as the means to salvation, and when they speak of salvation at all, the way of Torah, “which is your life” (*Deut.* 32:47), is that salvation. While the ethical seriousness of the rabbis is heightened because of their belief that the commandments express God’s will for man’s good, they cannot in all fairness be called legalists. Faith and works are never seen as opposites, for each would be meaningless without the other. The law is not felt to be burdensome (when it is, it is modified), and the characteristic phrase is “the joy of the commandments.” Far from being an inducement to sin or the curse of condemnation, the law is God’s gracious means of helping people to conquer their “evil impulse.” There is no indication that Paul is aware that many of the laws concern the means of atonement, which presuppose human sin but also proclaim the divine forgiveness. It is very significant that the concept of repentance, so central not only to rabbinic theology but also to the teaching of Jesus, never occurs in Paul. As G. F. Moore says: “How a Jew of Paul’s antecedents could ignore, and by implication deny, the great prophetic doctrine of repentance, which, individualized and interiorized, was a cardinal doctrine of Judaism, namely, that God, out of love, freely forgives the sincerely penitent sinner and restores him to his favor—that seems from the Jewish point of view inexplicable.”⁹ One of the best recent books on Paul’s theology (by H. J.

Schoeps) has to entitle the conclusion of the chapter on Paul's teaching about the law "Paul's Fundamental Misapprehension." Schoeps writes, "Paul did not perceive and for various reasons was perhaps unable to perceive, that in the Biblical view the law is integral to the covenant. . . . The law was no longer a living possession, and this for the obvious reason that he had ceased to understand the totality and continuity of the Berith-Torah."¹⁰ How is Paul's fundamental ignorance to be explained? Various suggestions have been offered:

1. The traditional answer to the problem is to deny its existence. Most Christian scholars have drawn their primary understanding of the Jewish concept of Torah not from Jewish sources but from the pages of the New Testament itself. This understanding could then be "discovered" in the pseudepigrapha (Bousset-Gressmann), or in Talmud and Midrash (Weber, Billerbeck). The fundamental ignorance, not of Paul but of his interpreters, has been documented for earlier works by G. F. Moore¹¹ among others, but it is still very prevalent, including the only book on Pauline theology cited by Ruether.¹² This was not done out of malice. Most of the great interpreters of Paul identified Paul's opponents with their own. Particularly impressive is the recent commentary on *Romans* by E. Käsemann, which identifies the "Jew" with the universal type of *homo religiosus* (read: the Church establishment). But can profound theology be bought at the price of historical inaccuracy and the slander of a sister religion?

2. Paul, apostle to the gentiles, was not really attacking Judaism as such, but Jewish Christians from Jerusalem who asserted the necessity for salvation of keeping the whole law. F. C. Baur, who suggested this answer a century ago, derived his concept of Jewish-Christianity from the caricature of Judaism held by most Christians, from his own fertile Hegelian imagination, and from the Pseudo-Clementine literature, which he thought was quite early. According to Baur, the Jerusalem Christians were not only legalists of the worst sort, but they were fiercely opposed to Paul and violently jealous of his gentile converts. Following him around the cities of the East and attempting to subject his congregations to Jerusalem were emissaries of James and Peter, whom Paul had to denounce as the party of Cephas (I *Cor.* 1:12), super-apostles, servants of Satan (II *Cor.* 11:5, 13f), so-called pillars who were false brethren intruding to rob Christians of their liberty (*Gal.* 2:4), dogs and evil-workers who mutilated the flesh (*Phil.* 3:2). The most important work opposing Baur's reconstruction is J. Munck's *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind*,¹³ a book which, in spite of some weaknesses, represents the beginning of a new look in Pauline studies. According to Munck, Paul was interested not in isolated individuals but in the place of Jews and gentiles in God's *Heilsgeschichte*, and his

basic theological position did not differ from that of the Jerusalem Christians.

3. If Paul's opponents were not Jewish Christians, perhaps they were Jews after all. Perhaps Paul, as in the portrayal of *Acts*, was a frustrated missionary to the Jews who, constantly meeting stubborn resistance from the synagogues, finally turned in resentment to the gentiles. Such was the situation in Salamis (*Acts* 13:5), Pisidian Antioch (13:14), Iconium (14:1), Thessalonica (17:1), Beroea (17:10), Athens (17:17), Corinth (18:4), Ephesus (18:19, 19:8), and as a climax at Rome (28:17). Thus, Paul declared in Antioch, "It was necessary that the work of God should be spoken first to you. Since you thrust it from you and judge yourselves unworthy of eternal life, behold we turn to the gentiles" (13:46). If this picture is true, it could explain Paul's polemic even without recourse to the Tübingen hypothesis of opposition from Jerusalem. Paul's frustration would account for the bitterness of his attacks, and his few successes could account for enough Jewish Christians in his congregations to provide a stimulus for them. But, because a primary source is always preferable to a secondary source, the letters should provide the basic framework of our understanding of Paul's life and thought, to which certain statements in *Acts* can provide, at the most, supplementary evidence.

4. If, then, Paul is attacking neither Jewish Christians nor the synagogues of the Diaspora who refused to listen to him, perhaps the battle is within himself, and as a typical convert he has come to hate what he once adored. The psychological approach, particularly popular among pietists, makes a great deal out of Paul's "conversion" as his personal release from an anguished conscience in bondage to the works of the law. But Paul does not repudiate his own past in this negative way (*Gal.* 2:13f; *Phil.* 3:5f), *Romans* 7 is not to be interpreted autobiographically,¹⁴ and we have learned from J. Munck to speak of Paul's call as a prophetic commissioning (*Gal.* 1:15f), rather than a conversion from a repudiated past.¹⁵ If Munck is correct, Paul's central theological concern is *not* his salvation from his own past, nor authentic existence, nor even justification by faith of the individual, but rather the legitimacy of including gentiles at this time as full-fledged members of the people of God. (K. Stendahl has spoken to this point in a seminal article, "The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West."¹⁶) It would not be necessary to mention this approach except for its recent revival in an extreme form in a book which, however moving as a personal testimony, is not persuasive otherwise: R. Rubenstein's *My Brother Paul*. If we had to choose, a Marxist interpretation of Paul (as in F. W. Marquardt, *Die Juden im Römerbrief*) is much more appropriate than a Freudian one.

5. Perhaps Paul's attitude is best understood against the background

of Hellenistic Judaism. The word *nomos* is so different from the word *torah* that Hellenistic Jewish conceptions, which were "poorer, colder, less satisfying and more pessimistic than Rabbinic Judaism," must have provided the impoverished understanding against which Paul's polemic was directed.¹⁷ Or, it may be that the Diaspora was exceptionally lax,¹⁸ and that Paul only perfected what was already a tendency within Hellenistic Judaism to subordinate the particularistic law of Sinai to the universalistic law of nature.¹⁹ But scholars have now learned to abandon the false dichotomy between Hellenistic and Palestinian Judaism, for there were too many Hellenistic elements among the rabbis and too many Palestinian loyalties in the Diaspora, as well as too much intercourse between the two for this explanation to work. Hence, such an attempt to account for Paul's apparent rejection of the Torah can be considered to have failed.

6. Perhaps Paul should be understood as a theologian of the messianic age, in which there will be no more Torah.²⁰ Particularly impressive is the parallelism which can be drawn with the antinomianism of some of the followers of Sabbatai Zvi.²¹ Ultimately, however, this solution too fails. The texts are all very late and do not really speak of the abolition of Torah.²² Even if this concept could be presupposed for a first century situation, it would still have to fall under the accusation of being a fundamental misunderstanding of Torah within the context of Israel.

Torah and Christ are for Paul mutually exclusive categories, even if it is not clear why this is so. Whether his enthusiasm caused him to exaggerate or whether he really knew no better, Paul seems systematically to denigrate the significance of the Torah for Israel. It is wise to digest this before seeking too quickly another solution, and that is the great value of Ruether's presentation. However, I have lived with the problem long enough that I cannot help but go on. Given the history of Christian bias so well documented by Ruether, perhaps in every case of doubt we ought to decide for a positive interpretation. This is true with respect to textual criticism,²³ translation,²⁴ and the many decisions that have to be made on exegetical options.²⁵ There exist today in Pauline studies the beginnings of such a radical rethinking. This is not being done in the spirit of a theological reparation, if that were possible, but as a search for a new and better understanding of Paul on the part of those whose eyes have been shocked open. Thereby we may find a foundation within the New Testament itself for attacking the Christian anti-Judaic myth Ruether so eloquently delineates.

The account of the discussions in Jerusalem, *Galatians* 2:1-10, is, in my opinion, absolutely crucial for an interpretation of Paul. While Paul speaks about the conference in terms of its implications for the Galatian situation, I agree with Schmithals²⁶ that those who had the most at stake in

the meeting were the Jerusalem Christians whose position would be rendered precarious unless it was made clear that he was preaching his law-free gospel only to gentiles and not to Jews. The results of the conference were an agreement on basic theology, an agreement to disagree on the priority of the gentile mission, and the arrangement of a collection from the Pauline churches to Jerusalem as a sign of their mutual unity. Most important was the division of the mission field: "When they saw that I had been entrusted with the gospel to the uncircumcised, like Peter to the circumcised, for he who worked in Peter for the apostolate to the circumcised worked in me also for the gentiles, and when they came to know the grace given to me, James and Cephas and John gave to me and Barnabas the right hand of fellowship, that we should go to the gentiles and they to the circumcised" (2:7-9). I believe that Paul kept this agreement throughout his career, confining his preaching strictly to gentile God-fearers, and never encouraging Jews to abandon the Torah, so that he was innocent of the accusations which led to his final arrest. This is consonant with his commissioning: "It pleased him who had set me apart from my mother's womb and had called me through his grace to reveal his son in me, that I might preach him among the gentiles" (1:15f). Without the special revelation of God which said that Paul should preach Christ among the gentiles, there would be no legitimacy to his gospel, leaving his gentile converts, who were not proselytes, as still strangers and sojourners rather than members of the household of God. Although it is not emphasized, we note that Paul was *not* commissioned to preach among Jews, whether about Jesus Christ or the Torah or anything else. It is perhaps not too fanciful to make a comparison to the prophet Jonah, who was commissioned to deliver a specific message to the gentile Ninevites, but to whom was given no word of the Lord to Israel.

What is the content of Paul's gospel (*Rom.* 2:16, etc.), the "gospel to the uncircumcised" (*Gal.* 2:7), which he "preaches among the gentiles" (2:2), and which says that "God would justify the gentiles" (3:8)? In answering this question, it is important to realize that Paul's letters were written to congregations overwhelmingly made up of gentiles, most of whom were former "God-fearers," with only a few Jewish co-workers. This is true of Thessalonica ("how you turned to God from idols to serve a living and true God" *I Thess.* 1:9), Corinth ("you know that when you were gentiles you were led astray to dumb idols" *I Cor.* 12:2), Philippi ("watch out for circumcision . . . and do not trust in the flesh" *Phil.* 3:2f), Galatians ("Formerly when you did not know God, you were in bondage to beings that by nature are no gods" *Gal.* 4:8), Romans ("among all the gentiles, including yourselves" *Rom.* 1:5f, cf. 1:13; 6:19; 11:13; 28; 15:15f), to which we can add the deutero-Pauline letters to Colossae ("you who

were dead in your trespasses and the uncircumcision of your flesh" *Col.* 2:13, cf. 1:21, 27), and Ephesus ("you gentiles in the flesh, called the uncircumcision . . . , alienated from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the covenants of promise, having no hope and without God in the world" *Eph.* 2:11f, cf. 2:1-3; 4:17-19). Paul writes to gentile Christians, dealing with gentile-Christian problems, foremost among which was the right of gentiles qua gentiles, without adopting the Torah of Israel, to full citizenship in the people of God. It is remarkable that in the endless discussions of Paul's understanding of the law, few have asked what a first century Jew would have thought of the law *as it related to gentiles!*²⁷ W. D. Davies has recently been so bold as to claim that the relationship of Israel to the gentile world was *the* theological problem of Judaism in the first century.²⁸ Let us look for a moment at the setting for Paul's proclamation.

The Torah and the Gentiles

In her discussion of the Christian anti-Judaic myth, Ruether points out quite correctly that while the schism of particularism and universalism is a major problem for the Church, Judaism has long since found an admirable solution (pp. 236ff). Alongside the fundamental postulate, "All Israel has a share in the world to come" (*MSanh* 10:1)²⁹ stands the corollary concerning the "righteous among the nations of the world who have a share in the world to come" (*TSanh* 13:2—R. Joshua, end of first century). It is precisely Israel's universalistic perspective, allowing non-Jews to relate to God in their own way, that enables Israel to have her particular way of relating to God through the Sinai covenant. But, to be deemed righteous, one must live in some form of relationship with the Creator, and there can be no relationship with God apart from Torah (understood as revelation),³⁰ and there can be no Torah apart from commandments.³¹ What commandments should "the righteous among the nations of the world" live by?

As far as I can determine, the first clear Jewish answer to this question was given by Maimonides: "Everyone who accepts the seven (Noachic) commandments and observes them carefully is one of the righteous of the nations of the world and has a share in the world to come. But he must accept and observe them on the ground that the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them in the Torah and that He informed us through our teacher Moses that the children of Noah had earlier been given these commandments. But if he practices them on the basis of his own rational considerations, then he is not a *ger toshav* (resident alien) nor one of the righteous of the nations of the world, but one of their sages."³² Just as for the Jew commandments were to be done *lishmah* (for their own

sake, without ulterior motive) and with *kavvanah* (with intention to do them as commandments of God), so also for the righteous gentile what really counted was not the doing of works *per se*,³³ or the number of commandments, but the deeper acknowledgment of a relationship with God. Whether connected with the Noachic commandments, and apart from Maimonides' qualification about believing in revelation, the concept of righteous gentiles has since become general within Judaism. But this was not always the case.

Before Maimonides, the concept of the Noachic commandments³⁴ really had nothing to do with the point under consideration, for "the righteous among the nations" were never mentioned in connection with them. When discussed in the Talmud (*Sanh.* 56-60a), the context is of actual (if at that time theoretical) court decisions concerning gentiles living in an independent land of Israel (resident aliens). There is no reference to a covenant of grace or the possibility of repentance and atonement, and the penalty for violation is (theoretically) death. There is still some debate about the number (up to 30 are mentioned) and content of the commandments, and, in fact, more than seven stipulations concerning the "stranger who sojourns among you" are found in the Pentateuch, such as those in *Lev.* 17-18 which are taken up in the apostolic decree of *Acts* 15, 21. The point of this legislation is only to keep the land from being polluted. Of the commandments chosen, one comes from *Gen.* 9:4, and the other six are ingeniously derived from *Gen.* 2:16, "And the Lord God commanded Adam. . ." This is an important verse, because it shows that from the beginning God related to his creatures through commandments, and that Adam is an appropriate figure to use when thinking about the relationship between God and the gentile world.

Let us return to the two statements concerning Israel and the righteous among the nations. How old is the concept that all Israel has a share in the world to come? Recent studies show that "in the entire body of Palestinian Jewish literature between Ben Sirah and the redaction of the Mishnah, with only the exception of IV *Ezra*, membership in the covenant is considered salvation."³⁵ With respect to the concept of the "righteous among the nations of the world" sharing in the world to come, the evidence is mixed. There is one clear parallel in *Test Naph* 8:3, which says that in the end times God will appear "to save the nation of Israel and to gather together the righteous from amongst the gentiles," but it is not said how the righteous are to be defined. In addition to proselytes, there were many in the ancient world who were attracted to Judaism as a kind of religious philosophy and attached themselves to the synagogues, keeping many of the customs (commandments) without in any sense being Jews: the so-called "God-fearers." (The terminology is unclear, for often in our

texts the term "God-fearer" designates Jews or proselytes, but the existence of such a class cannot be denied.) Were they considered righteous? It seems that in the conversion of the royal family of Adiabene,³⁶ Ananias held King Izates to be such without circumcision. While Philo's attitude to God-fearers is not at all clear, he seems to sound a positive note when he observes (*Apion* II, 39) "There is not a single Greek or barbarian city, not a single people, to which the custom of Sabbath observance has not spread, or in which the fast days, the kindling of lights, and many of our prohibitions about food are not heeded." If G. Klein is right,³⁷ there was an extensive catechism literature produced for God-fearers, reflected in pseudo-Phocylides, the two-ways catechism, and some of the Sibyllines and *Derech Eretz* literature. We note, however, that the God-fearers kept many commandments, not the Noachic ones, only without circumcision, and that their status as being "righteous," while probable, is not really clarified.

It is because of this unclarity that legalism—the doing of certain works in order to win God's favor and be counted righteous—arose as a gentile and not a Jewish problem at all.³⁸ Salvation and God's grace were for all under the covenant who had not cast off the yoke of the Torah, but God-fearers *not* under the covenant had to establish their righteousness by the performance of certain works, compounded by uncertainty as to what these works should be. M. Barth³⁹ has shown that the phrase "works of the law," which is not found in any Jewish texts, refers to the adoption of selected Jewish practices on the part of gentiles and their attempt to impose them upon others as a means of self-justification. Such people are called Judaizers, those who want "to live according to the Jewish way of life," at least in part. That there were such gentile Judaizers in Asia Minor and that their message was a temptation for the Church is shown by *Revelation* 2:9 and 3:9, "those who say they are Jews and are not," and two interesting passages in Ignatius: "It is monstrous to talk of Jesus Christ and to Judaize" (*Mag.* 10:3; of course, it is not at all monstrous to believe in Jesus and be a Jew), and "But if anyone interprets Judaism to you do not listen to him; for it is better to hear Christianity from the circumcized (such as Paul) than Judaism from the uncircumcized" (such as the Judaizers, *Phil.* 6:1). Recognition of the existence of such legalistic gentile Judaizers is an important part of the background for understanding Paul's polemic.

In addition to the concept of righteous gentiles sketched above, there is another which is just as old. That is the concept that God offered the covenant-Torah to all the nations of the world, but it was accepted only by Israel. Moore says concerning it, "Did it consist with the justice of God that the heathen of all generations should be doomed for not keeping a law

which neither they nor their fathers had ever known? Some such reflections, I conceive, gave rise to the persuasion that the law must have been revealed to the Gentiles also; not alone the rudimentary law given to Adam and repeated to Noah, but the law in its Sinaitic completeness."⁴⁰ Of the many passages containing this idea, let me cite just one⁴¹ concerning God's voice on Sinai, "How did the voice go forth? R. Tanhuma said: The word of the Lord went forth in two aspects, slaying the heathen who would not accept it, but giving life to Israel who accepted the Torah." How can the one Torah be both a Torah of life (for Israel) and a Torah of death (for gentiles)? We must look more closely at this problem.

In early Judaism, the concept of Torah developed in two directions. (1) Torah as the revelation of God came to mean God in his knowability, in his presence, in his electing will, in his covenant. The concept of covenant—so important in the Hebrew Bible—did not disappear in Hellenistic or rabbinic Judaism, although the terminology changed. In Greek *diathēkai* means decrees or promises,⁴² even in the literal sense of testament (will), while in Hebrew *berith* became more and more restricted to circumcision. Hence, with the disappearance of a separate designation, the concept of covenant came to be more and more expressed by the words *torah* or *nomos*. Failure to understand the gracious, covenantal aspect of Torah has been one of the major reasons for Christian misconceptions of "law" within Judaism, which scholarship is now correcting. D. Rössler⁴ has shown that in apocalyptic literature one's status before God is determined by one's attitude to Torah as a document of election, and not by the performance of individual commandments. His thesis has been expanded by Niessen⁴⁴ and Sanders,⁴⁵ who have demonstrated that the same holds true also for rabbinic Judaism. Also, contrary to earlier assumptions, the Greek word *nomos* in many passages of the Septuagint and pseudepigrapha maintains the Torah connotations of revelation and covenant rather than mere law.⁴⁶ The wide-reaching richness conveyed by the word Torah is exceedingly important for understanding the nature of Judaism, but it *might* also tend to exclude gentiles from any meaningful relationship to God. Israel's openness to the gentile world qua gentiles is as old as Amos, but it is not universal within Judaism, for there was a major strand which said that concern for gentiles implied their incorporation into Israel. This tendency was reinforced by the development of another aspect in the understanding of Torah. (2) The concept of Torah was widened in a different direction when it became identified with wisdom. This first occurred clearly in *Sirach* (*Ecclesiasticus*). Wisdom was international, it was incorporated into creation itself, and therefore Torah was seen not as the privilege of Israel but as "the light of the law which was given for to lighten every man" (*Test Levi* 14:4), "the guide of life" (*Sib* III, 195), the

Torath ha-Adam (law of mankind, *Sifra* 86b). What this might mean for gentiles can be shown by a passage in *Sirach*: "The Lord created man out of earth. He filled them with knowledge and understanding and showed them good and evil. He bestowed knowledge upon them, and allotted to them the law of life. He established with them an eternal covenant, and showed them his judgments. Their eyes saw his glorious majesty, and their ears heard the glory of his voice. And he said to them, 'Beware of all unrighteousness.' And he gave commandment to each of them concerning his neighbor. He appointed a ruler for every nation, but Israel is the Lord's own portion" (*Sir.* 17:1, 7, 11-14, 17). But although wisdom was offered to the whole creation, it found no abiding place in the gentile world, and settled in Israel. "Then the Creator of all things gave me (wisdom) a commandment, and the one who created me assigned a place for my tent. And he said, 'Make your dwelling in Jacob, and in Israel receive your inheritance.' All this is the book of the covenant of the Most High God, the law which Moses commanded us as an inheritance for the congregations of Jacob" (*Sir.* 24:8, 23). Here we find the earlier counterpart of the rabbinic midrash on the offering of Torah to all nations and its acceptance only by Israel.⁴⁷ As soon as the Torah is identified with *wisdom*, then all nations are under the Torah as they are under the laws of creation,⁴⁸ but as soon as wisdom is identified with *Torah*, then the nations must keep all the laws given to Israel without being part of the covenant God made with Israel.

This background can help explain a rather strange phenomenon in many of the apocalyptic writings of the period. In the Hebrew Bible and in Talmud and Midrash there are two extreme conceptions concerning the fate of the gentiles in the end times: complete destruction or salvation by incorporation into Israel. There is also, as we have seen, the idea that the "righteous among the nations of the world" need come under neither Israel's covenant nor Israel's laws in order to attain salvation at the judgment. In the writings of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, however, with few exceptions the gentiles will be condemned at the judgment on the ground that they did not keep the commandments of God given not only to Israel at Sinai but to all mankind through Adam.⁴⁹ (It is consistent with this view that many of these writings emphasize that the Patriarchs, who lived before Moses, nevertheless kept the Sinai commandments.)⁵⁰ But, apart from the Patriarchs, there is said to be no hope for descendents of Adam who do not have the antidote to sin⁵¹ given at the Sinai covenant. One quotation will have to stand for many:⁵² "Let many perish who are now living, rather than that the law of God which is set before them be disregarded! For God strictly commanded those who came into the world,

when they came, what they should do to live, and what they should observe to avoid punishment. Nevertheless they were not obedient, and spoke against him; they devised for themselves vain thoughts, and proposed to themselves wicked frauds; they even declared that the Most High does not exist, and they ignored his ways! They scorned his law, and denied his decrees; they have been unfaithful to his statutes, and have not performed his works" (4 Ezra 7:20-24). *For gentiles, who do not have the Torah as covenant, Torah as law functions in an exclusively negative way, to condemn.* When this is allied with the notion, common in certain circles, that this law is administered by the 70 guardian angels of the nations, who were present at Mt. Sinai and heard the law proclaimed, then we can grasp not only Paul's background but also that of later gnosticism.

Within Pharisaic Judaism, the group that stood closest to this strict application of the law to gentiles was probably the House of Shammai. I am not thinking of the personal animosity to gentiles attributed to Shammai and Eliezer b. Hyrkanos in some stories and sayings, but of the fact that they were less open to compromise on matters of the law *vis-à-vis* proselytes, as well as more pessimistic concerning gentiles and more zealous for the law in general. Thus, as a counterpoint to the leniency of Ananias in the story of the conversion of King Izates, Eleazar later insisted on circumcision and the whole law. Especially significant were the nationalistic Eighteen Measures against gentiles forced through by the House of Shammai at the beginning of the war of 66-70 C.E.⁵³ Remembering that the word "Zealot" did not acquire the technical meaning of a specific party before the war, we can nevertheless maintain that the concept of being zealous for the law fitted the Shammaites better than other Pharisees. There are many indications that Paul was a Shammaite.⁵⁴ We note also how he always uses the word "zealous" whenever he refers to his earlier life: "with respect to zeal persecuting the church" (*Phil.* 3:6), "being exceedingly zealous for the traditions of my fathers" (*Gal.* 1:14), and even *Acts*, "being zealous for God . . . I persecuted this Way to the death" (22:3f). On the basis of *Galatians* 5:11, "but if I still preach circumcision," many scholars have also concluded that Paul had been a missionary to the gentiles even before his commissioning.⁵⁵ As a Shammaite living in the Diaspora he was in a rather unique position. On the one hand, he was firmly convinced that since all are to be judged by their works in conformity to the laws of Sinai, there was no hope for the gentiles except for those who had been "brought under the wings of the Divine Presence," that is, as proselytes who became members of the covenant-Torah. On the other hand, his close proximity to the gentile world gave him sympathy for his neighbors and an urgency for his task. His commis-

sioning outside Damascus was significant not only in personal terms but as providing a meaningful answer from God himself to his quandary concerning gentiles and the law.

The Torah and the Law

To attempt to understand Paul's many statements about the law from the perspective of their significance for gentiles is such a radically new departure that a full and convincing exposition is obviously impossible in a short paper. What follows is only meant to suggest an approach which might be fruitful if carried out in greater detail. If we concentrate on the predicament of gentiles under the law, inevitably most of our references will be to *Galatians* and *Romans*. Incidentally, it is worth underlining the fact that one of the favorite passages of those who interpret Paul in opposition to Judaism, II *Corinthians* 3, is completely beside the point. That text has nothing to do with law or scripture ("Old Testament") or Pharisaic Jews, but rather opposes the attempt of certain Hellenistic Jewish-Christian missionaries to develop a "divine man" understanding of Moses as a model for their own behaviour.⁵⁶ I turn instead to letters where the concept of law actually appears.

It has often been noted that Paul seems to have a double concept of *Torah-nomos*, sometimes saying that it is good and has been fulfilled in Christ and sometimes that it is bad and has been abolished in Christ. This causes confusion for any interpretation, but the double expansion of the concept within Judaism noted above should be remembered, for Paul used the only word available to him in the vocabulary of his times. It will perhaps clarify his thought if different concepts are identified by different words. In what follows, I shall use the word "Torah" when it includes the idea of covenant, whether for Jews or gentile Christians, and restrict the word "law" to the situation of the descendants of Adam who are not part of the Sinai covenant.

In particular, the phrase "under the law" is found in no Jewish writing to express relationship to Torah,⁵⁷ but seems to have been used by Paul to designate the gentile situation. That gentiles were under the law can perhaps best be shown by *Galatians* 3:21—4:11, especially when the passage is read in the light of its end. Paul's gentile readers, who "formerly did not know God and were slaves to 'gods' who actually were not such" (4:8), were subject to "weak and beggarly elemental spirits" (4:9) and the apostle can have intended nothing else when he wrote that "we were children serving under the elemental spirits of the universe" (4:3). Paul so identified with his readers that the first person plural⁵⁸ actually means "we gentiles," as in 3:14: "that in Christ the blessing of Abraham might come

upon the *gentiles*, that *we* might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." The nature of the "elemental spirits" is perhaps made most clear by *Colossians*, where they (2:8, 20) are also called "principalities and powers" (2:10, 15) and "angels" (2:18), where they enforce certain regulations (2:20) such as asceticism (2:16, 18, 21, 23) and astrological periods (2:15), and where they have a "certificate of indebtedness" which condemns all humanity who do not submit to their regulations (2:14). To return to *Galatians*, gentiles who used to be "*under* the elemental spirits" are also said to have been minors "*under* guardians and trustees" (4:2), schoolchildren "*under* the disciplinarian" (3:24), "confined *under* the law" (3:22). Not under the Torah, for it is the Torah as scripture which "has declared the whole world to be prisoners confined *under* sin" (3:22) and has said that those who rely on "works of the law" are "*under* a curse" (3:10). For those under "the law of deeds,"⁵⁹ the Mosaic covenant is of no avail (3:19-20). Those who have attempted to interpret the pedagogue (3:24) as a teacher so as to find a subordinate positive use for the law are wrong, for subjection to the law = elemental spirits is seen only in the negative sense of that from which we are redeemed. Those who interpret the passage as an attack on Torah are wrong, for it is not the past of Jews which is described but the past of gentiles. Thus in 3:23 "before faith came" has to mean "before faith came to the gentiles in Christ," unless Paul meant to retract the impressive things he had just said about the faith of Abraham. When the Torah of Israel is spoken of (3:17), it is not as something negative but as something irrelevant, for the Sinai covenant in fact was not the fulfillment of the promise to Abraham that "in you (and in your seed) shall all the gentiles be blessed" (3:8, 16). The climax of the passage is the assertion that "when the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons" (4:4f). By adoption, gentiles, who were not sons before, although they were under the law, became sons and thus heirs of the promise given to Abraham, of equal status with the natural sons of Abraham.

Other passages which speak of those "under the law" can be dealt with more briefly.⁶⁰ The Roman Christians are no longer "under the law" but are now "under grace" (*Rom.* 6:14, 15), just as the Galatians are no longer "under the law" if they are "led by the Spirit" (*Gal.* 5:18). I *Corinthians* 9:20-22 must be interpreted in terms of four groups: the Jews, those under the law = gentiles (which Paul said he is not), the lawless = the Corinthian antinomians (which Paul said he is not), and the weak = those under discussion in chapters 8-10. Significant is *Romans* 3:19, "We know that whatever the Torah (scripture) says, it says to those who are in (the sphere of) the law, so that *every mouth* may be stopped and

the *whole world* may be liable to judgment by God." Finally, when Paul said, *Galatians* 4:21, "Tell me, you who desire to be under law, do you not hear the Torah?" introducing a passage they had not considered, one almost detects the superior note of the Pharisee who really knows the Torah replying to amateurs who are only playing with the idea. For Paul, the Torah was the great privilege of Israel (*Rom.* 2:17-20; 3:1-2; 9:4-5) which belonged in the context of the promises to the Patriarchs and the Sinai covenant, leading to obedience as the life of faith. It should not be used in an attempt at self-justification outside that context.⁶¹ The Mishnah (*Ber.* 2:2) says that the Israelite "first takes upon himself the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven and afterwards takes upon himself the yoke of the commandments." Paul's concern was to say that the gentiles in Christ are under the equivalent of the yoke of the kingdom but not under the yoke of the commandments (which would make them righteous proselytes, Jews and no longer gentiles). At the same time, he wishes to say that gentiles in Christ have been redeemed from being under the law, and from the wrath of God which lies on the descendants of Adam for their disobedience, although they still owed obedience to God.

In *Romans*, Paul dealt with the gentiles and the law in connection with the figure of Adam. This is explicit in 5:12-21, where Paul made the point that Adam's trespass of God's command was the occasion for sin and death to come into the world. The law is not identified with sin and death but came in as the accompanying circumstance and occasion (5:20). Sin and death were in the world before the Torah came with Moses, and therefore (cf. 4:15!) all mankind in that period was under the law without the remedy of the Torah (5:14) or the grace of God in Jesus Christ (5:16).⁶² The situation of the gentile world described in 1:18—2:16 also has the Adam story as its background.⁶³ "The law gives knowledge of sin" (3:20), and the gentiles "know God's commandment that those who do these things deserve to die" (1:32). "The law produces wrath" (4:15), and the wrath of God in 1:18ff functions as does the law elsewhere, to increase sin (cf. 5:20 and 7:5, "sin's sad consequences which are through the law . . . produce . . . death"). Gentiles, "by nature children of wrath" (*Eph.* 2:3), "are for themselves the law" and "do by nature that which belongs to the law (= sin)" (2:14), for they have "the work of the law (= wrath) written on their hearts" (2:15). Chapter 7 deals even more drastically with the law and Adam (7:7-12)⁶⁴ and the consequences for Adam's descendants. If, in Chapter 1, the gentiles are subject to the wrath of God and in Chapter 6 we were slaves of sin, in Chapter 7 it is the law which rules over us (7:1, cf. 6:12) and from which we are freed (7:4, cf. 6:2). In 7:13ff the "law" seems closest to the Jewish concept of the "evil impulse," and we hear such strong statements as "the law of sin" (7:23, 25) and "the law of sin and

death" (8:2). And yet the overriding purpose of this chapter is to show the goodness of the law, which is "holy" (7:12) and "spiritual" (7:14) and "good" (7:16)!

When Paul is most negative about the law, he opposes it to—the law, i.e., the Torah! Opposed to "the other law, the law of sin" is "the Torah of God" (7:22f). The condemnation which lay on the children of Adam (5:16, 18) is overcome in Christ (8:1), because opposed to "the law of sin and death" is "the Torah of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus" (8:2). Opposed to "the law of works" is "the Torah of (God's) faithfulness" (3:27). Paul even said paradoxically that "I through the Torah died to the law" (*Gal.* 2:19). For Jewish Christians, and presumably for Paul himself, Christ was seen as the fulfillment of the Sinai covenant, and the word *nomos* in the passages just cited has the connotation of election. For gentile Christians, however, who are to come not as proselytes but as gentiles into the people of God, another word is more appropriate. The gentile counterpart to living in the covenant community of Torah is being "in Christ." Christ is the fulfillment of the promise concerning the gentiles given to Abraham. God shows his righteousness, his faithfulness to his promise, in a new act, apart from the Sinai covenant but not contradictory to it (*Rom.* 3:21).⁶⁵ Now we see why Paul so seldom connected covenant with law, for a new vocabulary was necessary when he spoke of the new relationship of God to the gentiles. We also see why he never spoke of repentance, for that meant turning back to the God of the covenant, and Paul was interested in gentiles turning *to* him for the first time. Torah was meaningless without commandments, and this was true also for gentiles. Those who walk according to the Spirit fulfill "the commandment of the Torah" (*Rom.* 8:4), and Paul could say that for gentiles the Torah was "fulfilled" by doing *Leviticus* 19:18, loving the neighbor (*Rom.* 13:8-10; *Gal.* 5:14). Paul could speak of doing "the Torah of Christ" (*Gal.* 6:2) and of his being not lawless but "in the Torah of Christ" (*I Cor.* 9:21). The actual content is vague when compared with the richness of the Talmud, but whether gentile Christians keep one commandment or many ("keeping the commandments of God," *I Cor.* 7:19), they belonged in a covenant and commandment relationship to God which was different from but parallel to that of Sinai.

If, then, Paul's central theological concern was the positive justification of the status of gentile Christians, why should other Jews have opposed his activities (and why did Paul himself earlier persecute the Church)? The idea that Jews would persecute gentiles who adopted some Jewish ideas along with faith in Jesus is absurd. It is equally absurd to think that Jews would persecute those Jews who taught gentiles to believe in Jesus apart from the Torah. I also think it is false to assume that Jews

persecuted other Jews who kept the commandments through faith in the messiah Jesus. But if it were even suspected that a Jew was teaching other Jews to abandon their Judaism, i.e., to throw off the yoke of the Torah, that would be quite another matter, particularly for the Zealots. The accusation made against Paul was stated quite accurately by Luke: those "zealous for the law" say "You teach all the Diaspora Jews to forsake Moses, telling them not to circumcise their children nor observe the customs" (*Acts* 21:21). The slightest suspicion that Paul was doing this would not only get him in trouble but would be exceptionally dangerous to the Jerusalem church, something that explains much of the tension between Paul and James. That Paul was accused of causing Jews to become apostate by abandoning the Torah is clear, but I also think that he was innocent of the charge.

If, as we have claimed, Paul's central theological concern was *not* a negative disparagement of the significance of the Torah for Israel, what, in that case, did he have against other Jews? If my hypothesis is correct, Paul said nothing against the Torah and Israel, but simply bypassed them as irrelevant to his gospel. Thus, the figures of Adam (negatively) and Abraham (positively) are much more important for his understanding of the significance of Jesus than Moses and David. For Paul, Jesus was neither a new Moses nor the messiah, nor the climax of the history of God's dealing with Israel, but the fulfillment of God's promises concerning the gentiles, and this is what he accused the Jews of not recognizing. Paul never accused the Jews of lacking zeal for Torah, and certainly not of legalism, but rather of disobedience to the new revelation he (Paul) had received. Hence, the reproaches in *Roman* 3:17-24 have to do with Israel's relative failure to become "a light to the gentiles." Israel is said to have "stumbled" (*Rom.* 9:32; 11:11) because most other Jews did not join Paul in proclaiming his gospel of the righteousness of God to the gentiles. "Israel did not understand" (10:19) that the time had come to do this. Though zealous, Jews were "ignorant of the righteousness of God and sought to establish their own" (10:3), which, of course, does not mean that individual Jews attempted to justify themselves by their own actions in defiance of the God of the covenant, but that Israel as a whole interpreted the righteousness of God as establishing the status of righteousness for Israel alone, excluding the gentiles from election. Had all Israel followed Paul's example, we could have had an Israel loyal to the righteousness of God expressed in the Torah alongside a gentile church loyal to the righteousness of God expressed in Jesus Christ and his fulfillment of the promises to Abraham. But the delay in the consummation of history which Paul had not anticipated and his own successes made anything more than a "bridge generation"⁶⁶ unnecessary. With the passing of that first genera-

tion of Jewish Christians (who left no direct records), with the development of a New Testament which forces its readers to choose between Torah and Christ, and with the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the Christian movement by an important strand of later Judaism, Paul's reproach has long since become obsolete.

As long as Judaism is understood as a kind of Christian heresy to be combatted, there will never be an end to Christian anti-Judaism. Is there room in Pauline thought for such a concept as "two religions, two chosen people?"⁶⁷ The man who said in another context, "I wish that all were as I myself am" (I Cor. 7:7), probably hoped that all Jews would come to share his faith. But he does not explicitly say so,⁶⁸ and the absence of Jesus from *Romans* 11 (cf. also I Cor. 15:28) may give a hint in another direction. Paul also declared that in Christ "there is neither Jew nor Greek . . . neither male nor female" (*Gal.* 3:28). That means that in Christ there is both Jew and Greek, both male and female. Just as women do not need to become men nor men women to attain their full humanity, so Jews do not need to become gentiles nor gentiles to become Jews. Paul is, of course, concerned to argue for the equal rights of gentiles as members of the people of God, and it is to this issue, where Christ-language is important, that all of his words are directed (whereas otherwise God-language, as in *Romans* 11, would be more appropriate). But that battle has long since been won, and Pauline interpreters, in the light of subsequent history, need to emphasize the other side—the right of modern Israel to remain Israel, without being defined by someone else's "mystery," as equal but elder recipients of the grace of God. All of the positive things Paul had to say about the righteousness of God effecting salvation for gentiles in Christ need not at all imply something negative about Israel and the Torah. Indeed, it may be that Paul, and Paul alone among the New Testament writers, had no left hand. Although it has only been hinted at here, I believe that it is possible to interpret Paul in this manner. That it is necessary to do so is the implication of the agonized concern of many in the post-Auschwitz situation, including Rosemary Ruether in her powerful *Faith and Fratricide*.

Notes

1. Even in Justin's *Dialogue*, the law is the main issue Chap. (10) and christology is discussed later in the framework of Christian disregard of the Torah.
2. *Prolegomena to the History of Ancient Israel* (Edinburgh, 1885), p. 425.
3. *The Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, Div. 2, Vol. 2 (Edinburgh, 1910), p. 124.
4. Ruether, p. 52, This is an important insight but may have nothing to do with the "Jewish Torah."

5. *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans* (London, 1932), pp. 63, 179, cf. 43-45.
6. See P. Richardson, *Israel in the Apostolic Church* (Cambridge, 1969), whom Ruether has misunderstood at this point.
7. *Rom.* 1:3; 4:1; 9:3, 5; *I Cor.* 10:18.
8. She speaks (p. 106) of those who "speak out of good intentions, but inaccurate exegesis." Cf. A. Roy Eckardt, *Elder and Younger Brothers* (New York, 1967), pp. 54-58; A. Davies, *Anti-Semitism and the Christian Mind* (New York, 1969), pp. 102ff. K. Stendahl has hinted at but not yet expounded fully a more adequate understanding of these chapters.
9. *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, Vol. III (Cambridge, Mass., 1930), p. 151.
10. *Paul* (Philadelphia, 1961), pp. 213, 198.
11. "Christian Writers on Judaism," *HTR* 14 (1921), 197-254. That a distorted understanding of the Jewish concept of Torah persists into the present is shown by chapter IV in Charlotte Klein, *Theologie und Anti-Judaismus* (Munich, 1975).
12. G. Bornkamm, *Paul* (New York 1971). The mask slips from the universalistic talk of a "church of Jews and Gentiles" when he speaks of "gentiles" and "former Jews" in the Church (p. 209).
13. Copenhagen, 1954 (ET Richmond, 1959). W. Schmithals, *Paul and James* (Göttingen, 1963 ET London, 1965), reaches similar conclusions from a different perspective.
14. Generally accepted since W. G. Kümmel, *Römer 7 und die Bekehrung des Paulus* (Leipzig, 1929).
15. Cf. also U. Wilckens, "Die Bekehrung des Paulus als religionsgeschichtliches Problem," *ZTK* 56 (1959), 273-293; and K. Stendahl, *Paul Among Jews and Gentiles* (Philadelphia, 1976), especially chapter 2.
16. *HTR* 56 (1963), 199-215, reprinted in the work mentioned in note 15.
17. C. G. Montefiore, *Judaism and St. Paul* (London, 1914), p. 126. Cf. also Schoeps, *Paul*, p. 213.
18. J. Klausner, *From Jesus to Paul* (London, 1944); W.L. Knox, *St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles* (London, 1939).
19. S. Sandmel, *The Genius of Paul* (New York, 1958); E.R. Goodenough, "Paul and the Hellenization of Christianity," in *Religions in Antiquity* (Leiden, 1968), pp. 23-68.
20. L. Baeck, "The Faith of Paul," in *Judaism and Christianity* (Philadelphia, 1958); W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism* (London, 1948); Schoeps, *Paul*, pp. 172ff.
21. W. D. Davies, "From Schweitzer to Scholem: Reflections on Sabbatai Svi," *JBL* 95 (1976), 529-558.
22. Cf. among others P. Schäfer, "Die Torah der messianischen Zeit," *ZNW* 65 (1974), 27-42; E. E. Urbach, *The Sages* (Jerusalem, 1975), pp. 297-302, 308-314.
23. Given the anti-Jewish environment of the Christian second century, the period when the text was subject to least control, we shall have to reckon with the possibility of interpolations contained in all the later MSS. Thus *I Cor.* 15:56 is an interpolation (cf. the commentaries of Weiss and Manson) as is *I Thess.* 2:13-16 (cf. Birger Pearson in *HTR* 64 [1971], 79-94). If references to the fall of Jerusalem are indications of interpolation, we should consider whether this is not also true of *Rom.* 10:0-10 and *Gal.* 4:24-27. On *Gal.* 3:19, see below, note 59.
24. E.g. in the RSV the begrudging "although" in *Rom.* 3:21 and "yet" in *Gal.* 2:16. Baur's presuppositions are contained in the translation of *peritomē* as

"circumcision party" in *Acts* 11:2, *Gal.* 2:12, *Tit.* 1:10, and *gramma* as "written code" in *Rom.* 2:27, *II Cor.* 3:6.

25. E.g. because *Rom.* 2:1ff deals with hypocrisy it is almost always understood as referring to Jews, in spite of the "therefore" connecting it with 1:18-32.

26. *Paul and James* (note 13).

27. See the complaint of M. Limbeck, *Die Ordnung des Heils* (Düsseldorf, 1971), p. 50.

28. *Art. cit.* (note 21), p. 547.

29. On the centrality of this statement, cf. E. P. Sanders, "Patterns of Religion in Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: A Holistic Method of Comparison," *HTR* 66 (1973), 455-478.

30. "Man has his relationship with God only in his relationship with the Torah," Gutbrod, *TDNT* IV, 1055.

31. "Without commandments there could be no Torah. . . . God's first revelation to man is marked by the commandment (*Gen.* 2:16-17)," Urbach, *The Sages*, p. 315.

32. M.T. Melakhim 8, 11. On this text cf. especially S. S. Schwarzschild, "Do Noachites Have to Believe in Revelation?," *JQR* 52 (1961-62), 297-308; 53 (1962-63), 30-65. On the reading "but" (*ella*) rather than "nor" (*velo*) in the last line, cf. also J. Katz, *Exclusiveness and Tolerance* (New York, 1962), p. 175.

33. Note that Eliezer ben Hyrkanos calls the good deeds of the gentiles sin "because they do it only to magnify themselves" (B.B. 10b).

34. The usual list comprises the prohibition of blasphemy, idolatry, adultery, murder, robbery, and eating of flesh cut from a living animal, and the injunction to establish courts of justice (*Sanh.* 56a). Some have seen in the list an attempt to formulate a kind of natural law.

35. E. P. Sanders, "The Covenant as a Soteriological Category and the Nature of Salvation in Palestinian and Hellenistic Judaism," *Jews, Greeks and Christians* (Leiden, 1976), pp. 11-44, p. 15. With allowance made for difference of terminology, he shows that the same is true of Hellenistic Judaism. Whether or not *IV Ezra* is to be considered an exception to the general rule depends on the degree to which one considers the work to be a drama, which for Israel receives its resolution in chapter 14.

36. Josephus, *Ant.* 20:17-48. In general, cf. N. J. McEleney, "Conversion, Circumcision and the Law," *NTS* 20 (1974), 319-341.

37. *Der älteste christliche Katechismus und die jüdische Propagandaliteratur* (Berlin, 1909).

38. "The son who serves his father serves him with joy, saying, 'Even if I do not always succeed (in obeying the commandments), yet, as a loving father, he will not be angry with me,' while the Gentile slave is always afraid lest he may commit some fault and therefore serves God in a condition of anxiety and confusion" (*Tanhuma, Noah*, 19). Those who have experienced both a Jewish Sabbath and a Puritan Sunday will understand.

39. *Ephesians* (Anchor Bible, 1974), pp. 244-248; "Die Stellung des Paulus zu Gesetz und Ordnung," *EVT* 33 (1973), 496-526. Among the more important corrections to the all pervasive false concept of Jewish legalism, cf. E. P. Sanders, "On the Question of Fulfilling the Law in Paul and Rabbinic Judaism," to appear in the *Festschrift* for David Daube.

40. Moore, *Judaism*, I, p. 277. He points out that it was the teaching of the schools both of Ishmael and Akiba and therefore prior to both. For earlier parallels see note 47 below.

41. Ex. *Rab.* V, 9 (Soncino, p. 86-7). Cf. Bar 4:1, "She (wisdom) is the book of the commandments of God and the law that endures forever. All who hold her fast will live, and those who forsake her will die," and the passages contrasting Torah as medicine of life and medicine of death in Billerbeck, III, 130f, 498f.

42. Cf. C. Roetzel, "Diathekai in Romans 9,4," *Biblica* 51 (1970), 377-390. This tendency will have been influenced by the Aramaic *qeyama*, which means both covenant and promise.

43. *Gesetz und Geschichte* (Neukirchen, 1960), made a beginning. He dealt only with IV *Ezra* and II *Baruch*, on which see the more thorough study by W. Harnisch, *Verhängnis und Verheissung der Geschichte* (Göttingen, 1969).

44. "Tora und Geschichte in Spätjudentum," *NT* 9 (1967), 241-277; *Gott und der Nächste im antiken Judentum* (Tübingen, 1974), especially pp. 46-98. Why did Christian interpreters not learn this long ago from such classic works as S. Schechter, *Aspects of Rabbinic Theology* (New York, 1909) or A. Büchler, *Studies in Sin and Atonement* (Oxford, 1928), especially pp. 1-118?

45. "Covenant" (note 35). He concludes, "salvation comes by *membership* in the covenant, while obedience to the commandments *preserves* one's place in the covenant" (p. 41).

46. See L. Monsengwo Pasinya, *La Notion de Nomos dans le Pentateuque Grec* (Rome, 1973).

47. See pseudo-Philo, *LAB* 11:2, where God tells Moses, "You shall illumine my people through that which I have given into your hands, the eternal law, and according to it I will judge the whole world. For it will be for a testimony. For when men say, 'We have not known thee and therefore we did not serve thee,' for that reason I shall punish them because they did not acknowledge my law." Cf. also the Hebrew *Test Naph* 8-9, which *may* antedate the Christian era.

48. That Torah in the intertestamental period has been connected with the order of creation, so that it encompasses all creatures has been shown by M. Limbeck (note 27).

49. Note how in the Targums especially, Adam was to keep all the commandments and he and his descendants were punished for not doing so, *Gen.* 2:15 (Neofiti), 3:15 (*Ps.-Jon.*), 3:22 (*Pal.*).

50. So Jub, *Test XII Patr*, II Bar, Sir, cf. MKid 4:4. Cf. J. P. Schultz, "Two Views of the Patriarchs: Noachides and pre-Sinai Israelites," *Texts and Responses* (Leiden, 1975), pp. 43-59.

51. For the Torah as antidote to the sin of Adam and the evil impulse, see *Kid* 30b, *B.B.* 16a, *Shab* 146a, etc. "In any case death was due to Adam and deliverance from sin came by the Torah," Knox (note 18), p. 95. "Sinai had restored a proper relationship between God and Israel through the mediatorship of Torah," Scroggs (note 61), p. 38.

52. See also IV *Ezra* 3:32-36; 5:28-29; 7:11, 37, 70-73, 79-82, 127-129; 8:12-13, 55-58; 9:10-13; 13:37-38; I *Enoch* 5:4; 93:4; 99:6-7; II *Enoch* 65:4-5; II *Bar* 15:4-6; 48:40-43; 54:14-19; 82:3-9; *Jub* 15:26-31; *Visio Ezra* 63, etc.

53. On the significance of these cf. M. Hengel, *Die Zeloten* (Leiden, 1961), pp. 204-211.

54. J. T. Townsend, "I Corinthians 3:15 and the School of Shammai," *HTR* 61 (1968), 500-504; K. Haacker, "War Paulus Hillelit?," *Das Institutum Judaicum der Universität Tübingen 1971-1972*, pp. 106-120; H. Hübner, "Gal 3,10 und die Herkunft des Paulus," *Ker.u.Dog.* 19 (1973), 215-231; cf. W. D. Davies (note 20), p. 66.

55. R. Bultmann, *RGG*² IV, 1021; Schoeps (note 10), pp. 168, 219; Bornkamm (note 12), pp. 10-12.

56. The fundamental study is D. Georgi, *Die Gegner des Paulus im 2. Korintherbrief* (Neukirchen, 1964). Cf. also J. Collange, *Enigmes de la deuxième épître de Paul aux Corinthiens* (Cambridge, 1972).

57. At least I have not been able to find it, and the only person who claims that the phrase is "an inherited Jewish formula," E. Lohmeyer, *Grundlagen paulinischer Theologie* (Tübingen, 1929), p. 142, is able to cite no passages like "take upon oneself the yoke of the Kingdom of God/commandments/Torah," or "come under the wings of the Shekinah."

58. In addition to the inclusive and exclusive uses, perhaps we shall have to call this usage the "hospital we," as in the nurse's "How are we this morning?" As an indication of how far Paul's identification with his congregations could go, see *Phil.* 3:7.

59. *Gal.* 3:21, according to the oldest MSS. "Added because of transgressions" in later MSS is an interpolation from *Rom.* 5:20, where it makes sense, whereas it contradicts the context in *Galatians* (3:15).

60. The phrase does not appear in the Greek of *Rom.* 2:12, which should be translated: "Those who have sinned godlessly will perish godlessly, while those who have sinned in (the status of) Torah will be judged on the basis of Torah." Cf. *James* 2:12.

61. The Torah as covenant and commandments is only for Israel and irrelevant for gentiles. There are of course many passages where *nomos* is equivalent to Scripture, which was "written for our instruction" (*Rom.* 15:4; *I Cor.* 10:11). Torah as teaching remains valid also for gentiles.

62. Cf. R. Scroggs, *The Last Adam* (Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 76-82.

63. Cf. M. Hooker, "Adam in Romans 1," *NTS* 6 (1959-60), 297-306.

64. Cf. S. Lyonnet, "Tu ne convoiteras pas" (*Rom* vii 7), *Neotestamentica et Patristica* (Leiden, 1962), 157-165.

65. That this is the sense of two key passages in *Rom.* 3:21-31 and 10:4ff has been shown by G. Howard in two very suggestive studies in *HTR* 63 (1970), 223-233, and *JBL* 88 (1969), 331-337.

66. The concept is Eckardt's (note 8), pp. 137-140.

67. The title of the epilogue of J. Parkes, *The Foundations of Judaism and Christianity* (London, 1960).

68. "To the Jew, all of Paul's theology is a dialogue with the Gentiles in which the Jew is assumed and is silent," A. Cohen, *The Myth of the Judeo-Christian Tradition* (New York, 1971), p. 75. If we look very closely at what Paul does *not* say, his silences become very eloquent for our time.

The Gospel of John and the Jews: The Story of a Religious Divorce

John T. Townsend

It is not surprising that Rosemary Ruether has found the fullest development of New Testament anti-Jewish bias within the *Gospel of John*.¹ Her estimate of the gospel's anti-Jewish stance reflects the opinion of most exegetes.² The reasons for this evaluation of the gospel are well-known and often repeated. First of all, John proclaims a replacement theology.³ What John's Jewish contemporaries held dear the evangelist seems to have abolished and replaced with the Christian Jesus.

John 15:1-17 represents Jesus as "the vine," a well-known symbol for God's people Israel (*Ps.* 80:8 [MT 9]—16 [17]; *Hos.* 10:1; see *Jer.* 6:9; *Ezek.* 15:1-6; 17:5-10; 19:10-14; *Hos.* 14:7 [8]; II *Esdras* 5:23).⁴ Thus Jesus replaces Israel. As for the Jews, they have no right to call themselves children of Abraham (8:39f.).

In respect to the Jewish Law, John regards it as something alien to Christians (8:17; 10:34; 15:25), and he depicts Jesus ignoring it publicly (5:9-17; 9:16). As the one who truly reveals God's will, Jesus has become the Law's replacement (cf. 1:17; 5:39f., etc.).⁵ In rabbinic circles, typical symbols for the Law of Moses included bread, light, water and wine.⁶ According to John, Jesus is the living bread from heaven (6:32-38) and the light of the world (1:4, 9; 3:19; 8:12; 9:5; 11:8f.; 12:35f., 46). Jesus also transforms the water of Jewish purification into the good wine (2:6-10), and contrasts the water from Jacob's well with his own living water (4:12-15). Moreover, even though the Mosaic Law belongs to the Jews, they themselves have failed to understand it, for they have never known God (5:38-47; 7:28; 8:19, 24-27, 47; 15:21; 16:3).

According to *John* 2:18-22, there is to be no more Jerusalem Temple. Jesus has replaced it with his body.⁷ There is also a whole new cult. No longer is worship to be grounded in the Jerusalem sacrifices: "God is spirit, and his worshipers must worship in spirit and in truth" (4:24; see

vv. 20ff.).⁸ The new cult centers about Jesus as the new temple. According to *Ezek.* 47:1, *Joel* 3:18 (MT. 4:18), and *Zech.* 14:8, living waters are to flow forth from the Jerusalem Temple in the age to come; but *John* 7:37-39 declares that these waters will flow from the body of Jesus in a messianic celebration of the feast of Tabernacles.⁹ John also arranges his chronology so that Jesus' death coincides with the sacrifice of the Passover Lamb. Then, to insure that all who read the gospel understand the symbolism, the evangelist adds that Jesus fulfills a scriptural requirement of the Passover Lamb in that none of his bones were broken (19:32-36; cf. *Ex.* 12:46; *Num.* 9:12).¹⁰ Another implication that Jesus has replaced the Jewish cult may lie behind the words of the Baptist in *John* 1:29, 36: "Behold the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world." The interpretation of this saying, however, is far from certain and may have nothing to do with sacrifice.¹¹

John 10 depicts Jesus as the door to the sheepfold (vv. 7, 9) and as the Good Shepherd of the sheep (vv. 11, 14). Since the Hebrew Scriptures often depict Israel's leaders as shepherds (*Num.* 27:16f.; *Ezek.* 31:1-24; etc.), the passage in the gospel implies that Jesus has replaced the traditional Jewish leadership. For John, the Jewish leaders are thieves and bandits (v. 1)¹² or, at best, mere hirelings (vv. 12f.).

Since the Hebrew Bible sometimes depicts God as a shepherd (e.g., *Gen.* 49:24; *Pss.* 23:1; 78:52; *Mic.* 2:12f.), the title Good Shepherd may have implied Jesus' divinity. Elsewhere John is more explicit. He begins his gospel with the affirmation that Jesus is God's divine Word and shows no concern over having Jesus addressed as "God" (20:28),¹³ even though the evangelist generally prefers the title "Son of God" (see, e.g., 20:30), and regularly depicts Jesus' relation to God as a son's relation to his father (e.g., 14:9-11). The evangelist makes it clear, however, that in Jewish eyes Jesus' affirmation of his divine sonship implied a blasphemous claim to be equal with God (5:18; 10:35; 19:7).

It is probable that John even has Jesus apply God's name to himself. In several instances, such as *John* 8:58 (also 6:20; 8:24, 28; 13:19; 18:5f.; and possibly 14:3), Jesus uses the words *egō eimi* (= "I am") of himself without a predicate nominative.¹⁴ For Greek-speaking Jews and Christians these words could stand for the divine name. They appear as such in the ancient Greek translation of the Hebrew Scriptures known as the Septuagint. The use of "I am" for the divine name is especially clear in *Isaiah* 45:18 where the Greek translator used *egō eimi*¹⁵ to render "I am YHWH." There is need for caution, however, in concluding that the Johannine Jesus regularly uses "I am" in this sense. *Egō eimi* could occur without any theological implication as, for example, in *John* 9:9, where a beggar whom Jesus has healed identifies himself with *egō eimi*, words

translated, "I am the man," in the RSV. Still, the fact that, at least in *John* 8:58, Jesus uses "I am" of himself in a context where the words do not quite fit in the normal secular sense suggests that John regularly uses "I am" on the lips of Jesus in order to reveal his divinity. Thus, for John, Jesus is a challenge to all the essential elements of the Jewish religion: to the concept of Jewish election, to the Law of Moses, to the Temple and its cult, to the Jewish leadership, and even to the belief that God is one, an affirmation that every male Jew was bound to recite at the core of his daily prayers.¹⁶

The second indication of John's anti-Jewish bias is his negative portrayal of the Jewish people. Perhaps the most prominent aspect of this portrayal is simply his use of the terms, "Jew" and "the Jews." The very frequency of the use of the terms makes them stand out. Although they occur in each of the other gospels only five or six times, John uses them seventy-one times. The other gospels identify those opposing Jesus as particular groups within Judaism: Pharisees, Sadducees, and the like. Such specific designations give the impression that, although certain cliques within Israel were hostile to Jesus, the Jews as a whole were not. In contrast, John tends to label all of Jesus' opponents "Jews." John makes no attempt to avoid all specific designations of the opponents,¹⁷ but he calls them "the Jews" far more often than anything else. The effect of this usage upon the reader is the implication that the Jews as a whole were enemies of Jesus. The Jews in *John* appear so evil that some exegetes believe them to be not simply Jews, but a symbol for the evil hostility of the world to God's revelation. "The Jews" oppose Jesus and persecute him throughout his ministry, and their attack reaches its climax in the passion narrative.¹⁸ There, it is specifically the Jews (e.g., 19:14f.)—not merely an anonymous crowd (*Mk.* 15:8, 11, 15; *Mt.* 27:15, 20; *Lk.* 23:4)—who cry out for Jesus' blood; and it is the Jews who have the responsibility for carrying out the sentence of death (*Jn.* 19:16).

In spite of the apparently overwhelming evidence of John's anti-Jewish bias, a substantial minority of exegetes, including several who are Jewish, have concluded that the *Fourth Gospel* in general and its passion narrative in particular are at least no more anti-Jewish than the other gospels.¹⁹ Some interpreters even suggest that John's gospel was intended as a missionary tract for Jews.²⁰

There are indeed good reasons to believe that the *Fourth Gospel* is not as anti-Jewish as is commonly supposed. First of all, John does not hesitate to affirm the Jewish setting of his narrative. He readily indicates that Jesus himself was a Jew (4:9; cf. 1:11; 4:22), and has him, along with John the Baptist (3:26), addressed as rabbi (1:38, 49; 3:2; 4:31; 6:25; 9:2; 11:8; cf. 20:16). The evangelist also makes liberal use of the Hebrew Scriptures and

affirms the importance of the Jewish people in God's plan for salvation (4:22). Among exegetes, there seems to be a growing awareness, if not a consensus, of the extent to which the *Fourth Gospel* reflects first-century Judaism.²¹ Not long ago, it was commonplace for interpreters of John to understand the gospel in terms of Hellenism or gnosticism.²² At present there is a tendency to interpret the *Fourth Gospel* with a stress on one or more types of first-century Judaism, such as the Qumran community, Hellenistic Judaism, the Samaritans, etc.²³ Such labels, however, may themselves lead to false interpretations of John. We must always be aware "that 'Palestinian-Jewish' and 'Hellenistic' are not terms denoting separate planets."²⁴ Even within rabbinic Judaism, Hellenistic modes of thought were rife.²⁵ Therefore it is not surprising that exegetes can approach John with quite different assumptions regarding background without arriving at radically different results.

In the second place, if one looks closely at the evidence for John's anti-Jewish bias, there are several points at which the evidence may have been exaggerated. John may well believe that in Christ the "Old Israel" has been replaced, but the *Fourth Gospel* is hardly unique in this regard. As early as the Pauline Epistles, there were Christian arguments that Jewish election had become meaningless (*Rom.* 4; *Gal.* 3f.; *Phil.* 3:2ff.; etc.), although the apostle may not have been entirely consistent on the matter (see, e.g., *Rom.* 3:1; 11:1-36). Similarly, according to *Matthew* 3:9f., the Baptist warns the Jews about the danger of relying upon their lineage from Abraham.²⁶

In order to assess what John says about the Temple and its cult, it is necessary to remember that, when John wrote, the Temple lay in ruins and the cult had lapsed.²⁷ The fall of Jerusalem was a serious blow to both Jew and Christian. Both had their explanations.²⁸ According to John, Christians no longer needed a temple. Their temple was Jesus Christ. John was not abolishing a living institution. The temple and cult which he proclaims have been replaced in Jesus and no longer exist. John never questioned the validity of the Jerusalem Temple before the hour arrived for worship in spirit and in truth (4:21-23). In this respect, John is considerably more restrained than *Acts* 7:42-50, according to which the Jerusalem Temple and its cult were monuments to Israel's disobedience from the beginning (cf. *Acts* 17:24ff.). In the *Fourth Gospel*, Israel's temple and cult retain their rightful place in God's plan for salvation.²⁹

Although John indicates that Jesus has replaced the Law of Moses, the evangelist is hardly unique in this regard among New Testament writers. In fact, what he writes about the Law seems relatively restrained. Nowhere in his gospel are there assaults on the Law comparable to the assaults in *Galatians* and *Romans*. As for what John says against the

leaders of Judaism, his attacks are mild compared to those of the scriptural prophets (e.g., *Jer.* 23:1f.; *Ezek.* 34:1-10) and from the Qumran community.³⁰ Even the *Fourth Gospel's* affirmation of Jesus' divine sonship is not as opposed to the beliefs of first-century Jews as one might expect. First of all, the evangelist makes clear that, contrary to Jewish assumptions about Jesus claiming equality with God, Jesus as the Son is subordinate to the Father and never acts on his own behalf (5:19, 30; 6:38; etc.).³¹ Second, depicting a human being as divine was not entirely alien to the Judaism of John's day. The evangelist's references to Jesus in divine terms are similar to the language that Philo sometimes uses of Moses, and, according to Josephus (*Antiquities*, 3:180), Moses was a "divine man" (*theïos anér*).³² Even in later rabbinic literature, Moses occasionally comes to occupy divine status with the title of "God."³³

One particularly significant section of the *Fourth Gospel* for determining the extent of its anti-Jewish bias is the passion narrative. Its significance is twofold: passion narratives generally tend to blame the Jews for the crucifixion, and the Johannine passion narrative is the longest section of the gospel by comparison with parallel accounts in the other gospels.³⁴

The Trial of Jesus

Even though certain aspects of the Johannine passion narrative seem to heighten the blame placed upon the Jews, at some points John is less anti-Jewish than the other evangelists.³⁵ Whereas the other gospels insist that the Jewish charge against Jesus was blasphemy (*Mk.* 14:64 & //s), *John* 11:48 makes it clear that the Jewish authorities were concerned lest Jesus disrupt political relations with Rome. In the early parts of the gospel, John readily affirms that the Jews wanted to kill Jesus because he transgressed the Sabbath and made himself equal to God; however, it is the political concern that dominates the passion narrative. There is only one passing reference to the other accusations (19:7). John laid the groundwork for the political charge throughout his work. He reports an attempt to make Jesus king by force (6:15), and the triumphal entry into Jerusalem to acclamations of "King of Israel" from the crowd (12:13). Also reported are an attempt to arrest Jesus, which was thwarted by the power of his preaching (7:30-32, 44-49), and official concern over his growing popularity (11:47f.; 12:9f.)—a concern that leads directly to the decision to destroy him. The authorities plan to kill Jesus lest his growing popularity invite Roman intervention (11:48; see also 12:9f.). In contrast to the *Fourth Gospel*, *Matthew* 26:3f. reports the official decision but omits the political concerns behind it (similarly *Mk.* 14:1; *Lk.* 22:2).

The first three evangelists report Jesus' arrest as a wholly Jewish

action. They all mention that Judas Iscariot betrayed Jesus to Jewish authorities (*Mk.* 14:10f. & //s; *Mt.* 27:3-10)³⁶ and that, in addition to Judas, those responsible for the actual arrest were a crowd from the chief priests, scribes, and elders. John makes no mention of Jewish involvement with Judas (cf. 6:71; 12:4; 13:2, 26-30), but he adds that Roman soldiers were present at the arrest. Instead of the crowd mentioned in the other gospels, John reports that Judas came for Jesus with a cohort of soldiers under a centurian,³⁷ along with some officers from the chief priests and Pharisees (18:3, 12). Thus, according to John, Jewish authorities were responsible for arresting Jesus, but these authorities had acted under Roman pressure and had carried out the action with a band of Roman soldiers. Of the four evangelists, John alone was unwilling to shift responsibility for the arrest from Roman to Jew, even though failure to do so implied that Rome considered Jesus dangerous and invited Roman persecution of his followers.

John portrays the Jewish proceedings that follow the arrest as being relatively unimportant. Apart from the fact that they take place before the High Priest Caiaphas, and his father-in-law Annas, there is remarkably little detail about what happened to Jesus. John is content to say that the High Priest "questioned Jesus about his disciples and his teaching" (18:19).³⁸ John's meager treatment of these proceedings stands out in comparison to the other gospels. The latter describe a formal inquest,³⁹ if not a trial, and make clear that the charge against Jesus was blasphemy (*Mk.* 14:63f.),⁴⁰ so that the Jewish proceedings tend to overshadow the trial before the Roman governor. Thus the *Synoptic Gospels* emphasize that the primary charge against Jesus was a strictly Jewish crime. In the *Fourth Gospel*, the opposite has happened. By making the Jewish proceedings quite informal with no mention of the accusations against Jesus, the evangelist has featured the importance of the Roman trial⁴¹ in which the charge was a political crime against Rome.

In the Roman trial, all the gospels agree that Jesus was charged with claiming to be King of the Jews and that Jewish pressure forced the governor to condemn Jesus, whom he believed to be innocent. In the *Synoptic Gospels*, however, it is the Jewish crowd that cries out against Jesus (*Mk.* 15:11-15 & //s), while in John the Jewish presence at the trial is limited to the chief priests and their officers (19:6).⁴² Even though John regularly refers to those demanding Jesus' death as "the Jews" (18:31, 38; 19:7, 12, 14; cf. 18:36), the context makes clear that these Jews are merely the priestly delegation (see 19:6, 15). Certainly, John's account of the Roman trial contains nothing so anti-Jewish as *Matthew* 27:25, according to which the Jewish people (*laos*) demand that responsibility for Jesus' death fall upon them and their children. Still the fact that John frequently

chose to identify the priestly delegation as "the Jews" would lead the casual reader to believe that it was the Jewish people who forced the crucifixion.

Three verses in the Johannine account of the Roman trial require special attention. They are verses 15, 7, and 16 of chapter 19. According to *John* 19:15 (cf. v. 21) the chief priests declare, "We have no king but Caesar!" These words not only confirm the political nature of the trial; they also serve as a self-declaration that the chief priests serve no longer under the kingship of God. No longer are they true Israelites but loyal Roman underlings.⁴³ Such a judgment on the high priest was scarcely an exaggeration. During the last decades of the Second Temple, Jewish high priests were appointed and deposed at will by Roman governors who generally controlled their actions.⁴⁴

John 19:7 appears quite unexpectedly in the context of a trial about Jesus' kingship. In this verse "the Jews" make the following accusation against Jesus: "We have a law, and according to the Law he ought to die because he made himself Son of God." Whatever "Son of God" might have meant in Jesus' day,⁴⁵ the evangelist clearly understood the title quite literally, in a sense which he believed Jews would regard as blasphemous. Earlier in the gospel, he is quite clear that the Jews were ready to kill Jesus over the issue of his divine sonship (5:18; 10:33-39). Therefore, although these verses seem out of place in the context of a Roman trial about kingship, they fit in well with the thought of the gospel as a whole.

According to *John* 19:16 (see also v. 6), the Roman governor Pilate handed Jesus over to Jewish authorities for execution by crucifixion, but such an act seems highly unlikely. There is an apparent contradiction between this verse and verses 23, 31, according to which Jesus was crucified by the governor's soldiers.⁴⁶ Besides, would Jewish chief priests be expected to carry out a Roman execution, especially on the day before Passover (18:28; 19:31; etc.)? Still, while John has given the Jewish authorities an unlikely role in the crucifixion, that role would not have been impossible. The position of the chief priests was such that Pilate could regard them as his subordinates. The Jerusalem Temple was under his control, and he even kept the high priestly vestments in his possession.⁴⁷ Moreover, as subordinates of a Roman governor, the chief priests could have used Roman soldiers for the crucifixion as well as for the arrest. In writing *John* 19:16, however, the evangelist was likely less concerned with historical probability than with a desire to continue direct Jewish involvement in the passion through the act of crucifixion. The Jewish part in the crucifixion also appears in verse 21 where the chief priests argue with Pilate over the wording of the inscription on the cross, and in verse 31, where "the Jews" ask Pilate to make sure that the crucifixion is finished before the beginning of Passover.

The "Jews"

The most commonly cited indication of John's anti-Jewish bias is his use of "the Jews,"⁴⁸ but again the evidence needs qualification. In the first place, the designation "Jew" does not always appear in a negative sense. As mentioned above, John reports that Jesus himself was a Jew (4:9; cf. 1:11), and that Jews have a special role in God's plan for salvation (4:22). The gospel also affirms that many Jews believed in Jesus (2:23; 7:40; 8:30f.; 10:42; 11:45-48; 12:11, 19), although their faith was merely a naive trust in Jesus' miracles (2:33; 11:45; 12:9-11).⁴⁹ Unfortunately, such a shallow faith could easily turn to rejection (6:66) or even hatred (8:49); nevertheless, many Jews did maintain their commitment. In fact, according to *John* 11:45-48, Jesus' popularity among the Jews is what led to the decision to destroy him. John reports that even some of the Jewish leaders secretly believed in Jesus (12:42; cf. 3:1f.; 7:50-52), and that after his death two such leaders took his body and gave it a proper Jewish burial (19:38-42).

Other Johannine uses of "Jew," while not necessarily pro-Jewish, certainly do not depict Jews in a negative way. Sometimes the Greek word for Jew (*Ioudaios*) is simply an adjective, as in "the Judean land" (3:22). Other uses of "Jews" simply identify certain festivals and customs as Jewish (2:6, 13; 5:1; 6:4; 7:2; 11:55; 19:40, 42). Jesus is called "the King of the Jews," and occasionally "Jew" is merely a convenient way of distinguishing a Jew from a Samaritan (4:9), or from non-Jews generally (18:35; cf. 3:1).

In the remaining places where John mentions Jews, the context generally suggests hostility to Jesus. There is wide agreement among exegetes that in these cases "the Jews" denote opponents of Jesus, but there is considerable disagreement about just who the opponents are. According to many, "the Jews" in John represent, not simply Jews, but the sinful world as a whole.⁵⁰ On the basis of this interpretation, some commentators argue that John's use of "the Jews" is not anti-Jewish because he is not actually referring to Jews at all.⁵¹ Such reasoning, however, is hardly logical. As Ruether points out,⁵² quite the opposite is true. Using "the Jews" to denote, not only Jewish opponents of Jesus, but the whole sinful world is scarcely pro-Jewish. In such a case "the Jews" have become the epitome for what is evil!

Other exegetes suggest other interpretations of "the Jews" in *John*, and their interpretations commonly lessen the gospel's anti-Jewishness. Most would argue that the "the Jews" denote, not all Jews, but only a limited group within Israel such as the authorities, those Jews who oppose Jesus, Jewish non-believers, Judeans, etc.⁵³ Occasionally, one finds the suggestion that the *Fourth Gospel* is basically Samaritan, and represents a Samaritan attitude toward the Jews.⁵⁴

A number of interpreters correctly point out that John is quite inconsistent in his use of "the Jews." These exegetes find that John has used "the Jews" in several senses, including most of the ones just listed.⁵⁵ Such varying usage should not be surprising. It is common today. M. Lowe has recently pointed out that we regularly employ national designations in a number of different ways.⁵⁶ He cites the way we might use "the French." In a strict sense, a Frenchman is a French citizen of French ancestry who lives in France and speaks French. However, we may also use "the French" to mean the French government, in reference to the French negotiating with the Russians, or the French judicial authorities, when speaking about the French putting someone on trial. In the proper context, one may use "the French" to denote those of French language and culture outside France, such as French Canadians. Similarly John appears to have used "the Jews" in a variety of ways.

It is certainly true that the word "Jew" appears in John far more than in the other gospels; but the word also appears seventy-nine times in *Acts*, eight times more than in *John*. Why did Luke, who only uses the word "Jew" five times in his gospel, increase this usage almost sixteen times in the book of *Acts*? Since the same person wrote both volumes, the difference cannot be simply a matter of an author's unconscious choice of words. A clue to Luke's use of "Jew" is that the word is not evenly distributed in *Acts*. In the first eight chapters, where the setting is Palestinian, "Jew" appears only three times, and the word only becomes frequent when the setting becomes Greek. This distribution corresponds to Luke's tendency for matching style with setting. As long as his narrative moves in Palestinian circles, his style is quite semitic; but, as the story moves into the Greek world, the semiticisms disappear.⁵⁷ When writing about events in Palestine, he tends to distinguish among the various Jewish groups as any Palestinian Jew would do. In a gentile setting, Luke refers to Jews as a gentile would, and lumps them together as "the Jews" without distinction. Similarly in John, the frequent use of the word "Jew" may well be due, at least in part, to an author who writes from a gentile point of view.⁵⁸

Support for this explanation comes from other indications that John no longer considered himself or his readers part of the Jewish community. For the evangelist, the Law of the Jews is "their Law" (15:25), and in his gospel even Jesus speaks of the Law to Jews as "your law" (8:17; 10:34). Moreover, John assumes that his readers are so far removed from Judaism that he must explain the Jewishness of certain customs (2:6; 19:40; cf. 18:39), and of various festivals, including Passover (2:13; 6:4; 11:55) with its Preparation (19:42); Tabernacles (7:2) and possibly Pentecost (5:1).⁵⁹ Finally, the gospel mentions that certain followers of Jesus were expelled

from the Jewish community (9:34f.; cf. 16:2), and that Jews sympathetic to Jesus feared being expelled (9:22; 12:42). John also mentions a Jewish agreement "that if anyone should confess him as Christ, he would be expelled from the Synagogue" (9:22). There is even the suggestion that expulsion was accompanied by severe persecution (16:3). Thus the evangelist not only lived in a Christian community that was separate from Judaism, but he believed that the separation was forced upon the Christians by the Jews. Thus it was natural for John to view the Jewish community as an outsider, and follow gentile practice in lumping together all segments of this community under the name "Jew."

Although John generally uses "Jew" with an unfavorable or neutral connotation, his occasional use of "Israel" and "Israelite" always indicates a favorable bias.⁶⁰ The words appear a total of five times: Twice, incipient believers hail Jesus as "King of Israel" (1:49; 12:13), and John the Baptist declares that his mission is for Jesus to be "revealed to Israel" (1:31). Also Jesus declares that Nathanael is "truly an Israelite in whom is no guile" (1:47), and refers to Nicodemus as "the teacher of Israel" (3:10). These few examples suggest that John may intend "Israel" to denote a faithful remnant among the Jews.⁶¹

The above survey indicates that the anti-Jewish bias of John, while real, is not as extreme as commonly believed. The evangelist was no Marcion. He valued much that is Jewish, including the Hebrew Scriptures, and he affirmed the Jewishness of Jesus, whom he depicted as the Jewish messiah. Also, in his account of the passion, John often appears less anti-Jewish than the other gospels. Nevertheless, in many respects the gospel lives up to its anti-Jewish reputation. Although John affirms the Jewishness of Jesus, at times the evangelist has Jesus address the Jews as an outsider. According to this gospel, the Jews regarded Jesus as both law-breaker and blasphemer. John even implies that the Jews as a whole were responsible for the crucifixion. He does so largely by a subtle use of the word "Jew." By freely applying "the Jews" to limited groups within Judaism, he manages to imply that the Jews as a whole were behind Jesus' execution. John is never quite as anti-Jewish as Matthew in declaring that the Jewish people deserve God's vengeance (*Mt.* 27:25); nevertheless, the Fourth Gospel teaches that rejection of Jesus brings condemnation (3:18; 12:48; see 5:22-30), and that it was the Jews who rejected him.

Stages of Literary Development

That John contains both anti-Jewish and relatively pro-Jewish elements is a contradiction in need of some explanation. The common way to explain such divergent tendencies in a single work is to regard them as

reflecting multiple authorship, with one view stemming from the author or redactor and the other from an earlier edition or source.

In the case of John, there are commonly held source and redaction theories quite apart from its divergent view on the Jews. In regard to sources, P. Gardner-Smith⁶² and C. H. Dodd⁶³ have persuaded most interpreters that John does not use any of the *Synoptic Gospels*. John does, however, rely on other sources, and a considerable number of exegetes believe that it is possible to detect a source (or sources) behind the gospel's miracle stories and passion narrative. Although some, notably E. Schweizer⁶⁴ and E. Ruckstuhl,⁶⁵ argue that Johannine editing has made these sources irrecoverable, there have been a number of attempts to recover both a sign (or miracle) source⁶⁶ and a Johannine passion source.⁶⁷ One of the more daring recent studies on Johannine sources is *The Gospel of Signs*, by R. T. Fortna.⁶⁸ Fortna recreates an early gospel which he believes was a single source behind both the miracle stories and the passion narrative in John. In spite of many disagreements over the details of Fortna's work, especially over his view that the rediscovered source materials ever formed a single gospel, a number of interpreters are in basic agreement with him over what lies behind the Johannine miracles and passion.⁶⁹

In regard to earlier editions of the *Fourth Gospel*, there is wide agreement that it took shape in several stages within a Johannine community.⁷⁰ Exactly what these stages were may be beyond recovery, but the following four seem to be minimal.⁷¹ Stage one would represent the traditional material about Jesus that circulated in the earliest Johannine group. Such material, derived ultimately from eye-witness accounts (see *Jn.* 19:35; 21:24), would have been similar to the traditions behind the *Synoptic Gospels*. Stage two would represent the development of stage one into Johannine patterns through discourses, meditations, etc. In stage three an evangelist would have put the Johannine tradition into the form of a gospel, which, in a fourth stage, seems to have been re-edited by a redactor.⁷²

As the present version of the *Fourth Gospel* took shape, each author or redactor implanted his own views upon the developing tradition. We should not overemphasize, however, the freedom with which Johannine writers treated their sources. Even E. Käsemann, who insists that John used "the earthly life of Jesus merely as a backdrop,"⁷³ must admit that the evangelist found tradition "absolutely necessary," and that he used narrative from a miracle source "without great modifications."⁷⁴ The evangelist feels a responsibility to transmit his tradition, but he also writes as a theologian who interprets that tradition out of his own experience and the experience of his community. L. Martyn in his book, *History and Theology*

in the *Fourth Gospel*,⁷⁵ describes the tension between tradition and the evangelist's own experience as a two-level drama. On one level, John looks back on the life of Jesus, while on a second level he relates the past to the situation of his own day.⁷⁶

Jesus and his earliest followers were Jews; yet, as shown above, by the time that the *Gospel of John* had reached its present form, the Johannine community no longer considered itself Jewish. Since the movement of the community was away from Judaism, the gospel's relatively pro-Jewish elements must belong to the earlier stages of its development, while the more anti-Jewish aspects would have entered the text with later editing. Other considerations tend to confirm this conclusion. In the first place, several recent studies of the Johannine sign (or miracle) source find it free of the anti-Jewish bias that pervades the gospel as a whole.⁷⁷ Secondly, there are places in the gospel where the editorial nature of "the Jews" appears fairly obvious.

The following examples are typical: According to *John* 1:19, "the Jews of Jerusalem sent priests and Levites to ask [John the Baptist], 'Who are you?'" Certainly the Jewish people of Jerusalem had no authority to dispatch priests and Levites. The only Jews having such authority would have been the chief priests and those close to them.⁷⁸ Therefore, an earlier version of these words might have been the following: "The chief priests sent priests and Levites to ask [John], 'Who are You?'"⁷⁹ A middle stage in the developing tradition seems represented in *John* 1:24, according to which those who sent out the questioners are, not simply "the Jews" of Jerusalem, but "the Pharisees," the ones who assumed control of Judaism after the destruction of the Temple and its priesthood in the year 70. Thus, *John* 1:19 would lie at the end of a threefold development corresponding to three periods in Jewish and Christian history. When the chief priests exercised authority in Jerusalem, they would have been the ones responsible for dispatching temple personnel to the Baptist. After the year 70, it was the chief Pharisees who would have sent such a delegation, and this changed situation is reflected in *John* 1:24. Finally, when the Johannine community had severed its ties with the Synagogue, these Christians tended to ignore distinctions within Judaism. At this stage, found in *John* 1:19, it is simply "the Jews" from Jerusalem who dispatched the delegation.⁸⁰

In telling of Jesus feeding the five thousand and then walking on the sea, *John* 6 agrees with the *Synoptic Gospels* (*Mk.* 6:32-56 & //s) in referring to the people involved as a "multitude" (*óchlos*). Throughout the whole narrative section of the chapter and the beginning of the following discourse, the gospel portrays the multitude in a favorable light. Then, commencing from verse 31, the people begin to murmur against Jesus. At

the same point also, they cease to be a "multitude" and become "the Jews." This change fits in well with the usual source-critical analyses of the chapter. According to these analyses, the narrative section depends on a relatively early source,⁸¹ but there is no consensus of any source behind the rest of the chapter.⁸² It probably came from the evangelist or his redactor. Thus, in *John* 6, the anti-Jewish element probably represents a late stage in the development of the gospel.⁸³

John's anti-Jewish bias generally appears to have entered the developing gospel at a relatively late stage. This stage would have come from a period when the Johannine community no longer considered itself to be Jewish. It is quite likely that the gospel's allusions to being expelled from the Synagogue, to the official nature of such expulsions (9:22), and to further Jewish persecution reflect the living experience of the evangelist and his church. Having themselves experienced rejection and suffering at the hands of the Jews whom they knew, they were ready to assume that Jesus and his disciples had undergone similar experiences among "the Jews." Yet those who completed the last stages of the *Fourth Gospel* were too conservative to transform radically the tradition that they had received. They were ready to write lengthy additions and probably to make deletions. They were willing sometimes to modify their tradition through changes in wording, as seen, for example, in their use of the term "Jew." They were apparently unwilling either to ignore what they had received or transform it entirely. Rather, they generally chose to retain their source material, even when it contradicted the way they felt and what they wanted to say. *The result became a gospel containing a strange mixture of some of the most anti-Jewish parts of the New Testament resting upon a relatively pro-Jewish Johannine tradition.*

Synagogue Expulsion of Christians

The next questions concern dating. When did the Johannine community separate itself from the Synagogue? And what happened to cause the separation? The usual answer to the first question is that the separation occurred near the end of the first century when Rabban Gamaliel II was *Nasi*, i.e., the chief religious leader of the Jews.⁸⁴ The usual answer to the second question is that the Jews excluded the Christians from Synagogue worship by adding a curse against them to the liturgy.⁸⁵

There is evidence of hostility between some Jews and some Christians from the earliest days of the Church. The apostle Paul testifies that he himself, while still a Jew, had persecuted the Church (I *Cor.* 15:9; *Gal.* 1:13, 23; *Phil.* 3:6) and, as a Christian had himself suffered persecution from Jews (II *Cor.* 11:24). Even though many Christians of Jewish background retained their Jewish identity and way of life (see, e.g., *Gal.* 2:7-13),

hostility between Jew and Christian tended to increase. Two events in particular highlighted the hostility. The first was the martyrdom of James of Jerusalem, the leader of the Jewish-Christian group at the hands of Jewish authorities shortly before the first Jewish revolt.⁸⁶ The second was the Christian abandonment of Jerusalem just before the Romans besieged and destroyed it.⁸⁷

After the revolt and the loss of the Temple, Jewish leadership passed to the Pharisees. They became the saviors of Judaism. In the process, they attempted to bring Judaism into a close uniformity. To achieve this end, they had to deal with the *minim* (or heretics),⁸⁸ either by forcing them to conform or by expelling them from the Synagogue. The means chosen was liturgical. Central to the Jewish daily liturgy are the prayers known as the *Shemoneh 'Esreh* (or Eighteen Benedictions). At the request of Gamaliel II, a certain Samuel the Small emended (*tiqquen*)⁸⁹ benediction twelve to address the problem of the *minim*,⁹⁰ and the rabbinic evidence clearly shows that the purpose of the prayer was indeed to force their conformity or to drive them from Jewish worship.⁹¹

Although early rabbinic sources never claim that Samuel's emendation was directed specifically against Jewish Christians, two other kinds of evidence compel this conclusion. The first concerns the wording of the benediction in later texts. It appears in many versions, but two related versions mention Christians by name. One of the latter was published by S. Schechter from two mediaeval Egyptian liturgical fragments in 1898.⁹² The other comes from a late manuscript containing the ninth-century liturgy of Rav Amran Gaon.⁹³ The versions read as follows:⁹⁴

Schechter fragments

For apostates (*meshummadin*) may
there be no hope [unless they re-
turn to thy law];
And the kingdom of arrogance⁹⁵
mayest thou quickly uproot in our
days;
And may the Christians
(*haNotserim*) and the *minim* perish
in an instant.
[May they be erased from the Book
of Life;]
And along with the righteous may
they not be written.
Blessed art thou, O Lord, who hum-
blest arrogant ones.

For Apostates (*meshummadim*) may
there be no hope [another version:
unless they return to thy cove-
nant];
And may the Christians
(*haNotserim*) and the *minim* be de-
stroyed in an instant;
And may all our enemies and those
with violent hatred be quickly cut
off;
And the kingdom of arrogance⁹⁵
mayest thou quickly uproot, break,
and humble in our days.
Blessed art thou, O Lord, who
brokest enemies and humblest ar-
rogant ones.

The second other kind of evidence consists of patristic references to benediction twelve, references proving that the mention of Christians in the above versions was not a late addition from Islamic times. The most specific references are those of Epiphanius and Jerome. In 410, Jerome alluded three times to the benediction in his commentary on *Isaiah* (2:18; 49:7; 52:4). He confirmed that "three times each day in all the synagogues [the Jews] under the name of Nazarenes (*sub nomine Nazarenorum*) curse the designation Christian" (2:18). Somewhat earlier in 375/76, Epiphanius had also written that Jewish boys, "on rising at dawn, in the midst of the day, and at evening, three times during the day when they perform their prayers in the synagogues, give a curse three times during the day by saying, 'Curse the Nazarenes (Nazōraïous), O God'" (Haereses, 29:9). Only slightly less specific is Justin Martyr in the middle of the second century, who charges the Jews with "cursing in your synagogues those who believe on the Christ" (*Dialogus cum Triphone Iudaeo*, 16:4; similarly 96:2; see also 47:4; 93:4; 95:4; 108:31; 117:3; 137:2).⁹⁶ Therefore, there must have been some mention of Christians in benediction twelve after Samuel revised it.⁹⁷

The fact that benediction twelve in the *Shemoneh 'Esreh* was reworded to include Christians suggests that other liturgical changes may have come about with Christians in mind. The most likely change of this type concerned the Decalogue.⁹⁸ According to rabbinic accounts,⁹⁹ the Ten Commandments were dropped from the liturgy, even though they had been recited daily in the Temple, in order to forestall a claim from the *minim* that Moses had received no commandments on Mount Sinai except these ten.¹⁰⁰ The liturgical form of the Decalogue would have been particularly open to this interpretation because after the commandments came the following: "and these are the statutes and the commandments which Moses gave the Children of Israel when they went forth from Egypt."¹⁰¹ Since many early Christians tended to regard the Ten Commandments as the whole law from Sinai,¹⁰² the *minim* who prompted their deletion from the Synagogue liturgy may indeed have consisted partly or entirely of Christians.

It is important to interpret rabbinic measures against Christians in the context of the general Jewish situation at the end of the first century. Judaism was rebuilding and closing its ranks. There was a new demand for orthodoxy, and other groups, as well as Christians, were being suppressed.

One such group was the Sadducees, who had controlled the Jerusalem Temple with the cooperation of Rome. They were known for their rejection of Pharisaic oral law and particularly for their denial of a future resurrection.¹⁰³ The rabbinic attitude toward such *minim*¹⁰⁴ was well expressed in the saying, "These are the ones who have no share in the world

to come: he who says there is no resurrection of the dead, [he who says] the Law is not from Heaven, and Epicurus (i.e., a skeptic)."¹⁰⁵ Significantly, there also appears in benediction two of the *Shemoneh 'Esreh* a reference to God as the one who raises the dead. This prayer would certainly have offended any Sadducee, and a relatively early rabbinic reference specifically states that benediction two was used to identify such *minim*.¹⁰⁶

Another group that suffered from an imposed rabbinic orthodoxy was that segment of the Pharisees which comprised *Bet Shammai* (or the School of Shammai). The struggle between *Bet Shammai* and the rival *Bet Hillel* had been long and bitter. On one occasion *Bet Shammai* had even resorted to force and had imposed its will through drawn swords and murder.¹⁰⁷ After the fall of Jerusalem, *Bet Shammai* lost much of its influence; and finally under Gamaliel II came the declaration that, while the dicta of *Bet Shammai* and *Bet Hillel* were "like the words of the living God," the dicta of *Bet Shammai* were invalid.¹⁰⁸

Repressive measures against Christians and others matched the character of Gamaliel. He believed in using his authority as *Nasi* and brooked no opposition, even from the sages of his generation. On one occasion, he excommunicated his own brother-in-law.¹⁰⁹ In time, Gamaliel's autocratic ways led to his deposition; but the fact that he loyally continued to be active under his successor, coupled with his obvious ability, led to his restoration.¹¹⁰

The effect of the anti-Christian addition to benediction twelve seems to have varied among the Christians from community to community. A few communities maintained a relatively positive attitude to the Synagogue as late as the third century.¹¹¹ One explanation could be that the anti-Christian emendation was not adopted in all synagogues. Another factor is that Jewish congregations which did use the emendation would not have recited the benediction on Sabbath and festivals. On these days, they read only the first three and last three of the Eighteen Benedictions. Benediction twelve was omitted at the very times that Christians would likely have been present.

The Johannine community was not one of those that maintained a positive relationship with the Synagogue. It is impossible to say with certainty that the Johannine community was responding directly to the official Jewish liturgical emendation cursing Christians; however, such a conclusion seems justified. *John* 9:22 mentions what seems to be an official Jewish decision to drive Christians from their synagogues, and this emendation is the major Jewish official act against Christians which would have affected the Johannine community. Thus, in the Johannine community, the new emendation seems to have resulted in divorce and mutual hatred.

It is these latter stages that contain the bitter denunciations of "the Jews" coupled with implications of actual or impending persecution and even killing of Christians (16:2; cf. 5:18).¹¹²

The *Fourth Gospel* reflects the situation of the Johannine community both before and after its divorce from Judaism.¹¹³ In the earlier stages before the divorce, the gospel betrays no denunciations of "the Jews." Now, after the divorce, "the Jews" have become the enemy. In the earlier period, certain Christian views on Jesus, the Law, etc., were probably tolerated in local Jewish circles. Now these views, at least in their developed form, have become central issues in Jewish Christian confrontations. In the earlier period there had been certain instances of persecution by Jews throughout the Christian world, but such persecution apparently did not affect the Johannine community. Now, amid increasing tensions, Johannine Christians, no longer welcome in the Synagogue, were beginning to face Jewish persecution themselves, and the community situation left its mark upon the *Gospel of John* in its final stages of development.

Inevitably, the post-divorce situation of the Johannine community affected its view of the past. No longer could an evangelist from this community simply transmit a tradition that portrayed Jesus' death in largely political terms. While the Fourth Evangelist valued his tradition too highly to ignore it entirely, he did reinterpret it in the light of his own recent experience with the Synagogue. Thus throughout his gospel, there appear references to "the Jews" persecuting Jesus for breaking the Sabbath (5:16), and particularly over Jesus' claim to divine sonship (5:18; 8:58f.; 10:33; 19:7; see 20:31f.). Later, a redactor¹¹⁴ apparently added his own experience that Jews generally were repulsed by Christian eucharistic teaching (6:51-60).

Unfortunately, the anti-Jewish teaching of the *Fourth Gospel* did not stop with its final redaction. John soon became one of the most influential writings in the early Church, and its popularity has continued to the present day.¹¹⁵ Its popularity has vastly increased the influence of the gospel's anti-Jewish teaching in Christian and pseudo-Christian circles. Today, we may learn to understand the anti-Jewish tenor of the gospel as the unfortunate outgrowth of historical circumstances. Such understanding in itself, however, will not prevent the gospel from continuing to broadcast its anti-Jewish message unabated.

Notes

1. *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism* ("A Cross-road Book"; New York: Seabury, 1974), pp. 111-116.
2. E.g., R. Fuller, "The 'Jews' in the Fourth Gospel," *Dialog*, 16 (1977), p.

35; E. J. Epp, "Anti-Semitism and the Popularity of the Fourth Gospel in Christianity," *CCAR Journal*, 22:4 (Fall, 1975), pp. 35, 43, 45-52; M. A. Getty, "The Jews and John's Passion Narrative," *Liturgy*, 22:3 (March, 1977), p. 6; K. Jaspers, *Myth and Christianity* (New York: Noonday, 1958), p. 21; S. Sandmel, *A Jewish Understanding of the New Testament* (New York: University Publishers, 1960); C. K. Barrett, *The Gospel of John and Judaism*, trans. from German by D. M. Smith (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970), pp. 70f.; and R.E. Brown, *The Gospel according to John* ("Anchor Bible," 29, 29A; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), pp. LXX-LXXV (with hesitation). For other examples see R. Leistner, *Antijudaismus im Johannesevangelium?* ("Theologie und Wirklichkeit," 3; Bern: H. Lang, 1974), pp. 9-67; and also E. Grässer, "Die antijüdische Polemik im Johannesevangelium." *New Testament Studies*, 11 (1964), pp. 86f.

3. See Getty, pp. 7f.

4. For Israel as a vine in Rabbinic literature, see *Hullin* 92a; *Exodus Rabbah* 36:1 (based on Ps. 80:8 [9]). For a general discussion, see Brown, pp. 669ff.; C. H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1954) pp. 410ff.

5. Dodd, pp. 82-85.

6. On bread, see *Genesis Rabbah* 70:5; *Pesiqta deRav Kahana* 11:1; *Canticles Rabbah* 1:19; cf. *Exodus Rabbah* 25:7; on light, see Prov. 6:23; *Sifre on Numbers* 6:25, parag. 41; *Ketubbot* 111ab; *Deuteronomy Rabbah* 7:3; cf. *Bava Batra* 4a; *Avot deRabbi Natan*, text b, 31; on water see *Mekhilta deRabbi Yishma'el, Bahodesh*, 5, p. 222 (Horovitz); *Sifre on Deuteronomy* 11:22, parag. 48; *Ta 'anit* 7a; *Tanna deve Eliyahu*, p. 198 (Friedmann); *Numbers Rabbah* 1:6; etc.; on wine see *Ta 'anit* 7a (*bar.*); *Pesiqta deRav Kahana* 12:13; *Canticles Rabbah* L:19; and *Exodus Rabbah* 25:7.

7. For a full discussion, see J. T. Townsend, "The Jerusalem Temple in New Testament Thought," (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Harvard Divinity School, 1958), pp. 174-183; (R. Schnackenburg, *The Gospel according to St. John*, trans. K. Smith, New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), p. 352; R.H. Lightfoot, *St. John's Gospel, a Commentary*, ed. C. F. Evans (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956), pp. 113f.; Brown, pp. 121-125; O. Cullmann, *Early Christian Workshop*, trans. A. S. Todd and J. B. Terrance ("Studies in Bibl. Theol., 10; London: SCM, 1953, pp. 71-74).

8. Townsend, pp. 170-173; Brown, pp. 180f.; Cullmann, pp. 80-84; F. M. Braun, "In Spiritu et Veritate", *Revue Thomiste*, 52 (1952), pp. 270f.

9. The passage has many exegetical difficulties. See Townsend, pp. 183-196; Brown, pp. 320-331.

10. On the scriptural allusion, see Brown, pp. 937f.; R. Bultmann, *The Gospel of John, a Commentary*, trans. G. R. Beasley Murray et al. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971), p. 677; cf. Dodd, *Historical Tradition in the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 43f., who feels that the allusion is more akin to Ps. 33:21.

11. For surveys of various interpretations, see E. E. May, *Ecce Agnus Dei!* ("Catholic Univ. of America Studies in Sacred Theol.," ser. 2, no. 5; Washington: Catholic Univ., 1947); S. Virgulin, "Recent Discussion of the Title 'Lamb of God,'" *Scripture*, 13 (1961), pp. 74-80.

12. So Brown, pp. 395f.; but cf. H. G. Wood, "Interpreting the Time," *New Testament Studies*, 2 (1956), pp. 265f., according to whom the thieves are "violent revolutionary leaders."

13. John also refers to Jesus as God in 1:1 and, according to good textual evidence, 1:18. Heb. 1:8-9 is the only other place in the New Testament where it is certain that Jesus is called "God." See Brown, "Does the New Testament Call Jesus God?" *Theological Studies*, 26 (1965), pp. 545-573.

14. See Brown, *John*, pp. 533-538. See also E. D. Freed, "Did John Write his Gospel Partly to Win Samaritan Converts?" *Novum Testamentum*, 12 (1970), pp. 251-253, on the Samaritan background of the usage, and Bultmann, pp. 225f., n. 3, for the non-Jewish background. On the meaning of the Hebrew divine name, see F. M. Cross, "Yahweh and the God of the Patriarchs," *Harvard Theological Review*, 55 (1962), pp. 225-259.

15. The text was corrected to "I am Lord" in the margin of Codex Marchalianus.

16. See A. E. Millgram, *Jewish Worship* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publ. Soc., 1971), pp. 96-101.

17. John's second most common designation of Jesus' opponents is "Pharisee(s)," which appears nineteen times. The probable reason is that, when the gospel was written, Pharisees dominated Judaism. See Brown, *John*, p. LXXII.

18. So Barrett, pp. 71f. See Ruether, p. 114; Sandmel, p. 277; D. M. Smith, "The Setting and Shape of a Johannine Narrative Source," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 95 (1976), pp. 231-241.

19. E.g., Leistner, pp. 69-150; J. R. Michaels, "Alleged Anti-Semitism in the Fourth Gospel," *Gordon Review*, 11:1 (Winter, 1968), pp. 12-24, R. T. Fortna, "Theological Use of Locale in the Fourth Gospel," *Gospel Studies in Honor of Sherman Elbridge Johnson: ATR Supplementary Series*, 3 (1974), pp. 93-95, who concludes that John is polemical but "not in any racial sense anti-semitic." For other writers with similar views, see Leistner, *passim*, who includes a survey of Jewish views on John (pp. 57-63). See also the following note.

20. E.g., H. Mulder, "Ontstaan en Doel van het Vierde Evangelie." *Gereformeerd Theologisch Tijdschrift*, 69 (1969), pp. 233-258; J. A. T. Robinson, "The Destination and Purpose of St. John's Gospel," *New Testament Studies*, 6 (1960), pp. 117-131; W. C. van Unnik, "The Purpose of St. John's Gospel," *Studia Evangelica*, I, ed. K. Aland et al. (TU, 73; Berlin, 1959), pp. 382-411. For others see Grässer, p. 87. According to Fortna, *The Gospel of Signs* ("SNTS Monograph," 11; Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 223-225, 228-230, and W. Nicol, *The Sêmeia in the Fourth Gospel* ("Suppl. to NT," 32; Leiden: Brill, 1972), pp. 77-79, John used a source intended for Jews.

21. So also W. A. Meeks, "'Am I a Jew?'—Johannine Christianity and Judaism," *Christianity, Judaism and other Greco-Roman cults: Studies for Morton Smith at Sixty*, Part I, ed. J. Neusner (Leiden: Brill, 1975), pp. 163, 167ff.; Robinson, "The New Look on the Fourth Gospel," reprinted in *idem*, *Twelve New Testament Studies* ("Studies in Bibl. Theol.," 14; Naperville, Ill.: Allenson, 1962, pp. 94-106.

22. Particularly influential today is the Gnostic interpretation of Bultmann, both in his commentary and in his *Theology of the New Testament*, Vol. II, trans. K. Grobel (New York: Scribner's, 1955). For others with Gnostic or Hellenistic interpretations of John, see the surveys of Leistner, pp. 9-47; G. MacRae, "The Fourth Gospel and Religionsgeschichte," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly*, 32 (1970), pp. 13ff. See also Meeks, pp. 167-169.

23. See the surveys of A. Wind, "Destination and Purpose of the Gospel of John," *Novum Testamentum*, 14 (1972), pp. 26-69; Leistner, pp. 51-56; and Barrett, pp. 1-19. See also J. D. Purvis, "The Fourth Gospel and the Samaritans,"

Novum Testamentum, 17 (1975), p. 11, n. 1, for a recent bibliography of studies (by J. Bowman, G. W. Buchanan, Freed, Meeks, and C. H. H. Scobie) which use a Samaritan approach to John.

24. Meeks, p. 185; see also pp. 167-170.

25. See S. Lieberman, *Greek in Jewish Palestine*, (New York: P. Feldheim, 1965), and *idem*, *Hellenism in Jewish Palestine* ("Texts and Studies of JTSA,") 18 (New York: Jewish Theol. Seminary of America, 1962).

26. "Call no man on earth your father" (Mt. 23:9) also probably concerns relying upon the fatherhood of Abraham. See Townsend, "Matthew 23:9," *Journal of Theological Studies*, 12 (1961), pp. 56-59.

27. It is possible that some Jewish sacrifices were offered in Jerusalem even after the destruction of the Temple. So K. W. Clark, "Worship in the Jerusalem Temple after A.D. 70," *New Testament Studies*, 6 (1960), pp. 269-280. See also H. Bietenhard, "Die Freiheitskriege der Juden unter den Kaisern Trajan und Hadrian und der messianische Tempelbau," *Judaica*, 4 (1948), pp. 84-108, 161-167. On the dating of John after the fall of Jerusalem, see below, pp. 21ff., and n. 85.

28. See H. J. Schoeps, "Die Tempelzerstörung des Jahres 70 in der jüdischen Religionsgeschichte," *Coniectanea Neotestamentica*, 6 (1942), pp. 1-46; J. R. Brown, *Temple and Sacrifice in Rabbinic Judaism* ("Winslow Lectures," 1963; Evanston, Ill.: Seabury-Western Theol. Seminary, 1963).

29. It is sometimes claimed that the Qumran sect considered their community to have replaced the Jerusalem Temple. So B. Gärtner, *The Temple and the Community in Qumran and the New Testament* ("SNTS Monograph," 1; New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 1-46; however, his arguments are based, at least in part, on faulty translations. See my review in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 84 (1965), pp. 328f.

30. E.g., CD 8:3-18. On the situation generally, see J. Murphy-O'Connor, "The Essenes and their History," *Revue Biblique*, 81 (1974), pp. 215-244.

31. John 10:30: "I and the Father are one," is no exception. The unity of Son and Father that the evangelist had in mind is explained in 17:1: "That they may be one, even as we are one." See also 17:21.

32. See Meeks, "The Divine Agent and his Counterfeit in Philo and the Fourth Gospel," *Aspects of Religious Propaganda in Judaism and Early Christianity*, ed. E. S. Fiorenza ("Univ. of Notre Dame Center for the Study of Judaism and Christianity in Antiquity," 2; Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame, 1976), pp. 43-54; *idem*, *The Prophet-King* ("Supplements to *Novum Testamentum*," 14; Leiden: Brill, 1967), pp. 138-142.

33. *Tanhuma*, Ruber recension, part 4, pp. 51f. // *Numbers Rabbah* 15:13; see also *Pesiqta deRav Kahana*, 32:9 (= Suppl., 1:9); *Midrash on Psalms*, 90:1. See also Meeks, *Prophet-King*, pp. 192-195.

34. It is unlikely, however, that John depends directly upon any of the Synoptic Gospels. See below, p. 17.

35. See Leistner, pp. 69-150, especially p. 71.

36. According to Luke 22:4, Judas "spoke with the chief priests and captains (*stratēgois*)." These captains are probably the Temple captains mentioned in Luke 22:5. See also Acts 4:1; 5:24.

37. That the cohort and centurian imply a Roman presence is generally accepted. See Townsend, *A Liturgical Interpretation of Our Lord's Passion in Narrative Form* ("Israel Study Group Occasional Papers," 1; New York: National Conference of Christians and Jews, 1977), p. 18, n. 41. Among the few who reject this inference are J. Blinzler, *The Trial of Jesus*, trans. I. and F. McHugh

(Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1959), pp. 66-70, and D. R. Catchpole, *The Trial of Jesus* ("Studia Post-Biblica," 18; Leiden: Brill, 1971), pp. 148-150. Leistner, pp. 82f. has answered their criticism and given special attention to Blinzler's philological arguments. Cf. W. R. Wilson, *The Execution of Jesus* (New York: Scribner's 1970), pp. 170f., and E. Haenchen, "History and Interpretation in the Johannine Passion Narrative," *Interpretation*, 24 (1970), pp. 200-203, both of whom regard the Roman presence in John as a theological addition to the tradition.

38. This interest in Jesus' disciples would fit in well with the high priest's stated concern over Jesus' popularity (11:48). See Leistner, pp. 101ff.

39. R. H. Husband, *The Prosecution of Jesus* (Princeton: Univ. Press, 1916), pp. 102-13, 182-208, especially p. 135. Although Mark 14:55 & //s; 15:1 mention that Jesus appeared before "the sanhedrin (to *synédrión*)," this name need not designate any particular body. The Greek word *synédrión* is a relatively common word meaning "council"; and might denote any Judaean council, known or unknown, such as a council of advisers to the high priest. See Townsend, *Passion*, pp. 20f., n. 50.

40. Although a political concern underlies the Jewish proceedings in 14:53-72 (see Townsend, *Passion*, p. 24, n. 66), it is clear that the evangelist himself regards blasphemy as the central issue.

41. So Haenchen, p. 205; Leistner, pp. 106f.; P. Benoit, "Jésus devant le Sanhédrin," in *idem. Exégèse et Théologie*, Vol. 1 (Paris: Cerf, 1961), p. 301. See also Barrett, *The Gospel according to St. John* (London: SPCK, 1955), pp. 436f., and Bultmann, *John*, pp. 642-644.

42. Cf. Matt. 27:25: "And all the people (*laós*) said in reply, 'His blood is upon us and upon our children.'" See Leistner, p. 116.

43. Meeks, "Divine Agent," p. 58; Haenchen, p. 216; F. Hahn, "Der Prozess Jesu nach dem Johannesevangelium," *Evangelisch-katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament: Vorarbeiten*, Heft 2, by J. Gnllka et al. (Neukirchen: Neukirchener-Verlag), p. 51.

44. See Townsend, *Passion*, p. 14, n. 12.

45. In Jesus' day "Son of God" would likely have been a royal title. So probably in John 1:49 and possibly in 11:27. See Townsend, *Passion*, p. 23, n. 61.

46. See P. Winter, *On the Trial of Jesus*, 2nd ed. rev. by T. A. Burkill and G. Vermes ("Studia Judaica," 1; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1974), pp. 80-82.

47. See above, n. 44.

48. Cf. the caution of Grässer, pp. 76f., according to whom the key to understanding John's anti-Jewish bias does not lie in his use of the word, "Jew."

49. See M. de Jonge, "Jewish Expectations about the 'Messiah,' according to the Fourth Gospel," *New Testament Studies*, 19 (1973), pp. 246-270. See also Fortna, *Signs*, pp. 228-234, according to whom John's major source taught that miracles demonstrated Jesus' messiahship.

50. See Bultmann, *John*, p. 86; Ruether, p. 113; Getty, p. 9; Michaels; pp. 17-19; Fortna, "Theological use of Locale," pp. 92f.; Grässer, pp. 88f.; Meeks, "'Am I a Jew?'" pp. 182f.

51. So Michaels, p. 18; G. A. F. Knight, "Antisemitism in the Fourth Gospel," *Reformed Theological Review*, 27 (1968), pp. 81-88. Cf. also Grässer, pp. 83, 88-90.

52. P. 113.

53. Those who would equate John's Jews with Jewish authorities include E. L. Allen, "The Jewish Christian Church in the Fourth Gospel," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 74 (1955), pp. 88-92; R. E. Brown, *John*, pp. LXXII (gener-

ally). See also Barrett, *St. John*, p. 143, for whom the Jews are "Judaism and its official leaders." According to J. Jocz, "Die Juden im Johannesevangelium," *Judaica*, 9 (1953), pp. 140-142, the Jews are non-believing Israelites. Several other writers suggest that "Jews in John should sometimes be translated Judaeans." So M. Lowe, "Who were the *IOUDAIOT*?" *Novum Testamentum*, 18 (1976) pp. 101-130 (mostly); J. H. Bernard, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to St. John* ("Intern. Crit. Comm."; New York: Scribner, 1929), Vol. 1, pp. 34-35 (usually); B. Lindars, *The Gospel of John* ("New Century Bible"; London: Oliphants, 1972), p. 102 (often); Cf. Fortna, "Theological Use of Locale," pp. 58-95. For the opinions of various other exegetes, see Leistner, pp. 47-51. See also above, n. 50, and below, n. 55.

54. E. G., Scobie, "The Origins and Development of Samaritan Christianity," *New Testament Studies*, 19 (1973), pp. 390-414. See also above, n. 23.

55. R. G. Bratcher, "The Jews' in the Gospel of John," *Bible Translator*, 26 (1975), pp. 401-409; Schnackenburg, p. 287; Leistner, p. 87; M. H. Shepherd, "The Jews in the Gospel of John: Another Level of Meaning," *Gospel Studies in Honor of Sherman Elbridge Johnson: ATR Supplementary Series*, 3 (1974), pp. 95f., 104; cf. Grässer, pp. 76f.

56. P. 107.

57. H. J. Cadbury, *The Making of Luke-Acts* (London: SPCK, 1958), pp. 221-250.

58. Barrett, *John and Judaism*, p. 70; cf. Shepherd, pp. 96f.; Michaels, p. 14.

59. So R. E. Brown, *John*, p. 206, and Braun, pp. 263-265 (probably). Others suggest that the nameless festival in John 5:1 was Passover. So Irenaeus, *Adv. Haereses*, 2:23:3; M.-J. Latrange, *Évangile selon Saint Jean* ("Études Bibliques"; Paris: Gabalda, 1936), pp. 135f.; J. N. Sanders, *A Commentary on the Gospel According to St. John* ("Harper's NT Commentaries"; New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 158; Bultmann, *John*, p. 240; Bernard, Vol. 1, pp. 225f. See also T. Zahn, *Das Evangelium des Johannes* ("Kommentar zum NT," 4; Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1921), pp. 275-279, who argues that the festival was Tabernacles. For other suggestions, see E. C. Hoskyns, *The Fourth Gospel*, ed. F. N. Davey, (London: Faber and Faber, 1947), pp. 263f.

60. S. Pancaro, "The Relationship of the Church to Israel in the Gospel of St. John," *New Testament Studies*, 21 (1975), pp. 398-401; Fortna, "Theological Use of Locale," p. 92.

61. Michaels, pp. 19f.; Pancaro, pp. 396-405; but cf. *idem*, "People of God' in St. John's Gospel?", *New Testament Studies*, 16 (1970), pp. 123-125, where he argues that "Israel" in John "includes all believers." Note also that, wherever "the Jews" appears in John in a positive sense, the context suggests special reasons for the usage. In some verses it represents a Samaritan (4:9, 22) or pagan (19:3, 21) point of view. Again, where "the Jews" designates Jesus' followers, the gospel implies that their faith is not sufficient. See above, pp. 12f.; Michaels, p. 20.

62. *St. John and the Synoptic Gospels* (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1938).

63. *Historical Tradition*. See also E. Käsemann, *The Testament of Jesus*, trans. G. Krodol (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968), p. 36.

64. E. Schweizer, *Ego Eimi* . . . , ("Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des A. und NT," 38 (56); Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1939), pp. 82-112.

65. E. Ruckstuhl, *Die literarische Einheit des Johannesevangeliums* ("Studia Friburgensia," n. F., 3; Freiburg in der Schweiz: Paulus, 1951), especially pp. 180-219; *idem*, "The Gospel of John: Its Sources, Redaction and Theology," paper given at Colloquium Biblicum Lovaniense, XXVI, Aug. 20-22, 1975. For other

studies opposing these sources in John, see Smith, *The Composition and Order of the Fourth Gospel: Bultmann's Literary Theory* (New Haven: Yale), pp. 57-115. Against Schweizer and Ruckstuhl, see Fortna, *Signs*, pp. 203-218.

66. E.g., Nicol, G. Reim, *Studien zum alttestamentlichen Hintergrund des Johannesevangeliums* ("SNTS Monograph," 22; Cambridge: Univ. Pres, 1974); Bultmann, *John*. For a reconstruction of Bultmann's "Semeia-Source," see Smith, *Composition and Order*, pp. 39-44.

67. E.g., A. Dauer, *Die Passionsgeschichte im Johannesevangelium* ("Studien zum A. u. NT," 30; München: Kösel, 1972); Bultmann, *John*. See Smith, *Composition and Order*, pp. 44-51, for the text of Bultmann's passion source.

68. *Op. cit.* in n. 20. Among those who essentially agree with Fortna is his former teacher, J. L. Martyn, "Source Criticism and Religionsgeschichte in the Fourth Gospel," *Jesus and Man's Hope*, I ("A Perspective Book"; Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Theol. Seminary, 1970), p. 248. For a similar source theory, see Smith, "Setting and Shape," pp. 231-241.

69. So Smith, "Setting and Shape," pp. 231-234; MacRae, pp. 15f.; J. M. Robinson, "The Johannine Trajectory," in J. M. Robinson and H. Koester, *Trajectories through Early Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), pp. 235ff. However, as these writers point out, there is no wide acceptance of a source behind the Johannine discourses. Bultmann's discourse source (*Offenbarungsreden*) has found little favor. For a text and critical evaluation of the *Offenbarungsreden*, see Smith, *Composition and Order*, pp. 15-38, 57-115.

70. See, for example, the studies of Cullmann, *Der johanneische Kreis* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1975); and J. L. Martyn, "Glimpses into the History of the Johannine Community," paper given at Colloquium Biblicum Lovaniense, XXVI, Aug. 20-22, 1975; *idem*, *History and Theology in the Fourth Gospel* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

71. Martyn, "Glimpses"; *idem*, "Source Criticism"; and R. E. Brown, *John*, pp. XXXIV-XXXIX, both suggest five stages. Fuller, p. 31, outlines four. According to W. Wilkens, *Die Entstehungsgeschichte des vierten Evangeliums* (Zollikon: Evangelischer Verlag, 1958), there are three stages. See also M.-É. Boismard, who finds four stages, the last possibly by Luke, in John 1:19-26; 3:22-30. Cf. *idem*, "L'évolution du thème eschatologique dans les traditions johanniques," *Revue Biblique*, 68 (1961), pp. 507-524; and "Saint Luc et la rédaction du quatrième évangile," *Revue Biblique*, 69 (1962), pp. 185-211.

72. See Bultmann, *John*, *passim*; J. Becker, "Die Abschiedsreden Jesu im Johannesevangelium" *Zeitschrift für die neuestestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 61 (1970), pp. 215-246; G. Richter, "Zur Formgeschichte und literarischen Einheit von Joh. 6:31-58," *Zeitschrift für die neuestestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 60 (1969), pp. 21-55.

73. *The Testament of Jesus*, trans. G. Krodel (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968), p. 13; cf. pp. 74f.

74. P. 37. See generally, Leistner, pp. 71-79.

75. *Op. cit.* in n. 71.

76. A good example of this two-level composition is the story of the man born blind (*John 9*; Martyn, *History and Theology*, pp. 3-41). According vs. 18-22 his parents were afraid to defend him before "the Jews" because "the Jews had already agreed that, if anyone should confess [Jesus] as Christ, he should be expelled from the Synagogue." The actual story of the healing seems to come from traditional material, but the Jewish agreement to expel Christians from the Synagogue probably reflects the situation in the evangelist's day.

77. So Fortna, *Signs*, pp. 32f. & n. 6, p. 12, n. 4, p. 131, p. 132, n. 2, pp. 215, 223; *idem*, "Theological Use of Locale," p. 90, n. 90; Nicol, pp. 142ff.; cf. pp. 23, 90f.; Fuller, pp. 32-35; Smith, "Setting and Shape," pp. 236f.

78. According to Fuller, pp. 32f. the authorities were the Great Sanhedrin; however, in Jesus' day the chief priests dominated this body.

79. Fortna, "Theological Use of Locale," pp. 66f. suggests the version might have simply read, "Priests and Levites sent to ask him." Similarly *idem*, *Signs*, p. 170.

80. Similarly in John 18 & 19 the "the Jews" of 18:31, 38f.; 19:7, 12 are clearly "the chief priests" of 19:15 or "the chief priests and the officers" of 19:7. See Lowe, p. 124; Leistner, pp. 115-118.

81. Fortna, *Signs*, pp. 55-69, 237f.; Nicol, pp. 32-35; Bultmann, *John*, pp. 210f. See also R. E. Brown, *John*, pp. 252-254.

82. On the suggestions of various commentators, see R. E. Brown, *John*, 293-294. See also above, n. 69. There is, however, considerable agreement that vss. 51b-58 stem, not from the evangelist, but from a later redactor. So Bultmann, *John*, pp. 219f.; G. Bornkamm, "Die eucharistische Rede im Johannesevangelium," *Zeitschrift für die neuestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 47 (1956), pp. 161-169; Richter, pp. 21-55; R. E. Brown, *John*, pp. 285-291.

83. For other examples, see Fuller, pp. 32-35.

84. Gamaliel was *nasi* for two periods between c. 80 and c. 116.

85. So, for example, Ruether, p. 115; Grässer, p. 86; etc. One objection to these answers would be a very early dating of John before the fall of Jerusalem in the year 70. Among the few who argue for such a dating is J. A. T. Robinson, *Redating the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976), pp. 254-311, especially pp. 272-274. However, arguments for an early dating prove at most that John could possibly have been written before 70 but fail to demonstrate that the dating is probable.

86. Josephus, *Antiquities* 20:197-204 (also quoted by Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, 3:23:21-24); Hegesippus, as quoted in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, 3:23:4-18. According to Josephus the martyrdom occurred in 62, but Hegesippus places the event in 66.

87. Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, 3:5:3.

88. On the *minim* generally, see D. Sperber, "Min," *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 12 (Jerusalem, 1971), cols. 1-3.

89. So *Berakhot* 28b (bottom); but cf. *yBerakhot* 4:3 (8a). For the interpretation that Samuel emended an existing benediction and did not compose one, see J. J. Petuchowski, "Der Ketzersegen," *Das Vaterunser*, ed. M. Brocke et al. (Freiburg: Herder, 1974), p. 95, who follows J. Heinemann, *Prayer in the Talmud*, ("Studia Judaica", No. 9; trans. and revised, Berlin & New York: De Gruyter, 1977) pps. 225f. For the view that Samuel composed the whole benediction, see Jocz, *The Jewish People and Jesus Christ* (London: SPCK, 1962), p. 54.

90. Note that many mss. read "*tseduqim*" (= "Sadducees") instead of "*minim*." The reason is that in mediaeval Europe, where "*minim*" always designated Christians, the term was changed to avoid the Christian censors.

91. *yBerakhot* 5:4 (9c): "Rabbi Ahi and Rabbi Judah ben Pazi (both c. 320) were seated together in the synagogue. One of them came and recited the prayers (lit: crossed over before the ark), but he altered one of the benedictions. They came and laid the question before Rabbi Simon (c. 280). Rabbi Simon said to them (*lo*) in the name of Rabbi Joshua ben Levi (c. 250), 'A congregation may be unconcerned if someone alters two or three benedictions. They do not have him read them over again.' He found it taught differently (in a *baraita*, i. e., a tradition from the first

two centuries): 'Generally they do not have him recite it over again, except in the case of one who does not say, "Who makest the dead live" (= benediction #2), "Who humblest the arrogant ones" (benediction #12), and "Who buildest Jerusalem" (benediction 14). [In that case] I should say he is a *min*.' Samuel the Small (c. 100) recited the prayers and altered the end of 'Who humblest the arrogant ones.' He remained staring at them. They said to him, 'The sages did not imagine this.' " // *Berakhot* 28b-29a: "The Rabbis have taught (in a *baraita*): 'Shim'on haPaquli arranged the Eighteen Benedictions in order before Rabban Gamaliel (= *Nasi* twice between c. 80 and c. 116) in Jamnia. Rabban Gamaliel said to the sages, "Is there anyone who knows how to emend (*letaqqen*) the benediction on the *minim* (= Sadducees in the censored texts)?" Samuel the Small (c. 100) arose and emended it. After a year he forgot it, and he thought about it for two or three hours [without recalling it], but they did not remove him [as reader]. Why did they not remove him? Did not Rav Judah (c. 150) say [that] Rav said, "If [the reader] errs in any of the benedictions, they do not remove him; [but, if he errs] in the benediction on the *minim* (= Sadducees in the censored texts), they remove him. (The text changes to Aramaic.) We take into consideration [that] perhaps he is a *min*. Samuel the Small is different because he himself emended it." Note that the new benediction did not constitute a formal act of excommunication, but it would have been just as effective. So D. R. A. Hare, *The Theme of Jewish Persecution of Christians in the Gospel According to St. Matthew* ("SNTS Monograph," 6; Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1967), p. 56. On the benediction generally see Petuchowski, pp. 90-101; Hare, pp. 48-56; Jocz, *Jewish People*, pp. 51-57.

92. "Genizah Specimens," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, old ser., 10 (1898), p. 657, for the first fragment, and p. 659, for the other. See also L. Finkelstein, "The Development of the Amidah," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, new ser., 16 (1925-26), p. 157.

93. Codex Bodl. 1095 (Neubauer). The ms. is dated 1426. For a printed text, see D. Hedegard, *Seder R. Amran Gaon*, Part I (Motala: Bröderna Borgströms, 1951), p. 37 (Hebrew numeration), middle col., lines 8-16. Note that Hedegard gives his own translation on p. 93 (English section).

94. The translations consistently match each Hebrew word with the same English word. The first bracketed line in col. 1 is not in Schechter's first fragment, and the second bracketed line is not in his second fragment. The bracketed variant in col. 2 appears in the mss. itself.

95. A Rabbinic designation of Rome. However, if the original benediction predates the Maccabean age, the designation then would have referred the Cambridge Codex of the Mishnah and the text used by Maimonides). Other Mishnah texts and *Avodah Zarah* 18a (*bar.*) read, "he who says there is no resurrection of the dead in the Law (*min-haTorah*)."
Avodah Zarah 18a also omits "and Epicurus."

96. For texts, see E. Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*, vol. II, 4th ed. (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1907), p. 544, n. 161; S. Krauss, "The Jews in the Works of the Church Fathers," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, old ser., 5 (1892/93), pp. 123-134, for Justin and 6 (1893/94), pp. 225-261, for Jerome; see also 5 (1892/93), pp. 139-157, on Origen, who in his *Hom. in Jer.*, 18:12 (13), speaks of a high-priestly decree against the Ebionites.

97. One of the few who argue against the word "*Notserim*" being part of Samuel's work is Jocz, *Jewish People*, pp. 51-57, although he does not doubt that the benediction was aimed at Christians.

98. For other possible anti-Christian measures, see Barrett, *John and Judaism*, pp. 48-51; Jocz, *Jewish People*, pp. 45-51.

99. *Barakhhot*, 12a; *yBerakhhot* 1:8 (3c); cf. *Tamid* 5:1. See J. Mann, "Genizah Fragments of the Palestinian Order of Service," *Contributions to the Scientific Study of Jewish Liturgy*, ed. Petuchowski (New York: Ktav, 1970), pp. 379-448; Jocz, *Jewish People*, pp. 47-49; Barrett, *John and Judaism*, pp. 49f. See also R. N. Grant, "The Decalogue in Early Christianity," *Harvard Theological Review*, 40 (1947), p. 1.

100. Cf. Acts 7, according to which Moses received "living oracles" on Mt. Sinai before the golden-calf incident (vss. 38-41), but the result of his return to the mountain was an idolatrous cult (vss. 42f).

101. The wording is known because some synagogues continued to recite the commandments. It is based on Deut. 6:4 (LXX only). The translation here comes from Mann, p. 393.

102. On the early Christian use of the Decalogue, see Grant, pp. 1-17.

103. See Mark 12:18 & //s; Josephus, *Wars*, 2:165; *Antiquities*, 18:16; *Avot deRabbi Natan*, text a, 5 // text b, 10.

104. *Sanhedrin* 90b uses the word "minim" in commenting on *Sanhedrin* 10:1. See the following note.

105. So *yPe ah* 1:1 (16b, *bar.*) and *Sanhedrin* 10:1 (according to the Cambridge Codex of the Mishnah and the text used by Maimonides). Other Mishnah texts and *Avodah Zarah* 18a (*bar.*) read, "he who says there is no resurrection of the dead in the Law (*min-haTorah*)."
Avodah Zarah 18a also omits "and Epicurus."

106. *yBerakhhot* 5:4; [9c], (*bar.*).

107. *Shabbat* 17a, *TShabbat* 1:16-23; *yShabbat* 1:7 (3c). See S. Mendelsohn, "Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai," *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, 3 (London, 1902), p. 116; Sh. Safrai, "Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai," *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 4 (Jerusalem, 1971), col. 738.

108. 'Eruvin 13b // *yBerakhhot* 1:7 (3b). The decree takes the form of a voice from heaven, but it is significant that it came under Gamaliel II. See "Gamaliel, Rabban," *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 7 (Jerusalem, 1971), col. 296.

109. *Bava Mestica*, 59b.

110. *Berakhhot* 27b-28a // *yBerakhhot* 4:1 (7cd).

111. See *Didascalia Apostolorum*, 21:14, pp. 184f. (Connolly): "Even though they (= the People, i.e., Jews) hate you, yet ought we to call them brethren." See generally G. Strecker, "On the Problem of Jewish Christianity," in W. Bauer, *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity*, trans. R. A. Kraft, G. Krodel, et al. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), pp. 241-285.

112. Ruether, pp. 87f., following Hare, pp. 39, 48-56, concludes such killing would not have been officially sanctioned by the highest Jewish authorities; and she may well be right. For arguments that Jewish killing of Christians was officially ordered, see Martyn, *History and Theology*, pp. 43-68. For Jewish persecution of Christians in a slightly later period, see Justin Martyr, *Apol.*, 1:31:6; *Martyrdom of Polycarp*, 12:2; 13:1; 17:2; 18:1. See also Barrett, *John and Judaism*, p. 10.

113. On this two-level approach, see Martyn, *History and Theology*; see also above, n. 76.

114. See above, n. 82.

115. See Epp, pp. 36-45.

The Patristic Connection

David P. Efroymson

Rosemary Ruether's presentation of "The Negation of the Jews in the Church Fathers" (117-82) is one of the stronger sections in *Faith and Fratricide*. She has demonstrated that the anti-Judaic myth was there, was operative, and was "neither a superficial nor a secondary element in Christian thought" (226). The two dominant themes or emphases seem particularly well chosen, and are fully documented. The first shows how the "doctrine" of the election of the gentiles and its almost universal counterpart, the reprobation of the Jews, are usually connected with the claim that "the Jews" were responsible for the death of Jesus, which is itself (according to a long tradition of scriptural "testimonies") the culmination of previous Israelite history as a "trail of crimes" (124-31). The second, the alleged inferiority of Jewish law, cult, and understanding of scripture, and their spiritual and christological fulfillment, shows fairly clearly what Ruether calls the "antithetical and supersessionary" (160) character of the typical Christian approach of the time. Judaism becomes in these texts all that is merely outward, particularistic, and by-passed in salvation history. Thus, for Christianity, "anti-Judaism was not merely a defense against attack, but an intrinsic need of Christian self-affirmation" (181).

The value of her patristic contribution lies in the sharpness with which she raises the question of the connection between this anti-Judaism and the theological issues or tensions she treats in the final section (226-61). It is on the strength of a congealing of positions during the patristic period (whatever the earlier NT roots were) that Christianity "deprived itself of the tradition of prophetic self-criticism" (230), at least for large segments of its history, and tended to glory in an "ecclesiastical infallibility complex" (231).¹ The same seems true of the pseudo-universalism which rapidly became the "Christian particularism" of "only one path to God" (234), and the "incarnational triumphalism" connected with the unre-

solved tension between letter and spirit, which led to problems both in sacramentalism and in ethics.

Any attempt, therefore, to discuss her handling of the patristic period ought not to focus on marginal issues such as whether one of another ecclesiastical writer "liked" Jews or Judaism more than is allowed in her essay, but on the twin issues of her concern: the development of an attitude toward Judaism (or a theology of Judaism) that led to what Jules Isaac called the "teaching of contempt" and, inextricably connected with it, her claim that "each of the basic antitheses which were used to vilify the Jews also appears as an antithesis that has retarded Christian theological maturation" (228).

The sharpness of her focus is in part due to the limits within which she decided to work. She presents "a general profile of the major themes found in the *adversus Judaeos* tradition" (121). These themes were the object of concentration because they represent "what is most important from the point of view of doctrinal history" and "what is most constant in the tradition" (123). From this point of view, the choice was wise. None of the other surveys,² covering approximately the same time period and containing at least roughly similar material, has quite the same effect in raising the question of the impact on Christian theology of the anti-Judaic theses. And not one of them offers material which would appear to make Ruether retract anything in the section of *Faith and Fratricide* under consideration here.³

Still, what we have is nevertheless a profile, and a good deal more context remains to be provided before the entire role of the patristic era in the foregoing process is adequately understood. Ruether, of course, regrets that she had to pass over the context of each writing (123), apparently for reasons of space and agenda. Some of the necessary context can be furnished by "case studies": studies of the anti-Judaism of the various writers,⁴ of the political, cultural, and religious factors which help make sense of what they had to say, and of how and why they said it; and studies of isolated elements or themes⁵ within the stages or regions of the tradition. Further, it is important to get beyond the *adversus Judaeos* literary tradition, not only because massive (and sometimes interestingly different) anti-Jewish material is also found elsewhere, but in addition because certain of the affected theological themes become clearer.

What follows will be offered both as a response to Ruether and as an attempt to carry the discussion one stage further. A presentation of a few of the issues *outside* the Jewish-Christian debate will be followed by a necessarily brief examination of some of the anti-Jewish theology which arose in connection with those issues. Tertullian's writings (c. 200 C.E.)

will serve as a kind of focus, but important parallels and similarities in other writers will not, I hope, be neglected.

The Challenge of Marcion

Perhaps the place to begin is with a reminder: the largest block of anti-Jewish material in Tertullian is to be found not in his early treatise *Adversus Judaeos*,⁶ but in the later *Adversus Marcionem*, the longest work he wrote. Why should this be so? What is the connection between a defense against Marcion and anti-Judaism?

Marcion's position⁷ seems to have developed along the following lines: the gentile Christianity he knew (c. 140 C.E.) did not keep the law (circumcision, Sabbath observance, abstention from certain foods, and temple sacrifice), and apparently made a great deal of its own "newness"; it also held, as sacred and authoritative, the Hebrew Scriptures, the "Old" Testament. This book, with the history it narrated and the "prophecies" it contained, provided Christianity with roots that were centuries deep, and with a kind of insurance against being identified as a total newcomer on the scene of world history. For Marcion, however, there was a tension which had to be resolved: if Christianity was truly "new," and if it had truly abandoned the law, it was surely imperative to be consistent about this newness and to relinquish, along with the "old" law, the book which contained it and the God who enacted it. Marcion's Christianity, therefore, consisted in large part of these points:

1. The law is to be ignored as being beneath the dignity of humans and beneath the dignity of any God who could be called wise and kind.
2. The God who enacted the law must be relinquished as completely unwise, overly concerned with justice (as opposed to mercy or kindness), and (perhaps) as humankind's enemy, the Creator of this evil world.
3. Jesus had come, suddenly, as the revelation of "newness": a new, previously unknown god, and a new human situation free of the law and free of the God who created the world and the law.
4. The "Old" Testament is to be abandoned as religiously authoritative (but "kept" as an account of that God, that world, and that history from which Christians are liberated by the god revealed in Jesus).
5. The only authoritative books are some letters of Paul (one of the few who understood the "newness" with which Jesus had been concerned) and a version of Luke's gospel, everything else having been tampered with by those who did not understand.

Tertullian's major attack on Marcionite theology is found in the five books of his *Adversus Marcionem*.⁸ The first book is a philosophical defense of the unity of God, and can be disregarded here. The principal emphases of the other four books, however, are worth noting.

Book II is largely a defense of the God of the "Old" Testament against objections levelled against him by Marcion. If, for example, this God visited the fathers' sins upon their children, "it was Israel's *hardness* which *demand*ed remedies of that sort, to cause them to obey the divine law at least through consideration of their posterity." And those whom God had primarily in mind were those who were going to call this judgment upon themselves in *Matthew* 27:25: "His blood be on us and on our children" (II, 15, 1-3). Thus God was not unfair. Nor can his wisdom be questioned, for even though Marcion may not have liked the law that demands an eye for an eye, such an approach was necessary when dealing with "that stiff-necked people, devoid of faith in God," who did not have the patience to await God's justice (II, 18, 1). The law which forbade certain foods, and that which expected sacrifices, were equally manifestations of God's wisdom, since it was the only way to restrain Israelite gluttony and proneness to idolatry respectively (II, 18, 2 and 3). As for the many regulations dealing with daily life,

This law was not laid down because of its *Author's* hardness, but by reason of that supreme kindness which preferred to tame the *people's* hardness, and smooth down with exacting obligations their faith, as yet unpracticed in obedience (II, 19, 1).

Nor was God inconsistent in alternately forbidding and commanding images and sacrifices; Israel's "idolatrous propensity" and worshipping "according to their own desires and not according to God's religion" helped to explain everything (II, 22, 2, and 4). Did the biblical God seem unworthy in his lowliness? The latter was nothing compared to the humility (agreed on by both Marcion and Tertullian) of him who suffered "the revilings, the scaffolds, and the sepulchres of the Jews" (II, 27, 2).

Although much of this material is also in the *adversus Judaeos* literary tradition, and is noted by Ruether,⁹ it is important to attend to the changed context here. The question was not the earlier question "Does the law bind?", nor the further question "Why not?" These were the questions of the original debate with Judaism. Here the question came from Marcion, and was about God: "If, as 'everyone' agrees, the law is to be abandoned—especially since it is so clearly 'inferior' to what Christians do—how can one take seriously the *God* who enacted this inferior law in the first place?" Tertullian's answer (and, as we shall see, the answer of Justin and Irenaeus) was as follows: the (admitted) "inferiority" of God's "old" law and/or cult cannot be due to any inferiority on God's part, but must be accounted for by the "inferiority" of the people with whom God was working at that time. Thus, the God of the Hebrew Bible was "salvaged" for Christians precisely by means of the anti-Judaic myth.

Book III's concern is to show that Christ did not come "suddenly" and "unannounced" as the revelation of a new, previously unknown god, as another of Marcion's assertions would have had it; he was rather the Christ of the Creator, of the God of the Bible, whose scriptural prophecies he fulfilled (III, 2; 5). The position of Marcion, then, was no better than that of the Jews, whose "error" and "poison" he shared in not seeing that Jesus clearly fulfilled biblical prophecy (III 6; 7; 8; 23). The fact that the Jews did not accept or recognize Christ was no argument for Marcion ("he must have been a stranger" to the Jews), because "there were also prophecies that the Jews would not recognize Christ and would therefore destroy him" (III 6, 4). Further, "this blunting of their salutary senses they had *earned* for themselves by loving God with their lips, but with their heart withdrawing far from him" (III, 6, 6). It should occasion no surprise that those who had despised the Word and Spirit in the past, those who "did not recognize the Father," were "incapable also of recognizing the Son" (III, 6, 8). Just as clearly foretold was the work of the apostles, who,

in turning aside from Judaism itself, by exchanging the obligations and burdens of the law for the freedom of the gospel, . . . were going as the psalm (Ps. 2:3) advised, "Let us break their bonds asunder, and cast away their yoke from us" (III, 22, 3).

So the apostles were doing the will of the Creator, not the will of some new god. And, finally, the destruction of Jerusalem, the desolation of Judaea, and all the other "punishments" of the Jews—all, of course, also predicted—made no sense except as acts of vengeance meted out by the God of the Bible against the Jews precisely because they did not recognize the messiah whom they should have accepted (III, 23).

Again, practically none of this was foreign to the *adversus Judaeos* tradition. But Marcion's claim about Jesus triggered a new and heightened emphasis on the clarity of the prophecies and the guilt of the Jews, re-emphasizing what kind of "Christ" he was. Jesus was "he who should have been recognized." The bond between Jesus and the Father, and the continuity of salvation history, were insured and reinforced once again by the anti-Judaic myth.

The central argument of Book IV is the demonstration that the Jesus of Luke's gospel (as "restored" by Marcion¹⁰) was still the Christ of the Creator and not the emissary of a new god. Throughout, there is a ready acceptance by Tertullian of constant conflict between Jesus and the Jews, but with an explanation of that conflict to show that it was perfectly appropriate and in no way supportive of Marcion's position. First, the conflict itself: there were disputes about forgiveness and about the Sabbath (IV, 10, and 12); there was Jewish opposition to and hatred of Jesus (IV,

10, 14), and Tertullian supplies a steady stream of references to Jesus "attacking" Jews: Jesus "criticizes" and "takes offence" at Israel's lack of faith (IV, 18) and "attacks" Israel's unbelief and pride (IV, 35); he "reproves" and "comes down hard" on her (IV, 23); he "condemns" the persecutors of the prophets (IV, 15); he "disapproves" of the hypocrisy of the Pharisees (IV, 28), and "curses," "criticizes," "rebukes," "accuses," "attacks," and "inveighs against" the scribes, Pharisees, and doctors of the law (IV, 27).

But all of this was no help to Marcion; the conflict was perfectly intelligible—perfectly "Christian," Tertullian almost says—since the conflict and hatred had been *foretold* (IV, 14; 33; 42), and since Jesus' severity toward Jews was completely in tune with the same antagonism toward Jews that had often been expressed by his Father, the Creator (IV 12; 15; 23; 27). There was, further, a more "theoretical" way of handling the opposition. The conflict, for Tertullian, centered on Jesus' "termination of the ancient things," his separation of "the newness of the gospel from the oldness of the law" (IV, 11). But this was as it should be, as Tertullian explains:

I do admit that there was a different course followed in the old dispensation under the Creator, from that in the new dispensation under Christ. I do not deny a difference in records of things spoken, in precepts for good behavior, and in rules of law, *provided* that all these differences have reference to one and the same God, that God by whom it is acknowledged that they were *ordained* and also *foretold* (IV, 1).

Thus,

Marcion's purpose is in no sense served by what he supposes to be an opposition between the law and the gospel, because this too was *ordained* by the Creator, and in fact was *foretold* by that promise of a new law and a new word and a new testament (IV, 9).

And further,

I have long since established the fact that this termination of the ancient things was rather the *Creator's own promise* made actual in Christ, under the authority of that one same God to whom belong both old things and new. . . . In that sense we admit this separation, by way of reformation, of enlargement, of progress. . . . So also the gospel is separated from the law because it is an advance from out of the law, another thing than the law, though not an alien thing; different, though not contradictory! (IV, 11).

What seems significant here is not the negative picture of the Jews of Jesus' time, which was, of course, already firmly embedded in the tradition. It is rather the heavy emphasis on the appropriateness of the opposi-

tion between Jesus and Jews, or between God and Jews. Jesus was "retrieved" from Marcion for traditional Christianity, again by means of the anti-Judaic myth. Not only was there an emphatic heightening of an anti-Jewishness ascribed to Jesus; there was the additional element, apparently now crucial against Marcion, of a God who for some time had "opposed" Israel and had wanted to rid himself of the "old" covenant in the interest of something new and better.

Book V deals again with God, Christ, and law, but now it was Paul's position that Tertullian wrested from Marcion. Tertullian's reading of Paul includes some expected contrasts: letter and spirit, law and gospel, new and old, and a God who "kills through the law" and "makes alive through gospel" (all in V, 11, on 2 *Cor.*); there is the "liberty" or "noble dignity" of Christianity as opposed to the "legal bondage of Judaism" (V, 3; 4; on *Gal.*). There is the reminder that Paul's offensive was against the Jews, and not against the Creator (V, 13, on *Rom.*), and that, because of their guilt, their treatment at his hands was not unfair (V, 14). And there is God's plan that "the entire operation of spiritual grace was to come to rest" in Jesus, and "as far as the Jews were concerned, to come to an end; . . . the Spirit of the creator no longer breathes among them" (V, 8, on 1 *Cor.*).

But the heart of the argument is probably contained in the following passage:

We too claim that the primary epistle against Judaism is that addressed to the Galatians. For we receive with open arms all that abolition of the ancient law. The abolition itself derives from the Creator's ordinance. . . But if the Creator promised that the old things would pass away, because, he said, new things were to arise, and Christ has marked the date of that passing, . . . the apostle . . . invalidates the old things while validating the new, and thus has for his concern the faith of no other God than that Creator under whose authority it was even prophesied that the old things were to pass away. Consequently both the dismantling (*destructio*) of the law and the establishment of the gospel are on my side of the argument. . . Therefore the whole intent of this epistle is to teach that departure from the law results from the Creator's ordinance (V, 2).

Tertullian was not unaware that his position could appear precarious:

Did he, you ask, wipe out observances he himself had appointed? Better he than someone else. . . But this is not the place for asking why the Creator has broken down his own laws; it is enough that we have provided that he *intended* to break them down . . . (V, 4).

Tertullian never directly answers the question *why* God "wiped out" what "he himself had appointed." One assumes that it was largely because of "Jewish iniquity"—the "trail of crimes" described by Ruether.¹¹ Or perhaps he had in mind some plan of God, to which he had earlier alluded:

In the beginning, by his own right, and by a hostility (*aemulatione*) which was completely reasonable and therefore good, he provided beforehand for the maturity and fuller ripeness of those things which were his all along (II, 29).

Was there also, on God's part, some looking ahead to the gentiles, from whom Jesus "was destined to find better acceptance" (V, 9)?

In any event, the net effect of Book V's argument is to give to God the "credit" for Paul's avowal of the newness of Christianity and—at least as both Marcion and Tertullian read him—the demise of the law and the "old" covenant. Against Marcion, it was simply Christianity that was defined or described in anti-Jewish ways; *God and Christ must be anti-Jewish too*.

It must be repeated that the issue is not simply the personal anti-Judaism of Tertullian: one might "rank" him in this respect with Cyril of Alexandria, and only a notch behind John Chrysostom. The more important point is that Marcion's challenge or threat placed all the anti-Judaic themes in a new apologetic context, appending them to ideas of God and Christ in ways that came perilously close to permanence. And Tertullian's importance consists primarily in the fullness of his answer to Marcion. The problem has arisen earlier, and was "solved" in similar (if slightly less vigorous) ways by Tertullian's predecessors.

Perhaps the first to respond to Marcion's challenge was Justin, who wrote c. 155-60 C.E., nearly a half-century before Tertullian. He mentions having produced a full-blown "treatise against all the heresies which have arisen,"¹² but this treatise had not been preserved. Nevertheless, as has recently been shown,¹³ Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho* shows significant traces of the defense against Marcion: certain of the arguments are shaped by Marcion's questions, and one can speak of a "front" against Marcion along which Justin fights (along with the "fronts" against Jews and pagans). Justin's emphasis that it is the same, perfectly consistent God of both Jews and Christians, of the old and new law (*Dial.* 11; 23; 30; 92) betrays the concern with Marcion. But the "contribution" of Justin lies in his attention to the purpose of the law. Beyond the standard scriptural testimonies to the law's invalidity, Justin seems to have been the first to have faced the new question. On Trypho's lips, the challenge is phrased: "You expect to receive favors from God *when you disregard his commandments*" (*Dial.* 10). Justin answers with "proofs" of the cessation of the law, but also with a discussion of its purpose (*Dial.* 18-30, but especially 19, 5-23, 2). While slightly less specific than Tertullian's treatment (*Adversus Marcionem*, II), it comes to roughly the same thing. The ritual law was a "historically conditioned" dispensation enacted because of various manifestations of Jewish sinfulness (obduracy, idolatry, disobedience, etc.). Thus Justin was the first to have "saved" the God who enacted the law, and the book which contained it, at the expense of the Jews. God was not

at fault in having commanded "inferior" observances; it was those inferior Jews with whom he had to deal. Marcion had raised again the "law"-question, but now it had become a "God"-question.

A generation later, Irenaeus answered Marcion (along with Valentinus; Basilides, and others) in the five books of his *Adversus Haereses*. While attention to Marcion may be minimal in Irenaeus' description of the various heretical positions (I and II), the Marcionite challenge completely dominates the presentation in Books III and IV, in which the controlling idea is that there is one God, one author of both covenants, and that Jesus was sent by this one God, not by another. It was within this context that Irenaeus presented a significantly expanded version of the "purpose" of the law (IV, 9-19), but still along the basic lines of Justin. God's wisdom in having the law was again defended by an appeal to that Jewish sinfulness which made it necessary and which helps to "explain" it (IV, 14-18). Irenaeus added Jesus' condemnation of the "traditions of the elders" which had never been a part of God's law (IV, 12),¹⁴ and several references to a contrast between Christian liberty and Jewish/Israelite servitude or bondage, for which the law was quite appropriate (IV, 15; 16; 18).¹⁵

This same God's goodness and power are in no way called into question by the destruction of Jerusalem (as Marcion had apparently claimed), since the "time" of the Jews and their law was "up" (IV, 4). And an appeal to Jesus' claim that "no one knows the Father except the Son" (LK. 10:22) was no real help to Marcion, since knowledge of the one God, through the Word, had been available "throughout all time." What Jesus was attacking, according to Irenaeus, was the Jews' "imagining that they could know the Father by himself, without the Word, that is, without the Son" (IV, 6 and 7). Finally, to remove all doubt that the Son had been sent by precisely that God who had sent the prophets, Irenaeus appealed to the parable of the wicked husbandmen (Mt. 21: 33-44) to show that one and the same God avenged both the prophets and his Son by giving the vineyard to gentiles, the "other husbandmen"; and to the parable of the wedding feast (Mt. 22: 1-14) to prove that it was one King and Lord who had "from the beginning" prepared the marriage feast for his Son, replacing with gentiles those unresponsive Jews who refused to come, and who had "destroyed them and burned down their city" for what they had done to his servants, the prophets (IV, 36).

Again, it is worth noting that Irenaeus was not writing against Jews, but against Marcion; he was not writing (directly) about Jews, or about the law, but about the one God, and the Word or Son sent by him. The tragedy was that "God-talk" and "Christ-talk" had now inevitably taken a strong anti-Judaic turn.

Marcion's challenge continued to be a threat well into the third century, as a brief look at Origen reveals. His *Contra Celsum* indicates that the Marcionite position was known to Celsus (c. 175 C.E.), and that for Celsus it pointed to a weakness in Christianity.¹⁶ But the treatise *On First Principles* (*Peri Archōn*, or *De Principiis*: c. 255-30 C.E.) is more relevant to our purposes here. Several parts of Book II are a defense against Marcion, "to refute those who think that the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is a *different God* from him who gave Moses the sayings of the law and sent the prophets, and who is the God of the fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob" (II, 4, 1). Among Origen's arguments is the anger of God (against the Jews) in the parable of the wicked husbandmen, showing that the God of the gospel can be depicted as being as angry as the God of the "Old" Testament (II, 4, 4). Further, the same Spirit was operative in the prophets as in the apostles, but this was understood only by the prophets themselves, the Israelites could not "get beyond the literal meaning" of things like circumcision, sabbath rest, and animal sacrifice (II, 7, 2).

Origen's more substantial legacy, of course, is to be found in Book IV, on scripture and its interpretation. Earlier debates with Marcion's theology had focused on God (Justin) or God and Christ (Irenaeus and Tertullian). Origen's was certainly the fullest and most direct defense of the Bible, though Tertullian's work frequently has not received the attention it deserves. Origen's treatment begins with the thesis that the divine character of scripture (the "Old" Testament) is revealed in its fulfillment, especially the end of the ritual law and of Jewish rule, the "divinity" of Jesus, and the replacement of Jews by gentiles (IV, 1, 3-4). Reading the scriptures in their *spiritual* sense is the solution both to the problem of the "hard-hearted and ignorant members of the circumcision," who "refused to believe in our Savior" because they could not get beyond the *literal* sense (IV, 2, 1) and to the problems of Marcion, who also read things "according to the bare letter" (IV, 2, 2). While Origen has some of the same references to the law's being "suitable to the time when the law was given" (IV, 2, 9), he appears to have broken new ground with a theory of the "spiritual sense" (or senses) of scripture.¹⁷ Now, in view of that "spiritual sense" in which the scriptures were always to have been understood, it is clear that the *one* God was ever at work; that his Son was from him and from no other god, and that the "light" had always been there: it was "contained within the law of Moses, but was hidden away under a veil," but then "shone forth at the advent of Jesus" (IV, 1, 6).

So for Origen, too, the defense against Marcion summoned up the anti-Jewish material. Thus, for the better part of a century, for the four writers who dominated the scene, theological discourse on God, Christ, and scripture continued in an (apparently) inevitably anti-Jewish way.

It is essential to add that Marcion did not create or invent the problem. The preceding analysis has emphasized Marcion's role in order to show that anti-Judaic themes appeared outside the *adversus Judaeos* literary tradition, and that they congealed, in the Marcionite debate, around central theological conceptions (again: God, Christ, scripture). What Marcion did was to draw conclusions from premises that had been built into the "mainstream" gentile Christianity he knew early in the second century: a God whose change of mind (replacement of Jews with gentiles; abandonment of much of his ritual law) seemed insufficiently accounted for; a Jesus described as in constant conflict with, and critical of, the people of the ("former") covenant; a Bible supposedly sacred to Christians, but whose ritual law they did not keep; an emphasis on newness which seemed inconsistent with a claim to continuity or antiquity. Something was wrong. Marcion's solution—two gods, no Bible, and a phantom Jesus—may not have been acceptable then or now. Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen succeeded in getting Marcion's case ruled out of court, but their case was hardly a solution to the original problem. Antagonism between Judaism and Christianity may have been unavoidable; but after Marcion and the defense against him, Christianity was thinking of its God, its Christ, its Bible, and itself, in anti-Jewish ways. That much, at least, can be changed today.

In addition to the debate with Marcion, there were other issues, also outside the *Adversus Judaeos* literary tradition, which also summoned up many of the same unfortunate anti-Judaic affirmations. Although I believe they admit of the same kind of analysis as does the anti-Marcionite material, they will be treated more summarily here.

The Claim to Antiquity

The Greco-Roman world seems to have mistrusted innovations and late arrivals, and to have held "antiquity" (frequently: the following of ancestral customs) in high regard. Christian apologists appear to have felt vulnerable to criticisms along these lines, and to have claimed, in defense, Christianity's right to its own antiquity.¹⁸ The logic of this claim—in literature addressed, it must be noted, to non-Christian gentile ("pagan") intelligentsia, and thus outside the *adversus Judaeos* literary tradition—frequently involved a strategic use of anti-Judaic premises. Thus we have another issue, another context, in which anti-Jewish colorations were attached to Christian theological arguments and themes.

Justin's *First Apology* introduced a long argument on the truth of Christianity based on ancient prophecy and its fulfillment (c. 30-53). The books containing the prophecies were, of course, possessed also by Jews

"but they do not understand what they say, and consider us their enemies and opponents" (c. 31). Among the prophecies to which Justin pointed are God's intention to rid himself of ritual observances (c. 37), and predictions of what the Jews would do to the Christ (c. 38-39), of the desolation of Judaea and destruction of Jerusalem (c. 47), and of the acceptance of Christ by gentiles (c. 49). More crucial, perhaps, is his reference to Christ as the pre-existent Logos (c. 46), on account of whom all those who live "according to Reason (*meta logou*)" are Christians, including "pre"-Christian Greeks like Socrates and Heraclitus. It was this same Logos who spoke in those ancient prophets, but the Jews did not understand this and thus "did not recognize Christ even when he came" (c. 36; 63).

In this argument, Justin's Bible and his conception of Christ as the pre-existent Logos were used to make a case for Christianity's antiquity, and consequently to bid for intellectual respectability in Greco-Roman eyes. Moreover, the anti-Jewish content of the prophecies, and the "blindness" of the Jews who did not understand them to the Logos who "really" uttered them, appeared as an essential proviso to insure that Christianity, rather than Judaism, could be the authentic beneficiary of that antiquity.

Tertullian's presentation of a roughly similar argument is somewhat clearer, and takes on the lines of a kind of story. It appears in his *Apology*, a kind of "manifesto" to Roman officials. He reminded his Roman readers that the God whom Christians worship (c. 17) has "added the assistance of books, in case one wishes to search for God," which contain the prophecies of spirit-filled men whom God had sent into the world "from the beginning" (c. 18). These books themselves had "great antiquity" and consequently must be accorded prime authority, even by Romans (c. 19). But Tertullian admitted that there is a small problem:

Since we have declared that this religion of ours depends upon very ancient Jewish records, but most people know it only as something of a novelty which came to birth during the reign of Tiberius (a fact which we ourselves acknowledge),—perhaps on this ground there should be further treatment of its status, as if, under the protecting name of a very well-known and certainly lawful religion [Judaism], it were hiding some claims of its own (c. 21).

To preclude confusion, Tertullian averred that, "aside from the question of age, we have nothing to do with Jews," since Christians observed neither food restrictions, holy days, nor circumcision. Then follows the narrative (c. 21), the point of which is to account for Christianity's claim to have replaced Israel and thus fallen heir to her scriptures and her antiquity:

At first the Jews enjoyed complete favor with God, and the justice and faith of their original founders were outstanding. As a result, the people multiplied

and their kingdom rose to exalted power. Their good fortune was so great that, by the words of God which taught them, they were forewarned about serving God and not offending him. To what extent they failed, being so puffed up with presumptuous pride in their ancestors as to stray from their teaching into the manners of the world. . . . , the unhappy lot which today is theirs would indicate. Scattered, wandering about, deprived of land and sky of their own, they roam the earth without man or God as king. . . . The holy voices which warned them of this fate all constantly insisted on the same points: that the day would come in the last cycles of time when God would select for himself worshipers from every race and people and palace—worshipers much more faithful, to whom He would transfer his favor in fuller measure because they would be capable of a fuller “discipline” (*ob disciplinae auctioris capacitatem*). Then came the One whom God had foretold would come to renew and shed light on that *disciplina*, Christ, the Son of God.

He was the Logos by which the world was made, so his coming (which even the Jews expected) was not an “innovation.” The Jews, however, rejected him, and forced Pilate to hand him over to them to be crucified—a fact which both Jesus and the prophets had predicted would happen. But then the disciples spread throughout the world (also, by the way, “enduring with constancy much suffering from the persecution of the Jews”), and thus emerged “a coherent outline of our founding” (c. 21).

We are again confronted with anti-Jewish material that was common coin in the *adversus Judaeos* literature. But this was a treatise for a Roman audience, and in support of Christian antiquity against a Roman objection. As with Justin, both the scriptures and the “Christ foretold long ago” were the bases of the argument, especially when reinforced by the Jewish lack of understanding and rejection of Jesus. It is then *we*, rather than *they*, who must be awarded the antiquity! With Tertullian, there were added some extra touches: a version of Israelite history which made their loss of place (to Christians) more intelligible; a God who warned Jews, and replaced them with gentile Christians “capable of a fuller discipline”; and an “ecclesiology”: a Church, now comprised of these same “more capable” gentiles, but with historical roots (and a claimed respectability in the Roman world) that went back to the beginning of time. So God, Christ, Church, and scriptures were thought of, or presented in, anti-Jewish ways in a treatise that really had nothing to do with Jews *per se*.

Origen is probably the most important writer on this issue, since his *Contra Celsum*¹⁹ offers a picture of what Christianity and its claims looked like to a perceptive Roman outsider like Celsus (c. 175 C.E.). Among the many charges against Christianity which Celsus adduced, two are relevant here. The first is that Christians were at fault for having abandoned their ancestral customs—the religious traditions of the nations from which they have “departed,” and for having turned, to some extent, to alien Jewish customs (I, 22 and especially V, 35-41). Part of Origen’s defense is an

analysis of the "reasonableness"—for their time—of some of these Jewish traditions (V, 43-49),²⁰ but with the reminder that "these were *symbols* of certain truths before the advent of Jesus" (V, 49), and things had changed significantly when the "care and grace," which had been lavished on Israel, "changed to us when *Jesus* transferred the power at work among the Jews to those gentiles who believed in him" (V, 50).

A second line of argument is more pervasive, and more important here. It concerns another kind of weakness, as Celsus saw the Christian enterprise. Christians were not only parvenus, but apostates, having "abandoned" their origin in Judaism by a "rebellion" against the Jewish community (II, 4; III, 5; V, 33);²¹ the appeal to prophecy was of no value, according to Celsus, since it was not at all clear that Christians were the subjects of the prophecies (I, 50); one cannot have it both ways, claiming antiquity in Jewish books and history, and yet forsaking those very roots in the rejection of Jewishness. As Celsus finally puts it,

Who is wrong? Moses or Jesus? Or when the Father sent Jesus had he forgotten what commands he gave to Moses? Or did he condemn his own laws and change his mind, and send his messenger for quite the opposite purpose? (VII, 18)

Origen's response followed the well-marked lines of the *adversus Judaeos* tradition. There was first of all the Christian ability to see in the "old" law a type, or a deeper, spiritual meaning (II, 2; VII, 18 and 20), according to which Christians accord the law "greater honor" than do Jews, who "have not looked deeply" into these writings (II, 4). Or the old ways did not "fit in" with the calling of the gentiles (VII, 26). Or the change came about because of the teaching of Jesus (V, 33), who taught that the Kingdom was to be given to gentiles, and whose "doctrines" . . . "lift and raise up the soul and mind of man" while "the doctrines of the Jews living today" are "myths," "trash," and "earthly" (II, 5)

The most basic response calls on God and what he has done in history:

The providence which long ago gave the law, but now has given the gospel of Jesus Christ, did not wish that the practices of the Jews should continue, and so destroyed their city and temple . . . and the prescribed worship. Just as providence did not want them to be performed, and destroyed them, in the same way it increased the success of Christians. . . (VII, 26).

The fullest version of the same response includes the crucial role of Jesus, and a more complete "explanation" of that "abandonment" which both-ered Celsus:

One of the facts which show that Jesus was some divine and sacred person is just that on his account such great and fearful calamities have now for a long

time befallen the Jews. . . For they committed the most impious crime of all, when they conspired against the Savior of mankind, in the city where they performed to God the customary rites which were symbols of profound mysteries. *Therefore* that city where Jesus suffered these indignities had to be utterly destroyed. The Jewish nation had to be overthrown, and God's invitation to blessedness transferred to others, I mean the Christians, to whom came the teaching about the simple and pure worship of God. And they received *new laws* which fit in with the order established everywhere. Those which had previously been given were intended for a single nation ruled by men of the same nationality and customs, so that it would be impossible for everyone to keep them now (IV, 22; see also IV, 32 and VIII, 42).

Origen was intelligent enough to sense that Celsus had found a real flaw, or at least an apparently serious inconsistency. As the argument proved more difficult, the greater became the need for a convincing account of the "break" with Judaism. God's control of history (the destruction of Jerusalem; the "success" of Christianity), and the central position of Jesus in the break (especially his death at the hands of Jews) were strategically critical, and the spiritually-understood scriptures only slightly less so. Thus again, in an argument directed against a pagan, in a book written for Christians (according to Origen's preface), in defense of Christian antiquity—subjects all outside the Jewish Christian debate—, God, Christ, and scriptures were thought of, presented, and used in anti-Jewish ways. Perhaps more importantly, Celsus' argument had, in essence, pointed to the anomaly of a Christianity at odds with its Jewish roots. Origen's answer, tragically, was that this was no anomaly at all; it was as it should be.

Finally, a word on Eusebius, perhaps the most ingenious of the Christian claimants to antiquity. His *Ecclesiastical History* (early 4th C.) is as imaginative in its treatment of Christianity's great antiquity as is his *Praeparatio*, and as anti-Jewish as the *Demonstratio*. What is notable is the ease with which the *History* short-circuits the objection of the "abandonment" of Judaism. Christianity's "real" history begins (Book I) with the pre-existent Logos, preparing humans by sowing the seeds of true religion. Israel was not the point of Christianity's origin, but a brief and necessary interlude until

... at last, when *all mankind* and *every race* throughout the world had received help and by now were fitted to receive knowledge of the Father, once again that same . . . divine and heavenly Word of God, in a human body which in all essentials shared our own nature, appeared in the early years of the Roman Empire (I, 2, 22).

The role of the Jews in the story (Books II, III, and IV) is as witnesses to that divine justice which had punished them through Roman hands for

having killed Jesus and persecuted Christians, and as a dramatic counterpart to the triumphant Church. Typically:

While our Savior's teaching and his Church were flourishing and progressing further every day, the Jewish tragedy was moving through a series of disasters towards its climax [the disasters of 115-17 and 132-35 C.E.] (IV, 2, 1).

The "New Life" of Christians

A third issue, in which a kind of anti-Jewish "principle" was at work, can be found in much of Tertullian's description of and argument for that "fuller discipline" (mentioned above in *Apology*, C. 21) of which Christians were capable.²² Not one of the treatises to be cited has anything to do with Jews; all are "in-house" sermons or tracts addressed to fellow Christians, or, during Tertullian's later "Montanist" days, against his former "Catholic" colleagues.

A standard assertion is that God asks "more" of Christians. "Our law," in the treatise *On Prayer* (22, 8) is "amplified and extended" compared to Israel's. In the sermon or treatise *On Penance* (3, 13), the Christian "addition to the law" forbids even sins of the will. In the argument against second marriages (*To His Wife*, I, 2) he contrasted the "laxity" that was appropriate to the "oldness" or "obsolescence" of Judaism (*libertas vetustatis*) with a new Christian restriction or "tightening" (*castigatio posteritatis*). Along the same lines is the claim, in the later *Exhortation to Chastity* (6, 3)—again in opposition to second marriages, in explanation of why they had been allowed in Israel—that "now in these later times," God "has restricted what he had allowed before and revoked that *indulgence* which he had then permitted." His final word on the same subject is from the treatise *On Monogamy* (7, 1):

... the law is *abrogated* in the sense that the burdens which it imposes no longer rest upon us, those burdens which "not even our fathers were able to bear." However, those of its precepts which have to do with righteousness not only continue in force, but have been *extended*, so that our justice "may abound more than that of the scribes and pharisees" (Mt. 5:20).

Perhaps the most vigorous statement is from the "position paper" *On Purity* (6, 3-8), where the argument concerns Tertullian's antagonism to submitting sins of adultery to the penitential discipline:

The burdens of the law are "until John"; the yoke of "works" has been cast off, but not the yoke of moral precepts; "freedom in Christ" has done no injury to virtue. There remains in its entirety the law of piety, sanctity, humanity, truth, chastity, justice, mercy, charity, and purity.... "Do we

therefore void the law by faith? God forbid! Rather we establish the law" (Rom. 3:31) in those things, that is, which since they are now reprobated in the New Testament also, are prohibited by a commandment which is *even more comprehensive*. Instead of "Thou shalt not commit adultery," we have "Whosoever even looks with a view to concupiscence has already committed adultery in his heart" (Mt. 5:27). . . . In vain is a law superimposed . . . if pardon is granted to adultery now on the pretext that it was granted in times past. *What would be the advantage, the point, of today's fuller discipline?*

And, to take the argument momentarily beyond morality into christology, one finds the same "principle" at work in Tertullian's strategy against a "monarchian" christology. It is the final argument in his *Against Praxeas* (31):

Finally, it would be *practically of Jewish faith* so to believe in one God as to refuse to count in with him the Son, the Spirit. For *what other difference* would there be between us and them except that disagreement? *What need is there, then, of the Gospel . . . ?* It was God's will to make a *new covenant* for the very purpose that *in a new way* his unity might be believed in through the Son and the Spirit, so that God who had previously been preached through the Son and the Spirit, might now be known in his own proper names and persons.

There is here at work a "principle," both disciplinary and theological, picked up, apparently (and however "mistakenly") from Paul and Matthew. On this principle, Christianity is by definition, "more" and "better" than Judaism; it defines itself, at least for Tertullian, by this negative reference to Judaism. And God, of course, has become he who asks "more" and "better" of Christians. Otherwise, what would indeed be the point of the gospel? What indeed would be the "advantage" of Christianity's fuller discipline?

I have no "conclusions" to offer beyond what can be drawn from Ruether's book. While it may be true, as Walter Burghardt has pointed out,²³ that there are some generalizations and some lack of evaluation of the comparative significance of the early Christian writers she quotes, it is also true that the case—at least against the "fathers" of the Church—is even more serious and more extensive. God, Christ, the scriptures, and the "Christian" way of life all get taken up into the anti-Judaic stream. And the stream flows into what to some might be unexpected places: the debate with Marcion, the claim to antiquity, and the exhortation to the "Christian" life. Something had gone wrong, and it had happened earlier than the patristic period. The fathers were "carriers" to be sure, and "aggravators." But what they carried and aggravated had come into existence earlier. Ruether has reminded us it is high time to find out when and where, and to do something about it.

Notes

1. This was, of course, at least until recently (Vatican II), truer of the Roman Catholic tradition than of its Protestant counterpart. It is possible that attentiveness to this issue is something to which those with roots in the former tradition (like Ruether and myself) are peculiarly sensitive.

2. Among those available and used by Ruether: Marcel Simon, *Verus Israel* (Paris: Boccard, 1964), 87-124 and 166-213; Robert Wilde, *The Treatment of the Jews in the Greek Christian Writers of the First Three Centuries* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1949); Robert L. Wilken, *Judaism and the Early Christian Mind. A Study of Cyril of Alexandria's Exegesis and Theology* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) 9-38, and "Judaism in Roman and Christian Society," *Journal of Religion* 47 (1967), 313-30; Jacob Neusner, *Aphrahat and Judaism. The Christian-Jewish Argument in Fourth-Century Iran* (Leiden: Brill, 1971) 197-244, esp. 214-44.

In addition, there are: Walter J. Burghardt, "Jewish-Christian Dialogue: Early Church versus Contemporary Christianity," *The Dynamic in Christian Thought*, The Villanova University Series, Vol. I. Edited by Joseph Pepin (Villanova: Villanova University Press, 1970); and Gerhart B. Ladner, "Aspects of Patristic Anti-Judaism," *Viator* 2 (1971) 355-63.

Ladner's essay is limited to Ambrose, Chrysostom, and Augustine. Burghardt concentrates on the second and third centuries; the treatment is brief, but at least suggests some plausible reasons for the Christian antagonism. Neusner offers some useful comparisons between Aphrahat and other early Christian writers. Wilde's book is the fullest presentation, but is limited to second-and third-century Greek writers and seems more concerned with reporting than with analysis or criticism. Simon's treatment is, of course, essential reading for all of us, even though Ruether's "theological connection" was not as central for him as was his demonstration that the Judaism of the (Christian) patristic period refused to become obsolete. Wilken's two "surveys" are more attentive to social context than is Ruether, but neither is as extensive. The book-length treatment of Cyril is a full and detailed analysis of how "what Cyril says of Christ is inextricably related to what he thinks of Judaism" (*Judaism and the Early Christian Mind*, p.x.).

3. Interesting and ironic corroboration is provided in the puzzling work of D. Judant, *Judaïsme et Christianisme. Dossier Patristique* (Paris: Editions du Cedre, 1969) who covers roughly the same materials (though more extensively) and sees many of the same theological connections. The irony lies in the different conclusion: for Judant, it seems the theology must be kept, and therefore the "theological" anti-Judaism, too. Bishop Carli, in his Introduction to the book, p. 9, suggests that the evidence shows us a "datum of authentic tradition"; an "untouchable datum of Catholic doctrine."

4. Neusner's *Aphrahat and Judaism* and Wilken's treatment of Cyril (see n. 2, above) are excellent examples, and were used by Ruether. Since her book appeared, we now have: Theodore Stylianopoulos, *Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law* (Missoula, Montana: SBL, Dissertation Series 20, 1975); Nicholas de Lange, *Origen and the Jews* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Robert Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom*—primarily on Aphrahat and Ephrem—(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); C. K. Barrett, "Jews and Judaizers in the Epistles of Ignatius" in Robert Hamerton-Kelly and Robin Scroggs, eds., *Jews, Greeks, and Christians. Religious Cultures in Late Antiquity* (W. D. Davies Festschrift: Leiden: Brill, 1976), 221-44.

5. John Gager, *Moses in Greco-Roman Paganism*. S. B. L. Monograph Series

16 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972); and two papers from the *SBL Seminar Papers*, 1976, edited by George MacRae (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1976): Wayne A. Meeks, "Jews and Christians in Antioch in the First Four Centuries," 34-65; and Robert L. Wilken, "The Jews of Antioch," 67-74.

6. This is especially true if one follows the majority opinion of scholars (as I do) that only the first eight chapters of *Adversus Judaeos* are authentic.

7. The standard work on Marcion is still A. von Harnack's *Marcion: das Evangelium vom fremden Gott*² (Leipzig, 1924). My reconstruction is indebted in large part to that of Hans von Campenhausen, *The Formation of the Christian Bible*. Translated by J. A. Baker (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 73-102 and 149-67.

8. The best edition and translation (the one generally followed here) is now Ernest Evans' two-volume *Tertullian: Adversus Marcionem* in the Oxford Early Christian Texts series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). Tertullian devoted two other lengthy treatises to other, more specific, facets of the Marcionite position: *De Carne Christi* (On the Flesh of Christ) and *De Resurrectione Mortuorum* (On the Resurrection of the Dead). The most valuable treatment of the larger context of Tertullian's thought and writing is Timothy David Barnes' *Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

9. Especially in the sections on the inferiority of the law (151-53), of the cult (156-57), and on Jewish history as a "trail of crimes" (especially 127). The Tertullian material included here, however, is from his *Adversus Judaeos*; in that treatise the question is about the law and its demise, not about God.

10. A convenient summary of Marcion's apparent alterations can be found in Evans' *Adversus Marcionem* 2, 643-44; details and evidence in Harnack, *Marcion*, 183-240.

11. Ruether's "trail of crimes" is treated on pp. 124-31. Tertullian's list, culled exclusively from *Adversus Marcionem*; is impressive:

—Jewish blindness or lack of faith (II, 18, 1; III, 6, 6; 7, 1; 17, 4; IV, 10, 13; 16, 5; 18, 2; 23, 4; 35, 7; V, 11 *passim*; 17, 8-9), and inability to understand the Bible (III, 13, 4; V, 9, 7).

—Jewish rejection and murder of Jesus, usually foreseen and foretold by God (II, 15, 3; III, 6, 1-10; 18, 3; 23; IV, 39, 9; 42, 2; V, 15, 1-2).

—Jewish disobedience (IV, 10, 4; 12, 23; 18, 13; 31, 4 and 8; V, 5, 4), impatience (II, 18, 1), and ingratitude (II, 14, 4).

—Jewish envy or jealousy (IV, 31, 6), pride (IV, 35, 7), and calumnies against Christians (III, 23, 3; IV, 14, 15-16).

—Jewish *duritia* ("hardness": II, 15, 1-3; 18, 1; 19, 1), idolatry (II, 18, 3; 22, 2) and forgetfulness of God (III, 16, 1; V, 14, 6-8).

—Jewish *vetustas* ("oldness"; being by-passed in salvation history; clinging to a "dead" past: I, 20, 4-6; IV, 1, 4-11; V, 2, 1-4; 8, 4-5) carnality (II, 18, 2), and empty ritual (II, 22, 4; IV, 1, 8; 12, 13).

—Jewish persecution of Jesus' followers (IV, 14, 15-16; 39, 9).

12. *I Apol.* 26. This treatise, usually referred to as the *Syntagma* or *Against Marcion* is in part (and hypothetically) reconstructed by Pierre Prigent, *Justin et l'Ancien Testament* (Paris: Gabalda, 1964). Whatever the merits of the reconstruction, one can find excellent parallels between the *Dialogue with Trypho* and some material of Irenaeus and Tertullian.

13. By von Campenhausen, *The Formation of the Christian Bible* (see n. 7), 88-102, and, more fully, Theodore Stylianopoulos, *Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law* (see n. 4).

14. Irenaeus refers here to Jesus' attack on the Pharisees and scribes (as per Mt. 15:1-3) for ignoring "The commandment of God" for the sake of "their" tradition. Further reference is made to Isa. 29:13 and to Paul's distinction between "God's righteousness" and "their own righteousness" in Rom. 10:3. Irenaeus comes close here to one of the theses of (the Valentinian) *Ptolemy's Letter to Flora*. See Campenhausen, *op. cit.*, 82-88.

15. The "source" for this, it would seem, is Paul's contrast between slavery and freedom (whatever he intended by it), e.g., in Gal. 4:21—5:1.

16. The relevant passages are *Contra Celsum* II, 6; V, 54 and 61; VI, 53; and VII, 25-26. The issue, however, has more to do with Christianity's claim to antiquity than with Marcion himself. See the section below, on this issue.

17. Hans von Campenhausen, *op. cit.*, 307-25, has argued this point. Justin, Irenaeus, and Tertullian can all appeal to allegory and typology (against Marcion and Jews equally), but none of them—and least of all Tertullian—are very elaborate on it, and in some cases it almost seems a last line of defense.

18. On the Greco-Roman concern, see A. D. Nock, *Conversion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933), 53 and 73 (for the cults of Sarapis and Dionysos) and 281; and the same author's *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) 25 and 62.

For the apologists' awareness and a sample of their response, see J. Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 34-35. A fuller and still useful treatment can be found in Adolf Harnack's *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity* (New York: Harper, 1961; orig. 1908).

19. Ruether, of course, refers briefly to the *Contra Celsum* (120), but I would prefer not to call it a "three-cornered debate." The issue seems to be primarily *two-sided*: a pagan philosopher's sense of a serious weakness in Christianity, and a capable Christian's defense. Each side seems to use Judaism for its own purposes.

The translation followed here is that of Henry Chadwick's *Origen: Contra Celsum* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965).

A useful discussion of the argument from a broader point of view (than that followed in my own analysis) can be found in Chadwick's "The Evidences of Christianity in the Apologetic of Origen," *Studia Patristica* I, 2 (1957), 331-39.

20. On this "defense" of Judaism, see Nicholas de Lange *Origen and the Jews* (cf. n. 4, above), 63-74.

21. Even Jewish believers, according to Celsus, "deluded by Jesus, have left the law of their fathers . . . and have deserted to another name and another life" (II, 1). On this point, Origen simply points, with ambivalent feelings, to the Jewish-Christian "Ebionites," and denies Celsus' charge: "Jewish believers in Jesus have *not* 'left the law of their fathers,' for they live according to it" (*ibid.*).

22. This material is, again, roughly parallel to Ruether's treatment of the "inferiority" of Jewish law and cult, 150-60. What warrants its inclusion is its appearance *outside* the *adversus Judaeos* tradition (i.e., in straight-forward treatments of the "Christian" way of life), and the insistence by Tertullian on the "principle" that Christianity is "more" or "better" than Judaism.

23. In response to a condensed version of the book, presented by Ruether, at the International Symposium on the Holocaust (in New York, June 3-6, 1974). Burghardt's "Response" appears in Eva Fleischner, ed., *Auschwitz: Beginning of a New era?* (New York: Ktav, 1977, 93-95).

From the Jesus of Story to the Christ of Dogma

Monika K. Hellwig

All Christian theologians seriously engaged in Jewish-Christian dialogue must sooner or later face the question: Is antisemitism (or anti-Judaism) rooted in essential structures of Christian doctrine?¹ This involves the painful further question: Can Christian antisemitism (or anti-Judaism)² be remedied at all within an orthodox Christian doctrinal context?

It must be said at the outset that there are two slightly different ways of understanding these questions, and that the difference greatly influences the outcome. Christian speakers and writers sometimes engage in the discussion without making explicit on which side they stand, with resultant confusion. On the one side, there is a way of answering these questions which can be reduced to a kind of academic game, albeit a serious one. The point of the game is to offer a reformulation or new explanation of Christian doctrine so that it can still be fitted into an internally, logically coherent Christian stance. The fixed reference points that justify it as a Christian stance tend to be established by what is generally accepted or becomes accepted in certain scholarly circles. Usually these reference points will include the historical Jesus, what is known through scholarly channels of his message and stance, and what was understood to be his project among his earliest followers. In this context, solutions to the dilemmas of anti-Judaic Christian doctrinal formulations have been proposed rather widely for some time.³ These solutions have not been generally adopted in Christian theology or preaching, because the real problems do not lie within this academic game.

The second side to the two questions proposed above is more delicate, more subtle and far more fraught with consequences. The second way of asking and answering the two questions requires that any reformulation be historically defensible as orthodox teaching in the Church (or the church-

es). Here the real problems lie, particularly for those churches that have committed themselves not only to biblical and early kerygmatic formulations but also to subsequent elaborations. Such later elaborations and explanations of the Christian message make up an official "confessional" stance. The message is crystallized in formulations taken from particular historical moments, and the formulations involve a certain amount of uncritical assimilation of prejudice. They involve, for instance, ethnocentric assumptions, caricatures of outsiders, idealizations of insiders, and arbitrary interpretations of cosmos and history.

This situation is compounded by time. Generations and centuries have passed in which the believing community has reinforced old formulations with constant repetition. By this process, the whole cultural accumulation has come to be regarded as an integral part of the message of salvation. Commonly the whole cultural accumulation receives the same reverent assent of faith as the core of the message. When scholarly analysis points to a direct conflict between the core of the Christian message and some of the prejudices and ethnocentric assumptions of this cultural accumulation, such scholarship is suspect to the community at large because it calls in question traditional beliefs. All these traditional beliefs have come through the same channels. The community at large, including its clerical and hierarchic leaders, have assumed that all the beliefs handed on are trustworthy. Seldom have believing communities as a whole been aware of any need to scrutinize the beliefs handed on for alien and contradictory elements. Indeed, believing communities more usually make an easy identification of the God-given message with the whole cultural accumulation in the form in which it has reached these communities in the present generation.

The real challenge calls for a reexamination of traditional syntheses of the Christian message in terms which are on the one hand truly exigent, critical and clearsighted, and which are on the other hand deeply rooted in the experience, worship and language of the faith community for which and to which they must speak. The reexamination must ring true to the faith community as a project of faith seeking deeper understanding. They must be perceived by that community as authentically in continuity with the trustworthy heritage from the past. This sense of continuity is for believing communities at large the touchstone of credibility.⁴ An ecumenical venture heard by outsiders as clear, authentic and coherent, but perceived as meaningless or heterodox by the insiders for whom it claims to speak, is simply no ecumenism. The task is a delicate and a slow one. It is a task of discernment rooted in deep community loyalty—rooted in worship and spirituality shared with the "orthodox" community. An ecumenism rooted only in elitist and fringe communities, speaks only for

elitist and fringe communities. An ecumenism rooted in iconoclastic attitudes speaks only for the iconoclasts. The difficulties arise in the attempt to reexamine the Christian synthesis on behalf of a whole church or tradition. Yet nothing else will suffice, for even the elitists and iconoclasts are happy to point out that the problems and distortions to be corrected do indeed lie in the church or tradition at large, though they may be reluctant to acknowledge that the resources for resolving the problems also lie in the faith or tradition of the church at large.

The task is one of discovering, not superimposing, authentic trends in the spirituality of the confessional group taken as a whole. It is from these trends that doctrinal reformulations may be drawn that are recognized by that confessional group as expressing continuity with its traditions and its hope. Only this type of effort can claim to be authentic and constructive ecumenism. Other efforts may point out a problem, but the work remains to be done to resolve that problem. Moreover, doctrinal reexamination and reformulations can only seriously be attempted on behalf of a particular confessional group, within a frame of reference acceptable according to the canons of orthodoxy of the group. Therefore, there appear to be no ecumenical shortcuts such as a general encounter of Christians with Jews culminating in a reformulation.⁵ The suggestions in this chapter are made from the point of view of the Roman Catholic confession.

Making the foregoing assumptions about the context, this paper will now address itself to the content of the two questions raised at the outset. It is no secret that the conflict experienced by the Christian theologian in dialogue with Jews is sharply focused on christology.⁶ The question whether antisemitism is doctrinally rooted appears first in the context of ecclesiology in relation to the claims of election and covenant, but the question cannot be solved within that context without calling into question doctrinal formulations at the heart of the Christian faith—in christology. This is so widely agreed that there is no need to belabor the point. A Christian partner must enter any serious dialogue with Jews on the basis of an explicit christology. However, at this point the Christian partner in Jewish Christian dialogue is habitually embarrassed, knowing that some reformulation is necessary. There is no question, of course, of attempting to sketch a christology that would be acceptable to Jews. Such an attempt could only be an evasion of the issues that divide us—vulnerable on the Christian side to accusations of compromise of the gospel, and vulnerable on the Jewish side to accusations of proselytism. What is required is a christology which allows legitimacy and respect to post-Christian Judaism. One may even hope, beyond this, for a christology that Jews can understand as meaningful, while not assenting to it as truthful.

Before suggesting lines along which such a christology might be

elaborated within a Roman Catholic context, it may be necessary to pause a moment longer. It may not be immediately apparent to all *why* a reformulation of christology is required at this time. Basically, it is required because we cannot live by a formulation of Christian faith which contradicts in profound and consequential ways the truth of our experience in history. Where such a contradiction arises there has been a misunderstanding, and we know this because truth which is rooted in God is one as God is one. This is, after all, at the heart of any faith with origins in the faith of Israel—that human existence and its context are not absurd, but are the good creation of God who is good.

It is for this reason that we cannot look at a faithful community and name it a gathering of infidels. We see the fidelity of the people of Israel over the centuries of Christian history—fidelity frequently under conditions of brutal persecution, heroically giving witness to the nations of the absolute claims of the One God, and of the loving fidelity of that God. If we are to deny what we have seen and assert its opposite—that the Jews are a reprobate people—then the grounds of credibility for our own faith have been destroyed, and indeed the basis for a personal morality has been removed also, with the substitution of an arbitrary code. Moreover, such a stance is simply contrary to common sense. In fact, when we see the courage and humanity and fidelity of the Jewish people over the centuries and their dogged perseverance as a people, it comes to us with all the force of the Burning Bush—as a living revelation of the creative fidelity of God, which it reflects in human history. This sign cannot well be read as the testimony of an arbitrary God setting aside a people who on their side remain faithful. Yet our traditional (orthodox) christology is often interpreted and preached in such a way that (explicitly or implicitly) fidelity in the Jewish tradition appears as a special evil or problem or at best an incomprehensible anachronism. The question that must be faced is what role this understanding plays in the official christology of the (Roman Catholic) Church, and whether and how that christology can be reformulated so that it is possible to acknowledge without embarrassment the fact and the positive value of contemporary Judaism.

Contrary perhaps to appearances, the fundamental theses of Roman Catholic christology are simple and few—if we take as fundamental that on which the whole structure is built.⁷ Christian faith testifies that God (the transcendent God of Israel) has in a wonderful way raised from the dead Jesus of Nazareth who was crucified by the Romans and who did indeed die, discredited and unsupported by the leaders of Israel established in Jerusalem at that time. From the experience of this event by the followers of “the Way” of Jesus, the further formulation was drawn that Jesus mediates the fulfillment of the hope of Israel. That mediation was

soon understood to apply universally to the peoples of the earth, although the title that was considered most appropriate for Jesus and which became central is that of messiah (Christ). The title is taken from the scriptures and traditions of Israel, but no reputable contemporary theologian will deny that Christian usage changes the focus of the title and gives it a specificity of meaning it did not previously have. All the Hebrew Scriptures and traditions are reinterpreted by Christians in the light of this specific meaning content.

Classical Christological Formulations

The emphasis of the Christian proclamation shifted, however, as the title of Christ came to be used almost like a surname. What comes into ever sharper focus in the first four or five centuries is the claim that Jesus of Nazareth is revealed in his death and resurrection not only as the truly and definitively human but also as the truly divine, the Word or Son of God. The prayerful attitude in which Jesus is worshiped as divine seems to date from the later New Testament writings. However, the explanatory formulation of the divinity claim culminates only at the Council of Chalcedon in the year 451 of the common era.⁸ The official doctrine concerning the person of Jesus has remained doggedly committed to the unchangeability of the words used in the Chalcedonian formulae. However, there has been a rather narrow focus on the "definition" itself to the neglect of the other documents officially canonized by Council of Chalcedon. This has had the disadvantage of taking the divinity claim and the "two natures-one person" formulation out of the context of the confessions of faith with their trinitarian and salvation history pattern. It has also taken the formulation out of the context of Leo's Tome to Flavian with its wealth of allusions to Christian piety and devotional images. Moreover, the removal of the abstract definition out of this context has had the further result of a long term divorce of christology from its foundations in soteriology—a divorce which contemporary theology is finally attempting to reconcile.⁹

As a result of this development there seems to be a "hidden agenda" to be uncovered and explored in the Jewish Christian dialogue. The contempt for post-Christian Judaism is not really grounded in the divinity claim that is so central in Christian attention, though it certainly seems to be crucial when we remember the deicide accusation. Nor is this contempt really rooted in the messianic claim for Jesus, nor in the debate about realized against anticipated eschatology in the resurrection claim of Christians,¹⁰ nor yet in the notion of two successive covenants.¹¹ Rather, what appears to be at the root of the issue is the understanding of redemption which is packed into the messianic claim. But this understanding has

become implicit (and indeed largely hidden from Christians) in consequence of the focus on the divinity claim and the "two natures" dilemma.

Reflection on the context of the Chalcedonian definition may prove quite helpful in unraveling the tangle.¹² First of all, the formulation of the relationship of the "two natures" was not intended to establish or insist upon the divinity claim. It was an answer to the claim, judged heterodox by the Council, that in Jesus Christ there is only the divine nature and no true human nature.¹³ The definition maintains:

... that Our Lord Jesus Christ is one and the same Son, the Same perfect in Godhead, the Same perfect in manhood, truly God and truly man ... *homoousios* with the Father as to his Godhead, and the same *homoousios* with us as to his manhood; in all things like unto us, sin only excepted; begotten of the Father before ages as to his Godhead, and in the last days the Same, for us and for our salvation, of Mary the Virgin *Theotokos* as to his manhood ...¹⁴

To this is added a second section, somewhat more abstract than the first, asserting that Christ is made known in two natures which exist without confusion change, division or separation, retaining their difference and characteristics while united in one *prosopon* and one *hypostasis* (regularly translated "person") who is equated with Jesus Christ, the divine Logos.¹⁵ The Council attributes this understanding to the prophets of old, to Jesus himself and to the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Symbol.

Subsequent tradition appears to have taken this as an attempt to explain how God can become man without ceasing to be God. In the context of the argument with Eutyches it appears rather as an attempt to explain how a man can be seen as divine without a denial that he is indeed a man. The reason for the more common subsequent interpretation lies no doubt in the Nicene Creed which introduces the divine Son, *homoousios* with the Father and instrumental in creation, and then tells of his having come "down," having become flesh and having been made man for our salvation. The Symbol of Constantinople amplifies this imagery by having him come "from the heavens" later to return there and resume his seat "at the right hand of the Father."¹⁶ These creeds are not simply compositions of the Councils but selections among deeply rooted traditional worship formulae that had grown up in the old churches.

The patterns and structures of the symbols, though surely known to the Council Fathers as part of their own worship, were mediated to the Council of Chalcedon largely through the celebrated Tome of Leo, the letter of Leo the Great of Rome to Flavian of Constantinople which is dated June 13, 449. This letter observes that even without scholarly subtleties in the interpretation of the scripture, Eutyches might have known the truth of the orthodox Christian teaching from the baptismal

symbols, from the "common and uniform profession of faith which all the faithful make."¹⁷ Throughout this document, Leo argues directly from the language of worship and piety to the abstract formulations that came to dominate the Council of Chalcedon.

There is, of course, no reflection on the nature of religious language. Upon careful reading and rereading of the documents in their chronological sequence one is compelled to ask whether there may have been a misperception of literary genre. The poetic language of piety seems to be used as though it were simple historical record or already the self-critically nuanced language of a systematic exposition. Thus, in Leo's Tome the battle of wits between God and the devil,¹⁸ the pageant of the descent of the Son of God into the world to trick the devil,¹⁹ the succession of colorful tableaux contrasting spectacular works of power with moments of vulnerability,²⁰ are all retold from Bible and devotional tradition, losing nothing of their epic quality. Yet they are used without further attempt to interpret. They are piled up item after item as evidence leading straight to the conclusion which is substantially that of the Chalcedonian formula quoted above, though more wordy and diffuse than the latter.²¹

Contemporary Roman Catholic scholarship²² has begun cautiously to explore this language and argumentation in the context of the experience and reflection that led to it. In consequence, one might hazard the observation that the divinity claim is no longer the insuperable obstacle to meaningful dialogue with Jews, but is being parted like a veil to show the real issue which has been concealed behind it. The reasons for this assertion may be listed as follows. In the first place, the key formulation of Chalcedon was not intended to establish the divinity claim for Jesus but to limit the divinity claims that arose out of popular piety in the gentile world, in order to maintain the solid fact that Jesus was human. In the second place, both the definition and Leo's Tome preserve intact the distinction between Jesus, honored as Divine Word, and the transcendent Father. In the third place, they leave the divinity claim mysterious and unexplained, while providing a vocabulary that respects the poetry and imagery of traditional piety. In fact this vocabulary allows for interpretations as creative as those of Paul Tillich²³ and Piet Schoonenberg²⁴—to mention only two modern systematic theologians. This third point rests in part on the understanding that "person" and "nature" (*prosopon*, *hypostasis* and *ousia*) as used by Chalcedon are not taken by any serious scholar to have the meaning they have in contemporary usage.²⁵

Christ and Salvation

When, therefore, it is acknowledged that the meaning content of the divinity claim is by no means self-evident and by no means capable of

definition in strictly appropriate terms, we are thrown back upon the function of the claim in early Christian piety for an understanding of its meaning. But it is clear that its function in Christian piety is to turn the worshiper and the follower of "the Way" to Jesus as the healing, redeeming and reconciling power and presence of God in history. The divinity claim functions as an intensification and specification of the messianic claim. Its meaning is largely constituted in practice by the experience of salvation and the interpretation of that experience on the part of the faithful of the Christian community.

To anyone not familiar with recent scholarship on the subject of grace and salvation, this last statement may be obscure and may require a quick sketch of the context in which it is made. Salvation to modern Christians has tended to be a consummation after or beyond death, wholly outside experience in the life we are presently living, awarded to individuals and without relevance in the social and public dimension of life. In the enthusiastic sects of Christianity this has been slightly different, inasmuch as salvation may be something that is known by inner illumination, by personal serenity and emotional warmth and a sense of being accepted. Nevertheless, it pertains almost exclusively to individuals and to an inner change of consciousness. Strangely, Christian theology, especially in its Catholic traditions, has shown almost no interest in the question concerning what we mean by salvation.²⁶ This central point has been taken for granted with regrettable consequences. Latterly, however, considerable attention has been given to the closely related topic of grace and the supernatural.²⁷ Roman Catholic theology has always maintained that grace is continuous with salvation, that it is the same reality not yet brought to maturity, the same relationship with God, the same harmony. However, it has too often been quietly assumed that grace is quite outside experience, so that the quality and nature of salvation are also quite outside experience.

Recent scholarship²⁸ has made it quite clear that this last was not the understanding of the early Christian communities depicted in the New Testament, for example by Paul when using the term *charis* to describe communities. Nor was it the understanding to which the Church Fathers of the earliest centuries testify. These early witnesses point to a changed experience of life and reality, overwhelming for the believer in its inner and personal dimensions and striking even to the outsider in its community expressions. "Grace" described a changed pattern of interpersonal relationships, of community structures, of expectations. It describes an intensified focus and purpose in life, a sense of destiny and mission that is implemented in the public dimensions of life, a source of joy and courage and harmony. The resurrection is the foretaste and beginning of the Reign of God, the consummation that is to come, and the resurrection is

experienced in the transformed life of the community of believers. In other words, it is tacitly assumed that the quality of salvation is known, though dimly, and is already experienced now, though it is expected to burst all bounds of anticipation in its eventual fulfillment.

When we consider what this already realized experience of salvation has been since early Christian times, certain negative factors stand out sharply. Since the flight of the Jerusalem Christian community to Pella and the destruction of the Temple and the city soon after that, the Christian experience of salvation (from which the Christian messianic understanding is shaped) has been disconnected from the land of Israel, the city of Jerusalem and the Temple. As things evolved from this point in history, the Christian experience of salvation (and understanding of the messianic role) has also been disconnected from the peoplehood of Israel and the fate of the community of Israel throughout the ages.²⁹ (These are here called negative factors and those in the following paragraph positive factors not by way of a value judgment, but to point out something about the facts of the historical development.) While Jews are painfully aware of the above, Christians are generally surprised when these points are made. We are generally not conscious of ever having said that the Temple, the city, the land and the people no longer matter and are expendable. We simply took a gentile and universalist focus and (except in times and situations where Jews were felt as a threat and therefore persecuted) we then paid little further attention to the negative side of our assertions, in particular as it affected the election of Israel as a witness among the nations.

These negative factors are complemented by the positive developments, that is by the explicit identifications the Christian community did make. Again, these are called positive not by evaluation of their merit but in the sense that they were directly intended and explicitly proclaimed. With the Constantinian establishment, the Christian experience of incipient salvation is gradually identified with the cultural achievement of a Christian empire, integrating disparate peoples and interests under strong military power. That there should have been a sense of emerging into the light after the persecutions, of a general elevation or bettering of human relations and the focus of human life, of important progress in the direction of the Reign of God, is not really surprising, even though in retrospect it may look much less helpful and salvific. A similar development occurs with the rule of Charlemagne in the West. Moreover, when the great political empires of East and West eventually fade out of history, they leave the ecclesiastical empires of Rome and Constantinople patterned after these vanished secular powers.

The claim has frequently been made by Christians (or post-Chris-

tians) engaged in Jewish Christian dialogue, that Christianity spiritualized the notion of salvation and relegated it outside history, outside this world, and beyond death. It has even been said that this is the key issue in the difference of perception and expectation between Christians and Jews. But the issue appears more complex than this. Jesus is seen as saviour because he has universalized the promises made to Israel, because in his name the gentiles have been brought together in some semblance of peace, and because he has therefore become the center of history even in a secular sense (in terms of the dating with which we measure history, and in terms of the major political alliances even in the contemporary world). Whether explicitly acknowledged or not, such peace and order as have been experienced provide the model or analogy of ultimate fulfillment and reconciliation with God and among human persons. Jesus is acclaimed as divine saviour, as the self-utterance of God in history, as the Divine Word that is the pattern of creation as well as redemption, because of the utter and self-validating simplicity of the reintegration of broken human persons, broken human history, the broken human world, as experienced by Christians in the following of Jesus of Nazareth.³⁰ Unlikely as this may seem to contemporary critics of Christendom, Christians through the centuries, and particularly through the "Catholic centuries" in the West, discerned strong continuity here. Christian institutions in law, culture and socio-economic structure were certainly seen as improvements on the pagan past and steps toward making salvation universally accessible. Moreover, the peculiar charm and salvific impact of Christendom in its multidimensional institutionality were indeed its unifying and therefore universalizing power. The individualizing reaction of the Enlightenment did not really reject the understanding of salvation implicit in all this. It rather accentuated it, though relegating it from the more tangible realm of political power to dominate and command to the more subtle of cultural-philosophical power to shape thoughts and values imperceptibly toward ever-widening circles of conformity. It was not necessarily an improvement or a move toward freedom. The Enlightenment reaction was certainly not less inclined to confuse what had been achieved in its own history with the substance and totality of the eschatological hope of Christians. The post-Enlightenment period still leaves us with the task of disentangling the gospel of Jesus as the Christ who saves from the accumulations of a heavy cultural ethnocentrism.

The cumulative effect of this is that the Christian claim of salvation in Jesus as the Christ is linked to a universalized notion of peoplehood. This notion appears as superseding the Jewish understanding of election and peoplehood in chronological sequence in history. Where the Jewish understanding is still maintained it appears as the very antithesis of the Chris-

tian, not because one is particular and the other universal, nor because one is concretely historical and the other spiritualized and other-worldly. Rather the antithesis appears because both are highly particular and this-worldly in the way they are rooted in history and in those historical experiences that have been in some measure self-validating experiences of salvation. The people Israel is not seen as central to the history of salvation, because there is a center elsewhere. That center is not simply Jesus of Nazareth, Jew of his time with universal significance for the gentiles. That center is the enchurched and even domesticated Christ figure that has accumulated a great deal of unacknowledged cultural accretion since Chalcedon. In the light of the whole historical sequence, it becomes much clearer why Jews of our time frequently see an antithesis between the Christ of Christianity and the Jewish commitment to Israel,³¹ while maintaining at the same time that they do not see the same conflict between the historical Jesus and the fate of his people in history.

There is a task of disentanglement and reformulation here which is certainly a theological task but need not be either anti-Chalcedonian or heterodox within the Roman Catholic tradition. The thesis of this paper is that the meaning of our christological dogmas is not to be understood primarily by analysis of the propositions and vocabulary of the definitions. That meaning is to be understood rather by study of the development of the imagery and story which express the experience and devotion of the followers of Jesus. That story from which the Christ of dogma is fashioned is not only the story of the historical Jesus, but the story of his followers through the ages interpreted as the story of the saving Christ. Since early days, as we know from contemporary studies of the gospels, this continuing story is constantly being projected back upon the figure of the historical Jesus with very little self-critical awareness of the process. Our times are probably more favorable than any previous era to the emergence of such self-critical awareness because of the tools, insights and analogies that psychology and cultural anthropology have given us in this respect. Such awareness relativizes particular formulations within an historical development, focusing attention rather on the thrust and direction within changing contexts than on a definition seen as static and timeless. Such a refocusing of attention obviously allows much more scope for the rethinking of doctrinal formulations and Church positions within a continuously orthodox frame of reference.³²

In the light of this thesis and perspective the opening questions may be asked again. As to the first, it has not been shown, and it is difficult to see how it could be shown that antisemitism is rooted in *essential* structures of Christian doctrine, or of christology in particular. Essential structures are here understood as those which the Church (in a Roman

Catholic contest) could not abandon without risking its whole teaching and therefore itself. As to the second question, it must most certainly be answered with a resounding "yes": Christian antisemitism can be remedied within an orthodox Roman Catholic context. Our continuing Christian experience after the Enlightenment, after the world wars and Auschwitz, after the liberation movements of the Third World, calls for a continuation of the process which has always been going on from story to dogma, and for an intensification of the self-critical scrutiny of the process. These are continuations, perhaps in a new key, of processes that have always gone on in the Church. They have always been greeted with a certain lethargy and reluctance and with outright hostility from those who had interests at stake in the *status quo*. They will certainly be greeted this way again, for the problem is common to all human endeavors. Certainly such development of doctrine and such self-critical scrutiny of the doctrinal formulations are not radical innovations in Church or theology.

New Directions

This chapter will conclude by suggesting some possible directions for Church reflection and effort and a possible theoretical construction of christology within a Roman Catholic context. In the first place, the self-revelation of God in Jesus as the saving Christ may be seen either exclusively or inclusively. It is exclusive if the Christian experience of reintegration and reconciliation is interpreted as qualitatively distinct and discontinuous with any and all other experiences. This tends to happen when Christian preaching and catechesis direct attention to the events of the past as past, rather than to the present generation's participation in those events. Where the emphasis is on the past event as past and completed, the event is alien or "hearsay" to the believer. If Christians think of Jesus as Saviour and Divine Word only in terms of something they have been told and have accepted as true on the authority of the source of the message, they are not in a position to reflect upon the quality of the experience that leads to the message of salvation. If they cannot reflect upon the quality of the experience, they are also unable to recognize that quality of experience and attitude and life in others. They can only cling to the assurance that to believe in Jesus as Saviour is right, and conclude therefrom that not to believe in Jesus as Saviour is wrong. From this conclusion it would further follow that to know the earlier "history of salvation" and reject Jesus as the culmination of it is the greatest wrong of all.

It is not entirely fortuitous that Vatican II has opened up new ecumenical possibilities with its more existential perspective on revela-

tion,³³ its concern with total participation in the liturgy,³⁴ and its emphasis on spiritual self-renewal of the Church as the chief ecumenical effort.³⁵ This opens vistas not only for the inter-Christian but also for the wider ecumenism.³⁶ The potential inherent in these developments can be deliberately though indirectly fostered by the focus on present, living and creative participation of the faithful in revelation and the process of redemption-salvation. A community that is reflexively aware of its own participation in revelation and salvation is a great deal more likely to discern similar participation in other traditions.

A second suggestion of possible directions for Church reflection and effort is that we take a new look at the "ascending" christologies.³⁷ These have already been bringing about an acknowledgement in theology, catechesis and preaching that the humanity of Jesus is the fundamental and truly knowable fact. It is from this knowledge that we move to the interpretive statements that culminate in the divinity claim. Moreover, this transition is by way of reflecting on the experience of Jesus as salvific. Failure to acknowledge this sequence leads to the assertion of the divinity claim as though its meaning were self-evident and its truth had been publicly demonstrated in history so as to convince all persons of good will. Clearly, both of these assumptions are ill-founded. Besides this, these assumptions tend to cover over the question about the meaning of salvation so that this question is never asked. A christology that begins with the humanity of Jesus and moves from there through claims of uniqueness to the divinity claim, is forced to reflect in some depth on what it is that makes us call Jesus saviour and what it is that we understand by salvation.

This would seem to be a crucial change in perspective if Christians are to allow good will and legitimacy to the Jewish position. It disallows the easy assumption that Jews must certainly be in bad faith in failing to acknowledge what has been clearly and publicly demonstrated. It also brings into the open the "hidden agenda," namely what we mean by salvation and out of what experiences we have formed this understanding. As has been indicated above, this change of perspective to an ascending christology seems to be a regaining of the orthodoxy of Chalcedon rather than an attack upon that orthodoxy. However, it certainly carries with it the need for some changes in customary doctrinal formulations commonly (though incorrectly) supposed to be simple repetitions of Chalcedon.³⁸

A third suggestion concerns the importance of the current socio-critical theologies and spirituality movements in relation to theological anti-Judaism. These include the liberation theologies, the non-violent movements, the "theology of hope," and the "political theology" proposed by J.B. Metz.³⁹ As these reflect explicitly on the meaning of salvation (the content of Christian hope) they find a need to restore the balance between

individual and society, and between transcendent and worldly-historical aspects of salvation.⁴⁰ The present focus of the socio-critical theologies is on the rediscovery of the socio-political dimensions of Christian hope by post-Enlightenment Christians. With this rediscovery, analogies and continuities appear between Jesus and other "saviours" or redeemers (liberators) of the oppressed, the hopeless, the poor and the marginated. Strong similarities also appear between the Jewish and the Christian quest for salvation—though on specific practical issues this may accentuate the conflict between Christians and Jews.⁴¹ In spite of such sporadic clashes of interest, the general thrust of these movements is helpful. They raise the central issue of salvation in doctrinal theology in the context of a sensitive Christian social conscience. This necessarily opens the way for an inclusive christology which does not reject testimonies of salvific experience and salvific fidelity outside reference to Jesus as the Christ.

From the foregoing, a tentative proposal may be made for the theoretical construction of christology within the Roman Catholic context. This can only be tentative if it is to serve the cause of dialogue with Jews. The crucial christology is not that of a few mavericks but that which can be assimilated (no matter how slowly) into the general self-understanding of the Church.

First of all, without contradicting the "one person-two natures" statement of Chalcedon, one might modify the usual approach and vocabulary slightly. Jesus is a man of Israel whose interpretation of the divine promises to Israel was in some respects radical. His concern with the promised and coming "reign of the heavens" consumed him. It integrated his life and his whole being. It led him to an untimely death by Roman execution through which (unexpectedly) his life and presence and spirit exploded into the world and burst out of the boundaries of the Jewish people (in a pattern that he did not necessarily anticipate). In this human person (sic)⁴² there was uttered into the world the reality ("nature") of the divine which became in him his own reality, fully that of a human person. In this Jew, therefore, there is a culminating point of Jewish fidelity that makes possible for all time the integration of the gentiles into the promises of Israel. This neither superannuates nor displaces Israel, it simply brings the gentiles in palpable ways into the knowledge and worship of the One God and the coinheritance of the promises with Israel. In Jesus, seed of Abraham, it has indeed happened that all the peoples of the world are blessed. There is no good reason to make this an exclusive claim. It is evident that the peoples of the world have been blessed and uplifted in countless ways by the witness of Jewish fidelity, by Jewish art, industry and creative vision, by Jewish scholarship and compassion, and much more besides. It would be flying in the face of

the evidence to deny that this also is the ongoing history of the salvation of the world, that through this also the people of the world are coming into the knowledge of the One God and the acceptance of God's inclusive covenant with the whole world.

This does not detract from the unique place and role of Jesus in history. In him, in a unique way, the God of Israel is present in power and mercy to the world and to the nations. There is a certain fittingness in the timing of the Christ-event. It happened on the brink of the disastrous scattering of the people of Israel into their exile of about two millennia in which they were divorced from the land of their witness and their full peoplehood. Two generations later, the "Jesus movement" could not have sprung up out of the same firm roots—out of the fullness of the experience of the people Israel rooted in the Temple, the Holy City, the land, the pilgrimage feasts, the tombs of the patriarchs, the places of the prophets.

The "Jesus movement" emerges in history out of the maturity of Jewish fidelity. This does not deny that in its passage through history, Christianity has often shown the religious immaturity of the gentiles and of the idolatrous origins of most of its members. Nor does it deny the religious maturity of other Jews continuing faithful in the traditions of their forebears. To claim that Jesus marks a culminating point of Jewish fidelity is not to claim that other Jews are unfaithful by continuing in the same tradition in which he walked throughout his life and in which he walked into his death. To claim that in him the nations of the earth are blessed is clearly not to claim that in him Israel is cursed. To say that in him the God of Israel is present in power and mercy in the world and to the nations, is not to say that the God of Israel is therefore absent from Israel. To speak of the "fullness of time" in relation to the event of Jesus, is not at all to imply that Israel was destined at that point to wither away, that its survival is an anachronism or an example of useless senility. In each of these cases the inner logic of the assertion seems to demand that it be understood inclusively and not exclusively.

What is important in the above paragraph is that it is not the christology of Chalcedon, nor any of the major soteriological positions of Christian theology, that leads to exclusive interpretation. It is rather a series of unquestioned ethnocentric assumptions arising out of the particular patterns of our history which lead us (anachronistically) to read back into the story of Jesus and into the doctrine that he is Christ and Lord a divinely ordained ending of the covenant of Israel, giving way to the new era of the covenant of Christians. But our history continues and new questions arise out of our history, which demand that we call in question all our unquestioned assumptions, discerning whether they spring from the saving power and mercy experienced in Jesus or from cultural residues untouched by that saving power and mercy. Auschwitz is one such

question mark that bursts in on our assumptions. Israel is another. So are the voices of all the oppressed, and poor and margined of our time, questioning whether the history of salvation can be simply equated with the progress of Christianity in the world, and questioning again and again what we really mean by salvation. In this context, the confession of Jesus as divine saviour emerges in dialogue with Judaism as a friendly wager that in him God is truly and uniquely revealed to the nations in power and mercy, reconciling all things to the Father and that this will eventually be evident in the fruits of the "Jesus movement" (which is larger than the churches).

Notes

1. This is a frequently voiced question. e.g. Gregory Baum, *Is the New Testament Anti-Semitic?* Glen Rock, N.J.: Paulist, 1965 (first published, 1960); Edward H. Flannery, *The Anguish of the Jews*. New York: Macmillan, 1965 (especially Ch. 2); James Parkes, *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue*. New York: Atheneum, 1969 (first published, 1934); and more recently, in a more strident tone, Rosemary Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide*. New York: Seabury, 1974. All of these should probably be considered directly or indirectly as responses to such Jewish challenges as: Jules Isaac, *Jesus and Israel*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1971 (first published 1948, after long years of writing, research and testing).

2. The point has repeatedly been made that antisemitism is hostility based on ethnic origins without reference to fidelity to the faith or traditions of Israel. Thus Nazi antisemitism was directly indiscriminately against Christians of Jewish origin, "secular Jews" and "religious Jews," against Jews of the ghetto and against acculturated Jews. Therefore, the appropriate term in the present context is anti-Judaism rather than antisemitism.

3. See, e.g., the survey of contemporary efforts in: Michael B. McGarry, *Christology after Auschwitz*. (New York: Paulist, 1977), Ch. III.

4. This is patently true even for official statements of Church governing bodies, which are often simply not assimilated into the effective tradition of the community at large.

5. This seems to be the weakness of attempts like that of Josef Klausner, *The Messianic Idea in Israel*, (New York: Macmillan, 1955), comparing Jewish and Christian notions of messiah (pp. 519-531). Few, if any, Christians would accept the composite picture of the Christian messiah presented by Klausner.

6. The case has been made by Jewish writers for centuries. See, e.g. F. E. Talmage, ed., *Disputation and Dialogue*. New York: Ktav, 1975, especially Part II and bibliography. More recently it has also been recognized and discussed by Christians. Cf. McGarry, *op.cit.*, *passim*, for a review of official and unofficial statements. The Christian interest is evident also in such periodicals as *S.I.D.I.C.*, *The Bridge*, *The Christian Century*, etc.

7. For the author's own synthesis of Roman Catholic official Church teachings on christology, see "Christology" in *An American Catholic Catechism*, ed. by George Dyer. (New York: Seabury, 1975), pp. 66-77.

The relevant Church documents are authoritatively collected in *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, Henricus Denzinger, re-edited Adolfus Schönmetzer. Freiburg: Herder, 1965. This collection, however, is chronologically, not topically organized. In English see *The Teaching of the Catholic Church*. Josef Neuner and H. Roos, ed.

Karl Rahner. New York: Alba House, 1967. Ch. 6, "The Redeemer," pp. 143-179. There is also a modified later edition: *The Christian Faith*, ed. Josef Neuner and J. Dupuis. Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1975. Ch. 6, "Jesus Christ the Savior", pp. 135-190. This collection omits some items given in the earlier one, but includes the highly problematic Declaration, *Mysterium Filii Dei* of the Sacred Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith of 21 February 1972,—a statement whose main point is based upon an understanding of the Chalcedonian word "person" (*persona*, *prosopon*, *hypostasis*) which equates it simply with the meaning of that word today. It would appear to be beyond dispute today that that equation cannot be made (between the classic Christian and contemporary general understanding of "person"), whether in relation to the assertion that there is a personal God, or in relation to the doctrine of the Trinity, or in relation to the christological doctrines.

8. The Council of Chalcedon listed as authoritative statements five different documents: the Symbol of Nicea, 325 C.E., as revised by The Council of Constantinople, 381 C.E.; the decrees of the Council of Ephesus, 431 C.E.; the two letters of Cyril of Alexandria pertaining to the same matter; the celebrated Tome of Leo I: and Chalcedon's own "definition".

9. The argument concerning "ascending" and "descending" christologies seems to be concerned largely with this issue. Cf. Karl Rahner, *Theological Investigations*, Vol. XIII, New York: Seabury, 1975. "The Two Basic Types of Christology," pp. 213-223. Cf. also, for example: Walter Kasper, *Jesus the Christ*. New York: Paulist, 1977; Piet Schoonenberg, *The Christ*. New York: Herder, 1971. Even more forceful is the thrust in Third World christologies, e.g. Sabastian Keppens, *Jesus and Freedom*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1977; and Jon Sabrino, *Cristologia desde america latina*. Mexico: Ediciones CRT, 1976 (to be published soon in English translation as *Christology at the Crossroads*, Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis).

10. This focus on the time frame of the messianic claim has dominated the discussion to date. For a summary of this, see McGarry, *op.cit.*, Part III, pp. 56-98.

11. The debate over the question of only one covenant or two distinct covenants, is concisely summarized by McGarry, *ibid.* pp. 72-97.

12. Documentation of, and reflection upon, this material, may be found not only in the documents of Chalcedon themselves, but in R.V. Sellers, *The Council of Chalcedon*. London: S.P.C.K., 1953; and in Aloys Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition*, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1965. This last is a much enlarged and revised version of the author's earlier essay in the monumental collection of scholarship on Chalcedon which he himself had co-edited with H. Bacht, *Das Konzil von Chalkedon: Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Würzburg, third edition 1963.

13. Associated with the name of Eutyches, but clearly representing a minority church tradition in spirituality and devotional formulae prior to its abstract or systematic formulation.

14. This very cautious translation, with its careful use of punctuation, capitalization and untranslated terms, is that of R. V. Sellers, *op.cit.*, pp. 210-211.

15. This summary retains the vocabulary used by Sellers, *ibid.*

16. The vocabulary is that of the English translations used by J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, *The Christian Faith*, pp. 6, 10.

17. *The Fathers of the Church*, vol. 34, Pope St. Leo the Great. transl. Edmund Hunt. New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1957. p. 93. This translation of the Tome is used throughout this article.

18. *ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

19. *ibid.*, pp. 97-99.

20. *ibid.*, pp. 99-101.

21. *ibid.*, pp. 101-103. This is also anticipated at the beginning of the letter, p. 93, and interpolated at intervals, e.g. in the famous passage: "In this preservation, then, of the real quality of both natures, both being united in one person, lowliness was taken on by majesty, weakness by strength, mortality by the immortal. And in order to pay the debt of our fallen state, inviolable nature was united to one capable of suffering so that . . . one and the same mediator between God and men, the man Jesus Christ, could die in the one nature and not die in the other" (pp. 95-96).

22. See note 9. In particular, the work of Piet Schoonenberg, some of it set out in unpublished papers and talks, seems to point steadily in this direction.

23. *Systematic Theology*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). vol. II, *passim*.

24. *op.cit.*, and subsequent lectures and papers, mainly unpublished.

25. The implications of this for Trinitarian theology are far-reaching and are succinctly stated by Josef Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity*. (New York: Herder, 1970), pp. 114-137.

26. See Gustavo Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation*. (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1973), pp. 145-167 and corresponding endnotes.

27. Most notably in the work of Henri de Lubac and Karl Rahner. The outcome of the inquiry is summarized by Karl Rahner, "Grace. B. Systematic," in *Sacramentum Mundi*, ed. K. Rahner *et al.* (N.Y.: Herder, 1968. Vol. 2), pp. 415-421. Note bibliography, p. 421.

28. This was first made clear to me by interventions of David Flusser and Shemaryahu Talmon, both of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in various inter-faith discussions held in that city, 1975-76. *Cf.* the general thrust of David Flusser, *Jesus*. (New York: Herder, 1969).

29. It is not intended here that all Christians have participated personally in such experience of salvation. The point is only that the tradition and life of the community rests on such experience by some Christians.

30. Thus, for instance, David Flusser, speaking on the key issues between Jew and Christians. See note 26.

31. To some extent the fruits of this began to be apparent at Vatican II, e.g. in *Lumen gentium* (as it deals with those not subscribing to the Catholic faith), and in *Gaudium et Spes* (as it deals with the historical and worldly aspects of salvation). Both these documents may be found in English in Walter Abbott, ed., *The Documents of Vatican II*. New York: America Press, 1966. Likewise, some fruits of this changed perspective have emerged in the Jewish-Catholic dialogue, in spite of its slow pace. *Cf.* Helga Croner, ed., *Stepping Stones to Further Jewish-Christian Relations*. New York: Stimulus Books, 1977. Pt. I. "Roman Catholic Documents," pp. 1-68.

32. See, *Dei Verbum*, the Constitution on Divine Revelation of Vatican II, in Abbott, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-128.

33. See, *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy of Vatican II, *ibid.*, pp. 137-178.

34. See, *Unitatis redintegratio*, the Decree on Ecumenism of Vatican II, *ibid.*, pp. 341-366.

35. The connection between revelation theology and ecumenism was pointed

out forcibly more than a decade ago by Gabriel Moran, in "The God of Revelation," in *God, Jesus, Spirit*, ed. Daniel Callahan. New York: Herder, 1969, especially pp. 7-13. (Reprinted from an earlier article in *Commonweal*).

36. See note 9.

37. To be discussed in the concluding paragraphs as part of the theoretical construction of christology proposed.

38. Some representative authors in Liberation Theology whose works are published in English are: (among the Catholics) Gustavo Gutierrez, Hugo Assmann, Juan Luis Segundo, Enrico Düssel; (among the Protestants) Rubem Alves, Jose Miguez Bonino. Representative "Theology of Hope" authors are: Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg. A representative of the thought of the non-violent movements is James Douglass.

39. Gustavo Gutierrez, *op. cit.* pp. 145-167.

40. The tragic example is Israel. It is more than unfortunate that Israeli (and some other Jewish) scholars tend to see Liberation Theology and some other socio-critical theologies as essentially hostile to Judaism. This is due, no doubt, to the concern of the socio-critical Christian groups over the plight of the Palestinian Arabs, and over the power exercised by the wealthy of any society. Nevertheless, by reason of their basic commitment, these movements and theologies seem rather to be the best potential Christian friends of Judaism.

41. It seems obvious from the documents of Chalcedon (as has been suggested by Schoonenberg) that the emphasis on unity of person in Jesus, comes down on the human rather than the divine side, *i.e.* the teaching of Chalcedon is a protest against a voided and meaningless humanity. It seems in no way to require the supposition of a fully-fashioned, pre-existent, reflexive self-awareness that is divine but oppositional to the transcendent Father. In any case, it must be reiterated that "person" in the Chalcedonian sense does not carry a meaning co-extensive with our contemporary understanding of person. On the implications for trinitarian theology, see note 25.

42. Cf. the image of the grafted branch in *Romans* 9-11. But *cf.* also the image of the seed and the great branches of the tree in Judah Halevi; *The Kuzari*, available in translation by Hartwig Hirschfeld, (New York: Schocken, 1964), pp. 226-227.

Catholic Dogma After Auschwitz

Gregory Baum

At Vatican II the Catholic Church redefined its relationship to the Jews and their religion. We were told that the Jewish people continue to be God's chosen people, that their religion remains for them a source of divine grace, and that it is the task of Christians to engage in conversation and cooperation with them. This is a new teaching in Catholic history. During the conciliar debate, several conservative bishops opposed the new teaching because, they claimed, it denied what Christians had always believed, going against scripture and tradition. And, in a sense, they were right. For the Church had always taught, with more or less explicitness, that after Christ's coming the Jewish religion was null and void, and that divine grace was available to the Jewish people only through conversion to Jesus. The Church's liturgy, the witness to its ongoing tradition, presented the Jews—following an image of Paul—as blinded by a veil over their eyes, and prayed that God in his mercy would convert the faithless people to the truth of Christ.

The New Testament—at least in most sections—teaches that the Synagogue has missed its calling, that Israel has been blinded, that her religion is no longer a source of salvation, and that it is the task of the Christian Church to preach Jesus Christ to the Jewish people. In Paul's letter to the *Romans*, chapters 9-11, we have probably the most generous approach to the Jews in the New Testament. Here we are told that the Jews remain God's chosen people, that they continue to be ruled by God's faithful providence, that even their blindness has salvational meaning since it made the Church turn more quickly to the gentiles, and that, despite their present stubbornness, God will not permit them to fall into the world but will preserve them for their eventual return to the community of salvation. Thus *Romans* 9-11 modifies the more negative teaching on the Jews found elsewhere in Paul's writings. According to this negative teaching, Torah itself is suspect; legalism and "salvation by works" characterize not only Pharisaic Judaism but have defined the religion of Israel from the

very beginning. By separating Torah from the divine promises made to Abraham, Paul saw the whole of Israel's history under the shadow of the law, suggesting that only a small minority of the people had ever been true believers. *Romans* 9-11 clearly corrects this teaching: Israel's history is the locus of divine revelation. Israel is the irremovable witness of salvation history, and even the Church of the gentiles must be understood as in some sense grafted onto the ancient people of Israel. Against the discontinuity between Israelite religion and Christian faith stressed in some Pauline texts, *Romans* 9-11 puts the accent on continuity. Vatican II in its teaching on Jewish religion specifically refers to this Pauline text. Still, it is quite clear that *Romans* 9-11, however generous in the context of the New Testament, does not present the ongoing election of the Jews as a source of grace for them in the present: the election simply preserves them in present darkness for a future redemption. Even in *Romans* 9-11, Jewish religion has become null and void, and grace is offered to Israel only through conversion to Christ.

Principles of Doctrinal Change

How could Vatican II propose a teaching that differed from the letter of scripture and tradition? It is useful to reply to this question in some detail. How does doctrinal development take place in the Catholic Church? If Christian theologians look upon the Bible as the *norma normans non normata*, as the only rule of faith, then one does not see how they could ever acknowledge Jewish religion as a source of divine grace and recommend that Christians associate with Jews as brothers and sisters. Of course, the Catholic Church recognizes besides scripture the authority of its ongoing experience, i.e., tradition. But even the churches that follow New Testament teaching alone, rejecting the idea of doctrinal development, do in fact read and re-read the scriptures at different times and from different perspectives, and thus come to different perceptions of what the Bible actually says. Hence, the history of exegesis in itself actually constitutes something of what the Catholic Church calls development of doctrine, although Protestants sometimes overlook this fact.

How did the new teaching on the Jews emerge in the Catholic Church? There were two distinct but related factors at work. First, the universality of divine grace, an ancient doctrinal theme, at one time marginal in the Catholic tradition, slowly moved to the center of attention in the twentieth-century Church. Confronted with the urgent question about the salvational status of humankind, i.e., the salvation available to people born into other religions and into a divided Christendom, Catholic theologians came to stress the ancient teaching that in Christ God had

acted on behalf of all humankind, that the grace of Christ was more abundant than the sin of Adam, and, furthermore, that divine creation itself was oriented toward Christ's coming and ultimate transfiguration. Thus God summons people to grace and salvation wherever they may be—from the beginning of history, in all cultures, in all religions, even from within modern secularism. Thanks to God's mercy revealed in Christ, there is an element of graciousness in the history of every person and every people. However ambiguous their doctrines, the religious traditions of humankind mediate a sense of the divine and a trust in a reality beyond human life. This line of thought became so central that it affected the teaching of Vatican II on world religions and the Church's place in the modern world.

Because of urgent questions posed by the Church's historical experience, a doctrine hitherto marginal in the Christian tradition assumed central importance, so central that teachings that had previously occupied the center fell into a subordinate position and suffered reinterpretation in the light of the new perspective.¹ But if world history is the locus of divine grace, how are we to understand the traditional teaching regarding the sinfulness of the world and its need of redemption? The sin of the world is now seen as referring more concretely to the structures of oppression in society and in human consciousness. And the traditional warning against false religion and legalism (i.e., purely human projects of salvation) is now understood as a critique of the destructive trends present in all religions, including Christianity. While the doctrine of the universality of divine grace seems to relativize the position of Jesus in human history, it does so only in a qualified way; for the intimate correlation between creation and redemption, on which this doctrine is based, presupposes the presence of Christ as the divine Logos at work in the whole of human history.

The second factor operative in recent doctrinal development, more important than the first, is the Christian response to the Holocaust, the annihilation of the six million Jews by the Nazis. This awful event, unique in its horror, poses many questions to the Church. To what extent has the Church's rejection of Jewish religion, accompanied by teachings of contempt and vilification, made a contribution to the torrent of antisemitism that destroyed European Jewry? Christian thinkers on the whole agree that while Christianity bears no direct responsibility for the Nazi dream of world dominance and Jewish death, the Church's negation of Jewish existence before God has created symbols and produced an atmosphere in which it was possible for Hitler to make the Jews a scapegoat for the ills of society, and count on much popular support for his antisemitic campaign. The Church's spiritual negation of Jewish existence has been translated

into brutal, physical fact by anti-human and, in fact, anti-Christian political forces joined to a modern technology of killing and disposal. Can Christians, after this awful event, repeat the old teaching? After World War II, a growing number of Christians have demanded that the churches cleanse themselves from anti-Jewish teaching, acknowledge Judaism as a biblically-based religion before God, and, instead of asking Jews to cease being Jews and become Christians, promote friendship and cooperation with them. It was this trend, supported by Pope John XXIII, that was adopted as the official Catholic position at Vatican II.

On what authority did this change of traditional teaching take place? The universality of divine grace, mentioned above, was a doctrine that was helpful in this situation, but, by itself, it could hardly have reversed the Church's teaching on Jewish religion. Someone might argue that, since Jewish religion is based on the Old Testament, it should be easy for Christians to recognize that it remains, even after Christ's coming, a biblically-based religion reading the sacred texts from its own unique perspective. Yet, the New Testament itself makes this view difficult to defend. (Since the Bible says nothing of the great Asian religions, the Church has never been committed to negating their religious claims.) Christianity defined itself over against Jewish religion. The Christian gospel was the new way, the new message over against the old religion of Israel; and since the Christian Church constituted itself very quickly in opposition to the Synagogue, so that the struggle of the early Church against the competing mother religion influenced the formulation of the Christian faith and the writing of the New Testament, the negation of Jewish existence was made part and parcel of the Christian message. How can this possibly be changed?

The Christian thinkers who first wanted to remove the anti-Jewish trends from Christian teaching naturally looked for arguments drawn from scriptural texts, but they often stretched the meaning of the latter, attributing, for example, a generous meaning to *Romans* 9-11 which went far beyond its literal sense. They also searched the Christian tradition for a more generous approach to the Jewish religion, firmly believing that the traditional teaching must be changed, whether they could find useful arguments in the ancient sources or not. Why did they hold this conviction? Since, in the history of the West, the spiritual negation of Jewish existence has led to contempt, injustices, and, however indirectly, physical extermination, the traditional teaching stood condemned by a superior principle, namely the redemption of human life, which constitutes the spirit and substance of the Bible. Divine revelation is *propter nos et propter nostram salutem*. Divine revelation is the pure and uncontaminated source

of new life. Because of this supreme biblical teaching, it is possible to correct certain positions of scripture and tradition when they serve the destruction of life and the enslavement of human beings.

In German philosophy, this corrective procedure is called "ideology critique." Here, ideology means the deformation of truth for the sake of social interest. It is claimed that every group, every nation, every religious community produces—by a largely unconscious process—a perception of reality expressed in special dogmas that promotes its own interest, defends the group against others and makes it easier for the rulers to exercise their power. From the beginning, the Church preached the Christian message with an anti-Jewish ideology. When, in later centuries, the Church gained political influence and social power, the anti-Jewish ideology translated itself into legal structures that excluded the Jews, with the result that the Christian gospel in fact came to promote the oppression of a living people. Because the enslavement of human beings goes against the spirit and substance of the gospel, it is possible, I hold, to remove these ideological deformations from Christian teaching, however ancient and venerable they may be.

That it is both possible and necessary to submit the Church and its teaching to an "ideology critique" has not yet been universally accepted in the Catholic tradition. This is a new principle. While Christians always believed that the gospel promoted the life of the world, they did not feel that this justified the correction of traditional teaching when the latter appeared, in concrete situations, to foster the death-dealing forces of history. What religious power authorizes Christians of the present generation to apply this principle? What religious authority stands behind such a step? (We note in passing that the anti-Jewish trend is not the only ideology operative in Church teaching; much has been written in recent years of the anti-feminist bias in sections of scripture and in the entire history of the Church. An ideological deformation of the Christian message has also occurred whenever the Christian Church identified itself with the dominant powers and their political and economic empires.) The turning point in the Church's quest for more authentic self-understanding was its encounter with the Holocaust. Here God spoke and still speaks to the churches. Here the churches are authorized to free their teaching from ideological deformations, however deeply they may have penetrated.

The thesis I am defending is that something altogether special surrounds the Holocaust. It is a disturbing event that does not permit the Church to rest; it is in some sense a moment of revelation; it reveals the evil power of ideology and summons the Church to free itself from its ideological teaching—its anti-Jewish trend as well as all the other oppressive trends insofar as we can perceive them. In recent Catholic theology,

much importance has been attached to "the signs of the times," to special events in concrete history that shift the focus of attention and make Christians re-read the ancient texts from a new perspective. Thus Pope John XXIII mentioned three such "signs of the times" characteristic of the twentieth century: three emancipatory movements—of the working class, of women, and of colonized peoples.² These events have a certain authority: through them God addresses the Church. To take them seriously in the interpretation of the gospel is not to surrender to purely human considerations, but to respond to God's voice addressing us in history.

Auschwitz, I claim, is an altogether special sign of the times, in which God empowers the Church to correct its past teaching, *including its central dogma*, to the extent that it distorts God's action in Christ and promotes human destruction. Auschwitz is unique from many points of view. For Christians it is unique because here, in the midst of what was for centuries a Christian civilization, a vast organization of death destroyed the Jewish people—the same people who have been portrayed in Christian symbolism as the dark shadow of the Christian Church: the blind Synagogue, the stiff-necked people, the faithless enemies of God. The Holocaust acted out the Church's fantasy that the Jews were a non-people, that they had no place before God, and that they should have disappeared long ago by accepting Christ. The Church is now summoned to a radical reformulation of its faith, free of ideological deformation, making God's act in Christ fully and without reserve a message for life rather than death.

Such a theological undertaking, needless to say, is not an arbitrary or easy one. For, while obedience to God's summons demands the removal of all ideology, fidelity to the Church's original message and authentic tradition also demands the preservation of continuity. What theologians have done and are still doing is first to allow the *raison d'être* of the gospel, the promotion and redemption of human life, to move to the center of attention, and then to relate the other Christian doctrines to this center, re-interpreting them, possibly in a radical way, in light of this new focal point. This method has been applied by Vatican II when it declared, against the letter (though not the substance) of the scriptures, that Jewish religion remains a dispensation of grace and that Christians should, instead of trying to convert Jews, engage in dialogue and co-operation with them.

Implications for Christian Self-understanding

The ideological deformation of Christian teaching, which had such devastating consequences in Western history, has also produced a serious

impoverishment of the Christian tradition. Ideology not only wounds the outsiders, it also damages the community that generates it. For this reason, the discovery of ideological trends in one's own theological and ecclesiastical tradition is inevitably associated with a change of consciousness through which the Christian community recovers repressed elements of its religious heritage. It is possible to ask, therefore, whether Vatican II, in freeing the Church from a certain anti-Jewish ideology, also recovered some elements of the Christian tradition that had previously been neglected.

It is safe to say that the believing acceptance of God's work of creation—especially the reality of history and the world of culture—which Jewish religion has often greatly emphasized, has been underdeveloped in the Christian tradition. At Vatican II, the greater realization of the universality of grace, repressed for ideological reasons in the past, was one of the factors that led to a new theological evaluation of the global human community. In the conciliar document *Gaudium et Spes*, the Catholic Church for the first time clearly recognized human history as the locus of divine grace, and discerned in the ambiguity of culture not only the sin from which God saves us, but also the work of grace which mediates God's presence to the human family. While for the secular thinkers of Europe steeped in Enlightenment wisdom and Enlightenment confidence, Auschwitz shattered the liberal dream of human progress once and for all, the Catholic Church, at odds with the Enlightenment and hostile to modern society, was moved by Auschwitz to a more accepting stance, a more liberal outlook, a greater openness to the world. Against the mood of total despair expressed by Enlightenment thinkers such as Adorno and Horkheimer, Catholic thinkers responded to Auschwitz with horror and repentance, but also with hope. The readiness of the Church in the past to demonize its opponents, whether they were Jews, dissidents or modern liberal society, blinded the Catholic community to God's presence in humanity and legitimated the crusades of hatred against groups in disagreement with Catholicism. What the Church has now learned, although possibly too late, is that its old notions of brotherhood and sisterhood were far too restricted.

We touch here on an important principle: the de-ideologizing of Christian teaching involves the recovery of authentic elements that have been lost, and hence leads to a more complete and better balanced assimilation of the gospel. This principle has been formulated by Rosemary Ruether and applied in a creative way in her theological work: indeed, it is one of the elements that constitutes her great originality.

In my introduction to Ruether's *Faith and Fratricide*, I have shown

that the changes introduced by Vatican II, while significant, did not have a profound effect on Catholic teaching. Why? Because the anti-Jewish ideology is finally lodged in the Church's central dogma regarding Jesus Christ. It is true, of course, that books of religious instruction and theological treatises now recognize Jewish religion and foster dialogue between Christians and Jews, but when these books move to the more central themes of the Christian proclamation they continue, quite unwittingly, to annihilate Jewish existence before God. For, if Jesus is the messiah of Israel, if he fulfills all the promises made to Israel of old, if he ushers in the new age, if he embodies the expectations of all mankind, if he incarnates all the truth and the love that God communicated in human history, if he represents God in our midst in a definitive, exhaustive, and unconditional manner, then the Jews are foolish in waiting for the messianic days, in clinging to a stage in the history of salvation that has been superseded, and in blinding themselves to the fullness of redemption and divinity present in Jesus Christ. Hence the Church becomes the new people of God, the true Israel, replacing the people of the old covenant which has missed its vocation. With this christology, there develops inevitably what has been called "a theology of substitution" (Pawlikowski). Making room for Jewish religion in the Church's pastoral policies is quite ineffectual as long as no room is left for Judaism in the central christological teaching.

The negation of Jewish existence is lodged so deeply in Christian doctrine, below the level of awareness, that Christian teachers and theologians unthinkingly endorse and repeat it, even when they want to adopt a new, positive stance toward the Jewish people. Typical examples of this are Jürgen Moltmann and Hans Küng, both of whom have strongly reacted against anti-Jewish ideology and favor dialogue and fellowship between Christians and Jews. However, when they deal with the Church's central teaching, and do not reflect explicitly on Jewish existence, then even they do what the Church has always done, i.e., leave no room for Jewish religion. Both Moltmann and Küng favor a theology of redemption—one, incidentally, rarely found in the Catholic tradition—according to which Jesus as the new man of freedom and the mediator of the Spirit was persecuted by representatives of the Law, by men who did not break the Law but were faithful to it, so that it is proper to say that Jesus was put to death by Torah.³ Instead of recognizing that the persecutors of Jesus stood for a legalism that threatens all religions and all societies, including the Church, and instead of clarifying the fact that Jesus' criticism of legalism was not foreign to the religion of Israel, but actually derived from ancient prophetic as well as rabbinic teaching, Moltmann and Küng, quite unthinkingly, accuse Torah of having crucified Jesus. They forget that there

is an inward, liberated and surrendered manner of practicing Torah in keeping with the prophetic tradition, and hence not at odds with the teachings of Jesus.

Can christology be freed from its ideological elements? It is at this point that some Christian theologians get "cold feet." They fear that a radical re-interpretation of the Church's central doctrine might dissolve the gospel altogether. John Oesterreicher, for example, a Catholic theologian who has done much to promote Jewish/Christian co-operation in North America, thinks that the rectification of the anti-Jewish trends in Christianity only involves psychological and sociological factors, and in no way raises doctrinal questions.⁴ We have shown that this is not true. The spiritual negation of Jewish existence is implicit in the Church's central teaching. Oesterreicher's point has been re-iterated in a more careful, polite and dignified form by two scholars, T.A. Idinopulos and R.B. Ward, who argue against Ruether's thesis that to remove the anti-Judaic elements from Christianity one must re-interpret the central christological affirmation.⁵ They too believe that Christian antisemitism has been produced by sociological and cultural factors, operative very early in the formation of the New Testament, which can be overcome by the charity of Christians who have become wiser through the awful history of antisemitism. But the arguments put forward by these two authors against *Faith and Fratricide* are weak indeed. The authors point to certain hints that prior to the christologies formulated in the synoptics there existed a wisdom-christology, not concentrated on the cross, which was free from the anti-Judaic taint; they argue that Ruether affirms one-sidedly those passages in Paul where he presents the law not as a dispensation of grace but as an interruption of the dispensation of promise begun with Abraham and completed in Jesus, thus neglecting the passages in which Paul defends the continuity between the old and new covenants; they accuse Ruether of not taking seriously enough the impact of pagan antisemitism on the Christian tradition and of not paying attention to the shift in Christian teaching that occurred after the destruction of the temple. These are weak arguments; for the shifts of emphasis and the alternate interpretations proposed by the authors do not weaken the central thesis of Ruether's book that the negation of Jewish existence, from the earliest records of the New Testament on, is implied in the christological affirmations.

Let me add that the authors misunderstand Ruether's position. They believe that she wants to recover a purely Jewish Jesus devoid of specifically Christian elements, while instead, believing that in Jesus God has acted on behalf of all humankind, she wants to formulate a christological teaching free of the anti-Judaic complement usually associated with it. The main worry of the two authors is that Ruether's re-interpretation under-

mines the Christian dogma that in Jesus Christ the salvation of the world has been wrought once and for all and is available to all who seek it now, not only at the end of time. However, since the authors admit that there are several christologies in the New Testament, some even slightly at odds with others, there seems to be no reason why the Christian Church, on the basis of the believing response to the Holocaust and a new Christian piety, should not be able to re-think and re-formulate the Christ-event in a way that retains Jesus unalterably as the source of God's judgment and new life for the believing community, but specifies that this dispensation of grace is only a prelude to the complete fulfillment of the messianic promises when God's will be done on earth in the new age.

So far, no one has found a re-interpretation that is wholly adequate from every point of view. Addressed by the disturbing event of Auschwitz, we shall have to live with a few question-marks for a time. What matters in the various answers that have been proposed is that the new christological formulations be received by the Christian people, and recognized as expressions of the essential gospel in continuity with its original message. Doctrinal reconstruction, however radical, must remain capable of being integrated into the life and teaching of the Church, or, in other words, be "orthodox" in the larger sense of the term.

I propose, therefore, that the methodology operative in the doctrinal development at Vatican II be further applied to the re-formulation of the Church's essential christological teaching. At Vatican II, the movement toward the center of attention of an ancient doctrinal theme (the universality of divine grace) enabled Christian thinkers, under the impact of God's judgment on the Church following the Holocaust, to free the Church's teaching from an ideological deformation of the Christian message and to recognize a theological place for Jewish religion. As we saw, the ideological reformation of the Christian message goes much deeper: it is the Church's traditional christology that ultimately removes Israel from a place in the sun. While individual Jews, according to this tradition, may be saved despite their Judaism if they follow the partial light available to them, Judaism itself—i.e., post-biblical Jewish religion—is devoid of substance, an empty shell, a prison locking its followers into a past age.

Wrestling with this issue, Christian theologians have also moved another ancient doctrine to the center of attention, namely the ancient biblical theme of eschatology. They have focused their attention on the reign of God which Jesus proclaimed, for which he longed, and whose speedy coming he prophesied. After his death, he told his audience, he would return on the clouds of heaven and establish the kingdom of Israel, in which all the nations would be pacified. The early Christians still expected the speedy return of the Lord. The second coming was eventually

inserted into the Church's creeds, but it moved from the center of the Church's attention to the periphery. Today, for a variety of reasons,—one of them being the Christian response to the Holocaust—Christian theologians are recovering the ancient eschatological yearning of the Church again. They experience the society in which they live, including the Church, as under the coming judgment of God; they regard the present order of redemption as incomplete and provisional; they attach great importance to the divine promises for the future which are as yet unfulfilled. The Christian Church is still waiting, impatiently, for the visible manifestation of God's reign. While the divine pledge for God's ultimate victory over evil is given in the person of Jesus, his death and resurrection, the fulfillment of all the biblical promises will come only at the end. The high titles which the Church assigns to Jesus have their full and definitive meaning only in the day of his final coming. Jesus is the Christ in an anticipatory way.

This eschatological turn has brought the Church closer to the Synagogue: both Jews and Christians now yearn for the messianic days when God will triumph over the powers of darkness. Because of the incompleteness of the present order, the Church is able to make theological space for Judaism as a biblically-based religion in its own right, and for other dispensations of grace operative in the world religions. And since the overcoming of ideology, as we noticed above, is always associated with a recovery of repressed elements, and hence with a more adequate appropriation of the gospel, the turn to eschatology makes Christians aware of the incompleteness of present redemption, forcing them to recognize that the promises made to the Church have their full and complete meaning only at the end of time, so that the present Church is divested of its old symbols of triumphalism. Ruether has suggested that this is the meaning Judaism holds for the Christian Church: to remind the Christian community what it is always tempted to forget, namely that the present order is still incomplete and that redemption in the full sense is only for the end. In the last chapter of *Faith and Fratricide*, she shows in detail how the quest to free itself from anti-Jewish ideology leads the Church to a new, more authentic and more realistic self-understanding. This chapter, I hold, makes an abiding contribution to Christian ecclesiology.

What does this shift of perspective mean for christology? It is not my intention to develop a new christology appropriate to the recognition of Jewish religion. Since I am interested in a theological methodology that can be received and followed in the Christian Church, I only want to indicate the questions such a christology will have to deal with. It must be a christology that does not make Jesus the messiah of Israel who fulfills *all* the divine promises, who completes and closes the order of redemption,

and who is identified with God in such a way that there is no access to divinity through other dispensations. At the same time, such a christology, to remain in continuity with the Christian past, must clarify the pivotal place which Jesus holds in the history of salvation and the manner in which the absolute manifests itself in Jesus—that is to say, how it remains correct for Christians to say that God is substantially present in Jesus Christ.

Christian theologians have moved in this direction in a variety of ways. Since this is new territory, it is important that theologians use different images and try divergent approaches. For some theologians, what matters is that the duality in Jesus be expressed in conformity with the formula of Chalcedon, while for others it must conform to the scriptures, read and re-read. In her as yet unpublished manuscript on christology, Ruether develops the duality in terms of “the messiah of Israel” and “the cosmic Christ.” From her published writings, it appears that for her Jesus is the man of break-through, the passover man, the living paradigm of radical transformation who brings to light the divine action in history, inverting the inherited order, elevating the poor and humiliated, liberating the oppressed from their bondage, and bringing to consciousness the repressed dimensions of truth. This Jesus is in continuity with prophets of Israel, but he is greater than the prophets since his passover declares God’s definitive triumph over evil. In this context, Ruether insists that modern theology must “de-spiritualize” the Christian message, for Jesus is in continuity with the ancient prophets only if the passage from darkness to light which he initiates includes the transformation of the concrete social conditions of human life. The passover which Jesus brings to light has meaning for all religions and all societies to the extent that in them structural injustices subject people to oppression and distort their collective self-understanding. Jesus remains, therefore, a pivotal point in salvation history who affirms the ancient promises and assures their validity for the whole human family. And since in his life and destiny the end and purpose of history stand revealed, Jesus is in this anticipatory sense the promised messiah, the Christ.

It is through the same eschatological meaning of Jesus that Ruether links the absolute to Christ’s historical person. What is revealed in him as passover and liberator is the assured destiny of humankind, the final and hence ever valid judgment on human sin, the ultimate reconciliation of the human race—the substance of divinity itself! The realization of these promises is not available in the present except as forward-moving dynamic, as anticipation, as yearning and power. This does not mean that Jesus is the one to whom all religions, in particular Jewish religion, ultimately tend. As break-through man and eschatological figure, Jesus

can be meaningful to these religions by making more alive in them the inherent dynamics of their self-transformation.

Two Types of Theologians

Some reviewers of *Faith and Fratricide* have suggested that there is a significant difference between Ruether's christology as expressed in her book and my own remarks on the subject in the Introduction.⁶ How does my approach differ from hers? As a theologian, I put greater emphasis than she does on the reception of new theological insights by the Church. For me, the task of a theologian is to express new thought, however critical and innovative, in ways that can be assimilated by Christians without severing themselves from the sources of the Christian tradition. The new insights may shatter the taken-for-granted world and even touch upon ecclesiastical dogma, yet at the same time the theologian must provide good evidence that these insights are implied in God's judgment on the Church. The critical demands made by such Christian theologians derive their authority nevertheless from the spirit of the scriptures and the substance of the Church, for even the most radical critique of the Church is generated by the Church's own life. Since I am a theologian identified with the Catholic tradition, I regard it as my task to interpret radical theological thinkers in a manner that allows for their reception in the Catholic community, and—who knows?—this may cause me at times to misinterpret their original intention. Whether this has happened in my introduction to *Faith and Fratricide* I cannot say.

There are Christian authors who express their radical insights through negations. They feel that the traditional positions have so much weight that they must first be negated before entry into new insights is possible. Other authors, on the contrary, feel that they must present new theological positions more as re-interpretations of past teaching. While the latter recognize the blindness produced by the weight of tradition, they hold that radical demands can be integrated into a renewed tradition only if they present themselves as continuous with the Church's ancient symbols, re-interpreted in the light of a new horizon. The classical example of these differing methodologies is found in the preaching of Paul and Peter. Paul typically began his sermons with negations, speaking of the abrogation of the law, and producing upheaval among his hearers in the synagogues; on the other hand, Peter typically began with re-interpretation, speaking of the fulfillment of the ancient promises, and leaving his audiences in a calm, reflective mood, open to hear further. Both types of theologians, I believe, have their legitimate place in the Christian Church.

If I find myself more on the side of the re-interpreters than the

negators (where, I think, Ruether belongs), it is because I emphasize more than she does the immanence of God in human life and human history. Since, in my view, the mystery of the transcendent God is operative in human history and the self-making of human beings, I believe that mingled with the ideological trends of Christianity (and of the other great religious traditions) are profound expressions of authentic religious experience in which God is present to humankind. The great religions are all ambiguous in this sense. But, since I trust that beyond ideology the Christian symbols have always been the source of new life for vast numbers of Christians, I hold that the de-ideologizing of Christian teaching, demanded by God's judgment on the Church, preserves an essential continuity with the past, and hence reconstitutes rather than annuls the Christian tradition.

Notes

1. Baum, G., *Faith and Doctrine*, Paulist Press, pps. 101-110.
2. *Pacem in terris*, nn 39-43.
3. Moltmann, J., *The Crucified God*, SCM Press, London, 1974, pps. 128-35.
- H. Küng, *On Being a Christian*, (Doubleday, New York, 1976), p. 339.
4. Oesterreicher, John, *The Anatomy of Contempt*, Institute of Judaeo-Christian Studies, (Seton Hall University, 1975), p. 19.
5. Eckardt, A. Roy, "Is Christology Inherently Anti-semitic? A Critical Review of Rosemary Ruether's *Faith and Fratricide*," JAAR 45 (1977) 193-214.

The Historicizing of the Eschatological: The Spiritualizing of the Eschatological: Some Reflections

John T. Pawlikowski

The phrases "the historicizing of the eschatological" and "the spiritualizing of the eschatological" have become symbolic of Rosemary Ruether's reflections on the theological relationship between Judaism and the Christian Church, which, in its concrete manifestations, produced centuries of suffering for Jews at the hands of Christian people. These phrases encapsulate her fundamental critique of Christianity's separation from Judaism, a separation that has proven disastrous for Christians as well as Jews because it withdrew the Church from a purifying rootedness in the flow of history.

As far as can be determined, this thesis of a twin distortion in Christianity first appeared in an essay Ruether published in *The Christian Century* in 1968.¹ She continued this trend of interpretation in her essay entitled "Anti-Judaism is the Left Hand of Christology," where she writes,

Originally Christians also linked Jesus' Messianic role intimately to the final salvation of the world. But as this event failed to materialize, Christian theology pushed it off into a vague future—i.e., the "Second Coming"—and reinterpreted Jesus' Messianic role in inward and personal ways that bore little relation to what the Jewish tradition had meant by the "coming of the Messiah."²

This viewpoint has now become an important feature of nearly all of her writing on the problems of christology. In *Faith and Fratricide*, she takes up the question in chapter five on the "Theological Critique of the Christian Anti-Judaic Myth."³ Given the centrality of Christian Jewish relations, no critical examination of her contribution to the dialogue would be complete without some consideration of her contentions in this area.

In its initial phase in *The Christian Century* essay, the spiritualizing approach to the eschatological is described by Ruether as drawing on gnostic and Hellenistic philosophical ideas that pictured eternity as essentially above the human person in coherence with his/her inward spiritual nature. In this perspective, the eschatological could influence the human person's higher spiritual nature, even though the outward course of history continued to move along in much the same way as before. This tendency is especially apparent for Ruether in the *Gospel of John*.

The "historicizing of the eschatological" process, on the other hand, moved in the direction of explaining the final coming of Christ in terms of a new timetable of salvation history. This is fundamentally the approach in the *Gospel of Luke*. Christ, the resurrection, the outpouring of the Spirit, and the new covenant were detached from their final eschatological culmination of world history in Jewish thought. Instead, Christian theology relegated the "kingdom" to an indefinite future while claiming that such eschatological Jewish realities as the Spirit could be experienced here and now by the truly religious person. It was precisely this historicizing of eschatological Jewish symbols that, in Ruether's eyes, opened the way for their future use by antisemites.

Ruether greatly expands on the "historicizing of the eschatological" theme in *Faith and Fratricide*. "By historicizing the eschatological," she says, "the 'two eras'—the historical world and the messianic age to come—became the one Christian historical era, over against Judaism as the type of unredeemed humanity."⁴ The consequence of this is the confusion of the line between history and eschatology in such a way that it becomes a line dividing human history itself into premessianic and postmessianic eras. Under this scheme, Judaism and all other non-Christian faith communities become identified with unredeemed, "carnal" humankind over against the Christian "eschatological" person. She writes,

The ultimate crisis of human existence, the crisis that divides the historical from the eschatological, was thus imported into history as itself a "historical event." All history "before Christ" could then be regarded as the era of "unredeemed man"—which is still the identity of those outside Christian faith, i.e., Jews—while Christian times take on the aura of messianic glory. Messianic hope, instead of illuminating the crisis between the historical and the eschatological, now becomes the tool of false consciousness allowing the church to dress historical ambiguities in the dress of finality and absolute truth.⁵

This process of equating eschatological symbols with Christian history has resulted in serious consequences. Fulfilled messianism became the firm foundation for the attempt by the Christian Roman empire to forge an ideological universalism. Faith in Christ assumed the status of the last

word on the unification of all peoples, giving the Church a mandate to conquer other nations in the name of its revelation. Both Christian antisemitism, and the patterns of totalitarianism and imperialism with which Christianity has been connected, (as well as the secular revolutionary stepchildren of these patterns) have their roots in this false historicization.⁶

For Ruether, the only way for Christianity to ultimately overcome the dire potential of this eschatological deviation is through a radical reworking of christology. She candidly admits that "those trained in traditional Christian theology will be pained by this discussion and declare that 'Christ's coming' has made an ultimate difference."⁷ But they will simply have to confront all the contradictions that have resulted from the attempts to make sense of this christological claim. The ultimate eschatological event, the final coming of the messiah, must continue to symbolize the culmination of human history in the kingdom of peace and reconciliation. But such absolute finality can no longer be simplistically attributed to the heightened expectation surrounding the life and death of Jesus. The messianic meaning of Jesus' life remains paradigmatic and proleptic in nature, in no sense final and fulfilled. This proleptic and paradigmatic reading of the meaning of the eschatological experience in Jesus will demand its relativization *vis-à-vis* other communities of faith which do not share in the same saved memories.⁸

A Purified Christology?

It is quite obvious from even a cursory look at Ruether's treatment of the "historicizing/spiritualizing of the eschatological" theme that, if substantially accurate, it constitutes a major challenge to traditional Christian faith. My personal evaluation of her thesis is that, while she lifts up some crucial issues that will require significant modifications in segments of the Church's christological traditions, she significantly misreads the implications of the process she describes by not relating it to a parallel development taking place in Second Temple Judaism. She thus makes it appear that the "historicizing of the eschatological" is an exclusively Christian rejection of Judaism's dynamic, historical ethos. Ruether likewise by implication holds out little hope that this spiritualizing-historicizing tendency can have any positive contribution to make to a revitalized christology for our time. For her, such a revitalized christology seems to imply a wholesale discarding of the understanding of the person and ministry of Jesus produced by this tendency. In other words, removal of this tradition is an absolute condition for any authentic christological rebirth in the contemporary setting.

For a Christian theologian to cooperate fully with Ruether's call for a total abandonment of the spiritualizing-historicizing impulse in christology would mean the destruction of Christianity's greatest potential contribution to the religious understanding of the nature of the human community. It would be to give up the Church's most unique addition to such understanding; it would also gravely undercut Christianity's legitimacy as a major world religion. Without this "spiritualizing-historicizing" process, Christianity would have little to contribute today to the dialogue of world religions. If left solely with its initial definition of Jesus' ministry and mission in terms of a literal fulfillment of the messianic prophecies of the Old Testament shown by historical reality to be a false claim, as Ruether has rightly pointed out⁹—the Church today would be devoid of any *raison d'être*. It might as well admit its error of judgment, close up shop and reincorporate its members into the Jewish community. I am convinced that only by building from a purified version of the historicizing-spiritualizing tendency can we develop a meaningful christology for our day.

Let me make it clear that I welcome attempts to find parallel christological experiences in non-Christian religions, or even quasi-religions. But I am not ready to fully endorse the kind of total relativizing of christology suggested by Ruether as a corrective for the admittedly often brutal distortions caused by the "historicizing-of-the-eschatological" tendency. For me, what relativization is necessary must follow the realization that the fundamental insights contained in the developed christologies of the mature Pauline and Johannine traditions, in spite of their uniqueness and universal significance, do *not* constitute the full and complete understanding of what it means to be a religious person or a religious community. Christians cannot even approach such a complete understanding without appropriating insights from other faith communities. The haughty claims of the past that saw in Christ alone the full and complete meaning of religious experience must be rejected. In this, I am in full agreement with Ruether. It is her "replacement" christology that I find inadequate in its current form.

At this point, I wish to make clear my deep personal gratitude as a theologian to Ruether for raising issues that the Christian theological community cannot avoid if it is to construct a valid christology for our time. I make this assertion lest my comments above in anyway seem to associate me with critics of *Faith and Fratricide* such as Msgr. John Oesterreicher,¹⁰ who seem to impugn Ruether's very integrity as a Christian. In raising the issue of the historicizing of the eschatological, I recognize that she has made an extremely worthwhile contribution to Christian theological thinking. I accept it as a creative and potentially constructive challenge, and in no sense an attempt to destroy Christian

faith. It is imperative that Christian theologians confront this challenge.

The response from the Christian community to *Faith and Fratricide* must be primarily theological. But it ought also to include unqualified acknowledgment of and repentance for the sufferings which the distortions resulting from the "historicizing-of-the-eschatological" tendency have brought upon Jews and other non-Christians. Thus far, few if any major Christian theologians have shown genuine theological or penitential sensitivity to the issues raised by Ruether. Within the Catholic community, for example, only Hans Küng and, more recently, Edward Schillebeeckx have treated the subject with any real seriousness. As Eva Fleischner has noted, the subject is totally absent from the works of such eminent theologians as Johannes Metz and Walter Kasper, and occupies only a minimal place in the writings of Karl Rahner.¹¹

Thus *Faith and Fratricide* breaks significant new ground. It marks the beginning of a process of new christological construction in the context of interreligious dialogue. This process will have to take most seriously Ruether's contention that the problem of antisemitism lies in the biblical foundations of traditional christology, not merely in pietistic, exegetical or homiletical aberrations introduced by later generations of Christians. While the movement away from a simplistic christology based on the fulfillment of the Old Testament messianic prophecies to the more "spiritualized" christology of the later Pauline writings and the Johannine tradition established the fundamental uniqueness and identity of Christianity as a religion, the full implications of this change were never clarified by the New Testament writers. This left room for the Church to make the kind of absolute claims within history which, as Ruether correctly says, have proven disastrous for its spiritual well-being and for the physical safety of non-Christians, especially Jews. It may even be the case, as she argues, that the *Gospel of John* contains serious distortions in its basically productive christological development which serve to identify Jews (and by implication all other non-Christians) with the unredeemed, fallen world of evil.¹² A highly respected scholar of the Johannine tradition, Fr. Raymond Brown, has come around recently to acknowledging a fundamental hostility to Jews as a collective entity in Johannine literature, a biblical viewpoint that in his mind cannot any longer be taught as authentic Christian doctrine.¹³

However, the fundamental question still remains: Is the inward "spiritualizing" christology of the later Pauline and the Johannine traditions simply to be discarded and replaced by a christology in which Christ is seen as an expression of future hope for Christians, but a symbol which, while valid for Christians, is deemed to possess none of the absolute and universal significance traditionally claimed for it in the past (i.e., many

non-Christian groups have similar and equally authentic experiences of ultimate hope)? It is at this point that I personally must part company with Ruether. It is at this point that I feel her genuine contribution ends and a serious theological weakness sets in. This weakness lies fundamentally in her failure to deal adequately with the thought patterns that emerged within the Second Temple period in Judaism, especially within the Pharisaic revolution. Some of these thought patterns even appear, in the opinion of some biblical scholars, to have roots in the Hebrew Scriptures themselves. Ruether shows awareness in her writings of the tragic distortion of the Pharisaic movement in Judaism that has been so commonplace in Christian education. She condemns this distortion without hesitation. But she fails to take serious account of recent scholarship on the Pharisaic period and how it sheds light on the kind of "spiritualizing" tendency that marks later christological development in the New Testament. In so doing, she leaves the impression that what occurs in the later Pauline literature and in the Gospel of John is totally foreign to Judaism, and represents a basic corruption of the Jewish commitment to salvation within history, a situation from which the Church still stands in need of liberation.

The task before us then, in responding to Ruether's challenge, is to take a hard look at recent scholarship on the Hebrew Bible and the so-called "intertestamental" period. We will need to see how it might illumine New Testament christological development.

Two Covenants

One scholar of the Hebrew Bible who has exhibited a high degree of sensitivity over the years toward the improved understanding by Christians of the continuing validity of the Jewish covenant is J. Coert Rylaarsdam. His most recent essay on the subject contains some insights pertinent to the topic of the "spiritualizing/historicizing of the eschatological." As Rylaarsdam sees it, the basic tension between Judaism and Christianity can only be understood by recognizing the existence of two distinct covenants in the Hebrew Scriptures. The first, the covenant with Israel, represents the side of history and signifies a socio-religious union called into being by God. It includes a mutual pact of faithfulness and responsibility between God and his people. This covenant is characterized by the continuity between Torah and gospel, and includes both the motif of the recital of the covenant and the theme of obligation. These themes reflect the belief that the only significant world is that of the human person and history, especially as seen through the particularity of Israel, the "chosen" of Yahweh. This covenant is future-oriented, and the events

related constitute a salvation history replete with "acts of divine rescue." It is an open series. This salvation history would not be fully reconciled with the advent of Jesus and hence was not as significant for the New Testament as the second covenant.

The second covenant focuses on King David. As interpreted by Rylaarsdam, it represents the eschatological tradition. The principal characteristic of this covenant is the holiness attached to the mountain of Zion and the divine presence as revealed through the dynasty of David. This covenantal tradition marked a new beginning and continued to exist in tension with the first covenant, to which it was finally accommodated although never absorbed. This Davidic covenant alludes to and celebrates a supratemporal order of significance. God is King—of creation and of the nations. "Law" and "history" are largely absent from the Davidic covenant. Whereas there is no Alpha-Omega aspect to the future-oriented first covenant, the second celebrates Alpha with emphasis on its significance for the present, and thus adumbrates many Christian theological and liturgical motifs.

The tension between these two covenants ultimately produced several sects, one of which became the eschatologically oriented Christian Church. This new faith community witnessed the same tensions in its theological expressions found in Judaism, but with a reversal of the priority of the two covenants. In the words of Rylaarsdam,

However Jesus may have understood his vocation, at the outset Christians interpreted his career as an eschatological event. He had overcome the world (*olam*), relativized history—or even abolished it. Except for some sectarian movements, Judaism thought more historically than eschatologically. It awaited the transformation and redemption of the world. So the Jews said that the Messiah had not come. But the Gentiles believed. And the Christians wrote a commentary on the Hebrew Bible and called it the New Testament. Its accent is overwhelmingly eschatological. Therefore it has now become the primary occasion for the dilemmas of Christology.¹⁴

As Rylaarsdam views the matter, the Christians who authored the New Testament were a Jewish sect. They were sectarian because they took a one-sided view of the relation of the two covenants to one another. For a moment, they forgot about the paradoxical character of the relationship, and they thought that the full meaning of the historical could be fitted into the perspective of the eschatological. But Rylaarsdam believes that,

they quickly began to discover that they were wrong. And the story of nineteen centuries of Christian history can be told as the story of the progressive discovery, exploration and rectification of that initial mistake. Their retention of the Hebrew Bible has served the Christians well in this matter. They have thought and said that they retained it as the sign of a

preparation; but, in fact, it served as the source of their recovery of the knowledge of foundations that are enduring because they are paradoxical.¹⁵

Whether Rylaarsdam's proposed delineation of the development of the twin covenants represents an overly neat packaging of a considerably more complicated process (as Walter Harrelson of Vanderbilt University has indicated in discussions of the Rylaarsdam thesis by the *Israel Study Group of Theologians* to which I belong) can be left an open question for further research. But, even if the scheme does not quite fit all the data, Rylaarsdam is at least correct in pointing to the fundamental rethinking of the relationship between history and eschatology that was taking place in the latter stages of the composition of the Hebrew Scriptures. This fact in itself will necessitate some modification of Ruether's thesis.¹⁶

The Pharisaic Revolution

The process of rethinking how history and eschatology, the "temporal" and the "spiritual," were to be linked, took on a new vigor with the coming of the Pharisaic revolution during Second Temple Judaism. Generally, Christians have known nothing about the Pharisees outside the highly distorted picture of them that emerges from the pages of the New Testament. This is a picture that stands in urgent need of correction, as the 1975 Vatican *Guidelines on Catholic-Jewish Relations* clearly state. I cannot here go into any detailed analysis of the growing body of literature on the Pharisaic movement from both Jewish and Christian sources.¹⁷ As is the case with most areas of scholarly research, there is no complete agreement on all phases of the Pharisaic revolution.

One of the leading scholars of this period of Jewish history is Professor Ellis Rivkin of Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati. In his many writings on the Pharisaic revolution, he has spoken consistently of the process of internalization as one of the hallmarks of this revolution. The Pharisees proclaimed that the God of revelation was the Heavenly Father of each individual person. No longer was He looked upon simply as the Father of the patriarchs, as the Father of the people Israel. He had now become the Father of each and every person. For the individual person who internalized the Pharisaic system of oral and written Law and guided his/her life by it, the guarantee of eternal life stood on the horizon. The significance of the Pharisaic transfer of reward and punishment to the world to come and its shift of the focus of salvation from the people/land to the individual lay in its stripping time/history of its directional thrust:

History was not moving anywhere. Time present, time forward, time prior, was indistinguishable in structure and in quality, so long as salvation was

attainable. One was no closer to eternal life or resurrection now than had been an Abraham or a Moses then. God was no more the Father now than he had been the Father then. The individual soul had been as precious then as it was now.¹⁸

Rivkin makes clear his belief that the internalization process involved in later christology had its origins in the Pharisaic revolution.¹⁹ He tries to show, for example, how Paul's notion of Christ is structurally congruent with the Pharisaic system of the salvific oral/written Torah:

Each was believed by its devotees to be the creation of God the Father. Each promises to deliver from sin and each offers eternal life and resurrection for the believing individual. Each preaches that Reality is within, not without. Each denies to *externality* the power to refute the certainties of an internalized faith. And each acknowledges that the messiah will come-or come again. But, until that unknown and perhaps unknowable day, salvation is at hand: for the Pharisees in the two-fold law, for Paul in the ever-redeeming Christ.²⁰

This understanding of the internalizing process taking place within Judaism in the centuries immediately preceding the birth of Jesus puts the whole enterprise of internalizing the eschatological in Christian christological development in a different light. *It cannot be dismissed as simply a loss by Christians of Judaism's historical sense.* In fact, I am quite surprised that Ruether has not brought out the developments in this vein by Pharisaic Judaism. For, in a perceptive article on the Pharisees, she seems quite aware of this "a-historical" impulse in their thought. She writes:

It is commonplace to speak of Judaism as a historical religion uniquely characterized by the idea of salvation history. But there is a sense in which Pharisaism sought to emancipate the Jew from the tyranny of history, as much as from the tyranny of tribe and national homeland. Just as the spiritual Jew can be a Jew without the land, Temple or political autonomy to vindicate God's love for him, so he no longer should read history with too much anxiety to be sure that it is going his way or even that it is very clearly going any place at all. Rabbinic Judaism makes little effort to distinguish history from myth.²¹

In light of these remarks, it would seem that Ruether needs to alter significantly some of the statements she has made in chapter five of *Faith and Fratricide*.

Against the background of the internalization process in Judaism outlined above, how should we understand the uniqueness of the Christ event? How should Christian theology begin to construct the revitalized christology for which Ruether rightfully calls? As I see it, the actual christological transformation process in the early Church followed some-

thing along these lines. After the initial strata of the gospel materials and the early Pauline writings had proclaimed Jesus to be the expected messiah of Jewish historical thinking, problems arose for the apostolic Church. The signs and realities that were to accompany the coming of the messiah were nowhere to be seen. Hence the mature Paul and especially John were forced to re-examine the earlier christologies.²² Eventually, they came to appreciate a totally new and potentially more important aspect of Jesus the Christ. Through contact with his person and his ministry, men and women had been able to glimpse more profoundly than ever before the ultimate link that exists, and has always existed, between God and the human person. Humanity and divinity were more closely tied together than people ever imagined. And their linkage had deep implications for the understanding of the relationship of people to each other and to God, as well as for the dignity enjoyed by each human person. This realization was in part a development of the heightened sense of the dignity of the individual person that had emerged as one of the hallmarks of the Pharisaic revolution with Judaism during the Second Temple period.

It is this important link that Ruether misses in her thesis about the "spiritualizing of the historical." The process taking place in John and the later Paul was not as foreign to the soul of Judaism as she seems to imply. Nonetheless, we must admit that the christologies of John and Paul do represent a significant advance in this area when compared with the understanding found in Second Temple Judaism. Although, as a conglomerate, the socio-religious structures and ideas developed by the Pharisees point to a new closeness between God and the human person, the Pharisees as such were probably not ready to grant the direct link between humanity and divinity that eventually emerged in Christianity. But I would suggest that they were definitely leaning in that direction. The gulf between Judaism and Christianity still remains wide on this point. However, an understanding of the Pharisaic basis of christology may make passage of that gulf at some future date at least thinkable.

Jesus as "God"

Part of the reason for for the delay in developing the new christological consciousness within the early Church may have been due to something Raymond E. Brown has pointed out, namely that "if Jesus presented himself as one in whose life God was active, he did so not primarily by the use of titles or by clear statements about what he was, but rather by the impact of his person and his life on those who followed him."²³ Brown insists that the use of the term "God" for Jesus belongs to the second half of the New Testament period and became frequent only in the latter part

of that period. It likely originated in a liturgical setting. We have no evidence that Jesus was called God in the Jerusalem or Palestinian communities of the first two decades of Christianity. This judgment Brown believes is confirmed by the evidence of the earliest extra-biblical Christian works.

In Brown's view, as Christian theology grew and developed, the term "God" took on an expanded meaning:

It was seen that God had revealed so much of Himself in Jesus that "God" had to be able to include both Father and Son. The Pauline works *seem* to fall precisely in this stage of development. . . . By the time of the Pastorals, however, Jesus was well known as God-and-Savior. The Johannine works come from the final years of the century when the usage is common.²⁴

The significance of this developmental thesis put forward by Brown for the question at hand is that it confirms the existence and critical importance of the "internalizing" of christology spoken of by Ruether. But it also shows, unlike her writings, that the real meaning of christology is intertwined with this process. For the unique religious insights to be gained from christology do not come primarily from the Jewish prophetic and historical interpretations attached to Jesus' ministry, but from the process described by Brown in which the title "God" was finally applied, not to the Jesus of New Testament ministry, but to the pre-existing Word, to the resurrected Son in the Father's presence, to the triumphant Jesus whose throne is forever. Hence, we cannot simply abandon this internalization process within first-century christology without cutting out its very heart. It is not sufficient to maintain that hope is the central meaning of christology, as Ruether seems to do. We must go deeper and ask what is the basis of that hope. And it is only through the proper understanding of the internalization process which has strong parallels in first-century Judaism that we can begin to find the authentic Christian answer to this question.

At this point, it would be well to state in a more positive fashion the meaning of the Church's christological tradition as the developmental theory just outlined helps us to understand it. Through the ministry and person of Jesus, people came to see clearly for the first time that humanity is an integral part of God. This means that each person is divine, that he or she somehow shares in the constitutive nature of God. Christ is the theological symbol the Church has chosen to express this reality. As we learn from the latter strata of the New Testament materials, this humanity has existed in the God-head from the very beginning. So in a very real sense God did not become man in Jesus. That is the ultimate meaning of the infancy narratives' notion of the Virgin Birth. God always was man.

The Christ event was merely the occasion through which this reality became clearly manifest to the world.

The Christ event was in a sense the culmination of yet another process. In the act of creation, part of the humanity that was in the God-head was cast out into a separate, though not fully separated, existence. In the period from creation to the Christ event, men and women were searching for an authentic self-understanding that would recognize both their individuality and their dignity. Frequently, the human person assumed that he/she was greater than the Father, seeking to make themselves into gods. The Christ event revealed both the incomparable greatness of the human person as well as his/her limits. The growing sense of uniqueness and dignity which first surfaced in the *Genesis* sense of the human person as Co-creator, and which further heightened in the Phari-saïc emphasis on the worth and status of each individual person, reached its apex at this point. The human person now saw that he/she shared in the very life and existence of God. The human person was still a creature; there remained a gulf between his/her humanity and the humanity that was the property of the God-head. Perhaps this is the ultimate explanation of why Jesus had to die on the cross—to reiterate this gulf. But despite the ongoing nature of this gulf there was also a direct link: the two humanities could touch. The human person's struggle for self-identity had come to an end—almost. In this sense, we can truly say that Christ brought and continues to bring salvation to the human person its root sense—whole-ness. For in properly grasping the meaning of the Christ event the human person can heal himself/herself, can become whole, can fully bring to a close the struggle between humanity and divinity that lay in the deepest recesses of human consciousness. People can put to rest their struggle with God, and the temptation to try to become God. The human person will live forever in his/her uniqueness and individuality. God will not try to absorb them; in fact, God will allow the human person his/her eternal distinctiveness in order to become himself fully and finally God.

Judaism

This brief exposition of the meaning of christology leads inevitably to the question as to what meaning remains for the Jewish covenant. While, in one sense, I see the final version of the Church's christology as the culmination of the Jewish tradition (not the fulfillment of the messianic prophecies, but the fulfillment of the growing sense of the dignity and uniqueness of the human person), Judaism retains a unique and distinctive role in the process of human salvation. In the first place, it has maintained the sense of peoplehood, of community, the belief that no individual

person can achieve salvation without the whole human family having attained salvation. Ideally, if the new christological outlook had really remained in contact with the Jewish spirit, there may have been no further need for a separate Judaism. But this did not happen: perhaps the break was inevitable once Christianity experienced its Hellenistic influx. In the process of separation, Christianity lost the sense of community, becoming more and more individualistic in the bad sense of the term, turning increasingly to an I-God relationship that misguidedly believed the human person could reach full communion with God without achieving communion with the rest of humanity. This is the false type of mystical inwardness that Ruether has rightly condemned.

One prime example of this tendency in the Roman Catholic Church has been the privatization of the Eucharist, only rescinded since the II Vatican Council. The Eucharist stands as the ultimate symbol in the Church that people can only be saved communally. It is a recognition that in unity people become in a very real way the body of Christ. This is an integral part of the mature Paul's christology. It is one of his most important statements about the unity of the human community, the dignity of humanity and the ultimate link between humanity and divinity. Yet this symbol was allowed to deteriorate into a private action between the individual and God.

The difference between my position and Ruether's, then, is that, whereas she tends to identify the whole internalization process in christology with the type of tragic aberrations mentioned, I would maintain that internalization was fundamentally a positive contribution in line with important developments in the Judaism of the period. But I would insist that Christian contact with Judaism is necessary for the Church if it hopes to overcome the deep-seated and long-standing tendency toward false privatization of religion. This does not mean, however, a complete abandonment of the inner consciousness christologies of the mature Paul and John.

The Church's christological traditions also lost sight of (and hence need to recover) the sense of the human person as Co-creator, as responsible for history and for the world God has created. Part of this irresponsibility was due to a continuation of the initial christology of the apostolic Church which said that Christ had brought about the messianic kingdom, and hence the end of history. But it was likewise due to the fact that most Christians had lost the sense of salvation as ultimately communal, that one cannot by-pass other people in trying to achieve unity and harmony with God. There was no perception that a part of God resided in the human family. The Jewish sense of the human person as Co-creator, as concerned about history as a way of helping to build the final kingdom, is not a

materialistic concern, as Christians have sometimes claimed. It is rather a recognition that in the creation of social and political structures, which is what the flow of history is all about, we are advancing or restricting the ultimate communion of people. Social and political structures are a reflection of human consciousness. But they also advance or retard the development of that consciousness.

The above realization was crucial for the Pharisaic revolution and for the christologies of John and the mature Paul. They reveal a new understanding of the intimate relationship between inner consciousness and history, one generally missing from the concept of history that dominated the Hebrew Scriptures, and which formed the basis of the earliest interpretations of Jesus' ministry. It is this link between history and human consciousness that *Faith and Fratricide* does not adequately come to grips within its dismissal of the "historicizing of the eschatological" tendency in the Johannine and Pauline Christologies. A very real danger in the internalization process is that a break with the flow of human history will occur, as in fact took place in much of subsequent Christian theology. Another equally critical danger is that the various levels of history will be confused. This was an unfortunate reality in the apostolic Church. It tried in a highly superficial and ultimately distorting way to bring together the Old Testament view of history with the Pharisaic/Johannine view. This led to the "fulfillment of history" concept being transferred to another world outside the ordinary course of history which could be entered by Christians through baptism.²⁵

The Christian community owes a great debt to Ruether for forcefully confronting it with this central distortion. The answer to the distortion, however, lies not in the wholesale abandonment of the internalization of history but in the abandonment of the view that a fulfilled history exists anywhere. There is also a need to recapture a perception of the inherent connection between the heightening of human consciousness and the development of political-social structures that is the work of human history itself.

The contact with Judaism will prove crucial for Christianity in overcoming the false directions involved in the "historizing of the eschatological" tendency. For Judaism has recognized, far better than Christianity, that what the human person is doing in and through the historical process is to try to find patterns of social organization that will bring about the ultimate communion of people, while preserving their individuality and uniqueness. The Christ event is still not complete; the messianic kingdom is not yet here. This is the gospel we must affirm in the light of Ruether's challenge. All talk of a "realized eschatology" must be buried once and for all. What we Christians in our faith now profess is that

through the coming of Christ we have a clearer vision of the final dimensions of this kingdom. But the human community will be unable to bring about its completion unless the Jewish sense of the human person as Co-creator, as co-responsible agent for the world during historical time, becomes deeply ingrained in its collective soul. Likewise, it cannot come to pass until men and women recognize that communion with God in any ultimate sense involves of necessity communion with the rest of the human family. Any attempt to find a shortcut by going "directly to God" in the final analysis amounts to cutting oneself off from part of God's life.

From the above discussion, it should now be clear that in raising the issue of "spiritualizing of the historical" and the "historicizing of the eschatological," Ruether has hit upon crucial distortions in traditional Christian theology. The force behind her questioning of this "internalization" process will not permit us to easily avoid confronting it. And this is all to the good. Here *Faith and Fratricide* has made an invaluable contribution to the Jewish-Christian dialogue and to the process of Christian self-renewal. That I have serious reservations about the manner in which this volume handles certain aspects of the question is in no way meant to deny the gratitude I personally feel for the author's work. It is rather a recognition that a mature christology for our day will emerge only from dialogue and discussion among sensitive theologians, and not from an individual genius, no matter how insightful and wise that genius may be.

Notes

1. "Theological Anti-Semitism in the New Testament", Vol. XXXV, No. 7 (14 February 1968), pp. 191-196.
2. *New Catholic World*, Vol. 217, No. 1297 (Jan/Feb 1974), p. 13; reprinted in Robert Heyer (ed.), *Jewish-Christian Relations*. (New York, Paulist Press, 1974), p. 2.
3. pp. 226-261.
4. p. 240.
5. p. 247.
6. cf, pp. 238 & 248.
7. p. 243.
8. pp. 248-250.
9. cf. pp. 246-247.
10. *Anatomy of Contempt*, South Orange, N.J., Institute of Judaeo-Christian Studies, 1975.
11. Cf. *Judaism in German Christian Theology Since 1945: Christianity and Israel Considered in Terms of Mission*. Metuchen, N.J., The Scarecrow Press, 1975, p. 36. On Schillebeeckx's approach to the question, cf. Robert Schreiter, "Christology in the Jewish-Christian Encounter," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. XLIV, No. 4 (Dec. 1976), pp. 693-703.
12. Cf. *Faith and Fratricide*, pp. 111-116.

13. Cf. "The Passion According to John: Chapters 18 and 19," *Worship*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (March 1975), pp. 126-134.

14. "Jewish-Christian Relationships: The Two Covenants and the Dilemmas of Christology," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1972), p. 251.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Gregory Baum does allude to Rylaarsdam's view in his introduction to *Faith and Fratricide* (pp. 10-11). But he fails in my opinion to fully see its relevance for at least that part of Ruether's theory under discussion in this chapter.

17. On Pharisaism, cf. R. Travers Herford, *The Pharisees*. Boston, Beacon Press, 1962. Ellis Rivkin, "The Internal City," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 1966), pp. 225-240; Ellis Rivkin, "The Pharisaic Background of Christianity." in Michael Zeik and Martin Siegel (eds.), *Root & Branch: The Jewish/Christian Dialogue*. Williston Park, NY, Roth Publishing, 1973, pp. 48-49; Ellis Rivkin, "The Meaning of Messiah in Jewish Thought," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (Summer 1971), 383-406; Ellis Rivkin, "Defining the Pharisees: The Tannaitic Sources," *Hebrew Union College Annual*, 1970, pp. 205-249. Louis Finkelstein, *The Pharisees*, 2 vols. Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1964. Jacob Neusner, *From Politics to Piety: The Emergence of Pharisaic Judaism*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1973. Asher Finkel, *The Pharisees and the Teacher of Nazareth*. Leiden, Brill, 1964. J. Massyngberde Ford, "The Christian Debt to Pharisaism," in John M. Oesterreicher (ed.), *Brothers in Hope: The Bridge*, Vol. 5. New York, Herder & Herder, 1970. John T. Pawlikowski, "On Renewing the Revolution of the Pharisees," *Cross Currents*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Fall 1970), pp. 415-434.

18. Rivkin, "The Meaning of the Messiah in Jewish Thought," p. 391.

19. "The Pharisaic Background of Christianity," pp. 48-49.

20. "The Meaning of the Messiah in Jewish Thought," p. 401.

21. "The Pharisees in First-Century Judaism," *The Ecumenist*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (November/December 1972), pp. 3-4.

22. I here follow the more common understanding of the Johannine tradition as later (though Jewish) than the synoptic gospels. But should it come to be accepted by scholars that *John* is just as early, if not earlier than the synoptics, the basic thrust of the christology I am trying to develop would not be adversely affected. In fact, one then might postulate a closer connection between the developments in the Pharisaic period and *John* which might just account for the lack of explicit denunciations of the Pharisees in *John*. The Christian Jews responsible for the synoptic tradition with its greater stress on fulfillment of the historical prophecies about the messiah might be those who had not fully bought into the Pharisaic internalization process.

23. "Does the New Testament Call Jesus God?," *Theological Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1965), p. 546.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 569-570.

25. For a more comprehensive treatment of this consult my essay, "Pauline Baptismal Theology and Christian-Jewish Relations," in Michael Zeik and Martin Siegel (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 89-110.

Rethinking Christ

Douglas John Hall

"... the anti-Judaic structure of Christian thought is not only a problem for Jews, but rests on forms of thought that are troubling to Christians as well. Rethinking these modes of thought has become as necessary for Christian identity as it is for improved relationship with Jews."¹

Visitors to the magnificent Notre-Dame-de Paris may fail to notice two figures in stone, both women, one on either side of the great portal of the cathedral. The figure on the left is pathetic: blindfolded, her head bowed down in shame, her staff broken, her crown askew. Some Hebrew symbols can be recognized by the careful observer, for this image represents ... "The Jewish Religion." Being cognizant of the "abiding contempt" (Baum) of Christians for Jews, thinking Christians will not be surprised to find Judaism thus represented on the facade of a mediaeval cathedral. What few even of the most sophisticated Christians are prepared to entertain, however, is the extent to which Christianity had to represent Judaism in this way, given its own self-image. Therefore, few are receptive to the impact in the juxtaposition of the dejected Synagogue-figure with the figure on the other side of the portal. There, a very different personage confronts the world: a queen in all the strength and splendor of a victorious reign. A type of Elizabeth the First, haughty, defiant, self-satisfied. She faces God and man in the full confidence of one who has triumphed over both. She is ... "The Christian Church." And the particular object of her audacious stance is clearly symbolized by that sad figure with which she is juxtaposed.

This tableau is not unique to Notre-Dame-de-Paris. The same theme

can be found on nearly every mediaeval cathedral in Europe, though not always so prominently or tellingly displayed.² Unwittingly, it sets forth in stone the thesis that Rosemary Ruether has developed so convincingly in her book: Behind the Christian deprecation, vilification and persecution of the Jews throughout the centuries, there stands an exaggerated and even pathological self-estimate on the part of the Christian Church. Neither the memory of the Jews as "Christ-killers, nor the failure of the Christians to live up to their own love-ethic, is sufficient to explain the "abiding contempt" in question. It has finally to be traced not to what the Christians thought of the Jews, but to what they thought of themselves and their message. In short, anti-Judaism is a function of Christian triumphalism.

Listening for the Antiphon

It is my intention to take up Ruether's challenge that Christians must discover whether it is possible to affirm Jesus as the Christ without in that moment invoking the invidious specter of anti-Judaism. Or, as Ruether herself states it, pointedly: "Is it possible to say 'Jesus is Messiah' without, implicitly or explicitly, saying at the same time, 'and the Jews be damned'?"³

Such a possibility, I believe, may exist. As I hope to demonstrate, I feel profound agreement with Ruether's point of view. I have found her diagnosis to bear an exciting and helpful resemblance to the theological reflections I myself have entertained over the past decade, albeit under another nomenclature and from the perspective of a different theological tradition. My basic divergence from Ruether's analysis comes with my perception, rightly or wrongly, of an alternative theological- and faith-posture, which I believe runs alongside the dominant form of Christianity—the form expressed so graphically in the regal Lady of Notre Dame.

Alongside, underneath, or perhaps "high above" (Keats) the dominant triumph-song of Lady Christendom, it is possible now and then to hear another melody. It is not even a descant to the main piece, but more like a discordant antiphon, a different song altogether. One has to strain to hear it at all. If one thinks one hears it, and tries to hear more of it, one is introduced to the kind of search to which only a Kafka could have done justice. Nevertheless, with some careful training of the historical ear, it can be heard here and there throughout the two-thousand odd years of the Christian era, sometimes in unlikely places. For all the noise and pomposity of the military music of Christendom—the auditory equivalent of the queenly statue of Notre Dame—this "alternative," as we may call it for the present, is never quite overcome.

It can be detected in the New Testament, which, to my mind, Ruether has read in a rather too linear way. Already, to be sure, it has to share the reader's attention with the triumph-song—especially since, after sixteen centuries of "Christendom," most readers of the New Testament have no perceptual equipment for discerning such an "alternative." I do not say that it is very strong in the New Testament. It is certainly not unrivalled there. But I am convinced that it is present. And one of the many reasons why we Christians must learn from Judaism, past and present, is so that we can prepare ourselves to listen more intelligently for this antiphonal melody in our own Christian "source-book"; for the character of that melody, as to its major progressions and *leitmotifs*, is very like the strange songs of Israel.⁴

Beyond the Christian scriptures, the antiphonal melody can be heard at various points throughout Christian history. The attempts of the dominant religious tradition to overwhelm it have been consistent and predictable; they still continue today. But they have never fully succeeded. Those, moreover, in whom it has found an outlet—in thought, deed, art—have themselves usually sung this melody, as it were, reluctantly and in spite of themselves. Many of them have been able to sustain it only for a time, before they too capitulated to the more strident hymn of the majority. It is as hard to sing against the crowd as to swim against the stream. Nevertheless, it has persisted in various forms throughout the centuries—on the periphery of the official Church when it could not find any place within. And while it never achieved a permanent significance in the Church at large, it was all the same never insignificant. It inspired some of the truly great and wise ones of our past. To have encountered the work of one, Rembrandt van Rijn (to mention one name only), is to know that this "alternative" can neither be ignored nor minimized.⁵

It is my impression that Ruether has minimized this "other song." At times, I wondered whether she is aware of it at all. Did she perhaps leave it out of account in order to make a stronger case against Christianity? But her case against Christianity is in fundamental respects the same case that is made by the representatives of that "alternative." So their testimony, one would have thought, might have strengthened her case.

More important, however, is the positive side of the matter. It seems to me incontrovertible that, without recourse to this alternative tradition, there is no way in which Ruether's challenge to find a Christ who does not come out as antisemitic can be met within the bounds of historic Christianity. Such a "rethought" Christ must be enucleated within these bounds, although in the light of contemporary experience, because to present a "Christ" without any positive reference to the Christian tradition would be to offer a twentieth-century theological invention which contradicts its own historical and soteriological presuppositions.

The need to discern an alternative tradition—to find for ourselves roots that go deeper than “Christendom”—is today very great. Perhaps it is matched somewhat by new opportunities for such discernment;⁶ certainly, it is accompanied by a new sense of urgency which cuts across old ecclesiastical barriers. For the triumph-song of official Christianity has begun to sound false to many in these “last days” of the Constantinian era, including many persons who nevertheless remain in the churches. Unless the antiphonal melody can be more clearly identified, unless more Christians can become articulate about the alternative tradition, and less tempted to rest in the “ideology of ecclesial triumphalism” (Baum), nothing, I think, can save Christianity from the historical ash-heap. It will have to be thrown out along with those pretentious religious and national hymns which achieved their heyday in the nineteenth century, and were (perhaps) already lampooned by Tchaikovsky in “the world’s noisiest overture.” At a time when triumph is hardly the characteristic human experience, a religion grounded in an ideology of triumph is believable only by those whose need for an opiate is stronger than their concern for truth. Not only Auschwitz, but everyday life in the late twentieth century makes it necessary for Christians to “rethink” their faith. Auschwitz, however, is of particular significance for us in this process. If we can begin to discover why the triumph-song of Christendom led (in ways that are not obscure enough) to the death-camps of Europe, we may find ourselves in a better position to listen for the antiphon within our own tradition.

The Ideology of Triumph

What then is the character of this triumph-song? Who is the singer of this song? What does that imperious Lady of Notre Dame really stand for?

1. She does, of course, stand for the Church—namely, for that religious institution which, in the fourth century C.E., became the official cult of the Greco-Roman culture, and which, by the time the mediaeval cathedrals were in the building, had subjugated to herself what she (myopically) imagined to be the whole inhabited earth. Within her own household (*oekumene*), only the Jews remained conspicuously apart. Behind the secure pomposity of this “Queen” is the sure and certain knowledge of victories already acquired and altogether visible. She does not merely dream of power: she has it.

This is not to imply that the Church had no delusions of grandeur prior to its adoption by the Roman *imperium*. As Ruether and others have shown, the seeds of Christian imperialism are already present from the outset of Christianity. There were many in the Church who were ready to enter into a *modus vivendi* with power long before imperial power itself saw the advantages of this particular alliance. Without that readiness, it

would have been unthinkable for Christianity to become so solidly "established" so soon after the Edict of Toleration (313).⁷

Nevertheless, (and here I return to the antiphonal side to which I think Ruether has not done justice),⁸ the Church of the New Testament gives clear indication of its awareness of the dangers of walking the way of power. In the wilderness and garden temptations of the Christ; in the steadfast refusal of Jesus to adopt the programme of his own disciples (especially Peter, who already in the gospel narrative shows himself an ironic symbol of a Church that did indeed take up his sword and his flight from suffering); in the Pauline transvaluation of values, which insists that only "when we are weak, then we are strong"—in countless ways, the Christian scriptures engaged in a prophetic critique of power. I think that Ruether is quite right in insisting that the New Testament also contains the raw stuff (let us call it the *theology* of triumph) out of which Christendom's *ideology* of triumph came to be made. But I do not think that she has sufficiently stressed the role of the Christian establishment in the creation of this ideology. The Christian political imperialism which came to be in the centuries after Constantine certainly presupposes the biblical theology of triumph. But if the Christian Church had not been permitted to attach itself to power, I doubt that its inherent theological triumphalism would have been able to form itself into an ideology. At least, the biblical theology of triumph would have had to contend with the (equally inherent) critique of triumphalism, the antiphonal motif which in the established situation was virtually squelched. The combination of the biblical theology of triumph with cultural and political success meant that the prophetic element in the gospel was, in this as in other respects, eliminated. A theology of brokenness, announced by a community which thinks itself "salt" in an otherwise insipid fare and "light" in the midst of darkness, is no fit theology for a state religion. The ideology of triumph as it applies to the Church's self-image is a product of the ecclesiastical marriage with the empire.⁹

2. A second dimension of the religion symbolized by the sovereign Lady of Notre Dame is the eschatological confusion of Church and Kingdom. This is a central theme of Ruether's book, and indeed what she means, principally, by tracing the anti-Judaic element in Christian theology to "Christology":

At the heart of every Christian dualizing of the dialectics of human existence into Christian and anti-Judaic antitheses is *Christology*, or, to be more specific, *the historicizing of the eschatological event*.¹⁰

The ideology of triumph could not have emerged out of an eschatology which retained a strong dimension of futurity. Only a "realized"

eschatology could become the basis for such a religious world view. "Realization" means that the triumph of good over evil, life over death, righteousness over sin, light over darkness, has been achieved already. But it means more than "already in Christ." It means that the Church, the "mystical body of Christ," is the sphere of this realization. The eschatological triumph has not only occurred "in principle"—it has occurred concretely in the Church. "His victory has been established as the Catholic Church."¹¹ For this reason the *Ecclesia* is able to represent itself in all the symbols of majesty. The royal Lady of Notre Dame-de-Paris, bedecked in her finery, feels neither shame nor longing. She does not bow her head like her Hebrew "sister," in the knowledge that she has "fallen short of the glory" to which she is called; nor does she "wait with eager longing. . . ." She does not have to live in tension of remembrance and hope, but she lives as one who enjoys the present to the full. She is satisfied. She has arrived. Nothing more is expected except the confirmation of what already is.

There are some heady claims of this nature in the New Testament, too; and ecclesiastical triumphalism has not failed to discover them. All the same (to introduce once again the antiphonal theme), it is hardly possible to hear the whole testimony of the New Testament to the "new reality" in Christ, without sensing the presence of a strong critique against any confusion of Church and Kingdom. The earliest people of "the Way" evidently believed that theirs was the right path to the Kingdom of God; but they did not, on the whole, believe that they had arrived there. Paul, from whom some aspects of "realized" eschatology have been derived, rather consistently places "salvation" in the future, and he warns his little flocks not to indulge in presumption (e.g., I *Cor.* 9:24-10:6). Even the *Apocalypse*, which can be used to demonstrate all kinds of nefarious eschatological ideas, presents the "Betrothed of the Lamb" in such suggestive proximity with the "Great Whore" that some exegetes regard them as two sides of the same entity, viz. the Church!¹² Only through bitter trial and purgation can the precarious Bride of Christ enter the marriage chamber of the Kingdom. Again, the symbol of the "Second Coming" prevents the biblical authors from espousing a straightforward "historicizing of the eschatological." "The glory" is still awaited, longed for, sighed after. It can be anticipated only by faith, not by sight. It can be entered into now, to be sure, but only under the form of the antithesis of glory: suffering.

All of this had to change before the Christian Church could embrace a "realized" version of eschatology—an "already" without the attendant antiphon, "not yet." Pre-Constantinian Christianity could adopt a "spiritual" version of such an eschatology, and I think that Ruether is right in

claiming that this was done. But that it was done in a consistent way prior to the Constantian establishment would be difficult, I think, to prove. Even a spiritualized type of realized eschatology would require the setting-aside of the "not yet"; and, in the Diaspora-situation of the early Church, that, as a permanent posture, would have begged too many questions. I suspect, rather, that a type of realized eschatological emphasis shows through much of the literature of the earlier centuries because of the unrealized character of the Church's position in society. This emphasis was a kind of strategic theological response in the midst of uncertainty and persecution. Later, in the established situation, this very emphasis could be taken up—but in a different spirit. For it is one thing for a persecuted and rejected minority to emphasize the victory already won, and something else when this is done by "a religion which has achieved cultural success" (Baum). It is one thing for a Black congregation in Carolina to sing, "We shall overcome!" It is another when this and similar songs of the oppressed are taken up by fur-coated and wall-to-wall-carpeted congregations in White suburbia! There are contexts which call for a strong statement of the divine triumph over evil. I should say that they are always characterized by external data which loudly deny any such triumph. When the same strong statements are made in situations where the confessing community itself has the upper hand in human affairs, they are almost always demonic.¹³

3. Finally, the ideology of triumph comes down to an interpretation of the One whose "body" the Church declared herself to be: the doctrine of the Christ. Behind the confident pose of the churchly symbol of Notre Dame-de-Paris there is only the high self-regard of one who has power, and the self-satisfaction of one who has achieved the ultimate goal, but also the authority of one who is united with the Absolute.

It is in terms of authority that we must reflect on the christology which informs the dominant forms of Christianity. This christology did not develop in a vacuum, in an atmosphere of purely intellectual concern for "Truth." It was worked out in the heat of battle, in the Christian struggle for distinction and survival in the earlier centuries, in the pre-Nicene search for authority within the Church itself, and in the post-Constantinian quest for a religious metaphysic compelling enough to hold the attention of an entire civilization. It was almost inevitable under such circumstances that the side of christology represented by terms like "divinity," "supremacy," and "finality" (not to mention the host of technical and biblical terms which were employed in this dialogue) should have come to dominate the whole theology and faith of Christendom. The purely "human" need for certitude, permanence and ultimate significance—the need that informs every religion of mankind—would itself

almost account for this eventuality. Could Jesus be trusted at all if after him there might come Another, if what he put us in touch with were not, after all, the Ultimate, but only something "like" (*homoiousios*) the Ultimate, perhaps something merely temporal, finite, creaturely, subject to change? This "human" need has not been known to settle for relativities. It does not like to deal in risk and faith, hunger and thirst, openness to the future. It wants God. The power of this need alone could have turned Jesus into God—God pure and simple!

But, in addition to this, there came to be in the Church a special sociological need: the need of an official cult to exercise authority over the spirits and imaginations, not only of individuals but of whole nations and empires: the need to mirror, at the level of transcendent realities, the absolute authority of Rome, of course, to surpass it. Together with the psychological "human" need for God here and now, this sociological need almost guarantees from the outset the overwhelming of every element in the original story of the Nazarene which makes him human, vulnerable, tentative, one of us. It is more significant than is usually recognized in historical-theological studies that the two classical stages in the development of orthodox christology occurred after the establishment of Christianity—one of them (Nicaea) under the chairmanship of Constantine himself.

It is true that much of the raw material—not the language—of this official christology was derived from the scriptures, including the Hebrew Scriptures "christologically exegeted" (Ruether). But surely one has to recognize in that scriptural testimony (again the antiphon) elements which do not easily adapt themselves to the ecclesiastical process of the divinization and absolutization of Jesus. The "other side" of the Christ—his real humanity, his participation in *tentatio*, his need for friendship, his anxiety in the face of death, his sense of divine abandonment, etc.—certainly is part of the scriptural witness. How central it is to that witness is perhaps only beginning to dawn on some of us, because we have been conditioned to read the witness heretofore with post-Chalcedonian eyes. Even the modern liberals, who "humanized" Jesus to the point of relativising him out of sight,¹⁴ were in many cases still so captivated by the ideology of triumph that they had to triumphalize his humanity, making him as remote from our condition in his human being as orthodoxy had made him in his divinity. Perhaps only a broken humanity can discuss the man Jesus without in the process reversing the very thing the concept of incarnation was intended to communicate: the being "with us" of the eternal love.

But enough has been said to enable us at this juncture to construct the following generalization: The ideology of triumph occurs when one ele-

ment of the gospel is isolated from the other element with which, in authentic faith and theology, it is held in polar tension. Or, to use the metaphor I have employed throughout, it is what happens when the antiphonal motif is suppressed: when the dialectic of triumph-and-humiliation is exchanged for a one-dimensional emphasis on triumph. Thus, (1) the Church endorses the way of power only by ignoring and repudiating the call to suffering; (2) it adopts a realized eschatology only where it no longer wills to hear the critical "not yet"; (3) it develops an absolutistic christology only when it capitulates to the human and political need for proximity to the Absolute, and thus rejects the human side of the Christ.

In this, I have assumed two things: (a) that the potential for this reductionism exists in the New Testament itself, but that (b) the occasion for its actualization lies principally beyond the New Testament period.¹⁵ In other words, while the scriptural material may be said to be capable of providing almost everything that went into the ideology of triumph, it also contains a critique of itself which, so long as this is operative (and wherever in historical Christianity it has regained influence), prevents the ideological trick from coming off.

Official Christianity in its various historical versions opted for the ideology. But it did and does so only at a price, and the price is credibility. The Christian ideology of triumph is finally incredible. Its great pitfall is that it cannot account for—or even entertain—the continuing presence in history of the antithesis of triumph: defeat, failure, sin, suffering, evil, the demonic, death—the whole negative side of existence. Especially does the ecclesiastical institution which espouses such an ideology have trouble with this antithesis as it manifests itself in its own midst (as witness the long story of the Church's struggle with the question of the sin of believers).

The "antiphonal" motif to which I have been alluding is thus indispensable to any credible version of Christianity, for it alone, with its recognition of suffering, the "not yet," the humanity of the Christ, etc., enables belief to engage the experienced world, including its negative side. Without a frame of reference for the continued and prolonged experience of negation within the gospel itself, "faith" can only be sustained in the form of a theoretical and practical withdrawal from the real world—or, which is the same thing, the ecclesiastical attempt to create an alternative world ("Christendom"). Whatever in the real world does not conform to the triumphalist conclusions of official *doctrina* is excluded *a priori*.¹⁶ Thus "faith" becomes dogged adherence to the ideology, and "unfaith" means taking too seriously what negates the ideology ("negativism"). And "theology" undertaken within the terms set by this approach to Christianity becomes the endless exposition of an essentially changeless worldview

(*theologia eterna*); it is by definition non-contextual, for it consists of "a system of propositional truths independent of the situation, a superstructure no longer relevant to *praxis*, to the situation, to the real questions of life"—which is precisely how Dorothee Sölle defines ideology.¹⁷

But the repression of everything that contradicts the ideology of triumph is no easy achievement. Repression is always costly, and usually the greatest price is paid by those who stand in closest proximity to the repressor power. The contradictory element cannot be wholly ignored even in the most repressive situation; so its presence must be attributed to something external. "The enemy" must be located outside the system—though not too far outside. Thus repression regularly translates itself into suppression. At the same time, "the enemy" plays a very important role in the positive maintenance of the ideology. Every ideology of triumph, whether "orthodox" Christian or "orthodox" Marxist-Leninist, needs its enemy. It would be unwise to destroy the enemy altogether.¹⁸ The enemy must at the same time be persecuted and preserved. For the enemy "accounts for" the continuing presence of the contradicting element, and thus distracts attention from the incredible nature of the ideology as such.

Ruether's contention that the Jews have been this "enemy" for Christendom seems to me, therefore, an eminently reasonable interpretation of history:

The assertion that the Jews are reprobate because they did not accept Christ as having already come is really a projection upon Judaism of that unredeemed side of itself that Christianity must constantly deny in order to assert that Christ has already come and founded "the Church." The Jews represent that which Christianity must repress in itself, namely the recognition of history and Christian existence as unredeemed.¹⁹

But the credibility of the Christian ideology of triumph, which was always tenuous, is today in conspicuous jeopardy. In fact, it was dependent upon a great many historical factors which have been drastically altered in the modern world, notably the power of Christendom itself. Under the conditions of the dissolution of Christendom, no amount of Jew-bating or enemy-identifying can make human beings (including most Christians) believe a triumphalist gospel. The "Christian" world has, of course, made desperate efforts along these lines: to the Jews, it has added communists, materialists, secularists and a host of others to its roster of "enemies." But this no longer works. It does not work because the ideology itself has failed from within. Also its perennial failure has become visible. To honest persons in the late twentieth century, the regal Lady of Notre Dame is just not believable. Indeed, she is rather pathetic herself—or simply ludicrous, a caricature of things past. Ironically, it is much easier for people in the

"Age of Uncertainty" (Galbraith) to identify with the blindfolded and downcast woman on the other side of the portal!

The Alternative: Theologia Crucis

I have insisted that there is an "alternative" to the triumph-song within the bounds of the Christian tradition, and now it is mandatory that I identify this "discordant antiphon" more precisely. For here, I believe, we may be able to discern a positive answer to the question, "Is it possible to purify the Christian message of its anti-Jewish ideology without invalidating the Christian claims altogether?"²⁰ Not that the answer is already and simply "there." There can be no question of deriving such an answer directly from the past. Theology is in any case never mere repetition. I regard the antiphonal tradition, rather, as that which provides an historical-theological vantage-point, from which it is possible to derive a critical perspective for assessing the dominant theological tradition, as well as positive ways of responding faithfully to present realities.

There is no satisfactory name for the alternative tradition, but there are some reasons for sticking to the nomenclature Martin Luther invented for it: *theologia crucis*—the theology of the cross. It is impossible within the space of a brief essay to do any justice to this theology; I have developed it at length elsewhere.²¹ Reference should also be made to Jürgen Moltmann's *The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology*.²²

Since this theological tradition has had practically no influence in the Anglo-Saxon world,²³ it is necessary first to dispel certain impressions often suggested to English-speaking Christians by the nomenclature as such. By "theology of the cross" Luther did not refer narrowly to his interpretation of the death of Christ—his theory of the atonement. Rather, he was attempting to identify what he regarded as the whole spirit and method of authentic faith and theology. *Theologia crucis* refers to the whole enterprise; it is as much an eschatology as a soteriology, as much a doctrine of God as a christology, ecclesiology, pneumatology, anthropology, etc. Luther called this "true theology" a theology of the cross because he regarded the cross of Jesus as the central symbol and manifestation of the whole gospel.

But, in order to appreciate what the term connoted for Luther, it is necessary to reflect on it in relation to what he regarded as "false theology." This antithesis he named: *theologia gloriae*. And, by "theology of glory," he meant precisely what the queenly figure of Notre Dame-de-Paris enshrines: a triumphalistic theology which is able to maintain itself intact only by lying about reality. "That person," he wrote . . .

... does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon the invisible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible in those things which have actually happened (Rom. 1:20). He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross. *A theology of glory calls evil good and good evil. A theology of the cross calls the thing what it actually is.*²⁴

Luther's worldly "realism"—like Reinhold Niebuhr's in the same tradition—would not permit him to embrace a theology which necessitated being dishonest about experience. His quarrel with the orthodoxy of his time was not so much over its false authoritarianism as over its false and inadequate "gospel." Even in the sixteenth century, the ideology of triumph did not work. It did not work for Martin Luther himself, who knew that his sin and guilt remained unmoved after all the ministrations of the Church. And it did not work, in his view, for the society of which he was a part. He knew that it is easy for theology to get Christ down off the cross; but it is something else to remove the cross from human existence—which was the mission of the Christ, still awaiting completion.

In the scriptures, especially in the Pauline tradition ("I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ and him crucified . . ."), Luther "discovered" what seemed to him an astonishing alternative to the churchly "gospel" that brought "glory" at the expense of realism. The core of this Reformation gospel is a different eschatology: the triumph of the Christ is not yet fully realized; in this present dispensation, it is perceptible only by faith and as the subject of hope; it is "hidden beneath its opposite"; it can be anticipated by the Christian community, but only as this community is brought to participate in that beneath which "the glory" is hidden: the cross, suffering. "A theologian of the cross (that is, one who speaks of the crucified and hidden God) teaches that punishments, crosses, and death are the most precious treasury of all and the most sacred relics which the Lord of this theology himself has consecrated and blessed."²⁵

The stress on Christian suffering in this theology can, of course, be translated into masochism; this has been one of the dangers of the *theologia crucis*: it has sometimes led to a fatalistic "life is a cross" attitude. But only if it is distorted can this happen. Luther is not calling the people of God to wallow in its own pain but to participate in the "pain of God" (Kitamori). The cross (which, for Luther the reader of the Psalms, means something more inclusive than "Calvary") means God's identification of himself with suffering humanity, the end of which is not suffering itself but the conquest of that which causes it. This conquest has been inaugurated with the resurrection from the dead, but it is not by any means completed. The Church is that community which is being incorporated into the suffering of God, representative suffering. It senses the ultimate conquest

of sin and evil only as it is made to walk the *Via Dolorosa*. The cross is therefore the primary symbolic expression of eschatological existence. The resurrection is, for Luther, "a chapter in the theology of the cross," not its supersession. The Church may be called the community of the resurrection only as it has the courage to become the people of the cross.

This "alternative" tradition can be traced in the thought of many significant theologians, artists, writers, musicians and others throughout the centuries.²⁶ It must be reiterated that the representatives of this tradition have not always acted in ways consistent with their better insights. Certainly, Luther himself did not. In his anti-Judaic statements, as in his unforgiveable response to the left wing of the Reformation, he gave evidence of a return to the *theologia gloriae* which (especially at the beginning of his career) he damned. However, the validity of the "thin tradition" itself does not rest on the consistency of those in whom it found some expression.

Our responsibility as a theological community today is not simply to search this alternative tradition for pertinent things to say to "Auschwitz," "Hiroshima," "Viet Nam," "Watergate," and all the other specifics which constitute our situation. To treat the *theologia crucis* as if it were such an "eternal theology" would be to misunderstand it in a basic way. A theology of the cross cannot be a finalized, perfect statement about an incomplete and broken humanity. It can only be an ongoing exposure to the suffering and the grace that is ever new—in short a "broken theology" (Barth).

Given this built-in modesty factor, I would draw the following conclusions: Rethinking the doctrine of Christ today along the lines of a *theologia crucis* would lead to at least three emphases: (1) the accentuation of the real humanity of Jesus; (2) the centrality of the cross as the symbol and "means" of Christian solidarity with human suffering; (3) the development of a theology of hope which could form the basis of a dialogue with all "men of good will"—"the Jews first." I shall elaborate each of these briefly.

(1) *Jesus' Real Humanity*: the dominant theological tradition of the Christian Church (*theologia gloriae*) consistently downplayed, and in reality rejected, the confession of Jesus' humanity.²⁷ One type of evidence for this statement is to be found in the Church's exaggerated and exclusivistic stress on his "divinity," the emphasis on his miracles rather than his teachings, the type of trinitarian theology which was in reality sheer tri-theism, etc.²⁸ Another type of evidence is found in the character of the attempts that have been made to keep hold of his humanity. Most of them seem more official than real. One has the impression that the *vere Homo* of the classical definitions was more a theoretical necessity than a genuine

feeling for Jesus' flesh-and-blood reality: he "had to be" human—so that we could become divine (Athanasius), or so that the "price could be paid" by one of us (Anselm), etc. And when liberal theology took up the laudable cause of reaffirming his real humanity, as I have already noted, it often ended by making him as remote from us in his human perfection as the "orthodox" had done by a different means.

What is lacking in the entire tradition is a consistent and imaginative testimony to the humanness of Jesus that would bring him really close to us (which, according to the confession of the incarnation, is what it is all about). Not "perfect" humanity (whatever that would mean), but real humanity, is what is required of our christology. The world of art has been more faithful in this than the world of theology, preaching and liturgy. *Jesus Christ Superstar* achieved a humanization of Jesus unparalleled in the churches. More profoundly, a novel like *Silence*, by the contemporary Japanese author, Shusaku Endo, is a moving testimony to the vulnerable humanity of Jesus.²⁹ Significantly, Endo works out his christology over against the ecclesiastical triumphalism of the Western Church as it has manifested itself in the Orient. Reading this novel about the "Christian Century" in Japan (sixteenth-seventeenth centuries) is comparable only to the contemplation of Grünewald's Isenheim altarpiece version of the crucifixion: one knows that the credal statements "was made man, . . . suffered" have been taken seriously.

It is not claimed that the humanity of Jesus alone suffices as "Gospel." As Moltmann has rightly understood, the theology of the cross assumes a trinitarian basis.³⁰ But the point is that the humanity of Jesus is the *sine qua non* of whatever "transcendence" may manifest itself to us through him. If he does not "come close" to us, then no amount of doctrinal insistence upon his divine origin and destiny will make the least difference. As Ruether has written with great insight: "If Jesus is to serve as our paradigm of man . . . then he must not be seen simply as a finalization of an ideal, but one who reveals to us the structure of human existence as it stands in that point of tension between what is and what ought to be."³¹ Perhaps our practice in Christian teaching and preaching should be to bear witness only to this "real humanity" of Jesus—humanity in tension—in the faith that he himself, being present in the Spirit, will be able to bring us and our hearers under the influence of his unique transcendence. Which is exactly what he did in the original situation.

Such an emphasis on the real humanity of the Christ has not been consistently developed even in the main representatives of the theology of the cross. Nevertheless, the *theologia crucis* does provide a theoretical basis for such an emphasis, for it is throughout the insistence that the transcendent element in the gospel is "hidden beneath its opposite." If such an

emphasis were to inform our christology, it would not, of course, altogether "silence" the Jewish complaint about our *Christos*. The "scandal of particularity" remains. But it does not remain, I think, as an insufferable doctrine—a doctrine which does indeed want to "silence" the Jews. It leaves open the possibility that Judaism could still recognize this Jesus as one of its own sons.

(2) If the primary "christological" emphasis under a theology of the cross must be on the real humanity of Jesus, the primary "soteriological" stress must, I think, be laid on the cross as symbol and "means" of solidarity. Solidarity here means two things: it means the solidarity of God himself with suffering humanity; and it means the solidarity with human suffering into which all are introduced who "take up the cross" (i.e., the Church). The atonement-theology which has dominated in Christendom has almost universally ignored this motif (which certainly also belongs to the prophetic tradition of Israel). Instead of being a symbol of solidarity, the cross of the Christ has been treated as if it were a unique and isolated and altogether sacred thing, discontinuous, in its holiness, with human experience in general. In both of the classical theories of atonement,³² the cross is given such an "objective" interpretation that humanity is left out entirely, except in terms of reaping "the benefits of his passion." The Abelardian or "Moral Influence" theory does keep humanity in the picture, but its focus is still on the cross of Jesus as something special and apart.

What is implicit (if not always explicit) in the *theologia crucis* tradition, on the contrary, is that humanity and the human condition are at the center of the whole story. The cross is first of all not the Christ's but Adam's—mankind's! Jesus has to "go to the cross," not because of a divine strategem for the placation of the Devil or God's own "wrath," but because "the Cross" is where man is. It represents the human condition. To enter into the depths of that condition, he who is "sent" must undergo not only the humiliation of Bethlehem but also the deeper darkness of Golgotha. This is the "necessity" which is "laid on" Jesus, the "must" of the passion-predictions. It emanates, not from a wrathful God or a vengeful Satan, but from an oppressed humanity. Thus the theology of the cross speaks in the first instance of the identification of God with humankind in the totality of the human condition.

But this means that whoever is brought into the sphere of awareness of this divine solidarity with humanity is, in that moment, himself introduced into a new solidarity with his fellowmen—and especially, as the scriptures always make plain, with those who suffer, the poor, the abused, the victims of the powerful. The Church is that community which is being incorporated into the representative suffering of Jesus. Not only in name

but in reality (*Mt.* 25:31ff.). As the community of the cross, its boundaries are not to be equated with the lists of those who say "Lord, Lord!" It includes all who suffer with and for their fellowmen. As Luther insisted, the only indispensable mark of the true Church is, not holiness, unity, catholicity, apostolicity, etc., but "the holy cross"; i.e., it would not be the Church if there were no evidence in it of this suffering-with.

Of the many observations which could be made at this juncture, two must suffice: First, this type of soteriology assumes the continuance of evil, sin, and suffering in the world that has been visited by the Redeemer. Far from having to turn its face from evil in order to maintain its glorious Credo, the Church grounded in such a soteriological understanding "is not surprised" (*I Pet.*) by evil. In fact, its life consists in the painful but also—in the context of faith—joyful immersion into the baptismal waters of human alienation and suffering. What it is given in this vocation, besides the courage to go on with it, is—sometimes—enough light to "illuminate the crisis between the historical and the eschatological."³³

Second, a soteriology of solidarity by definition makes the cross of Jesus the point, not of exclusion, but of fraternity with Judaism, and with all who seek human liberation and peace. When the cross of Jesus is isolated and particularized as in classical soteriologies, it becomes a symbol of exclusion. Concretely, it becomes a battering-ram to make the others conform—as in the Crusades. For the Jews, it is so terrible a symbol on this account that one wonders whether it could be re-mythologized at all! And yet, the faith of Israel is incomprehensible unless one sees at its heart a suffering God whose solidarity with humanity is so abysmal that the "cross in the heart of God" (H. Wheeler Robinson) must always be incarnating itself in history. Reading the works of Elie Wiesel, one knows, as a Christian, that he bears this indelible resemblance to the people of Israel.³⁴

(3) The third christological emphasis I would see coming out of the antiphonal tradition of the *theologia crucis* is the development of a theology of hope which could form the basis of a dialogue with all "men of good will," "the Jews first."

This, for our present discussion at least, is the most important point; for I believe Ruether to be right when she states that the problem in Christianity that has given rise to anti-Judaism is not just "Christology," but a specific form of christology, namely, "the historicizing of the eschatological event." The *theologia gloria* of "Christendom" in its several forms is not only a triumphalist christology but a realized eschatology.

But here we are on dangerous grounds. Because what we are calling into question is what has been and still is for most forms of Christianity the central affirmation: the resurrection. This has been the primary doctri-

nal device by which the dominant theology of the Church has expressed its christology, its eschatology—its gospel as such. The old situation has been totally overcome. The old dispensation of sin, death and devil has been surpassed. “The strife is o’er, the battle won . . .” “It is finished!” And this implicitly and necessarily means: “And the Jews be damned!”

In the tradition of the *theologia crucis*, however, one finds a quite different interpretation of the Easter event. Indeed, what this tradition sets itself against in particular is the tendency of the theology of resurrection to overwhelm the cross. It rejects outrightly the declaration that, after the “victory of the third day,” the human situation is no longer that of the cross. It is at this point that the theology of Luther differs significantly from that of Calvin, which makes much more of the theology of resurrection and, I would say, introduces through the back door the very *theologia gloria* against which the Reformation was initially fought.

It is not the intention of the theology of the cross to deny or minimize the resurrection. What it amounts to rather is a radical reinterpretation of the meaning of this “event.” It sees it as “a different kind of event” (Baum). It is not ready merely to poeticize the resurrection, for faith sees in this symbol an indispensable testimony to the conquest of evil by the Crucified. But, as this theology will not separate the cross from human history and experience, neither will it permit the resurrection to be isolated and particularized out of all touch with daily existence. Thus the resurrection of Jesus is interpreted in this tradition in close relationship with the doctrine of the Spirit and of the Church. Whatever else resurrection means (and its meaning cannot easily be exhausted), it refers to the mystery of that courage, given wherever the Spirit wrestles with human spirits, to engage evil. It refers to a faith which dares to “take on” principalities and powers because it believes that they have (“already”) been taken on by one who permitted himself to suffer under their dominion, and who has broken their power from within—proleptically.

This hope can and must be stated in terms that are inclusive. An exclusive hope would in any case be a contradiction in terms. Hope is openness to the future, not specific theories about the way in which the good will triumph. “Hope” reduced to specific theories is no longer hope but ideology. The category of hope was in reality eliminated from all the historic forms of the *theologia gloriae* (in the modern form, it was replaced by “optimism,” based on the theory of historical progress). To recover and devise a theology of the cross indigenous to our own time and place means—as Moltmann has demonstrated so ably—to recover and devise a theology of hope. Only such a theology, which does not know everything in advance “like the ant,” but is always “properly astonished at events” (Barth), can function as a basis of dialogue and fraternity with other faiths—“the Jews first.”

I would like to conclude with a modest proposal: The imperious Lady on the facade of Notre Dame-de-Paris should, at this juncture in history, be taken down—not in a mood of Cromwellian iconoclasm, but, all the same, without too much pomp. She should be stored, along with many volumes of dogmatic theology, most of the Church's hymns, vestments and liturgical accoutrements, in some suitable place. (Perhaps a "Museum of Christendom" could be established in St. Paul's Cathedral or one of the other more imperialist palaces of our religion). In her place at Paris—because I could not bear to part with the cathedral itself—I would have put up a quite different statue. This would be a figure combining despair and hope, and in such a way that those who really do despair would find some hope in its contemplation, and those who hope falsely would be led to meditate more deeply on the data of despair. I even have a concrete suggestion to make in this connection: one of the beggar women of Ernst Barlach, perhaps his *Russische Betterlin* (Terracotta 1907). For the beggar, as Luther knew,³⁵ is the best symbol of authentic faith. It combines, in a unique way, the despair of not having and the hope of receiving.

I do not know what should be done with the Synagogue-figure on the other side of the door. In any case, that is not for me to decide. Certainly the blindfold should be removed! But the figure should not be too drastically altered, I suspect. A beggar woman and a disinherited queen could at least talk to one another. And in its present state of uncertainty the world, I think, would probably listen in.

Notes

1. Rosemary Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide*, p. 228.
2. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 135, 209.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
4. It is interesting that many of the 'rediscoveries' of the Christian gospel throughout the ages, especially the sixteenth century Reformation and the Theology of Crisis in the early part of the present century, have been inseparably connected with the rediscovery of the Hebrew scriptures. The Psalms were as important for Luther as was *Romans*.
5. See William A. Visser't Hooft, *Rembrandt and the Gospel* (London, S.C.M. Press, 1957). (In his retirement, Dr. Visser't Hooft has returned to the study of his countryman, Rembrandt. Recently he wrote to me: Rembrandt's art "is the great exception in the seventeenth century. Practically all other religious art at that time [Rubens] is triumphalistic; Rembrandt's art is *pictura crucis*." In art as in theology, the "alternative" is a "thin tradition"; but as the name of Rembrandt symbolizes here, it is not insignificant.)
6. The variety of liberation movements that touch upon the Christian faith today, and especially Third World Christianity as it liberates itself from the domination of European and North American Christianity, give promise of new versions of Christian history and theology. When from the Third World churches one hears that historic Christianity has engaged in an "ideological misuse of the

Bible," one looks for better things by way of biblical and historical interpretation.

7. Cf. Ruether, *op. cit.*, p. 185: "In less than fifty years, Orthodox Christianity elevated itself from a position of toleration to that of the exclusive religion of the empire. By the reign of Theodosius I (378-95), the faith and practices of pagans and heretics became illegal. Their temples and churches were destroyed or confiscated. Their very existence was proscribed."

8. I have wanted to assess Ruether's thesis in *Faith and Fratricide* on its own merits, and therefore I shall not use her other works in this essay.

9. Ruether certainly understands that political establishment introduced something new. But she seems to conceive of this "something new" in mainly quantitative terms: after the establishment, the theoretical triumphalism of Christian faith was able to realize itself in practical, political terms. "What had previously been theology and biblical hermeneutics now was to become law and social policy." (*Op. cit.*, p. 181). What I am proposing is that establishment introduces a qualitative difference: what was formerly a theology of triumph, held in tension with a polar emphasis on 'brokenness,' in the established situation becomes an ideology of triumph—in the proper sense, "triumphalism."

Perhaps I am wrong, but I think I detect at just this point a distinction between Ruether's and Baum's perception of these things. Baum finds it necessary to carry the analysis of the problematic element back into the pages of the New Testament (so do I), but he seems more concerned than Ruether to retain a qualitative distinction between pre- and post-Constantinian Christianity. E.g.: "When a Church that has become culturally dominant proclaims Jesus as the one mediator between God and man and regards him as the one way, invalidating all other ways of salvation, it creates a symbolic imperialism that no amount of personal love and generosity can prevent in the long run from being translated into social and political realities. The *symbols of exclusiveness belonging to a religion that has become culturally successful* are objective factors that will affect the consciousness of a people and promote their cultural and/or political domination, a trend that no subjective factors, such as love and generosity, can overcome." ("Introduction" to *Faith and Fratricide*, *ibid.*, p. 15; my italics).

10. *Ibid.*, p. 246 (my italics).

11. I want to resist the temptation to put the distinction between Ruether's and my own analysis in terms of the difference between Catholic and Protestant traditions respectively. This has to be resisted for at least two reasons, first because the problem under discussion belongs equally to both Christian traditions (and to the Eastern Church, too), and second because if the Protestants have sometimes had a better theology (better at least for avoiding the gross indecencies of antisemitism) their practice has been no better.

However, I feel constrained to make one reference to the Protestant/Catholic distinction at this point. However thoroughly Protestants ignored the teaching, the theology of the Reformers insisted on maintaining a strict discontinuity between Christ and the Church; or rather, it was the element of discontinuity, not of continuity, which dominated their ecclesiology. The Church may be the *soma Christou*, but it is not the Head. This is part of the overall emphasis that Paul Tillich has designated by his phrase "The Protestant Principle": nothing conditional may assume the posture of the unconditional. A statement like "His victory has been established as the Catholic Church" could not have been written either by Luther, Calvin or Zwingli, and it does not describe a Protestant sentiment even amongst contemporary Protestant critics of the Church.

12. E.g., Claude Welch: "Here the Church can by no means simply be identified with the bride of the Lamb who has made herself ready for the marriage (Rev. 19:7; 21:2). The perfect adornment (21:2, 10ff.) and readiness of the bride belong to the time of the consummation which is yet to come. Meanwhile the Church exists in the time of struggle and decision, for over against the figure of the bride is the figure of harlot (ch. 17ff.), the enemy yet temptation of the Church . . ." (*The Reality of the Church* N.Y., Scribner's, 1958: pp. 132f).

13. The earliest confession "Jesus Christ is Lord" makes excellent theological, psychological and sociological sense when it is whispered by a minority in a situation in which Caesar is obviously Lord. It becomes an obnoxious affirmation—and in reality no 'confession' at all—when it is used, as it was in the post-Constantinian situation, to put down all the other "lords" of men's religions.

14. Cf. Baum's warning against choosing the liberal alternative to the "orthodox" absolutization of the Christ. We must not, he says, abandon altogether "the gospel's claim to absolute truth." (Ruether, *op. cit.*, p. 15).

15. To say that it lies beyond the N.T. period does not imply that actualization occurs exclusively at the point of the Roman establishment of Christianity, as if by some magic the whole thing was transformed by the Edict of 313. The establishment is a process, well prepared for by evolving attitudes *within* the Church and anticipated by the "friendliness" of some emperors and officials along the road to toleration.

16. Something like this, I believe, is the theoretical explanation for the propensity of the Western world in general (and the 'New World' in particular) to repress the knowledge of great evil. If one wants to know why "Auschwitz" is hardly remembered by the dominant society of this world, one should look in the direction of such an explanation. The non-recognition of the evil that was "Viet Nam" is also a case in point. In the 'New World,' Christian ideological triumphalism combined with the 'modernity' of the Enlightenment optimism about the human situation to create a mind-set virtually incapable of entertaining radical evil.

17. *Political Theology*, trans. by John Shelley (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1974), p. 23.

18. The Nazis were too simple-minded to understand this, and therefore embarked naively on the "final solution" that the Christians, with intuitive "wisdom," never invoked.

19. *Op. cit.*, p. 245.

20. Gregory Baum's phrasing of Ruether's question (*op. cit.*, p. 8).

21. *Lighten Our Darkness: Towards an Indigenous Theology of the Cross* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976).

22. (London, S.C.M. Press Ltd., 1974).

23. It is largely unheard-of so far as the vast majority of Christian laymen and ministers are concerned, and many of those who have at least heard of it misunderstand it entirely. As Ernst Käsemann has stated, "In English-speaking circles especially it represents a confessional narrowness or even a gross misinterpretation, and these opinions have had unfortunate effects in ecumenical conversations." ("The Pauline Theology of the Cross," in *Interpretation*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, April 1970), p. 151.

Special problems with the terminology, "theology of the cross," seem to emerge for Roman Catholics. No doubt this stems from the (laudatory) reaction of many Catholics to the pietistic and privatistic traditions of the adoration of the

cross, the "sacred heart", the wounds, etc. But as Barth, Bonhoeffer, Moltmann and others have made clear, the authentic *theologia crucis*, Lutheranism notwithstanding, leads to a "political theology."

24. From the *Heidelberg Disputation*, Articles 16-21 (Cf. *Luther's Works* Muhlenberg Press, 1959, Vol. XXXI, ed. by Harold J. Grimm and Helmut T. Lehmann; pp. 40-41).

25. *Ibid.*, p. 225. It should be borne in mind that Luther is here setting "suffering" overagainst the veneration of relics and the whole concept of a "treasury of merit," which for him symbolize the *theologia gloriae*.

26. In my book on the subject, I have used in particular the early Barth and Kierkegaard to illustrate aspects of the tradition in question. However, to this one should certainly add the names of most of the greatest Protestant theologians of the immediate past (Tillich, Niebuhr, Bonhoeffer, Bultmann), many artists (Grünwald, Rembrandt, Rouault), writers (Bernanos, Greene, Endo) and even musicians (for example it has frequently been said that the music of J.S. Bach is determined by the *theologia crucis* of his Lutheran tradition, and this is contrasted with Handel, whose music is much more obviously "glorious" and who may have found a spiritual home in England for this reason).

In short, we are not dealing here with a merely "Lutheran" phenomenon. A student of mine is currently tracing aspects of this same tradition in Catholicism, especially St. John of the Cross and the mystical tradition. The official religion may not reflect this antiphonal tradition, but it is clearly present within the primary theological and artistic traditions of Christian faith.

27. I agree wholeheartedly with Ruether's statement that "As soon as this eschatological presence is regarded as already realized in his historical existence—i.e., he already was the Messiah—then the historical Jesus as a human person must be abolished." (*Op. cit.*, p. 243).

28. It is interesting to contemplate that even the divinization of Jesus took non-Hebraic forms. The divinity with which he was identified was far more Hellenistic than Hebraic. It raises the question: To what extent is the Jewish rejection of the concept of incarnation based, not on what this concept really symbolizes (the being-with us of God), but on the kind of divinity Jesus was invested with by developing Christian dogma?

29. Translated by William Johnston (Rutland, Vermont & Tokyo, Japan, Sophia University in co-operation with the Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1969). (Endo, a Catholic, is called "the Japanese Graham Greene").

30. *The Crucified God*, *op. cit.*, pp. 235ff.

31. Quoted by Baum in the "Introduction," *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

32. I am referring to the so-called "Ransom" (or classical) theory, which depicts the crucifixion-resurrection as a drama involving Father, Son and Devil, and the Anselmic-Calvinist "Substitutionary" theory, which is a drama involving only Father and Son—with the audience receiving "the benefits."

33. Ruether, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

34. I am not thinking only of the by-now famous account of the hanging of the little boy in *Night*, quoted by Christian theologians so frequently (Sölle, Moltmann), but of the total impact of Wiesel's "story-telling."

35. His last written words were, "Wir sind Bettler, das ist wahr" (We are beggars, that's true!).

On Religious Myths and Their Secular Translation: Some Historical Reflections

Alan Davies

In the preface to the first part of her famous study, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, the late Hannah Arendt wrote the following lines:

Antisemitism, a secular nineteenth-century ideology . . . and religious Jew-hatred, inspired by the mutually hostile antagonism of two conflicting creeds, are obviously not the same; and even the extent to which the former derives its arguments and emotional appeals from the latter is open to question. The notion of an unbroken continuity of persecutions, expulsions, and massacres from the end of the Roman Empire to the Middle Ages, the modern era, and down to our own time, frequently embellished by the idea that modern antisemitism is no more than a secularized version of popular mediaeval superstitions, is no less fallacious (though of course less mischievous) than the corresponding antisemitic notion of a Jewish secret society that has ruled, or aspired to rule, the world since antiquity. Historically, the hiatus between the late Middle Ages and the modern age with respect to Jewish affairs is even more marked than the rift between Roman antiquity and the Middle Ages, or the gulf . . . that separated the catastrophes of the First Crusades from earlier mediaeval centuries.¹

Arendt was not alone in this judgment. To the historian Ellis Rivkin, the hiatus between mediaeval and modern history as far as the Jews are concerned is no less vast; thus he also discounts the role of Christian theological anti-Judaism in placing the Jewish people on the road to Auschwitz. Otherwise, how could antisemitism have developed (as it did) in modern Japan, "a nation-state harboring no Jews and free of any tradition of Christian anti-Semitism"?² In any case, according to Rivkin, the Christian theological legacy would be largely irrelevant as an explanation of the Holocaust even if a measure of ideological and historical continuity could be established between the old religious *adversus Judaeos*

polemic of the Church and later racist expressions of *Judenhass*, for "ideological differences, no matter how mutually antagonistic they become, alone are not enough to sustain negative patterns of conduct."³ Such differences only became dangerous during periods of economic, social and political crisis when they are exploited by unscrupulous rulers and fearful power structures. Consequently, the real reason for the almost successful annihilation of the European Jews in the twentieth century is found in the disintegration of the Western political and economic systems, and Western society in general. Whatever exact constellation of forces drove the Jews to their fate (here, Arendt and Rivkin disagree), Christendom *per se*, in the view of both scholars, was not responsible, despite its age-old religious denigration of Judaism.

Rosemary Ruether takes the opposite position. In obvious refutation of Arendt, she points out that the "imagined discontinuity between mediaeval anti-Judaism and Nazism narrows to uncomfortable proximity"⁴ once it is realized that, for the Jews, the "Middle Ages" extended virtually into the twentieth century. For this reason, the mediaeval vision of the Jew, which, incidentally, was deliberately recaptured by the Nazi press, cannot be relegated to the remote past in terms of its potency for evil. As a living image, it only had to borrow the terminology of nineteenth-century racism—the Aryan myth—in order to influence a significant segment of German public opinion in a more or less direct manner. Since, moreover, the mediaeval image was a popular elaboration of the negative theological portrait of the Jew created during the classical age of Christian thought, modern antisemitism must be seen as essentially a mutation of a religious hatred whose sources are intermingled with the origins of Christianity itself, including its foundational documents. Admittedly, the racist ideologues translated the antithesis between Judaism and Christianity into an "antithesis between Jews and Europeans, or Jews and Germans" (or Semites and Aryans). But, Ruether continues, "the fundamental stereotypes of Judaism as the antithesis of Christian salvific values persisted underneath this secular translation."⁵ The latter point is crucial, for the core of her argument rests on the efficacy of such fixed images to have generated hostility through their incorporation into the changing forms of Western society as the post-Christian era succeeded the age of Christendom. Ruether, in other words, would not agree with Rivkin that ideological constructions, however bad, only matter in a secondary sense, because the true causes of the disorder lie elsewhere. Instead, she regards ideology as primary, and defends the same basic position as James Parkes (*The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue*) and Jules Isaac (*Jésus et Israël*), for whom the Christian religion, with its long continuum of theological anti-Judaism, was the "powerful trunk, with deep and multiple roots, upon

which have been grafted other varieties of anti-semitism.”⁶ However, she presses her critique of classical theology to more radical conclusions.

The contrast between Rivkin and Ruether contains the elements of a philosophical dispute.⁷ Rivkin reduces abstract ideas to a secondary level because, like Karl Marx, he identifies the economic order as the clue to history in general, and to the fortunes of the Jews, good and ill, in particular. Antisemitism, in his view, is triggered by a shrinking capitalist economy and overcome by an expanding capitalist economy (here, curiously, he inverts Marxist doctrine, making capitalism the instrument of social emancipation rather than social oppression). Such a thesis acquires the status of a historic law which, in the last analysis, can neither be proved nor disproved, only believed or denied. To prove the reverse thesis—that ideological constructions are paramount over economic factors—is probably also impossible, but some insights derived from modern cultural and psychological studies lend their support to this point of view, especially the rediscovery of the extraordinary potency of religious myths in even a secular society that imagines itself to have passed beyond the religious and metaphysical phases. Mircea Eliade in the field of religion and Northrop Frye in the field of literature have demonstrated the extent to which modern men are still the children of a premodern, mythic world despite themselves,⁸ and depth psychologists influenced by the late Carl Jung have insisted that the subconscious psyche itself is structured according to mythic archetypes. Human beings, it can be argued, are perennial myth-makers who live out of the myths which they fashion, no matter how strenuously they think otherwise.

If these insights are reliable, it does not seem likely regardless of studies which chart the vicissitudes of Jewish history in terms of the waxing and waning of economic systems, that ideological constructions (i.e., the myth of the Jew in Christian thought) are wholly powerless to sustain “negative patterns of conduct” by themselves. Since, moreover, myths are always forms of collective thinking (Eliade),⁹ their incorporation into the ethos of a given society is both a foregone conclusion, and a sufficient reason for the fact that a diseased culture does not require too great a rise in temperature before igniting the fires of overt fury toward whatever minority has been cast in a mythic evil role. Judging from those clinical studies (e.g., by Rudolph Loewenstein)¹⁰ that have probed this corner of the Christian psyche, antagonism toward Jews is generally close enough to the surface of the Christian (or Western) consciousness to be converted into negative patterns of conduct by considerably less than a crisis of capitalism. Undeniably, as contemporary Argentina illustrates, economic and social breakdown are major contributing factors in the resurgence of antisemitism. Yet, to attach this breakdown to the plight of

capitalism *alone* is to supply too narrow a basis for antisemitism even in economic terms. Rivkin's explanation, therefore, with its simple appeal to economic cause-and-effect, not only does not do justice to the historical complexities of the problem, but seriously underestimates its social and personal dimensions.

Anti-Judaism and Antisemitism

If, for these reasons, I side with Ruether, it does not follow that I agree wholly with her analysis, or regard it as the only way of assessing the body of anti-Jewish mythic and ideological material in the bloodstream of Western civilization. Is it certain, for example, that modern racial antisemitism is merely a secular mutation of the religious anti-Judaism of the Christian ages? Is it not also in some sense a new phenomenon with its psychological and spiritual roots in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? This, of course, is Arendt's position, but it is further supported, as Uriel Tal points out, by the fact that many of the racist ideologues of the modern period were the intellectual children of Feuerbach and Nietzsche, the arch-critics of religion itself.

The principle of 'Dionysus versus the Crucified One' (passion and not martyrdom) that was preached by Nietzsche, the rejection of religion as a corrosive historic force that perverted, poisoned, and debased man's natural instincts, the attack upon Christianity as the religion of the poor, the weak, and the disinherited and their hypocritical ideals of selflessness, humility, renunciation, and sacrifice that seriously undermined all the vital forces tending to promote or elevate the life-enhancing qualities of pride, courage, fortitude, and vital spontaneity all nourished racial anti-Semitism and endowed it with a non-Christian or anti-Christian significance.¹¹

Underlying this tremendous repudiation of traditional religion was much more than a simple loss of faith in the God of Christianity (and Judaism) as the tide of religious skepticism continued its inexorable rise in a world whose social foundations were visibly losing their old Christian character. Not only Christianity, but even the rationally conceived values and principles of the secular Enlightenment came under bitter assault, indicating a far deeper disorder in the bosom of Western man than the virus of secularism alone.

The spiritual source of this disorder was a profound sense of alienation that gripped the most extreme critics of the nineteenth century, thereby generating the real passions of what later became the modern ideology of racism. Alienation can be defined as a feeling of radical estrangement from both one's personal self and one's surrounding community, damaging the inner and outer life of man in equal measure. Having

suffered a double dislocation, the alienated individual embarks on a desperate quest for integration again, seeking the spiritual and social roots which he feels have been destroyed. From several points of view, the nineteenth century, as its greatest social thinkers certainly realized, was an age of alienation, produced by the sometimes slow, sometimes sudden crumbling of the old order in virtually every sphere of life. The 1789 revolution in France had unsettled old regimes everywhere, igniting new political fires in Western Europe in a chain reaction which lasted for several decades. More quietly, the Industrial Revolution, which also began in the previous century, worked its fateful changes in the socio-economic realm, uprooting peasant families from the countryside and producing an urban proletariat with its attendant misery. It is scarcely surprising that, out of the wilderness, impassioned voices would cry either for a return to the lost past—hence the nostalgic reaction and futile attempts to restore *les ancien régimes* throughout the nineteenth century—, or else for a utopian future equally at odds with the detested present. Nor is it surprising that one of the manifestations of an alienated intelligentsia would be the concoction of new ideologies such as racism in order to spurn a social order which seemed to threaten the holy roots of life itself. Not all such ideologies are necessarily evil, for alienation can bear good as well as bad fruit, but racism is decidedly among the bad fruit.

Count Gobineau, the pretended French aristocrat who became the “father of racist ideology,”¹² was the perfect example. He was not, of course, really the father of racial ideas, because the germs of race-thinking had been breeding in the European mind long before the modern age,¹³ but it was Gobineau, the alienated quasi-philosopher of the nineteenth century, who transformed race-thinking into racism: a total worldview which defines the concept of race as the fundamental clue to history. “An enigmatic and complex man, with something about him both of the polymath and of the charlatan,”¹⁴ he thoroughly detested a society which he believed to detest his own aristocratic (racial) lineage, and consequently found solace in melancholy reflections on the decay and death of civilizations. Gobineau, admittedly, was a Catholic, but his Catholicism was purely formal, and not important to his ideas. Essentially, he was a pagan, who made a point of denying to Christianity any role in the development of civilization, believing only (like Charles Maurras later) that the Catholic Church was socially useful as a religious veneer for the French racial genius because of its historic and cultural ties with feudal France.¹⁵ For this reason, his antisemitism—incidentally, a remarkably small segment of his thought—apparently owes nothing to the *adversus Judaeos* legacy of Christian theology: a corpus of teachings which does not seem to have attracted his attention or to have influenced him in any way. Instead, what

antisemitism Gobineau did express in his writings was based purely on racist premises, especially the notion that the Jews (e.g., Semites) were the product of racial admixture between white and black blood, and thus, as impure whites, the debasers of Aryan stock. It was left to the later Gobinists to expand this theme into a virulent dualism, or "racial Manichaeism" (Léon Poliakov), in which *Aryan* and *Semite* became counter-symbols of goodness and evil in a biological/metaphysical struggle for possession of the world: in other words, modern antisemitism.

Gobineau may have been the father of racist ideology, but France, that "humanity-loving country" to which must be traced the "humanity-annihilating power of racism,"¹⁷ was the father of Gobineau. His alienation was the mirror of French upper class alienation in general. The revolution had elevated the bourgeois Third Estate to a position of ascendancy over the defeated nobility, thereby prompting a fury of resentment on the part of French aristocrats who considered themselves cheated of their innate, historic right to rule. Because revolutionary egalitarianism had overturned aristocratic privilege, the anti-revolutionary section of French society inevitably expressed its reaction by endorsing a view of human nature at total variance with egalitarian principles. At the same time, because of its class origins, the new philosophy (racism) remained inextricably entangled with social and political attitudes in the nation, in spite of its claim to describe a more profound and basic underlying human reality. As Michael Biddiss makes plain, racism, like nationalism, always deals with political and social symbols, especially those symbols "peculiarly suited to the cultivation of intense group loyalties."¹⁸ In the case of a dispossessed ruling class, the symbol of a superior "race" temporarily and wrongfully cast down from the seats of privilege had obvious emotional appeal, even when, in fact, the French nobility had already lost its power. This symbol, as we have seen, did not initially entail antisemitism or identify Jews as the anti-race, although that happened later. Instead of anti-Jewish Christian religious myths, it found a wholly different mythology to support its pretensions, namely the French version of the so-called "Gothic myth" which, in another form, also appeared in Spain. According to this myth (formulated, by the way, even prior to 1789 by Count de Boulainvilliers),¹⁹ the French aristocracy were the racial heirs of the Frankish conquerors of ancient Gaul, and, on account of their greater virility, should prevail by nature over the Gallic Third Estate in latter-day France. What the nobility overlooked, however, was the ease with which the argument could be reversed once the tides of history had reversed themselves as well. The revolutionary ideologues (e.g., Sièyès) only had to invert the myth and claim racial superiority for the Gallic Third Estate in light of its impending victory in order to discomfort their antagonists.

Yet, once conceived, the French racial myth was bound to feed itself on anti-Jewish religious feelings of a time-honored variety as soon as the social climate in France encouraged a mood of generalized Judeophobia. This occurred after the collapse of the Second Empire in 1870, when the nation sank into the trauma of defeat, and Paris was flooded by German-speaking Jews from the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Edouard Drumont, the arch-antisemite of the Third Republic and the author of *La France Juive*, was—in doubtful order—both a racist and a Catholic. Unlike Gobineau, his Catholicism was certainly more than a veneer; at least, he was pious enough to attend Mass each Sunday during a period when piety was highly unpopular in an anti-clerical state. It is reasonable to suppose that he was influenced by the anti-Jewish rhetoric of conventional Christian theology, and that these religious images helped to color his racial portrait of the Semite, which, in fact, bears a distinct resemblance to mediaeval caricatures.²⁰ To this extent, *La France Juive* supports Ruether's contention that underlying racial antisemitism are always fundamental religious stereotypes that have only suffered a secular translation. Probably, Drumont's religious convictions assisted enormously in this translation, raising into sharp relief the category of the Semite out of the various non-Aryan categories of Gobineau's system of racial classification. But other and possibly even stronger feelings also fed his fury against the Jews, notably his personal alienation amid the soulless social order of the Third Republic with its corrupt politics, financial scandals and crass materialism. Like Gobineau, who regarded metropolitan Paris as a cess-pool swimming with rootless men (*les déracinés*) ripe for revolution with its racial miscegenation and coarse money values,²¹ Drumont despised the France of his own lifetime as a fallen society. A classic fascist before the age of fascism, he focused his social resentment on the Jews, especially illustrious Jewish financiers such as the Rothschilds, making the latter the symbols *par excellence* of an alien presence which had invaded and vitiated the idealized France of his own romantic imagination. This resentment was a distinctive psychological symptom of the nineteenth century and its peculiar disruptions, and not the product of former ages, although the image of the "carnal Jew" which Drumont employed was obviously borrowed from much older Christian materials. It was also, incidentally, the gateway through which racial ideas entered the French church, itself an alienated institution, as Drumont's appeal among middle-class Catholics and lower clergy who continued to resist the spirit of *ralliement*, or accommodation to the Third Republic, testifies.²²

The racial element in modern French antisemitism remained independent of the religious element, however, in spite of the interweaving of racial and religious anti-Jewish images in much popular Catholic literature

(including the Catholic press) during the Dreyfus era. This independence is illustrated in the thought of Charles Maurras, the brilliant founder of the French fascist movement, *Action Française*, a man so deeply alienated from Jacobin France that he advocated a return to absolute monarchy, although the king he envisaged was less a new Louis XIV than a type of French *Führer*.²³ Maurras, like another intellectual godparent of French fascism, Maurice Barrès, was a "Catholic" for whom Christianity had no transcendent significance whatever, at least in its biblical sense. Barrès desired a fusion between the Catholic saints and the old pagan deities in order to effect a reconciliation between Catholic piety and the "spirit of the earth."²⁴ Maurras, for whom Christianity was a "semitic leprosy" in the body of Greco-Roman civilization, approved of the Roman Church only insofar as it was Roman rather than Christian, "for the Christ of the Catholic tradition was the sovereign Jupiter who was crucified for us on earth."²⁵ To the French racist who deified Latin instead of Teutonic culture (like his German counterparts), in other words, Jesus was really a racial deity who had sacrificed himself for the Latin, e.g., French race. Nothing could demonstrate better both the narcissistic character of racism itself, and the extent to which, from the racist perspective, religion can have only a positivistic meaning, as the final expression of the unique configurations of the glorified ego. Hence, in Maurras' opinion, a paganized Roman Catholicism focused on a "Jupiter-Christ" was the single religion indigenous to the racial genius of the French. To be sure, his identification of the Jews, along with Freemasons, Protestants and atheists, as the prime enemies of France, may have been derived from Catholic dogma,²⁶ but the real offense of these *Quatre États confédérés* (significantly, he changed "atheists" to "aliens") was racial rather than religious; they were foreign, hostile elements which, by definition, could not be assimilated into the classical soul. His antisemitism, therefore, was not really rooted in traditional religious ideas at all, but in a wholly different, quite non-Catholic vision of the world-order. It was not mediaeval but modern.

Alienation was also the womb of German racism, which, in a strange way, was also connected with the French revolution, although the proto-racist intellectuals who gave birth to *völkische* ideas thought in terms of a nation rather than a social class, or caste. The great example was Johann Gottlieb Fichte. A romantic nationalist whose bad feelings toward the age were stirred by the military and cultural imperialism of Napoleonic France, Fichte posited the notion that a special relationship existed between the divine life of God himself (as understood by the idealist philosopher) and the mysterious spiritual life of the German *Volk*. Did not the German language itself with its primitive and expressive tonal qualities

hint at some profound layer of reality which other, more superficial modern languages had sacrificed? Did not the very sound of German suggest that its syllables were formed in the mystical, primeval depths of nature where divinity dwells, signifying a unique inner kinship between the Germans and God? Are not language and life united organically, so that to share a common tongue is to possess a common soul, or a collective *Volksseele*, as the national socialist theoreticians later said? Fichte was certainly no Nazi, but the germ of twentieth-century ideology was present in the cry of the romantic to the oppressed nation: "The German spirit," he rhapsodized, "will open up new shafts and bring the light of day into their abysses, and hurl up rocky masses of thought, out of which ages to come will build their dwellings."²⁷ These sentiments, like their author, were proto-racist rather than racist in character, at least in the proper sense of the term; nevertheless, the spiritual nation which they invoked only had to await the infusion of Gobinist ideas near the end of the century in order to emerge as an Aryan race-soul. Not only did modern German racism find its origins in *völkisch* romanticism, but, despite Fichte's attempt to attach his views to the theology of the Fourth Gospel (the Logos),²⁸ the anti-Christian implications of his thought would soon become apparent. Incidentally, he was probably the first modern European to echo the age-old suggestion of Marcion that Jesus was not a Jew.²⁹

The narcissistic elements in Fichte's mystical Germanism and their bearing on Christianity burst into open visibility in the writings of a later admirer, Paul de Lagarde, a contemporary of Gobineau and the author of the idea of a purely "Germanic" religion. A gifted if erratic scholar, Lagarde, whose personal alienation was possibly colored by some paranoia,³⁰ identified himself with that segment of German society in the imperial epoch which most detested the "classical values of liberalism,"³¹ and, like Nietzsche, extended this detestation to Christianity itself, especially the Protestant orthodoxy of his father's home. This repudiation of Christianity in the name of a German prometheanism was rooted in the intellectual, psychological and spiritual conflicts of the nineteenth century, and cannot be explained as a mediaeval residuum, even if, in fact, some antecedents can be found in the late Middle Ages.³² Lagarde, as Fritz Stern has written, attempted to unite a "Christian heaven and a German earth in one impenetrable mystery."³³ Antisemitism was certainly an important part of this mystery, but his religious views make it clear that the Christian tradition was not the direct source of his unusually vicious hatred of the Jews, although it cannot be denied that some of his notions about Judaism fed upon conventional prejudice. Like Fichte, for example, Lagarde greatly disliked the apostle Paul because of the latter's ineradicable Jewishness and its subsequent legacy in classical Christian theology:³⁴ one reason,

obviously, why Lagarde found traditional Christian ideas so unappealing. (It is interesting that this accusation was the exact reverse of the common charge against Paul that finds him guilty of the pagan metamorphosis of the messiah-figure of a Jewish sect into the dying and rising god of a Hellenistic mystery cult.) The Church fathers, on the other hand,—as Ruether herself has shown—, employed real or imagined Pauline arguments in order to denigrate Judaism, and the *adversus Judaeos* materials of Christian polemical literature were fashioned on the premise that Paul, along with other authors of the New Testament, was an enemy of Judaism. Consequently, Lagarde did not belong in the theological stream of Christian anti-Judaism except in the most generalized cultural sense; his anti-Jewish sentiments were really formed out of modern German self-intoxication and xenophobia.

The point becomes evident in his attitude toward Martin Luther, the father of the German Reformation. Luther, as Lagarde must have known, was an antisemite of no minor degree.³⁵ This was one reason why the German Christians of the Third Reich exalted him as a prototypal Germanic hero who, even in the sixteenth century, perceived the danger posed by the Jews to German society. But Lagarde, whose antisemitic passions were at least a match for Luther's, did not admire the reformer in any way. The great "Germanic" hero was too Pauline and therefore too Jewish for his taste, and the religious movement that Luther founded was the main-spring of that Protestant orthodoxy which Lagarde so thoroughly despised, as well as, in his opinion, the cause of Germany's national troubles.³⁶ Even their historic antipathy to Judaism, therefore, did not redeem the churches in his eyes.

Lagarde, also like Fichte, was a proto-racist rather than a racist; a fact for which he was later criticized sharply by H. S. Chamberlain.³⁷ As a distinct and recognizable doctrine of human nature with theological, philosophical and scientific overtones, racism developed slowly, requiring most of the nineteenth century in order to assume the form which made it, in conjunction with antisemitism, the most deadly ideology of the twentieth century. It also required time to become popular in the Second Reich. This qualification, however, is unimportant. In every significant sense, the xenophobic strain that arose out of the terrible depths of "cultural despair" (Stern) felt by the alienated intellectual fed directly into the racist fanaticisms of the emerging age, spawning with it an intensified hatred of the Jews which went far beyond mediaeval Christian hostility. Prophet of a new Germanic religion, Lagarde was also the prophet of genocide in the modern state—something which did not occur and could not have occurred to the kings, popes and lower clergy of the Middle Ages,³⁸ nor even to Martin Luther. The Jews, he wrote, must be treated like any bacillus,

that is to say, exterminated as swiftly and totally as possible.³⁹ Was it from Lagarde's lips, or from the lips of Eugen Dühring,⁴⁰ that the "final solution" was first whispered into the ears of the later National Socialists? To even dream such a dream necessitated not the continuation but the collapse of the mediaeval political and spiritual world-order, for genocide was not the translation of the Christian religious myth, but, as Yosef Yerushalmi has said, "a leap into a different dimension."⁴¹

For this reason, Ruether's thesis that modern antisemitism is only a secular mutation of Christian religious anti-Judaism is open to question. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment, in her construction, was an important agent in the transformation of the Christian myth with its anti-Judaic "left hand" into a secular myth with the Jews still cast in a sinister negative role, but the Enlightenment had pagan as well as Christian antecedents, especially, as Arthur Hertzberg has demonstrated,⁴² as far as the antisemitic instincts of the *philosophes* were concerned. Nationalism, moreover, which Ruether describes as the basis of modern antisemitism, and which found its "first great manifestation" in the French revolution⁴³ drew its initial political models not from the Christian past but from pagan antiquity, notably the Roman republic. While its roots were embedded in former ages, its sudden blooming in the "Age of Reason" signified more the birth of a new *Zeitgeist* than the rebirth of an old one. The rise of state antisemitism as a consequence of the new nationalism also represented a break with older "Christian" patterns. To be sure, Ruether acknowledges this fact, citing the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* as another link between Christian anti-Judaism and modern antisemitism because this spurious work employed "Russian anti-Judaic mysticism" (the mediaeval fantasy of a Jewish/demonic conspiracy against Christendom that Norman Cohn, in his book on the subject, has described as a "warrant for genocide")⁴⁴ for modern political ends, i.e., the organized pogroms of a crumbling Tsarist state in desperate need of a scapegoat to divert the flames of revolution from its own head. However, she fails to mention that the conspiratorial motif of the *Protocols* was probably inspired more by the Judeophobia of the Third French Republic which was reaching its crescendo in the Dreyfus era than by latent mediaeval mysticism; the forgery, after all, was concocted in a Paris obsessed with fears of the (Jewish) "Syndicate." This Judeophobia, in turn, was prompted more by modern than by mediaeval causes.

An earlier point of transition identified by Ruether between religious anti-Judaism and racial antisemitism was the emergence of a racial ideology, "purity of blood" (*limpieza de sangre*) in the late mediaeval Spanish church as an indirect result of the forced conversion of masses of Spanish Jews as an alternative to expulsion. To Ruether, this development

supplies both an object lesson in how a secular ideology can arise in a religious setting, as well as a historic "dress rehearsal for the nineteenth century," when the emancipation and attempted assimilation of Western European Jews stimulated the rise of racism among gentiles. In a phenomenological if not in a historical sense she is on strong ground. Threatened by the sudden influx of ex-Jews (Conversos) into the higher levels of Spanish society, the Church promulgated a series of statutes which purged the great religious orders of "New Christians" because of their supposed tendency to slide into infidelity, "vice qui commence à prendre racine dans les hommes dès leur naissance."⁴⁵ These statutes, in her opinion, can be considered the "ancestor of the Nazi Nuremberg laws," and, as such, mark the dawn of modern racial legislation during the twilight of the Christian Middle Ages. That racism can thus arise in the bosom of the Church itself is certainly demonstrated by this episode, and confirmed by the similar ease with which pious churchmen and eminent theologians during the Third Reich succumbed to a secular ideology centuries later. Paul Althaus and Emanuel Hirsch, for example, not merely approved of the Aryan legislation of 1933-35, but actually thought of the *Volk* and its racial purity as an "order of creation."⁴⁶

Historically, however, the Spanish precedent was less relevant, since it was not imitated by the German ideologues, if it was even known to them, and since Spain itself, as far as Europe in general is concerned, has occupied a somewhat peripheral status, although what Léon Poliakov has called the first instance of institutionalized racism in Western civilization cannot be without some historical significance.⁴⁷ The *estatutos de limpieza de sangre*, then, were not really the ancestor of the Nuremberg laws, which arose *sui generis* in totalitarian Germany. Furthermore, while the element of class conflict was clearly present in the social struggle between the Old and New Christians in sixteenth-century Spain, and while this had some affinities with the class resentment felt by such men as Gobineau in the nineteenth century, the more profound sources of spiritual alienation that prompted racist feelings and ideas in the later epoch were absent from the earlier situation. The difference between the two ages cannot be measured in terms of time and the growth of secularity alone, and this fact, I suspect, argues against the view that Aryan doctrines arose only as an ingenious rationale for anti-Jewish discrimination once the theological restrictions of the *societas Christiana* had been dissolved. *Modern racism, including modern racial antisemitism, arose mainly out of the spiritual condition of modern men, and not merely as a secular mutation of a more ancient prejudice.*

No one has analyzed this spiritual condition as a breeding ground for antisemitism better than Hannah Arendt, whose insight into this aspect of

the subject is all the more striking when compared with her lack of insight into the Christian sources of modern *Judenhass*, a charge that, in her view, "cannot be proved."⁴⁸ Racism (and, incidentally, Marxism) was an ideology articulated in the nineteenth century by alienated intellectuals who felt out of joint with their times, and who expressed their alienation by reading the historical process in light of race—or, in the case of Marx, a class-war. The insurrections of the nineteenth century, however, were dominated by the "mob," not the "masses," for social protest was the property only of special ultra-reactionary and revolutionary groups which, in an inverted fashion, were still part of the bourgeois world that they despised, and which still thought in terms of class values and class power, whether they represented a nostalgic mediaevalism or a utopian communism. But the masses of the twentieth century had dropped out of the class system completely, becoming instead "one great unorganized, structureless mass of furious individuals" characterized by a new psychology: the "European mass man."⁴⁹ This psychology was quite different from the older romantic psychology of a Nietzsche or a Lagarde, extending beyond even the "morbidity or nihilism of the modern intelligentsia"⁵⁰ into a more general sense of spiritual disintegration and anomie in which all values, including the value of life itself, were fragmented at their deepest levels. In the twentieth century, in other words, the alienation of the nineteenth century acquired a larger dimension as the mob became the mass, transforming a class resentment into a universal malaise far more pathological than its earlier counterpart. Such "masses of atomized, undefinable, unstable and futile individuals"⁵¹ were ripe for exploitation and organization by totalitarian movements on the basis of whatever principle best supplied them with the identity that they had lost, and this principle was antisemitism. It was no wonder that Heinrich Himmler, the perfect philistine—i.e., "the atomized individual who is produced by the breakdown of the bourgeois class itself"—was able to organize the mass man into committing the "greatest mass crimes" of history, and it was no accident that Adolf Eichmann, another philistine, was his accomplice.⁵²

To the mass man who had suffered the loss of his identity, the architects of the new totalitarian order, borrowing from the racist pioneers of the previous century, offered a new and alluring identity: the Aryan, i.e., the descendant of those "columns of masterful men" who once marched down from the "roof of the world, founding empires and civilizing the west,"⁵³ The Aryan myth, the great myth of the European racists, was neither a variation nor a secular version of the old Christian religious myth of the Jew, but a myth born of different parentage and bred in a different matrix. Its foundations are found in the romantic intuition that peoples whose languages are interrelated must possess a common racial origin, so

that the late eighteenth-century philological discovery of a family kinship between the Greek, Latin and Sanskrit languages implied a racial link between modern Europeans and ancient Indians: an idea further promoted by an old literary fascination with "Mother India" (Johann Gottfried Herder) and a similar fascination with pre-Christian German (Teutonic) folklore, leading naturally to the conclusion that the ancient Teutons were Aryans. The important point, however, is not the manner in which the myth was formed, but the power of its appeal to the masses once it was directed to their attention by the professional antisemites who, from the Second to the Third Reich, understood its usefulness for political ends (Wilhelm Marr, who coined the term "antisemitism," was perhaps the first to realize this potential).⁵⁴ This appeal had religious as well as ideological overtones, for, after all, the haters of religion could not escape being religious in some sense themselves, and, since they began with anti-Christian premises, it was only natural for them to invest their race doctrines with religious or cosmic significance of a decidedly non-biblical character. As Tal remarks, at least one of the most notorious early racist antisemites (Marr) so detested Christianity that he repudiated even Christian anti-Judaism.⁵⁵ On the other hand, the more old-fashioned Christian theological antisemites (e.g., Adolf Stöcker) firmly repudiated the new racial forms of antisemitism.⁵⁶ The two types of anti-Jewish rhetoric, therefore, although frequently mixed together, were not for that reason spun out of the same cloth, but rather related "as a complex system of diverse and even antagonistic forces that operated side by side during the period of the Second Reich,"⁵⁷ and, one might add, during the Third Reich as well. It would not be an exaggeration to say that racism really became a quasi-religion of its own, equipped with its own theologians and priests, and ultimately its own sacred rites.

These generic distinctions, of course, became increasingly blurred as Hitler, a master of the techniques of power, preyed upon every scrap of anti-Jewish thought and feeling present in German society for his own personal gain. But they were never blurred completely, as an examination of the "German Christians" who flirted with the new political promethenism reveals. On the whole, racism, including its antisemitic expression, probably did not arise in the minds of the churches so much as a simple extension or secular translation of that anti-Jewish religious prejudice that they possessed in abundance—some Christians, including Dietrich Bonhoeffer,⁵⁸ could be classified as theological *Judenfeinde* who remained nevertheless inflexibly opposed to racist ideas as the latter were incorporated into social legislation (The Aryan Paragraph)—, but arose in a more insidious fashion as a consequence of their intoxication with the Nazi revolution itself. This intoxication was itself traceable to Germany's defeat

in 1918, an event which, like the collapse of the Second French Empire at Sedan in 1870, opened a Pandora's box of evils. In either case, military humiliation and a shattered national self-esteem created a social ethos in which xenophobic philosophies and a lust for revenge were certain to breed. Like the France of the Third Republic, the Germany of the Weimar Republic was in a troubled and dangerous mood. As the French (Catholic) Church had hated the Third Republic, so much of the German Church (Catholic and Protestant) hated the Weimar Republic as an alien and decadent institution imposed on a defeated Germany by her conquerors. As the French clerics had lived in resentment and memory, so the more conservative German churchmen lived in resentment of the present order and in memory of the former Christian Reich which they longed to see restored. This feeling transcended ordinary political nostalgia. For Hirsch and others, the disaster of 1918 called into question the validity of Christian faith in the biblical God as "Lord of history."⁵⁹ God, he believed, if He is indeed God, will surely inspire Germany's moral, spiritual and political rebirth—a rebirth soon ecstatically identified with the National Socialist revolution of 1933. To Hirsch, the pious and theologically sophisticated Lutheran, Hitler's messianic rise to power represented a "holy moment" in which the divine presence was manifest, a moment fraught with peril but also with hope.⁶⁰ It was this political theology, rooted in German romanticism, that seduced Hirsch into betraying his own Reformation tradition by racializing its classical concepts, notably by proclaiming that the *Volk* rather than the state (as Lutheran orthodoxy decreed) should be regarded as an 'order of creation' that must therefore protect its purity of blood, and by acquiescing in the Aryan legislation.⁶¹ Even in post-war years, we are told, in spite of everything, he clung pathetically to his belief that God had sent Hitler.⁶²

The turn of events, then, accomplished its own peculiar ravages on the faith and teachings of German Christianity, which fell steadily under a racist shadow during the Third Reich. Through the open portals of a church that had decided that the 1933 revolution was a holy occurrence, the winds of racism swept, blowing down almost everything in their path. One sign of the new spiritual order was the establishment of a special institute for no other purpose than the de-Judaization of Christianity, which included proving Chamberlain's old assertion that Jesus himself was no Jew but a Galilean (e.g., racially speaking, an Aryan): the fact that such eminent biblical scholars as Walter Grundmann,⁶³ a contributor to Kittel's *Wörterbuch*, were enlisted for this enterprise is striking evidence of the erosion of traditional theological values that was setting in. It is clear that the final object of the more extreme German Christians was the complete racialization of Christianity as a Germanic religion. Indeed, the famous prophecy of Heine that one day "the old stone gods" of the Germans "will

arise from the forgotten ruins and wipe from their eyes the dust of centuries, and Thor with his giant hammer will arise again, and shatter the gothic cathedrals”⁶⁴ was well on the way to fulfillment, except that the hammer of Thor was wielded by moonstruck Christians who thought that, in demolishing the old faith, they were building a better one. This attempt to racialize Christianity was not begun without opposition, of course, but the opposition was tragically handicapped by its own theological anti-Judaism. It is significant and sad that Bonhoeffer, the hero-martyr of the Confessing Church, declared before the war that, if the Church applied the Aryan laws to its own membership, it would be guilty of slipping into legalistic, e.g., *Jewish* principles, making the Christian community, in effect, a “Jewish” community!⁶⁵ Bonhoeffer’s heart was sound, but his arguments against racism and antisemitism were themselves strangely anti-Jewish. Hence, Ruether is perfectly correct in pointing out his paradoxical blindness in this regard. She is, however, less correct in thinking that the anti-Jewish Christian myth to which Bonhoeffer certainly subscribed was the main source of that racist ideology that he so courageously opposed in Nazi Germany. As this essay has argued, racism had modern as well as ancient parents in Western history.

To say this is not by any means to question the larger claim of *Faith and Fratricide* that the Christian tradition is deeply implicated in the Holocaust. If I did not believe that to be true, I would never have written a book on the subject myself.⁶⁶ Indisputably, the religion which watered the cultural soil of the West throughout the centuries with its negative myth of Jewish existence was no minor factor in the success of Nazi propaganda, because of its grip on the popular as well as the ecclesiastical mind right down to our own generation. But it was not the *only* force at work for ill. The dominant religious tradition was aided by the depraved children of modernity, who were not the bastard offspring of Christianity alone. For this reason, an inquiry such as Ruether’s into the Christian materials and their social incorporation in the Christian nations should be balanced by an inquiry into the intellectual and spiritual pathology of European society since the nineteenth century, and its supreme expression in genocide. Otherwise, an important dimension of the problem of antisemitism is reduced in significance. At the same time, the reverse mistake must not be made, especially by Christians. To dismiss the Christian materials as irrelevant is to defy an immense weight of evidence as well as to support a Christian false consciousness that prevents any serious exploration of Christian responsibility. The two types of *Judenhass*, ancient and modern, religious and secular, theological and racial, nurtured in the churches and universities, conspired together in the twentieth century to commit the greatest mass crime in the history of Europe.

Notes

1. Hannah Arendt, *Antisemitism*, (Harcourt, Brace & World, New York), p. vii.
2. Ellis Rivkin, *The Shaping of Jewish History*, (Scribner's, New York, 1971), p. 212.
3. *Ibid.*, p. xxiv.
4. *Faith and Fratricide*, p. 215.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
6. Jules Isaac, *Has Anti-Semitism Roots in Christianity?*, (National Conference of Christians and Jews, New York, 1951), p. 56.
7. This is illustrated by the differing ways in which the two authors discuss the significance of the Spanish Marranos. To Ruether, the latter reveal above all the danger of precisely those "ideological constructions" that Rivkin considers largely powerless to produce evil by themselves, for Christian religious hatred did not disappear with the forced conversion of the Spanish Jews, as theoretically it should have done, but ingeniously changed itself into a racial ideology premised on purity of blood, which, in turn, supplied a new rationale for discrimination. Rivkin, however, uses the Marranos to illustrate his thesis that antisemitism is triggered by a shrinking capitalist economy and overcome by an expanding capitalist economy. The New Christians, who, incidentally, were the first 'Jews' to engage in capitalism, sank into social misery in Spain because capitalist entrepreneurism "failed to gain a secure foothold" in the Iberian peninsula, but flourished, at least temporarily, in other regions where capitalism took root more successfully. (Cf. Chap. VI, *The Shaping of Jewish History*).
8. Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality, Myths, Dreams and Mysteries*, etc; H. Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism*. Eliade writes these interesting words about the Aryan myth, which are germane to the subject of antisemitism:
 "The passion for 'noble origin' also explains the racist myth of 'Aryanism' which periodically gains currency in the west, especially in Germany. The socio-political contexts of this myth are too well known to require discussion. What is of concern for our study is the fact that the 'Aryan' represented at once the 'primordial' Ancestor and the noble 'hero,' the latter laden with all the virtues that still haunted those who had not managed to reconcile themselves to the ideal of the societies that emerged from the revolutions of 1789 and 1848. The 'Aryan' was the exemplary model that must be imitated in order to recover racial 'purity,' physical strength, the heroic 'ethics' of the glorious and creative 'beginnings.'"
Myth and Reality, trans. Williard R. Trask, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1963, p. 183.
9. *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries*, chap. I.
10. Rudolph Loewenstein, *Christians and Jews, a Psychoanalytic Study*, 1951.
11. Uriel Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany: Religion, Politics and Ideology in the Second Reich, 1870-1914*, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1975), p. 226.
12. Cf., Michael Biddiss, *Father of Racist Ideology: The Social and Political Thought of Count Gobineau*, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1970).
13. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (Meridian Books, New York, 1958), pps. 158-184.
14. Biddiss, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
15. *Ibid.*, pps. 232-233.
16. Léon Poliakov, *The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalist Ideas in Europe*, trans. Edmund Howard, Sussex University Press, London, 1971, p. 272f.

17. Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

18. Biddiss, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

19. *Histoire de l'Ancien Gouvernement de la France*, 1727, Tome I, p. 33.

20. For example, the following:

"Les principaux signes auxquels on peut reconnaître le Juif restent donc: ce fameux nez recourbé, les yeux clignotants, les dents serrées, les oreilles saillantes, les ongles carrés au lieu d'être arrondis en amande, le torse trop long, le pied plat, les genoux ronds, la cheville extraordinairement en dehors, la main moelleuse et fondante de l'hypocrite et du traître."

La France Juive, tome premier (nouvelle édition) (Paris, C. Marpon & E. Flammarion, 1886), p. 35.

21. Cf., Biddiss, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

22. Cf., Adrien Dansette, *Religious History of Modern France*, trans. John Dingle, Herder & Herder, New York, Vol. II, p. 168. See also Fadley Lovsky, *Antisémitisme et mystère d'Israël*, Editions Albin Michel, Paris, 1955, chap. 9, for a discussion of the process whereby resentment (ressentiment) made the French Catholics receptive to racist ideas.

23. *Enquête sur la monarchie*, 1924.

24. Cited in Robert Soucy, *Fascism, in France: The Case of Maurice Barrès*, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972), p. 143.

25. Cited in William C. Buthman, *The Rise of Integral Nationalism in France: with Special Reference to the Ideas and Activities of Charles Maurras*, (Octagon Books, New York, 1970), p. 152.

26. As stated by Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism*, trans. Leila Vennewitz, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1965), p. 121.

27. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, trans. R. F. Jones & G. H. Turnbull, (Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago & London, 1922), p. 86.

28. Cf., *The Way towards the Blessed Life*, trans. William Smith, John Chapman, London, 1849, pps. 95-96. Here, Fichte describes John as the "only teacher of a true Christianity" because "the Apostle Paul and his party, as the authors of the opposite system of Christianity, remained half-Jews. . . ." It is clear that, for Fichte, the Johannine Logos represented the same Divine Life that, in its mystical depths, later manifested itself through the Germans. For this reason, in Fichte's view, Jesus (in John) was probably no Jew.

29. "Es bleibt auch bei diesem Evangelisten (John) immer zweifelhaft, ob Jesus aus jüdischem Stamme sei, oder, falls er es doch etwa wäre, wie es mit seiner Abstammung sich eigentlich verhalte."

Fritz Medicus (ed.), *J. G. Fichte Werke*, Band IV, Verlag von Felix Meiner, Leipzig, p. 105.

30. Cf., Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair*, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974), pps. 24-26.

31. Tal, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

32. According to Norman Cohn, the roots of German racial mythology can be traced to a bizarre late mediaval manuscript entitled, *Book of a Hundred Chapters*, a promethean work which included the suggestion that Germans should form their own religion based on a repudiation of the Old Testament, Mosaic Law and the teachings of Jesus.

Cf., Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1970), pps. 119-126.

33. Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

34. Paul de Lagarde, "Über das Verhältnis des deutschen Staates zu Theologie, Kirche und Religion," *Deutsche Schriften*, Eugen Diederichs Verlag, Jena, 1944, p. 124f.

35. It is true that Luther's various antisemitic tracts, especially the notorious 1543 diatribe *On the Jews and their Lies*, seem to have had little historic influence until their rediscovery during the (German) renaissance of Luther studies around 1918, but they certainly were never wholly forgotten.

36. Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

37. Houston S. Chamberlain, *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, trans. John Lees, John Lane, London, 1913, Vol. I, p. 519.

Here, Chamberlain takes issue with Lagarde's assertion that "Germanism does not lie in the blood, but in the mind."

38. Cf., Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, in his "Response to Rosemary Ruether," *Auschwitz: Beginning of a New Era?*, Eva Fleischer (editor), Ktav, New York, 1977, pps. 97-107.

39. Cited in Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

40. Dühring wrote as follows:

"Es gibt aber grössere Dinge durchzusetzen, die den Vorrang haben, mit denen jedoch unseres Erachtens auch das *Verschwindenlassen der Juden* Hand in Hand gehen wird. Alle Wege, die zum Ziele führen, sind gut, wenn nur Kräfte und Personen vorhanden sind, die zum Einschlagen dieser Wege zureichen. . . . Waffenkräfte sind in letzter Instanz wenigstens als Rückhalt nirgends zu entbehren, wo ernstliche Umbildungen der Zustände, namentlich aber wo *persönliche Ausmerzungen* in Frage kommen." (Italics mine)

These extraordinary lines appear in the 1930 edition of Dühring's *Die Judenfrage als Frage des Rassencharakters und seiner Schädlichkeiten für Existenz und Kultur der Völker*, Leipzig, O. R. Reisland—a work originally published in 1880. I have not been able to ascertain if they appear in the earlier text.

41. Yerushalmi, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

42. *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1968).

43. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, (Collier Books, New York, 1967), p. 3.

44. Norman Cohn, *Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, (Penguin Books, 1970).

45. Albert A. Sicroff, *Les controverses des statuts de "pureté de sang" en Espagne du XV^e au XVII^e siècle*, (Didier, Paris, 1960), p. 101.

46. Good descriptions of the theological and personal attitudes of Althaus and Hirsch toward the new political order are found in Richard Gutteridge, *Open Thy Mouth for the Dumb!*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, pps. 45f, 145, fn. 69; and James A. Zabel, *Nazism and the Pastors*, Scholars Press, Missoula, 1976, chap. III. A systematic study of Hirsch's political theology has been written by Gunda Schneider-Flume, *Die politische Theologie Emanuel Hirschs, 1918-1933*, (Herbert Lang, Bern, 1971).

47. Poliakov, *op. cit.*, pps. 12-13.

48. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, (Viking Press, New York, 1963), p. 297.

49. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, p. 315f. The phenomenon of the mass man has also been described with great power by Jose Ortega y Gasset, Martin Heidegger and Gabriel Marcel.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 316.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 356.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 338 See the portrait of Himmler in Joachim Fest, *The Face of the Third Reich*, (Pelican Books, 1972).
53. Poliakov, *op. cit.*, p. 191.
54. An active propagandist, Marr founded the *Antisemiten Liga* in 1879 in order to combat Jewish influences in Germany.
55. Tal, *op. cit.*, p. 263-264.
56. *Ibid.*, pps. 248-259.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
58. Bonhoeffer, of course, was in no personal sense an antisemite, but, like many German Lutherans (with the conspicuous exception of Paul Tillich) he remained the victim of classical Christian forms of theological denigration. Cf., the sentence: "The Church of Christ has never lost sight of the thought that the 'chosen people', who nailed the redeemer of the world to the cross, must bear the curse for its action through a long history of suffering."
59. "The Church and the Jewish Question," *No Rusty Swords*, Edwin H. Robertson (editor), (Collins, London, 1965), p. 222.
60. Cf., Schneider-Flume, *op. cit.*, p. 1f.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 11f.
62. "Verdirbt das Blut, so geht auch der Geist zugrunde; denn der Geist der Völker und Menschen steigt aus dem Blute empor."
63. Hirsch, *Das kirchliche Wollen der Deutschen Christen*, Verlag Max Grevenmeyer, Berlin, 1933, pps. 9-10. This short tract, written in reply to Karl Barth's attack on the German Christians, makes Hirsch's surrender to racism clear.
64. Wilhelm & Marion Pauck, *Paul Tillich: His Life and Thought*, (Harper & Row, New York, 1976), p. 214.
65. Cf., J. S. Conway, *The Nazi Persecution of the Churches 1933-45*, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1968), p. 12.
66. Henrich Heine, *Religion and Philosophy in Germany: A Fragment*, trans. John Snodgrass, (Boston, 1959), pps. 159-160.
67. Bonhoeffer, *op. cit.*, pps. 223-225.
68. *Anti-semitism and the Christian Mind*, (Herder & Herder, New York, 1969).

An Ethical Critique: Antisemitism and the Shape of Christian Repentance

Terence R. Anderson

Are the roots of antisemitism that tangled and deep? Why then are so few attending to them? These two questions are lifted up by Rosemary Ruether's *Faith and Fratricide*. Some Christian thinkers have been responding to the horrors of the Holocaust by examining the long history and nature of Christian anti-Judaism and antisemitism. In what ways did these contribute to a cultural milieu that made Auschwitz possible in the very heartland of European Christianity? What enabled, at worst, Christian complicity in this nightmare and, at best, a Christian passivity in the face of it? Ruether's search takes her to the very foundations of the Christian faith. Her probings are painful and findings disturbing to committed Christians.

As striking as the depth of this search, however, is the fact of how relatively few Christian thinkers are conducting it or attending in any significant way to the implications of the Holocaust and the issue of Christian antisemitism. Indeed, one of the many profound issues raised by the agonies and terror of that event is why so little sustained response has been recorded from Christians in general, and from those most socially aware and concerned in particular. There is especially a notable dearth of Christian ethicists reflecting on the host of moral, ethical and meta-ethical ramifications of this most unmitigated moral travesty of our time. Shock, moral revulsion, but little sustained analysis has been done. Granted that the lines between ethics and systematic and dogmatic theology are always blurred—their difference being a matter of varying opinion and dispute,—it is still disturbing to observe that Christians who focus most directly on the question of what are we to do have been less attentive to the Holocaust and its implications than those who focus on the question of what are we

to believe. In what follows, I wish to indicate some agenda items for Christian ethics by asking four moral questions and reflecting ethically on them.

Is antisemitism a matter to which Christians at this time should attend and grant priority for claims on time and energy?

This moral question needs to be asked in North America at least, where most Christians, especially "main-stream Protestants," view the Holocaust as a horror, but one in the distant past unrelated to them. Nor are they usually conscious of any anti-Jewish teachings in their churches. Of course, the mere asking of this question reveals a certain privileged position. As part of a gentile majority, the issue of immediate personal identity and survival does not affect Christians in the way that it affects Jews, for whom the luxury of forgetting about antisemitism does not exist. Asking this question may also imply that the questioner has an illusion of non-involvement in antisemitism, the familiar *noblesse oblige* syndrome of a comfortable group which believes that its members are somehow innocently neutral concerning the turmoils of society, and can choose with dispassion which issues or "causes" they will "become involved in this year." It need not imply this, however. Rather, the question can arise legitimately from those all too aware of their witting or unwitting part in what Moltmann describes as the interlocking circles of death: poverty, racial and cultural alienation, force, ecological death of nature, spiritual anomie.¹ Given the limits of personal finitude, to which of the many manifestations of these interrelated circles of death should one attend and respond?

There are undoubtedly limits to the validity of any general answer to this question. The answer needs to take account of the particular situation of the person or group doing the asking. It will vary according to time, location, opportunity, need, etc. Yet, considered judgments about which matters are crucial for a certain society during a particular era is one of the important ethical tasks of the Christian community. Thus the community informs the moral life of its members and the wider society. This helps to check the tendency of personal decisions to become individualistic, shaped by a narrow perception of the agent's own group and locale. General answers to the above question are least problematic when sorting out which social issues responsible persons should be *aware* of and *concerned* about. That antisemitism belongs on any such list for North Americans seems virtually beyond dispute. But deciding which issues should receive *special attention* in terms of time and resources, or what *responses* and

actions are appropriate, is more problematic because such "answers" properly need to take greater account of the total situation. It is at this level that antisemitism and Christian involvement in antisemitism most frequently get dropped off "the list" of moral priorities for many North Americans.

I believe that antisemitism and the implications of the Holocaust are matters that certainly should claim the special attention of responsible persons, and especially the Church, for the foreseeable future in North America. To test this assertion, I want to propose some formal criteria for selecting which issues should be given priority and then see how they apply to antisemitism. Obviously, such criteria do not exhaust the way persons do or should make such decisions. They are merely formal and in content will be interpreted in different ways. Underlying perspectives and attitudes are among the factors that shape the formulation of these criteria, their interpretation and application. One central conviction for me is that God is at work in the world transforming persons and society, even nature itself, into a realm characterized by justice, wholeness, "shalom." Another is the related conviction that while God's aggressive love is for all persons, his "strategic concentration is on the victims of society, on the weak, the exploited, the neglected who are a large majority of the human race."² Choices concerning what we attend to with our time and energy should, I think, be made in accord with this activity and character of God. The proposed criteria may be one useful tool in assessing whether or not they really are.

The first criterion is simply urgency. Of the many wrongs and injustices that compete for our attention, which are most urgent in terms of need and suffering? For many, antisemitism does not seem on this continent as critical at this time as, for instance, national unity and separatism (for Canadians), justice for blacks, Indian land claims, food and world hunger, ecology, nuclear disarmament, genetic control, etc. Antisemitism is an important concern, but any injustices and oppression suffered by Jews at this time in North America are much less than those suffered by some other groups. From such a viewpoint, the churches' teachings on this matter may require tidying up, especially in denominations where tradition is accorded great importance, but that is a task for dogmaticians. At first glance, then, antisemitism and the implications of the Holocaust do not seem to meet this criterion.

Another criterion has to do with the availability of resources for righting the wrong. Where such resources are most limited, special attention is most merited. The self-confidence of Jewish communities in North America and the resources at their command for dealing with antisemitism give the impression of being much more extensive than those of other

victims of injustice. We shall return presently to this assessment in terms of these two criteria.

Three additional formal criteria for selecting those matters to which we should attend appear to be more readily met by the issue of antisemitism. One is the criterion of neglect. By this criterion, groups or persons suffering wrongs who have little voice in society, or are least attended to, or are caught in issues most ignored, would be given—other factors being equal—highest priority. This low visibility and neglect are often one symptom of a group's powerlessness and poverty, whether that neglect applies to the group as a whole or only to some form of injustice from which it suffers. Manifestly, this voicelessness is less applicable to Jews than some other minority groups in North American society, though it certainly applies to Jewish groups in certain communities. But the issue of antisemitism from which Jews suffer, and the more virulent forms of which they as a minority are ever vulnerable, is, as we have noted, relatively neglected by non-Jews, especially the churches.

Yet another criterion has to do with the degree of special involvement of one's own group because of geographical proximity or particular opportunity or some more direct responsibility for the wrong that needs righting. Christians, as such, have this kind of special involvement with antisemitism and anti-Judaism. It is *our* "family" and "household" that have long standing negative attitudes and practices toward Jews. The roots of these are deep in the very foundations of our faith. What J.C. Bennett says about women is equally true for Jews, and that makes attending to antisemitism a matter of particular obligation for the community of Christian faith.

"In the case of many forms of oppression and of dehumanizing ways of feeling and living, the church has been an accomplice. This is true of white racism and it is true of economic injustice and international imperialism. But in the case of the subordination and oppression of women [and I would add, Jews] the church has been a major *cause* of the oppression, a prime mover. It has been the prime preserver of this oppression through its theology, its liturgy and its ecclesiastical organization."³

This points to the fifth criterion. The more fundamental or basic an issue is with regard to *other* problems and wrongs, the greater claim it should have upon our attention. A distinction can frequently be made between social problems that are symptomatic of a deeper pathology and those that, in a manner of speaking, are part of the virus itself. Both need to be "treated," but an opportunity to strike at deeper causes should usually be given priority. Antisemitism is such a fundamental wrong. The

Holocaust is a paradigmatic event for modern industrial society and the Christian churches. It provides a focused lens through which to examine Christian religion, advanced technology, modern consciousness, political ideology, and the complex interrelationship of these. Nearly all important social issues before us today involve these complex interrelationships in one form or another. The lessons to be learned by using this lens, therefore, have bearing on the way in which we perceive and respond to most other matters before us.

Modernization is a term used by sociologists who study the social context of knowledge and perception to refer to "the institutional and cultural concomitants of economic growth under the conditions of sophisticated technology."⁴ One of these concomitants is a particular "consciousness," "the web of meanings that allow the individual to navigate his way through the ordinary events and encounters of his life with others."⁵ It is the pre-theoretical way in which ordinary people make sense of the world in which they find themselves. Certain aspects of the "modern" consciousness that is a concomitant of economic growth induced by advanced technology appear to be intrinsic to modernity regardless of the particular economic or political system. But exactly which aspects these are, and how they are affected by variations in the political and economic systems of advanced technological societies is not clear. Of crucial importance, for instance, is the discovery of which features of modern consciousness serve as a catalyst for racism and/or absolutist ideologies. Modernization has been viewed uncritically as a saving good by those across the whole political spectrum. Auschwitz provides a frightening vignette of it as a very unstable compound with destructive possibilities, even tendencies.

Simply listing some of the characteristics of modern consciousness is sufficient to make evident their potent presence in the Holocaust. One is a "functional rationality" that assumes that all reality can be "made over" or engineered and therefore approached with a problem-solving posture. "Everything is analyzable into constituent components, and everything can be taken apart and put together again in terms of these components."⁶ This "cognitive style" apprehends reality in terms of such components that can be assembled in different ways and sequences. An implication of this is the separability of means and ends. A person can concentrate on assembling two or three components without needing to know the end. The horrible logic of the "final solution to the Jewish problem" by efficient death camp means, in which workers could focus with great skill and even pride on two or three of the components of this process without regard for the end, comes to mind. Likewise, the problem-solving, cost-benefit approach and the antiseptic, sophisticated, technological execution of the bombing of North Vietnam reflects the cognitive style that is part of

modern consciousness. Another feature of the latter is a plurality of world-views and meanings that relativizes and weakens religious and moral certainties, with the consequent threat of anomie and longing for security of meaning. The oft noted spiritual bankruptcy of the Weimar republic and the eager embracing of Nazi myths in that vacuum illustrate this characteristic. Yet another aspect of modern consciousness is the "dichotomization of the individual's social existence" into public and private spheres with a different set of meanings, values and rules for each. Friendships, personal standards of conduct and loyalties must not be allowed to interfere with one's effective performance of roles in public life. The almost schizophrenic thinking of Eichmann is recalled, when he spoke at his trial of personal kindnesses he had extended to prisoners as a private person.

Enough has been said to illustrate the fundamental significance of the Holocaust for the critical scrutiny of modernization which, in turn, underlies so many current social issues. Contemporary antisemitism may be an early signal to us of the dehumanizing possibilities of modern consciousness that manifest such tendencies inseparable from other parts of modernity and essential to advanced technology with all its large benefits? These are the crucial questions for modern societies and societies now in the process of embracing modernization. These questions raise in a new way the old problem of Christian faith and culture, religion and modern consciousness. What peculiar amalgam of Christian teachings with modern consciousness formed the soil for fascism and the Holocaust? Do Christian teachings (which ones?) need to provide an ideological rationale or direction? Or do they only need to reinforce or endorse certain intrinsic characteristics of modern consciousness? Or must Christian images and these characteristics resonate with each other in a certain way in order to generate the demonic dehumanization of antisemitism that "sooner or later overtakes the entire human community"?⁷ Surely these questions call for special attention.

Antisemitism is a fundamental issue for the Church in yet another way. It has infected Christian self-identity and conscience formation. Moral perception and sensitivity, and the way persons decide and act, involve both moral character (basic perspective and dispositions) and moral reasoning: both the kind of persons we are becoming and our manner of thinking. Whichever is emphasized or however the relationship between them is viewed (a matter of considerable divergence of opinion in Christian ethics), both are shaped by the society into which we have been socialized and even more by the "people" or community which we acknowledge as our own, with its heritage of story, myths, beliefs and rituals. For Christians, this is the Church. A challenge posed by the Holocaust is

whether the generally sorry record of Christian response⁸ and the persistence of antisemitism in the Church reflect the common gap between what is morally required and what is actually done, or reflect a basic distortion in the actual story, beliefs and moral principles of the Christian heritage. The suspicion of many and the forthright claim of some that it is the latter is definitely a fundamental issue deserving special attention. If it is a well-founded claim, as I believe it to be, then our moral perception and reasoning on all other issues are apt to be significantly askew.

Clearly then, the issue of antisemitism meets the criterion of being a basic or fundamental issue, not merely a symptomatic one. In fact, as we have glimpsed, it is fundamental to the Church in a way that makes it not only a root social issue but a *dimension* of the Church's moral life bearing on its response to *all* social issues. In light of this, it is necessary to revise our earlier assessment of the urgency of antisemitism as a matter to which North American Christians should attend. This, in turn, leads to a reassessment of the resources available for dealing with it. We can now see that Christians aware and able to examine critically the tradition and able to tend to the pastoral implications of reshaping ethos and conscience in the Church are themselves the major resource necessary. How slight such resources are has already been observed. This criterion as well as all the other four are met, then, by the issue of antisemitism. It therefore claims special attention by concerned persons on this continent.

What is an Appropriate Response to Antisemitism?

Repentance! This is more appropriate than the frequently implied call to acknowledge guilt and do penance. Repentance, as spoken about in the Bible, does not entail static guilt over what has been done, nor is the emphasis on feeling regret or remorse. Instead, the focus is on steps that include a change of mind and heart and a turning away from sin back to God. The call is a call to reflect on and assess the present course of a community or person; to "stop by the roads, and look;" to recognize that the present way leads to destruction; and to turn, seeking the way that leads to the good in terms of the ancient paths (*Jer.* 6:16). Repentance is a turning back to God with a rejection of everything that hinders such a return (*Mt.* 5:29, *Lk.* 14:33), a whole reorientation of the person and renewal of life (*Ezek.* 18:31).

Repentance so understood does justice to the legitimate aspects of collective guilt while avoiding its many pitfalls. The difference between the legitimate aspects of collective guilt and the dangerous aspects have been examined carefully by T. R. Weber. He reminds us that a general repudiation of collective guilt as a morally viable concept arose out of the

experiences of its use with regard to Jews, Japanese-Americans (he might have added Japanese-Canadians), and communists (in the McCarthy era).

The bill of indictment presented against the concept included the following particulars:

- It linked people to deeds with which they had no proximate and/or volitional connection.
- It brought innocent people and moral monsters under a common judgment.
- It dissolved the necessary distinctions between minor transgressions and major crimes.
- It reduced the complexity of intergroup claims and counter claims to simple and unarguable moral judgments and demands.
- It erased the faces and histories of unique individuals.
- It ignored the historic diversity and social plurality of designated "collectivities."
- It predisposed groups to unrelenting, indiscriminate, unlimited warfare.
- It placed summary judgment on human beings at conception and left them vulnerable to the execution of sentence at the option of the "offended party" and at a time and in circumstances of the latter's choosing.⁹

The concept of collective guilt is primarily responsible for lending destructive power to the teaching that Jews were responsible for Jesus' death. It would be ironic if the concept used to damn falsely all Jews were revived to judge all Christians, all denominations, as equally morally culpable for antisemitism and the Holocaust. The promotion of the idea of collective guilt could again play into the hands of antisemites.

Further, it tends to generate moral cynicism. When all members of a collective are assessed as equally guilty and morally culpable simply by virtue of being part of that collective and regardless of intent or connection in deed, place or time, significant individual moral distinctions are thereby eliminated. Despair, indifference and cynicism follow, since a responsible choice is not even possible. Dark furies are unleashed in groups where persons feel so helplessly enmeshed in wrong and guilt that they have nothing to lose. Weber concludes:

"The concept of collective guilt is untenable as a principle of moral action. Guilt, in the process of moral deliberation, always is individual guilt. Although as social beings our social interactions and cultural and institutional involvement may provide the occasions for guilty acts and attitudes, we do not thus become liable for all the guilt of all the occasions arising from this milieu and its processes."¹⁰

But Weber goes on to point out some positive aspects of the concept of collective guilt. One is the recognition of social relatedness, an awareness that who one is as an individual is bound up with the people or community in which one was nourished or chose to adopt. Part of this belonging

entails "owning" the shame as well as the glory of the past and present of one's "people," even though one cannot be held morally culpable for all their actions. When one member is dishonored, all of us suffer (I Cor. 12:26).

"The self's memory therefore provides a track on which the guilt of other persons in other ages can run into the present, and the identification of the self with selected or given historical antecedents provides the coupling mechanism by which their guilt becomes my guilt."¹¹

Repentance, therefore, is an appropriate way for the Church in North America to respond to antisemitism because it takes seriously the deep-seated roots of antisemitism in its call for a fundamental reorientation, a new identity. Also it allows room for varying degrees of individual moral culpability, yet assumes persons do own the past and present shame of their churches, and have a responsibility to work to turn them in a new direction. The call to the churches to repent can and should take seriously the paradigmatic character of antisemitism and the Holocaust by extending the repentance call to the whole of Western society. The signs of the times indicate that we are at the end of an era of an uncritical industrial expansion and the moral and political hegemony of the West. Great benefits continue to come from modernization. But, as noted, its demonic possibilities and tendencies are revealed in the Holocaust. Other victims of those features are everywhere vocal and in rebellion. The present way *is* leading to destruction, and to search for a new direction is the appropriate response for Western society as well as the churches.

In what new direction should the Christian community seek to move?

"Where is the way that leads to what is good"? (Jer. 6:16). All that can be attempted here in response to this large question is to propose one key "normative focus" or "middle axiom"¹² for the churches' policy formation and action. Christians and their churches should seek solidarity with Jews to pursue our mutual survival and self-determination as persons, and our identity as uniquely different but related peoples or communities of faith. It is important to scrutinize this proposal carefully, since I wish to proffer it not only as a guide to action but as a guide for testing the doctrine and teachings of the Church.

This direction-setting norm of solidarity commends itself for a number of reasons. First, it does point to a radically different direction than the churches have taken in the past with regard to Jews and Judaism. That direction has been either mission in the sense of personal conversion to Christianity and elimination of unique "peoplehood," or exclusion and

persecution for the same end. The proposed solidarity is in keeping, therefore, with the call to repentance and seems to be in accord with the insights and recommendations of those Jewish and Christian thinkers who have wrestled most with this concern.

Secondly, the proposal seems congruent with the "ancient ways" of God that lead to life and peace rather than destruction (*Jer.* 6:16ff). The norm of solidarity itself, claims Dieter Hessel, has "Biblical/theological resonance." It is expressive of,

God's covenant with humanity, which Christians read in light of the incarnation—the act of solidarity. The covenant with Abraham, reinforced by Sinai, is an act of love by the One who wants to be loved by creation. And how is the Creator to be loved? By every creature being in community with every other, living harmoniously and secure in the quest for common well-being (*Is.* 2:2-4, *Col.* 1:20).¹³

Thirdly, solidarity with Jews for our mutual survival and self-determination as persons and "peoples" is a "normative focus" expressive of *agape*—love of neighbor, the active, equal regard for the highest well-being of all others in accord with God's love of us. Gene Outka provides a helpful summary of what have been widely regarded in the Christian tradition as the three main characteristics of "well-being" to be sought for the neighbor.¹⁴ The first characteristic he labels "welfare." It includes physical survival and the acquiring of knowledge and skill, plus psychological well-being encompassing the need for affection and self-respect. The proposed guideline for a new direction entails the former by seeking mutual survival, and the latter by advocating solidarity.

Another characteristic of well-being, more difficult to delineate and name, Outka labels "freedom." It involves dignity and self-determination.

If the human agent is to conform to grace, then whatever he does for others he ought not to take their own initiative and ability to act from them. And if God in His incessant action on every human creature does not enforce or coerce, then surely between the same finite creatures qualitatively greater restrictions govern what they may do for each other.¹⁵

The solidarity for survival proposal embraces this characteristic by making self-determination and respect for the integrity of each other's peoplehood a goal. This would encompass civil rights and liberties and the seeking of political and economic structures that allow different "peoples" the power to maintain and shape their own life in ways consistent with others exercising the same privilege.

Insofar as the recommended solidarity with Jews incorporates this "freedom" characteristic of *agape*, it will avoid two common corruptions

of agape: paternalism and the "blank cheque." The former would mean the Church defining in detail the well-being of Jews. The "blank cheque" would mean the Church simply adopting uncritically Jewish definitions of their well-being, and feeling obligated to pursue them. But solidarity for mutual survival and self-determination would entail negotiation on the more detailed content of the other's well-being.

The importance of this, together with the dangers of these two corruptions, is manifest in the third characteristic of well-being named by Outka, the "God-relation." It has to do with a person's conscious life in relation to God. Does our proposal of solidarity slight or even violate this essential characteristic? For many, the shift from mission to solidarity will indicate that it does, especially if by mission is meant attempts to convert others to Christianity. Here is a very sensitive and difficult issue. What does it mean to seek the "God-relation" characteristic of well-being for others? Does it mean basically the same thing for all persons? The whole debate concerning missions, evangelism, interfaith dialogue, christology, salvation, promise and covenant enters at this point! The discussion here must be confined to whether any direction on this problem can be derived from the integral nature of *agape* itself, and whether the solidarity proposal is congruent with this direction. The understanding that emerges will affect the angle of vision with which the above theological issues are approached, and could even help establish parameters within which the discussion moves.

There are a number of possible ways to approach the matter. It could be argued that neighbor love does not necessarily entail the pursuit of all three characteristics of well-being at the same time for the same neighbor, i.e., "welfare", "freedom" and "God-relation." Which receive priority could legitimately vary with the situation and the unique peculiarities of the neighbor. Given the history of Jewish-Christian relations, it would not be difficult to claim further that "welfare" and "freedom" should take priority for a while over "God-relation." The implication of this would be a moratorium on mission rather than its abandonment.

Another approach is to argue that the "God-relation" characteristic of well-being can best be sought in the case of Jews by affirming the living faith of Judaism. I believe there are sound theological grounds for such a conclusion. Important to observe here, however, is that the demands of neighbor-love themselves do not *necessarily* direct us this way. If Jews and Christians generally, or particular individuals and groups of each, were to agree on theological grounds that this constitutes the "God-relation" aspect of well-being for Jews, then this would, I think, be the direction neighbor love must take. But if either party does not, the dangers of paternalism and the "blank cheque" emerge. If Jews did not agree (and some do not), Christians would be deciding once again—this time with an

“enlightened” conclusion—what is best for Jews. Enlightened paternalism is still paternalism! If Christians did not agree (and many do not), then to simply accede to this because of guilt or because it seems the opposite to past Christian imperialism is to fall into the “blank cheque” distortion of *agape*. Both of these distortions prevent the “welfare” (self-respect) and “freedom” (dignity and self-determination) aspects of well-being.

A third approach is to argue that since the well-being of all persons includes “welfare,” “freedom” and “God-relation,” none should be pursued in a way that prevents or impedes the others. “God-relation” continues to be a facet of well-being which we should seek for Jews as well as other neighbors, but it should be understood and pursued in a way that is consonant with “welfare” and “freedom.” This indicates that the actual content of the “welfare” and “God-relation” characteristics would be mutually arrived at and not simply decided by one party. Mutual sharing of beliefs and substantive dialogue between Jews and Christians on matters of faith would be needed if the “freedom” characteristic of well-being is to be honored. Interfaith dialogue would replace traditional mission. The result, of course, might be continued disagreement. The obligation then would be to respect the other party’s views and not pursue one’s own understanding of the “God-relation” characteristic of well-being. Such respect for another’s definition of well-being at the end of such a process of dialogue is quite different from the “blank cheque” acquiescence before dialogue.

The proposed solidarity norm is compatible with each of these approaches. But the last one I think is soundest. Yet, plainly, such deep interfaith dialogue is not an immediate reality for most. The long and bitter history of Christian antisemitism cannot be easily or quickly overcome. In the meantime, the new direction for Christians might be characterized by solidarity with Jews in the pursuit primarily of the “welfare” and “freedom” characteristics of well-being, setting to one side for a time the “God-relation” characteristic until more trust makes possible the dialogue needed to decide its content. The suggested “normative focus” of solidarity seems, then, to be congruent with the basic character and activity of God and of neighbor-love. One further reason for supporting it is that solidarity in seeking the well-being of each other builds on the experience of solidarity between a growing number of Jews and Christians in seeking “welfare” and “freedom” for other groups in society.

What are some first steps to be taken in pursuing the new direction?

The Church should seek solidarity with Jews in reformulating the Christian conscience and working to establish social structures that make

the well-being of Jews less dependent on that conscience. Several such calls have been issued to the Church¹⁶ and the earlier discussion about the fundamental nature of the issue of antisemitism makes clear why. One aspect of this enterprise is the purging and refashioning of Church teachings and doctrines that inform the Christian conscience in a way that prevents or at least works against sound moral convictions and right action with regard to Jews. Ruether makes a significant contribution at this point. But conscience itself is a complex and not fully understood phenomenon, and even how beliefs inform it seems a convoluted process. We need, therefore, a more refined critical analysis of Church doctrine that takes greater account of the complexities and subtleties of the relationship between beliefs and behavior. Both the kind of modification necessary for Christian teachings, and the effectiveness of the whole enterprise of altering the Christian conscience will require attention to these complexities. All that is possible here is to mention some of the primary ones.

First, it is important to observe the limited and varied power of beliefs to determine behavior, the different functions they perform, and the significance of the way in which they are held.

Without entering into the lengthy debate surrounding this question, I think it is sound to affirm that beliefs and organized clusters of beliefs (doctrines) can and do shape behavior, but they are only one element that does so in the complexity of the self and its social context.¹⁷ Further, even the same beliefs *function* in different ways with regard to behavior. Sometimes they may function primarily in an ideological fashion, i.e., as a rationale to mask self or group interest or to hide an uneasy conscience. At other times, beliefs and doctrines may inform and direct behavior. The degree to which this happens has to do, among other things, with the "moral development" of the individual. According to one theory of moral development, for example,¹⁸ a person at a "pre-conventional level" behaves primarily in terms of avoiding unpleasant physical consequences or satisfying needs and hedonistic desires. At a "conventional" or "post-conventional" level of development, beliefs about right, good, etc., are very formative of behavior, albeit in different ways.

Another factor that affects the degree to which particular beliefs influence behavior is the *way* in which they are held. How central or peripheral a certain belief is to a person's total belief-system will have bearing on its potency, and thus on what truth claim is made for it and authority ascribed to it. A person who is absolutely certain about the truth of a conviction concerning right or wrong is not only more apt to have his or her actions shaped by it, but perhaps to be less tolerant of those who think differently. Reinhold Niebuhr stated well the problem this generates: how do we develop "both the ability to hold vital convictions which lead to

action, and also the capacity to preserve the spirit of forgiveness toward those who offend us by holding to convictions which seem untrue to us"?¹⁹ Christian acceptance of and solidarity with Jews obviously does have to do with *what* we believe. Interestingly, both Niebuhr and Ruether see christology as crucial. Niebuhr thought that the affirmation of Christ as Lord with an emphasis on the cross and his death for all those who rejected him is essential for tolerance in general. Ruether sees most christologies as incompatible with acceptance or tolerance of Jews. But the crucial point to be made here is that acceptance of and solidarity with Jews has also to do with the *way* that belief is held, the *mode* of apprehension of that truth. Niebuhr claims that way or mode must be on the one hand one that recognizes the broken character of our apprehension of truth, the ambiguity of our beliefs, and that the ultimate truth is *over* us, not simply *in* us or our possession, if self-righteous fanaticism and intolerance are to be avoided. On the other hand, the way or mode of holding beliefs must entail deep conviction and confidence in the possibility of attaining some measure of truth if the scepticism that enervates any connection between belief and action is to be avoided.

The Christian position of contrition in regard to "our" truth, the humble recognition that it contains some egoistic corruption, degenerates into irresponsibility as soon as we disavow the obligation to purge the truth we hold of its egoistic corruption.²⁰

Thus, in pursuing the well-being of Jews, *what* Christians believe about the content of the "God-relation" aspect is important, as seen earlier, but also of great significance is the *way* in which they hold that belief. Without some recognition of the partial and distorted nature of "our" truth, there is little likelihood of Christians pursuing the "freedom" aspect of the well-being of Jews (or others who believe differently). Yet, at the same time, without some confidence in their own convictions and some assurance that a measure of truth has been given to them, Christians are unlikely to seek the "God-relation" aspect, or any other aspect of well-being for Jews.

An additional matter to which any reformulation of Christian conscience regarding Jews must attend is the interaction of consciously held beliefs and unconscious convictions. The latter are largely values, norms for behavior, attitudes internalized in the socializing process that reflect culture, class, era and, for some, the community of faith in which they were nourished. For Christians, the churches' teachings are important, then, since they are involved in both levels. Simply changing them is insufficient, however, because of the presence of other sources for internalized values that may shape action. A morally mature person should have

access to his unconscious convictions, and be engaged in the task of discerning that which does or does not square with his conscious commitments.

Another important set of complications in the enterprise of refashioning Christian conscience and the associated task of reformulating doctrine has to do with the manner in which various kinds of beliefs interact with each other and, in turn, affect behavior. If doctrinal teachings concerning Jews and Judaism need to be reconstructed in accordance with right attitudes and actions toward Jews, as Ruether and others engaged in this reconstruction assume, the whole matter of the relation of morals and ethics to theology must also be examined. Usually, it is taken for granted that our intellectual understanding and formulations of the faith shape and inform our moral judgment and actions. Roger Shinn some years ago in his inaugural address at Union Theological Seminary argued that sometimes the reverse is valid.

The Gospel immediately prompts in men response of grateful acknowledgment, of loving service, of new intellectual understanding. Thus it evokes worship, ethics, and theology. In the intimate interrelations of these three activities, each at times becomes basic to the others.²¹

It is not being asserted here that an autonomous and independent ethic can be discerned apart from revelation. The reason/revelation debate can be set aside for the moment. Rather the claim is that moral sensitivities, perceptions and convictions can be prompted *directly* by the gospel, and not only *indirectly* via new intellectual understandings of God, i.e., theology and doctrine. Grace, both as judgment and reconciliation, may occasion some clear moral passion or sensitivity and consequent ethical insight that, in turn, leads to new theological understandings and doctrinal formulations, rather than the reverse. Moral sensitivity, perhaps awakened by the cries and demands of the victims of injustice, has resulted in critical perceptions of culture and the relation of faith to that culture, and thus to a fresh theology. Rejection of Western imperialism, for example, has prompted re-examination of triumphalist christologies and realized eschatologies.

Similarly, discovery of the horrors of the Holocaust and the cries of its survivors call forth a feeling of moral repugnance not only toward such an obvious evil, but toward the long history and continued practice of Christian antisemitism. Such moral awakening has moved a number of theologians to reassess and alter Church doctrine in the light of it. Clearly, such an unequivocal moral conviction can be the *occasion*, the impetus, the catalyst for self-understanding, for new insights, reassessments and different appropriation of beliefs that were entailed in such a travesty. It can

also provide a sound *motivation* for such an enterprise. As Shinn reminds us, obedience to the will of God and a passionate concern for such righteousness, while certainly subordinate to grace and not a claim upon it, is a way to religious insight (*Mt.* 5:6, 8, *Jn.* 7:17). But Ruether, along with some other theologians and biblical scholars for whom moral revulsion toward the Holocaust has occasioned a critical re-examination of Church teachings, appears to go a step further. Moral convictions seem to be implicitly used by them as *criteria* for assessing the adequacy or faithfulness of doctrine. Doctrines which generate or result in morally wrong attitudes and actions toward Jews and Judaism must be altered until they no longer do so, or even until they foster right attitudes and actions. Richard Rubenstein illustrates this approach when he says that any theology of providence that could make God into an accomplice of Hitler is morally wrong.²²

Moral convictions and norms are certainly not *sufficient* criteria for assessing and reshaping doctrine. But good grounds exist for claiming they are *necessary* criteria. Avery Dulles' proposed hermeneutical principles for distinguishing "between the truth of revelation and its time-bound formulations"²³ appear to affirm the importance of such testing. His fourth principle states that "in the interpretation of biblical and theological terms, cognizance should be taken of connotation as well as denotation."²⁴ He applies this to the doctrine of redemption and rejects the Anselmian formulation on the grounds that its connotations of appeasing God's honor by the sacrifice of innocent blood are repugnant to contemporary moral sensitivities.

A quite different approach to theology that also lends support to this method of testing and reformulating doctrine is the dialectical method of the theologies of *praxis*.²⁵ Their basic assertions are clearly true. All beliefs and doctrines are shaped to a degree by their context. One of the best vehicles for discovering to what extent and in what ways a particular doctrine is so shaped is critical scrutiny of it by those from a different context. Theory and practice do influence and transform each other. Consequently, it is important to assess Church teachings and doctrine not only in terms of their clarity and plausibility but also in terms of their implications for practice, for transforming the present in accord with the promise of the Kingdom. Operative in this approach are implicit moral judgments that need to be made explicit so they can be critically examined. Does *any* change in practice negate previous theory? If so, should we acquiesce in the change of theory if it is judged retrograde, or else allow the theory to negate the new practice? Moral conviction and moral action may be one way of negating old actualizations of both theory and practice so that some new theoretical and practical possibilities can be projected. It

would appear that to test doctrine by its effect on practice does entail at least an implicit assessment by some moral conviction or criteria.

Moral convictions and standards, then, can become not only the occasion and motive but also a set of criteria for testing and refashioning doctrine. If I am correct in perceiving that Ruether so uses them, it would be helpful to have that process made more intentional and explicit, since a number of methodological and substantive problems emerge. Two major limitations immediately surface. The first has already been described: namely, the complex and varied nature of the relationship between beliefs of all kinds and actual behavior. Furthermore, the relationship between moral convictions (beliefs about the good, the right or fitting character and acts) and theological convictions or doctrine (beliefs about the meaning of life, God, the nature of reality) is also complex and varied. Doctrines link together in different ways to affect moral sensitivities and standards. It is the combination of the deicide teaching and belief about collective guilt that is so devastating, as already noted. Doctrinal beliefs may influence moral convictions and perceptions indirectly by shaping moral character, as well as more directly through the choice and composition of norms. The conscious ethical method employed by a person to move from his beliefs to moral decisions also varies, and has bearing on the moral implications of a particular doctrine for that person. Thus, a "realized" eschatology may provide moral justification for imperialistic styles of Church mission, but it may also be associated, as in the case of Walter Rauschenbusch, with passionate moral convictions about economic justice and socialism. Assessing doctrine in terms of its possible moral implications is a very difficult and subtle task with generally inexact results.

The second major limitation concerning the use of moral convictions as criteria for assessing doctrine is that such convictions and sensitivities are as contingent, ambiguous and fallible as the beliefs that they are employed to criticize. There is no more certainty that truth and humane teaching will emerge by moving from practice and moral conviction to doctrine than by moving in the reverse direction. Many have *not* found persecution of Jews morally repugnant, and have used that "moral" conviction to test and reformulate doctrine! Establishing some hierarchy of principles or of core beliefs in relation to peripheral beliefs with which to assess both moral beliefs and doctrines may help, but does not solve this problem. There is no way to escape entirely this circle of the contingent nature of all human apprehension of the truth. It is good news that we are finally saved by God's grace, and not correct doctrine, moral conviction or practice!

In light of these two limitations, any simple purging or trimming of doctrine because of its moral implications becomes suspect. But is there

any way of refining the process by which moral convictions are used as criteria for refashioning doctrine that at least mitigates these two major limitations? One step might be to abandon the attempt to establish causal lines, i.e., testing doctrine in terms of what moral views and actions it "leads to" or "results in" or "produces." Instead, moral convictions and doctrine could be examined for their general congruency. Do particular teachings, attitudes, moral sensitivities, and core beliefs concerning God's character and activity harmonize with each other? If there is disharmony, then careful thought can be given, preferably in a community comprised of persons from different classes and cultures, concerning what should be changed to achieve congruency.

As stated before, there is no certain way of overcoming the second limitation. But it does seem appropriate at times to use some clear moral conviction as the *base* both for determining congruency and as the fixed point for making any shifts needed to establish harmony between various beliefs. If severe incongruency is manifest between actions seeking the well-being of Jews in accord with neighbor-love, certain core beliefs about God's character and intent, and particular teachings of the Church about Christ, covenant, eschatology, etc., the judgment is that the latter teachings must be changed to establish congruency. To make such judgments wisely, let alone carry out the reformulation task effectively, the actual content of the moral convictions used as the base requires more attention than when such convictions serve only as a catalyst or motive for reexamining doctrine. The vague category "anti-Jewish" is not adequate. We glimpsed this in the earlier discussion about *agape* and the proposed norm of solidarity with Jews. If the moral conviction is that the well-being of Jews entails minimizing Christian differences or avoiding conflicting views concerning the conscious life with God, then reshaping doctrine and reinterpreting scripture so that they are congruent with this conviction will lead to identifiable results. Quite different results will obtain if the reinterpreting is done with the moral conviction that the well-being of Jews entails the "welfare" and "freedom" aspects referred to earlier, as well as dialogue about the nature of their "God-relation." Unfortunately, Ruether does not make explicit the content of her implicit moral convictions, and tends to use them as if the casual connections with doctrine were clear.

A second step in refining the process by which doctrine can be assessed in terms of moral convictions is to take account (when ascertaining congruency) of how the doctrines under scrutiny are held and of the differing functions they perform. Concerning the function of informing behavior, some beliefs and doctrines are obviously inherently incongruous with Christian solidarity with Jews. An example is the belief that Jews are a cursed people whose religion has been supplanted by Christianity, and

thus is no longer valid. Concerning the ideological function, no change of content will prevent beliefs and doctrines from being so used. Such is the ingenuity of human sin that *any* teachings can be construed to provide a rationalization for antisemitic actions. Many travesties have been perpetrated in the name of love and justice for Jews! Nevertheless, pushing further, one can ask if there are beliefs and teachings that *lend* themselves particularly to an anti-Jewish ideology? Uncovering the anti-Jewish ideological origin of certain beliefs as Ruether does is helpful because it reveals this tendency. But two cautions are in order. The origin of a belief does not determine its truth or necessarily its ideological function at a later period. Dulles borders on committing the genetic fallacy in declaring that when a doctrine originates in social pathology, it should be reinterpreted or altered.²⁶ Still, an ideological origin does serve as a warning. Teachings designed to assert Christian identity over against Judaism are apt (but not necessarily) to function ideologically now. Another caution concerns the fact that the ideological propensities of a doctrine or belief will vary with the social context. The belief that we are called to be co-creators with God and exercise dominion over the earth has certain ideological propensities among classes with power that it may not have with the poor.

Perhaps then, yet a further question needs to be pressed. What Christian beliefs, doctrines and moral values *lend themselves in modern society* to use as a cloak for antisemitic attitudes and actions? This question should also be pursued when beliefs and doctrines function to inform moral norms and behavior. Which teachings become in our context incongruent with Christian solidarity with Jews? Further study is required to see if some teachings resonate with particular needs generated by advanced technological societies or our economic/political system or with special values and cognitive styles of modern consciousness, in a manner that directly fosters or ideologically disguises antisemitic attitudes and practices.²⁷

Ruether's discussion of christology and antisemitism would be strengthened by these distinctions. All christologies (as other beliefs) are potential ideological masks for antisemitism. It does not follow that all are inherently incongruous with the proposed norm of Christian solidarity with Jews. But which lend themselves most in the context of modern society to ideological use? Ruether takes account of the social context of teachings in discussing their origins, but is less attentive to such with regard to their present function and reformulation.

In summary, the transformation of the Christian conscience is an extensive undertaking requiring ethical and pastoral as well as theological attention. One important part of that enterprise is reformulating Christian doctrine so that it is harmonious with sound moral convictions and

attitudes concerning Jews. But, once the obvious scandals are corrected, this turns out to be more complex and onerous than first appeared. A deep commitment to repentance must energize Christians for this task lest complexity become sophistry and an ideology for changing little.

Finally, equally as important as the transformation of the Christian conscience and inseparable from it is the task of developing and maintaining social structures that would make the well-being of Jews less dependent on Christian goodwill or the goodwill of others. Self-determination is part of the "freedom" characteristic of well-being, and also has to do with the dignity dimension of the "welfare" characteristic. Thus, even if changing the Christian conscience were not a long and uncertain venture (which it is), or it were possible to make Christians good enough to exercise power wisely over Jews (which it is not), such would fall short of the well-being *agape* seeks. Political and economic structures that protect the Jewish people from the aggressive pride of larger gentile groups are essential. The survival impulse of collectives, and their use of various forms of power and ideology to establish their existence at the expense of other groups is not an adequate explanation of antisemitism, but Niebuhr is correct in perceiving it as operative there.²⁸

I have chosen to reflect in this chapter mainly on refashioning the Christian conscience because of Ruether's engagement with this question. But a host of crucial ethical questions concerning political and economic power for Jewish people present themselves. Civil liberties that provide protection for Jews and Judaism in majority gentile cultures is one familiar arena for Church action. Support for the state of Israel is a more controversial one. Without some political homeland, Jews will continue to be exceptionally vulnerable as minorities in different societies, regardless of their economic power or civil rights. This is one of the many lessons of the Holocaust. The Church, both as a corporate entity and as a dispersed community, I believe, should work in solidarity with Jews to give unequivocal support for the existence of the state of Israel. How can this be done, however, in a way that does not comprise either "automatic acceptance of every policy decision made by [the Israeli] government" and its supporters (the blank cheque fallacy) or judgment of these policies by standards of conduct not expected of others?²⁹ When non-dissent from Israeli government policy concerning Palestinians is made the test of support for the state of Israel, difficulties concerning ways of working for the cause of Israel are created for numbers of Christians and Jews who regard themselves as strongly loyal to it.

A climate more favorable to pluralism of policy and strategy choices on this sensitive matter might be fostered by greater vigor in the Church's commitment to the goal, namely, the unquestioned acceptance of the

existence of the state of Israel. It might also be fostered by more evidence of Christian repentance in terms of working to transform the Christian conscience regarding Jews. Likewise, the continuance of a strong state of Israel and social structures on this continent that insure security and "space" for Jews and Judaism will provide a social context conducive to the reformulation of the Christian conscience. Change of structures and conscience must go together. Hopefully, Christians and Jews might then increasingly share in the exploration of the rich mysteries of a conscious life in relation to God.

Notes

1. J. Moltmann, *The Crucified God*, (Harper and Row, New York), p. 329ff.
2. J.C. Bennett, *The Radical Imperative*, (Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1975), p. 14.
3. J.C. Bennett, "Fitting the Liberation Theme into our Theological Agenda," *Christianity and Crisis*, Vol. 37, No. 12, July 18, 1977, p. 166.
4. P. Berger, *Pyramids of Sacrifice*, (Basic Books, Inc. New York, 1974), p. 34.
5. P. Berger, B. Berger, H. Kellner, *The Homeless Mind*, (Random House, New York, 1973), p. 12.
6. *Ibid*, p. 27.
7. A.T. Davies, *Anti-semitism and the Christian Mind*, (Herder and Herder, New York, 1969), p. 33.
8. See F.H. Littell and H.G. Locke, *The German Church Struggle and the Holocaust*, (Wayne State University Press, 1974).
9. T.R. Weber, "Guilt: Yours, Ours and Theirs", *Worldview*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Feb. 1975, p. 15.
10. *Ibid*, p. 20.
11. *Ibid*, p. 21.
12. "Middle Axiom" is a term coined by J. Oldham and J.C. Bennett. See *Christian Ethics and Social Policy*, Charles Scribner's Son, New York, 1946. "Normative Focus" is used by D.T. Hessel in D.T. Hessel, "Solidarity Ethics: A Public Focus for the Church," *The American Society of Christian Ethics 1977 Selected Papers*, A.S.C.E., Newton Centre, Mass., 1977.
13. *Ibid*, p. 91.
14. G. Outka, *Agape*, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1972), p. 263ff.
15. *Ibid*, p. 266.
16. For example, A. Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 52. Robert E. Willis, "Auschwitz and the Nurturing of Conscience," *Religion in Life*, Vol. 44, Winter 1975, p. 432ff.
17. M. Rokeach, *Beliefs Attitudes and Values*, (Jossey-Bass Inc., San Francisco, 1972), p. 133ff.
18. R. Duska and M. Whelan, *Moral Development: A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg* serves as a useful introduction. See especially p. 45ff. (Paulist Press, New York, 1975).
19. R. Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man*, Vol. 2, (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1953), p. 219.
20. *Ibid*, p. 239. See also C.Y. Glock and R. Stark, *Christian Beliefs and Antisemitism*, (Harper and Row, New York, 1966), p. 92ff and p. 208ff.

21. R.L. Shinn, "Some Ethical Foundations of Christian Theology," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, Vol. XV, No. 2, January 1960, p. 101.
22. Richard Rubenstein, *After Auschwitz*, (Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1966).
23. A. Dulles, *The Survival of Dogma*, (Image Books, Garden City, New York, 1973), p. 181.
24. *Ibid*, p. 184.
25. As one example of this approach see I. Miguez Bonino, *Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation*, (Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1975), p. 103ff.
26. Dulles, *Op. cit.*
27. See for example, C.Y. Glock and R. Stark, *Op. cit.*, p. 130ff.
28. R. Niebuhr, *Pious and Secular America*, (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1958).
29. R. Willis, *Op. cit.*, p. 445.

The *Faith and Fratricide* Discussion: Old Problems and New Dimensions

Rosemary Radford Ruether

The examination of the two thousand year old Christian tradition of anti-Judaism; the suggestion that this tradition brought forth the evil fruits of many centuries of victimization and pogroms, and contributed in basic ways to the Nazi "final solution," raises tremendous anxiety for Christians. It is a subject that remains shrouded in a conspiracy of silence. Christian catechetics from the grade school to the seminary level dutifully repeats its traditions about the Jewish origins of Christian faith, and the supercession of Judaism by Christianity. Christians learn early to love the "good" Old Testament Jews and hate the "bad" New Testament Jews; i.e., scribes, Pharisees, High Priests and simply "the Jews." But what happened to Jewish Christian relations after that is a blank in Christian education. Facts about the long history of Christian persecution of the Jews, well known to their Jewish neighbors, are unknown to Christians.

As always, the victims remember; the victors forget. Consequently when Christians first begin to absorb some of this hidden history, there is at first a great incredulity. It seems impossible that all this could have happened for so long, and we have never heard of it! Our history books did not mention it! The line, here and there, that touched on it went unnoticed by us, unstressed by our teachers. Those who try to teach on this subject know the tremendous reluctance of Christians to learn about it. One encounters strange resistances from publishers in accepting manuscripts about it. A well publicized film series on the Holocaust at my seminary went almost unattended. Lectures on antisemitism are typically heard mostly by Jews. Books in libraries that treat it are often found defaced. A residue of profound irrationality still surrounds this topic.

Why then should one treat this issue at all? For me, there are two important reasons. First, I believe that peoples, somewhat like individuals, must come to terms with their past. Repressed parts of our past are

preserved in pathological ways. History can serve the function of a kind of collective psychotherapy. One needs to look at these suppressed pages honestly, understand them, repent of them in a way that acknowledges responsibility and in this way slay their subliminal demonic power. This was what was not done at the end of the 18th and during the 19th century. Western Europeans emancipated the Jews from the ghetto but did so in a way that allowed the old myths to fester in new forms which could rise later in Nazism like a hidden subterranean power.

But, secondly, the critique of anti-Judaism in our exegetical and theological traditions can be a profound impetus in Christianity for new creativity and insight. Nothing touches so near to the roots of Christian identity than its relation to Judaism. The very meaning of Jesus as a historical person and as a bearer of christological identity for us, the entire patterning of our theological systems, is profoundly linked with our ways of identifying ourselves over against the rejected parent religion. To reconsider that relation is, at the same time, to enter into deep transformations of our own theological identities. Reflection on our anti-Judaism is both searing judgment and grace to begin anew. This collection of essays seems to me a good testimonial to that creative probing evoked by this topic.

I have, of course, various questions and reservations which I wish to pose in return to these scholars. I will take these up in the order of presentation of the essays in this volume, although without treating every essay individually since many of the key issues that I would wish to discuss occur in more than one essay.

Pagan Antisemitism: John Meagher

John Meagher's essay was somewhat puzzling to me since he seems to have a tendency to present my views in a somewhat exaggerated and one-sided way that is not readily recognizable to me in some cases. He often seems to be engaged in "bending my twig" first in order to then embark on his efforts to "straighten it out." Nevertheless, several crucial issues emerge in this essay.

Meagher objects to the suggestion that Jews existed as a distinct minority, enjoying a certain middle-man relation between the colonizing empires and the colonized native populations in places such as Egypt. Privilege is a relative term. The Jews in Hellenistic cities were allowed to organize as a distinct corporation around their own cult in a way which also gave them a distinct legal status. They were exempt from the local civic cult with its responsibilities as well as from taxes imposed on the native population. As a distinct minority having rights to its own corporate identity, holding itself aloof from full religious and cultural assimila-

tion, neither possessing the power of the ruling Greeks and Romans, nor merging into the native population, the Jews could become a distinct target for the native odium against foreign occupiers which dare not be addressed to the dominant powers directly. The special dangers of such middle-men populations is well documented. The appropriate analogy is that of Asian populations in Africa, a strata between the ruling whites and the dominated Africans; or of the Jews themselves in their precarious position between Polish peasants and ruling Russians in the 19th century. One does not have to have an overly-schematizing imagination to see a similar sociology at work in the position of Jews in Alexandria or Antioch in the Greco-Roman period.

Often in Meagher's efforts to present the more complex truth to correct what he sees as my simplifications, he manages to miss the main point. It is true, for example, that one can present many more variations of the typologies of Jewish sectarian communities. The fact is that we really know only about the views of one such group first hand, namely the Qumran sectarians. It is these that I treat primarily. The point is not the relative nuances between messianic and apocalyptic formulations of the expected future. Qumraners were both. The point is rather the claims of sects to represent the "true" or "converted Israel" which placed them in a negative relation to the normative Judaism of the temple. The sect claims to actualize the religious identity of Israel in a more perfected way while vilifying the normative Judaism of the temple. They lump unconverted Israel with the gentiles as "sons of Beliel."

Christian scholars have often expressed puzzlement that New Testament authors that are most rooted in Judaism are also the most polemical toward their unconverted brethren. Matthew is far more vehement against the Pharisees than the gentile Luke. Paul's anger against the Law is deeply imbedded in his former strict adherence to it. To argue that an author like John is really very "Jewish" in background and therefore cannot really be anti-Judaic, is to miss the whole point of a hostility rooted, not in "race," but in religious sectarianism. Although nuances vary between New Testament writers, the fundamental roots of Christian anti-Judaism lie, not in gentile "antisemitism," but in this originally intra-Jewish religious sectarianism. It is the Christian version of the clash between the True Israel and the unresponding Wicked Priest of the Jewish establishment.

The nature of this antagonism is modified as the Church becomes primarily gentile and disassociates itself ethnically from the Jewish community. And yet the distinctive type of Christian anti-Judaism remains fundamentally rooted and based upon this sectarian hostility. The fact that the Jewish establishment itself is in transition between the leadership of the Temple priesthood of Jesus's time to the Pharisaic leadership of the

synagogues, that emerges victorious after the Jewish Wars, does not fundamentally change this sectarian stance itself. Whether the unbelieving brothers are the High Priests or the Pharisees, the basic antagonism is one of a sectarian claim by the Church to represent the true heir of the election of Israel over against normative Judaism. The heart of the conflict between Jew and Christian even today does not lie in the claim of Christians to be culturally superior as "true Hellenes." It lies in the Christian claim to be the "true Israel" which defines the old Israel as apostate and "divorced" by God. This sets Christian anti-Judaism fundamentally apart from pagan antisemitism.

Against Meagher's claim that I overvalue ideology, I would have to enter the contrary objection that he undervalues it. Between a pagan who objects to Jews because they are funny-smelling orientals who refuse to assimilate into Greek ways and absurdly regard their God as the only true one, and the Christian who rejects the Jews as the apostate Israel who has refused to recognize her messiah, there is a gulf that is more than rhetoric.

The Christian cannot vilify the Jew for the same reason as the pagan because the Christian is situated in a version of the same biblical exclusivism against the "idolatrous" pagan world. The ground for antagonism toward Israel is not a contempt for what is foreign, but a sectarian anger against the unyielding part of what is one's own. The Jew, for the Christian of the New Testament, is not primarily the puzzling stranger, but the rejecting elder brother who refuses to bend to the claims of the younger. It is this anger, rooted in claims and counter-claims within the same household, that is fundamental to the stance of Christian anti-Judaism through the centuries, as long as the Christian theological perspective governs the relation to the Jew. It is a relation that demands reprobation, but also hankers for Jewish conversion, that decrees punishment, but does not imagine genocide, since the Jew, the first elect of God, must be preserved until the final messianic reconciliation of the Church and the Synagogue. It is a perspective born within the dynamics of biblical faith, with its jealous exclusivism, and fundamentally incomprehensible to the genial cultural contempt toward Jews of a Cicero or a Libanius.

This, of course, does not mean that pagan dislike for Jews did not provide an important ground that readily received and nurtured the Christian antagonism and lent it distinct possibilities when Christianity became the religion of the Roman empire. But it was the Christian claim to be the True Israel that dominated and shaped the heritage of Greco-Roman cultural contempt and political superiority and gave it an anger and a fanaticism foreign to the classical mind. A Cicero might laugh at Jewish "superstition" (and Christian, as well) and be disgusted at the absurd claims of these Asian tribalists to exclusivity over against the

Hellene superiority. To rant against them as agents of the Devil, incarnations of the demonic, in the manner of a Chrysostom, would have revolted him. Indeed it would have been recognized by him as a version of that same semitic fanaticism and intolerance that he called "misanthropy."

Meagher's inability to take ideology seriously possibly has something to do with the fact that he (and I) would be more comfortable in the cultural world of Cicero than in that of Chrysostom. This becomes evident in his concluding paragraphs. He finds incomprehensible my statement that the continuous existence of an autonomous Judaism was "dangerous to the Church." Since Judaism was not a rival political power that could threaten the Church, Meagher concludes that Christianity could have settled for "tolerance and easy persuasion" "as Catholics and Protestants have done for centuries" (!) Meagher seems to have forgotten the hate and warfare that raged between Protestants and Catholics for centuries until secularism and enlightened "paganism" intervened to neutralize their antagonism and mutual persecution!

The absolutism of the Christian faith did not lend itself to the easy tolerance of any rival cult, whether pagan or heretical Christian. Once orthodox Christianity was in power and could use the state as its tool, all non-Christian and non-orthodox religions were repressed. Significantly, Judaism is the one exception to this universal repression of other religions. Only Jews were allowed to exist as a distinct religious group under Christians (a privilege accorded neither pagans nor heretics). The status given the Jews in Christendom accords exactly with the Christian theological perspective toward them. They may, indeed must, exist but in a state of reprobation and punishment and with a view to their future conversion.

To unyoke Judaism from this angry and jealous grip of the Church, to regard it neutrally as a parallel faith-community with "equal rights to exist," would have undone Christian identity at its core. The Church's understanding of its own identity depended on maintaining this view of Judaism. If Judaism was not reprobate for not having accepted the messiah, then perhaps the messiah had not come and Christian faith was founded on delusion, even as Judaism claimed! Unthinkable blasphemy! Rather than think such a thought even for a minute, the reprobation of the Jew must be reinforced ever and again throughout Christian history "to be the negative witness to the coming of Christ and the election of the Church."

The question before us today is not to minimize the profound threat to Christian identity posed by this unconversion of the Jews, but to ask whether it is possible to drop this "left hand" of anti-Judaism, while still maintaining the belief that Jesus is the Christ of Jewish messianic faith. What should be clear is that Christians cannot unyoke the Jews from this

left hand of reprobation without significantly transforming their christology. Meagher fails to see the connection between the two and so does not take either problem seriously.

New Testament Perspectives: Douglas Hare, Lloyd Gaston and John Townsend

Douglas Hare, Lloyd Gaston and John Townsend discuss possible ways of nuancing the anti-Judaism of the New Testament in the synoptics, the letters of Paul and the *Gospel of John*. They would distinguish various developmental stages ranging from the earliest period when Christianity was a *haburah* gathered around its rabbi, Jesus, to the early post-crucifixion mission to the Jews, to the increasing experience of rejection by the Synagogue and acceptance by the gentile god-fearers, to a final standpoint of a community organized outside and against the Jewish community, vilified by the Synagogue, and engaged in progressive gentilization. The assumption here is that there would be no anti-Judaism in the first stage, the progressive development of it in the intermediate stages and the hardening of a fixed mutual rejection in the last stage.

I would, in general, agree with this schema, at least as far as the mainline of Western Christianity, as represented in the New Testament, is concerned. But I would regard the development as somewhat more dialectical. Within the teachings of Jesus himself I would find nothing of what I would call Christian anti-Judaism. He neither regarded himself as the messiah, nor called for his followers to regard the Law as superseded by a New Covenant. Selective modification of observance of the Law on such principles as "the Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath" would have infuriated rigorists, but it had nothing to do with abrogation of the Law. It was the sort of ethical deepening of the tradition which the rabbis in general were engaged in his day. Attack on the ethical legalism and externality engendered disputes no doubt, the echoes of which are recorded in the synoptic debates. But such critique in no way rejects Judaism, but calls it to a deepening of its own principles. But this is no more anti-Judaism than the weekly Christian preacher who calls his congregation to "repent and be saved" is anti-Christian.

The difference between prophetic self-critique and anti-Judaism lies in the relation of the critic to the covenant and the Torah of Israel. The Hebrew prophet stands within the Abrahamic covenant and calls the people to become more faithful to the expression of that covenant in the Torah (however he interprets this), as the basis for the fulfillment of the future messianic promise. Jesus' critique of the Judaism of his day seems to me to stand within this prophetic tradition.

At the point where the Church regarded the covenant with Abraham

as superceded by a New Covenant in Jesus, requiring modes of faithfulness that no longer required adherence to the Torah as the "way" to the future promise, the Church became anti-Judaic. In much the same way, for example, a post-Christian who had come to regard Jesus as an inferior figure, preaching a weak and cowardly ethic, and who called for others to reject Jesus for a new messianic figure or new code of ethics that superceded the Christian dispensation, would be regarded, not as a Christian reformer, but as one who had passed outside the community into anti-Christianity. Jesus himself remained within the stance of a Jewish prophetic reformer; it was the early Church that appropriated his identity in such a way as to make it the basis for rejection of the "old" covenant for a new one "in his name."

It is relevant to discuss Jesus' own messianic identity here. As the authors have indicated, it was no blasphemy for a person to claim messianic identity. To claim to be "son of God" (in a metaphysical sense) would have been blasphemy. Jesus did not claim such a sonship of God, although John represents the Jewish charge against him as one of blasphemy by having him do so. Messianic claims were not a question of doctrinal heresy, but a matter of empirical testing. If a person was indeed the messiah, history would prove it by showing that he did what a messiah does: redeem Israel from oppression under the nations, overcome sin and evil, inaugurate the new age of blessedness. This could be interpreted more historically, as a new temporal age of national blessings, or more apocalyptically, as defeating the Devil, raising the dead, judging the world, reigning over a new age beyond both death and evil. Both views ran side by side and mingled in contemporary Jewish thought. In any case, being the messiah has something to do with evident changes in the human condition.

On the plane of visible history, Jesus did none of this and so, from a Jewish standpoint, was not the messiah. Such a Jewish rejection of Jesus as the messiah has nothing to do with disliking Jesus or even rejecting him as a prophetic reformer. It is quite possible that a modern reform Judaism might claim Jesus as a prophetic reformer within Judaism and yet regard all messianic claims about him as false. Rejection of messianic claims about Jesus have to do with actual and effective roles to be played in history and the fact that Jesus did not play those roles.

In any case, it is doubtful that Jesus himself claimed to be the messiah. More likely, he saw himself as a messianic prophet calling Israel to repentance in the light of an imminent advent of a messianic figure which he called "Son of Man." He saw that response to his message of repentance was critical for the future acceptance of the penitent Israel by the One who was to come. Jesus preached out of an apocalyptic type of messianic consciousness. He distinguished between the present unfulfilled

times of conflict with unbelief and signs of new beginnings, and the future advent of the Kingdom of Heaven. It is likely that he believed that the time of crisis was growing very short and that the messianic advent was about to break in during his final journey and ministry in Jerusalem that precipitated his death.

From a Roman point of view this would have looked like a nationalist uprising; from the standpoint of temple authorities like a revolt against their authority. The temple officials collaborated with the Romans in arresting him. His crucifixion was the death normally handed out by the Romans to leaders of insurrections of subject nations and slave populations. From the normal Jewish point of view, that was the end of the matter; a crucified man was not the messiah. Messiahs win; people (Jews) who get killed are a part of the tragic history of humanity (of Israel) but not the solution to that tragedy.

Douglas Hare claims that there are two roots to christology and anti-Judaism. One lies in the messianic claims about Jesus. The other lies in the Jewish rejection of those claims. The two were not intertwined in the beginning. They became intertwined only in the course of several decades of early Christian mission to the Jews. This resulted in failure and rejection by the Jewish religious community (by now represented by the Synagogue and the Pharisaic leadership) and finally the "curse" against the Christians of the Rabbinic Council of 90 A.D. Townsend also sees the situation after the rejection by the Synagogue as basic to the vehement anti-Judaism of the *Gospel of John*. The Church rejects the Synagogue which has rejected it and its mission to them.

The *Gospel of Matthew* also reflects this reaction against the rejecting Synagogue. I would agree that the vehemence of these authors is in the context of this later experience. But I would suggest that the root of this dialectic of christology and anti-Judaism is found in Christian faith from the beginning, from the Easter faith.

Christians have grown so used to the pattern of the crucified messiah that they have forgotten how totally scandalous this would have been to the Judaism of Jesus' time. Crucifixion, failure, death, prove that the messianic hopes pinned on a certain person are false. The crisis of the cross was two-fold. There was both the crisis of Jesus' arrest and death and the crisis of the disciples' betrayal of him. The gospels also show us that the disciples initially accepted the normal Jewish standpoint that those who fail cannot be messiahs (i.e., *Lk.* 24,21). It is not far-fetched or overly psychoanalytic to suggest that the vehement projection by the early Church of blame upon the Jewish authorities for his rejection has something to do with exculpation of the disciples' own rejection of him. In a real sense the only people who reject and betray Jesus in the New

Testament are his disciples. They are the only ones who *can* betray him. The New Testament narratives read the unfaith of temple authorities and, later, the Pharisees in the light of their own affirmation and so see this as betrayal. But betrayal presupposes a relationship. It presupposes a community that pinned its hope on him and then ran out on him in the crisis. Only the disciples could do that.

That the disciples did do that is written all over the four gospels. It is reiterated in the constant motif of the disciples not "understanding" him when he speaks of the Son of Man as one who must die. This is the fundamental backdrop for the reversal of this misunderstanding in the Easter faith. The early Church knows itself to be a community of converted betrayers who rejected and misunderstood the Master at the critical moment and accepted the normal viewpoint of Judaism that messiahs win—they do not get crucified. They also know that something has happened to them that has enabled them to reverse that normal judgment and to proclaim that Jesus was secretly the messiah of Jewish hope and will return openly as such in the figure of the Son of Man soon to come. Here and now repentance and salvation is to be proclaimed "in his name." Even the cross, paradoxically, is not the refutation of this messianic claim, but the means to its fulfillment. Jesus, by entering into death, has conquered it on our behalf. But this gives the Church a messianism fundamentally different from and contrary to the Jewish messianic tradition.

One can hardly underestimate the importance of this formation of early Christian faith through transcendence of rejection. This means both the disciples own betrayal of him and the divine rejection signified by the crucifixion itself. Did not God abandon Jesus on the cross? Did not God fail to respond to his cry: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" If God did *not* indeed abandon Jesus on the cross; if the cross was the means of God's affirmation of him, if the disciples were to reaffirm him as the Christ, a profound breaking and remaking of the messianic idea must take place. Not God, but the Devil, was responsible for the death of Jesus. The apparent victory of the cosmic forces of evil over him was not really his defeat, but a paradoxical means by which the Powers and Principalities themselves were defeated. The disciples, in reaffirming him, must reevaluate the Jewish religious authorities as committing not merely a political mistake, but a religious sin of deepest blasphemy and apostasy in helping him be killed. But conflict must be read on the most radical level, as the conflict of God and the Devil, light and darkness. The converted believers are children of God and the unbelieving Jewish brothers are children of the Devil. It is John that gives us the fullest theological version of this perspective. Only such radicalism could explain the paradox of the abandoned messiah.

Initially, of course, the early Church did not think of this message of

the crucified and risen messiah as putting them outside or against Judaism. They thought of it as a divine revelation that explained the paradox of the continuing messianic character of the Crucified. They sought to convert their brethren to their perspective. It should not surprise us that they failed, and for the same reason that they themselves originally lost heart at the cross. Messianic claimants who get crucified are false messiahs, however "good" they may be as persons. In the days leading up to and immediately after the Jewish wars (66-70 C. E.), when the Christian mission to the Jews would have experienced its denouement, such a message must have seemed like the sheerest insult to Jewish hopes, much like presenting Jews today with a Nazi armband, and the hair and shoes of a Holocaust child, and declaring that in these Israel was to see the signs of its redemption! Only those who had lived through these events, who knew Jesus, experienced the hopes surrounding him and lived through the crisis and renewal of those hopes, could find such a message meaningful. The majority of the Jews, who had had no such experiences, must have found it incomprehensible . . . even insulting.

The Christians experienced rejection from those Jews with the clearest Jewish identity; i.e., those who gathered around the reconstituted Pharisaic Judaism of the Synagogue. No wonder that these then became the "bad guys" of Matthew and John, who reflect this post-bellum rejection by the Synagogue. Some Jews accepted, of course. I suspect that they would have tended to be persons who, for one reason or another, already experienced the cultural and political attacks of the gentile world as putting them in crisis with Jewish identity. Several of the options in Judaism that existed before the wars vanished; the temple priesthood, the Essenes, various kinds of messianic sectarians, Hellenizing Judaism. Much of their membership may have found its way into the Church, which preserved the apocalyptic and Hellenistic literature of these kinds of Judaism that were abandoned by rabbinic Judaism.

About this time the Church also discovered another surprising fact. The message of the crucified messiah, unacceptable to the synagogues, was accepted by the "godfearer" gentiles. The fact that they did so probably has something to do with not being Jewish. The contradiction of a crucified messiah was not apparent to them in the same way. Many savior gods died and rose in the religions with which they were familiar. In their hands the concept "Christ" was transmuted into quite a different concept of "divine man." But the hostility to the Synagogue was left, in the Christian tradition, essentially in the place fixed, not by these incoming gentiles, but by the Christians of Jewish background as they shook the dust of the homes of their fathers off their feet and departed to preach the gospel to more receptive ears.

The Israel which has rejected Jesus as the Christ cannot be regarded

by the Church in a neutral way. It is the apostate part of itself, which has sinned against God, rejected its own salvation. It is deeply reprobate, and the evils that befall it are divine punishment. But the anger with which the Church looks at the Synagogue remains a jealous anger that believes that the Church itself cannot be whole until the Synagogue repents and accepts the One whom they rejected. In this Hare is wrong in thinking that anti-Judaism is the product of the failure and abandonment of the Jewish mission. Orthodox Christianity has never abandoned the Jewish mission. To do so would be to fundamentally reinterpret the traditional faith in Jesus as the messiah. The Church must pursue the Synagogue down through the corridors of history and even to the end of time with this jealous demand. Paul lays the foundations for the idea developed in Augustine that not until the Jews are converted will Christ return and the salvation of the world, of Church and Synagogue, be complete.

Several of these authors also raise the question of the relationship between Jesus' messianic identity and the supercession of the Law. The question, according to Hare, is not Jesus as the messiah—a perfectly possible idea within Judaism, if and when the claims might be vindicated on the plane of history—but the idea of a new covenant that supercedes the Torah. Ceasing to practice the Torah is the critical moment when Christians pass outside Judaism and must be rejected as non-Jews in turn. This is an important point, but again I believe that the ideas are more closely connected than these authors would allow. The new covenant in Christ is the messianic covenant which transforms one's relation to the Torah.

As Gaston rightly sees, Torah was not seen by Judaism as a "means" to the covenant, but an expression of the covenant with God. The Torah as *means* to election by God was a problem only for gentile converts, not for born Jews. But Torah was the expression of the covenant with God under non-messianic or unfulfilled conditions. No one was quite sure what would happen to Torah after the messiah. Even the Qumran community was not faced with this question. They believed that they had the final definitive interpretation of how to keep the Torah from the Teacher of Righteousness. Only those who kept it in their way would enter the messianic community. But what Torah-keeping would be like after the coming of the messiah was another question. Some could not imagine anything higher than the most faithful keeping of it even in messianic times, particularly if that time was thought of in its non-apocalyptic form. But there remained the possibility that Torah would be radically superceded, or internalized, so that the external keeping of it would disappear.

The writings of Gershom Sholem on the messianic idea in Judaism should have alerted Christian writers to the radically antinomian possibili-

ties of the idea of the messianic "new covenant."¹ The keeping of the commandments might disappear for a direct relation to God through the messiah. Laborious external conformity that strives for the converted heart might be replaced by the ecstatic union of human and divine wills that no longer needs this external labor. These were dangerous ideas, as the later Jewish messianisms, such as Sabbatianism, were to show. The Church itself had constantly to curb the excesses of this messianic anti-nomianism and bring newly enthusaistic movements back to earth; i.e., to unfulfilled or non-messianic times, by prescribing substitute forms of law.

This idea of messianic covenant seems to me fundamental to the religious view that allows the Church to abandon the practice of the Torah and even polemicize against it. Relation to the messiah has replaced the old covenant expressed through the Torah as the Way of salvation. Whether those of Jewish background might not keep on practicing it anyway, at least during this period between the initial messianic event of the resurrection and the final Advent, would not have been completely clear. Jewish Christians would have tended to continue to do so, for to break the Torah would have raised profound horror for them.

The crisis would have sharpened in the context of the gentile mission. Was the Torah to be imposed on them as the expression of their entrance into the messianic covenant, or not? Gaston is right, I believe, in seeing this as the context of the question for Paul. The Petrine and Pauline division of the two missions allowed those who continued the mission to the Jews to remain Torah-keepers. Jews converted to Christianity would add the belief that Jesus is the Christ to their Jewish life style. But for gentiles to adopt this practice would be to deny that, now, relation to God is given through Christ, not through the old covenant and its Law. It would make the Law a "means" to election. It was Paul whose acute theological mind grasped the implications of this belief that Jesus as messianic covenant has ended the Law. But it seems to me that the idea of Christ as a supercessionary covenantal principle that abrogates the Law, for gentiles, and, after the first generation, for Jews also, was implicit in the idea of messianic covenant. But it took the practicalities of gentile mission to bring this out.

I believe that Gaston is right that Paul did not counsel breaking of the Law for Jewish converts. His fight for freedom from the Law was in the context of the gentile mission. But Gaston tries to separate the idea of Christ as a covenantal principle for gentiles from Christ as messiah in a way that is unacceptable. Indeed one gets the impression from Gaston that Paul does not really believe that Jesus is the messiah at all. Christ is merely an alternative covenantal principle that allows gentiles to be related to God. He underestimates the profound connection in Paul between messia-

nism and the new covenant. The new covenant in Christ is the messianic covenant. This is why it supercedes the Law as the means of revelation to God, for gentiles first, but for Jews too. Paul did not push this in practice for Jews, but he lays down the theology for doing so. He himself, as a non-Torah-keeper with gentiles and a Torah-keeper with Jews had already reduced Torah-keeping to a meaningless conformity to obsolete religious sensibilities.

Augustine and Jerome, arguing over this matter three centuries later, disagreed as to whether Jewish converts should have continued to practice the Law in Paul's time.² Augustine believed that it was legitimate, but not necessary, for them to do so, since they were still conditioned by their former practices. Jerome believed that any continuance of practicing the Law, after one has grasped the principle that one is saved through relation to Christ, not through the Law, was apostasy. Both agreed that it would be apostasy to continue to practice it after the first generation. Augustine, I believe, correctly grasped the expediency of Paul's compromise. But the abrogation of the Law for all was implicit in Paul's theology. Belief that one already has the messianic covenant abrogates the Law as the Way of unfulfilled times. To continue to practice it is unbelief. Torah-keeping is superceded as the way of redemption. This is the essence of the Christian rejection of the Judaism of the Torah.

But just as inevitably the ongoing facts of non-messianic times must force the Church (and even Paul) to find new systems of law, new patterns of external conformity, while insisting that such patterns of conformity are not the "means" of grace, but only the expression of the fact that one has already been elected through Christ. But these new laws do not cause the Church to go back and reevaluate its rejection of the old law. To do so would be to question the initial premise: that Jesus is the messianic covenant.

The Development of Tradition: Efroymson and Pawlikowski, Baum and Hellwig

David Efroymson believes that anti-Judaism is fundamental to the theology of the Church fathers. He believes that it permeates all aspects of their thought. Baum, Hellwig and Pawlikowski recognize that the traditional formulations of belief in Jesus as the Christ link this belief with rejection of Judaism. They try to reformulate this faith in a way that relieves it of this anti-Judaic left hand. They believe in some formula of parallel covenantal communities in which each have positive salvational principles. Hellwig certainly believes that the Church's acceptance of Jesus

as the Christ is a revelation that fulfills and completes Judaism. It would add a certain cherry on the top of the sundae for the Jews to go ahead and believe this. But this does not make what they have something obsolete or negative. I believe that Hellwig's efforts do not dig deeply enough into the crisis of Christian faith entailed by questioning its anti-Judaism. Baum realizes this, but does not tell us very clearly what he does about it. In the last section of this essay, I will try to formulate my own understanding of post-anti-Judaic Christianity in a way that I hope will do better justice to the problem.

At this time I wish particularly to discuss John Pawlikowski's essay. This essay both restates Chalcedonian soteriology and at the same time profoundly mystifies the "non-messianic" character of this type of soteriology. Because Pawlikowski does not recognize the non-messianic character of these soteriologies, he is unable to grasp the profound dilemma of the development of christology; namely, the development of a non-messianic soteriology that insists on calling itself a "christology," thereby laying claim to fulfill the Jewish messianic tradition! Unfortunately his paper is full of carelessness. Pawlikowski thinks that the key to my position lies in objecting to two developments in christology: "spiritualizing the eschatological" and "historicizing the eschatological." He thinks that spiritualizing the eschatological is very good. The rabbis were doing it too, and that is just what saved, rather than ruined, christology. Unfortunately, he cannot seem to keep these terms straight. He mixes them up and even once conflates them into the meaningless formula of "spiritualizing the historical!"

Pawlikowski questions me for failing to recognize that the rabbis were "spiritualizing the eschatological" too. This is what saved them from the threats of unfulfilled messianism. They were removing Judaism from dependence upon history into "religion." Then he recognizes that, in an article that appeared in the *Ecumenist* on the "Pharisees in first century Judaism," I do recognize that the Pharisees were doing this. He wonders why I did not know this in the book, *Faith and Fratricide*. Pawlikowski has failed to notice that this very article is, in fact, identical with Chapter I, section 5 of the book! But these carelessnesses aside, the main problem with Pawlikowski's solution to the problem of christology and anti-Judaism is that he, like most Christians, has never been clear about what the term "messiah" means in Judaism. So he does not see the dilemma of a "christology" that is non-messianic.

Judaism, I take it, has no particular problem with soteriologies that try to mediate relation to the essence of God in some way that would transcend history and find a standpoint outside of it for personal salvation in an unredeemed world. It would, of course, have difficulty with embody-

ing this mediation in a human being interpreted metaphysically as an incarnation of God, if this means divinizing the created nature. This is idolatry, and Judaism continues to regard classical Christian christology as idolatrous. If Christians believe that Jesus' human nature was divine, Jews are right. Christology is idolatry. Christians have tried not to say this. They have tried to distinguish the human nature of Jesus, that remains fully and completely human, from an appearance or manifestation of the divine through him. For Judaism the Torah comes close to being the embodied presence of the divine Logos, although doing this with a code is rather different from doing it with a person. Some Hasidic groups have seen their Rebbes as being the embodied presence of God, but no other group of Jews have been asked to concur.

But no form of Judaism would confuse these ways of transcending history and standing outside of unredeemed times as the same thing as messianism. They may abolish messianic hope, but they do not fulfill it. Messianism has to do with that category which Christians talk about, but have so little ability to grasp; namely, history; real visible history; endemic human sinfulness that still goes on long after "Christ has come"; wars, famines, unjust oppression, murder; the riddle of history and the human condition that goes on unresolved. Judaism alone among the human religions takes this seriously. Christianity, on the other hand, typically uses its christology to deny the question. Messianism has to do with the hope that someday this question will be resolved. This may be expressed crudely or naively or in the most ecstatic visions. But it has to do with setting history to rights, settling the score of unrequited evil. God intervenes, judges the good and the evil and makes appropriate retribution between them. God changes the human condition so that it sins no more. Evil vanishes and maybe even death. Creation reigns with God in fulfilled community. Things become "very good," as they were intended to be in the beginning. God makes the gamble of creation come out right in the end. One can reject this hope, but one cannot claim that it has already happened in the last two thousand years. One can even ask whether there has been much "progress" in this direction through Christians (another important addendum to Jewish unbelief!). Moreover, one cannot drop the hope that this will happen without doing violence to a profound element of the human disquietude with the world "as it is."

It has been the great disservice of Christianity to this messianic question that it has either rejected the need for messianic hope or denied that it will ever happen by claiming that it has *already* happened "spiritually." This is what I called the "spiritualization of the eschatological." However, there is a messianic and a non-messianic eschatology. Most Christians believe in a Platonic or non-messianic eschatology. So it may be

less confusing to say "the spiritualizing of the messianic." The spiritualizing of the messianic is basically the denial of the messianic, while claiming to fulfill it. This is exactly what Pawlikowski wants to do, and find therein the solution to the problem. I say, go ahead, but do not call it christology; just call it by its right name, Platonic soteriology.

A biblical christology; i.e., one that has a real connection with the messianic idea, must take history, unredeemed times and the hope for redeemed times, seriously. It must continue to bleed with a bleeding humanity and remain unsatisfied until this is overcome. A christology that denies the whole question is not a christology at all, although it may well be an acceptable part of an interim strategy of spiritual survival in the midst of the disaster. The rabbis knew very well the need to create an interim strategy of survival in the midst of the disaster. This is why they took Torah-keeping and fashioned it in a way of salvation with God that could transcend and ignore continuing unredeemed history. But they, unlike Pawlikowski, did not confuse this with messianism.

There may be ways of linking us back to our original foundations in God through mystical prayer. There may be ways of rooting us in God's will through revealed commandments. All this saves our souls in the midst of unredeemed time, but it does not redeem the times! Those who could go singing the *Shema* into the Nazi death pits saved their souls. They did not abolish the reality of the death pits or right the balance of cosmic injustice. Any Jew understands the difference. Pawlikowski, like most Platonic Christians, does not. It has been a purpose of my own theological work to help restore to Christian consciousness the biblical meaning of the messianic idea, so that Christian faith will be formed in a meaningful struggle with it, rather than be spiritualizing forms of denial of it.

Pawlikowski also sees me as criticizing a second theological sin of Christendom, opposite, but complementary, to the first; namely, "historicizing the eschatological." Again, since the term eschatology has been used in such a confusing way in recent Christian theology (thanks to Bultmann), it would be well to interpret this phrase as meaning "the imposition of models of messianic perfection upon historical institutions created by the Christian community." The Church prescribes rosy-colored glasses through which to see such things as the Bible, the sacraments, the Church as hierarchical institution, its traditions of teaching, even political institutions, such as Christian kingship. Christians are invited to see one or more of these realities as sinless, perfect, infallible, the incarnate divine on earth. The divinized humanity of Christ is seen as continuing in the divinized existence of one or another instrument of Christ's continuing presence on earth. This too is idolatry. It also rapidly becomes incredible. The Church's errors multiply through its inability to criticize or correct them.

We have wished to believe that God has made a beginning of messianic times by establishing one or another vehicle where the human condition of fallibility and capacity for sin no longer applies. This appeals deeply to the human need for certainty and security. But we pay a high price for it: ultimately the sacrifice of critical intelligence and historical realism.

Pawlikowski has no desire to restore this triumphalist institutionalized messianism. Post-Vatican II Catholic theology represents a turning away from the triumphalist christology of Catholic Christendom and the recognition of the diaspora or post-Christendom situation of the Church. This provides a new opportunity to rediscover the authentic messianic idea and to ask how we can speak of Jesus as the messiah in unredeemed times. But Pawlikowski would mystify the question by leaping to the other pole of the Christian denial of the messianic question; namely to spiritualization of salvation. This is the way of privatistic mystical or pietist Christianity, which solves the problem of unredeemed history by ignoring it. Since our souls are saved, who cares what happens to our bodies, to the body politic, to the cosmic body. Messianism, we must reiterate, is not the salvation of souls, but the redemption of bodies, the redemption of history. To redeem souls we do not need a messiah. Torah obedience could suffice for that, or many types of mystical contemplation of the transcendent Origin. By translating the word "Christ" theologically into "Logos," classical christology could ignore the question of the end of history and look to ways, here and now, to link our souls to the Origin. Thereby we transcend and secure ourselves against history.

I believe that we need some ways of securing our souls against the defeats of history. But we should not use these to deny the messianic question, but rather to strengthen us to face it. If the resurrection of Jesus is the foretaste of messianic redemption, it should so convince us of God's demand and our need for this redemption that we can also face in all truthfulness its continuing unfulfillment. Our use of the cross to pillory Jews is our vicious collaboration with the continuing reign of the powers of sin and death. It is this truthfulness from which Pawlikowski's spiritualized christology would remove us, whereas an authentic biblical christology of the crucified messiah must place us at the very heart of this truthtelling.

From Christian anti-Judaism to racial antisemitism: Alan Davies

Alan Davies asks the question of the continuation of Christian anti-Judaism in racial antisemitism and therefore, ultimately, the question of Christian responsibility for the greatest tragedy of the hatred of the Jews; namely, the Holocaust. I believe that he wrongly interprets me as saying

that Christian anti-Judaism and racial antisemitism are the "same thing." He, therefore, wastes much ink in construing as arguments with me propositions with which I would fully agree. I never said that the two are identical. Merely that there are lines of both continuity and discontinuity which make the Christians responsible in important ways for the possibility of racial antisemitism. In no way, however, does this make Christian religious anti-Judaism identical with Nazi racial antisemitism. Indeed Christianity itself was the indirect target of modern Jew-hate.

The modern racial antisemite from Voltaire to Hitler hates the Jews as a way of hating the Jewishness in Christianity. He wants to remake his identity on a non-Christian basis, by nostalgically calling up some heroic pagan self which he imagines existed before the Western "soul" was corrupted by this debilitating Jewish faith *via* Christianity. Voltaire wanted to be a classical Roman. The Nazis imagined that they were ancient Teutonic heroes. Enlightenment antisemitism revived the literature of contempt for Jews found in classical paganism. This has lent credibility to the views of some modern Jews and Christians that antisemitism was "pagan." This also allows Christians to fob off the responsibility for their history of anti-Judaism on that alternative scapegoat of Christian mistakes, the "pagans." But this, as I have indicated earlier, is misleading.

An ex-Christian antisemitism (and anti-Christianity) is not in the same place as a pre-Christian dislike of the Jews, however much the one may borrow the rhetoric of the former. The pagan might alternatively dislike or be curious about the Jew in much the same way as a British colonialist might dislike or romanticize an Arab, but he has no particular desire to destroy him. Voltaire's violent dislike of the Jews, on the other hand, is that of an anti-Christian ex-Catholic. He hates the Jew as a way of despising what he hates most in the Church.³ This characterology is much more pronounced in a personality like Hitler. Nazism is not "paganism" in an autonomous pre-Christian sense. It is the demonic anti-Christianity of ex-Christians. Hitler could parade his Viennese Catholicism and even attend Mass when it suited his efforts to get a Concordat from the Pope. But he loathed it with a loathing of one who still remembered the grip of its authority. He wished to destroy the Jews to also pull out by the roots the foundations of the Church. He corrupted and neutralized the churches, but we cannot doubt that Christians were intended to be his final victims.⁴ The death camps have the character of a gigantic demonic ritual, like a Black Mass with the whole human race as the stage. Cicero would not have needed to do this. Only one who had first been a part of the war between light and darkness, God and the Devil, could play the demonic in this way.

This is not to say that all post-Christians are demonic anti-Christians.

It is possible to become a genial non-Christian universalist, sometimes simply thinking of oneself as some type of ethical culturalist. Such Enlightenment universalism was an essential force in dissolving Christendom and emancipating the Jews from the ghetto built in the Church. The dominant trend of the Enlightenment believes all races and religions to be equal. Each should be judged in relation to universal standards of humanness and rationality. The Jews themselves, in exiting from the ghettos, used a version of this same Enlightenment universalism to emancipate themselves from orthodox Judaism and make themselves into Europeans, Americans or Israelis. Unfortunately, some Europeans confused universal humanity with being French or German and so found new ways to regard the Jew as outside the bounds of acceptable humanity. The Jew became the scapegoat of racist nationalism. This spurred the Zionists to reject that aspect of the Enlightenment that would make the Jews simply a religion and to rediscover the peoplehood of Israel. But Zionism too sees the Jews as a nation among other nations and so stands within the pluralism of Enlightenment universalism, the Enlightenment of Montesquieu rather than Voltaire.⁵ Moreover, in Canada and the United States the assimilationist formula of the Enlightenment never failed the Jews. Here it continued to work, perhaps because in these nations no group can claim to be the original indigenous people of the land except the one group that is outside of them; namely, the Indians!

We have established, therefore, that modern racial antisemitism is not a direct continuation of Christian anti-Judaism, but is only possible after the denouement of the traditional Christian perspective. It grows to be a violent and destructive power, in Nazism, when it has the character of a rival exclusive religion that would rip up the Christian identity of Europe by attacking its Jewish roots. Jewishness is regarded as the essentially hateful element in Christianity. Nevertheless, Christianity provided the essential background for this development. Without twenty centuries of Christian vilification of the Jews it would be impossible to understand why it was the Jews, rather than some other group, that became the particular sacrificial victim of Nazi nationalism. It is true, of course, that the Nazi "race ladder" inferiorized many other groups. But they were marked out for slave labor, not for extermination. The gypsies alone join the Jews in the single "honor." But clearly the Jews play a particular role of the "demonic" in Nazi "theology" that sets them apart from all other groups.

But if Nazi antisemitism was not Christian and even, at its root, anti-Christian, we must also understand why it was that the overwhelming majority of Christians, both leadership and rank and file, collaborated, actively and passively, with the Nazis in this endeavor and indeed saw Nazi antisemitism as consonant with the traditional "severe" attitude of

the Church toward the Jews.⁶ So long as Nazis appeared to be involved in stripping Jews of their wealth and expelling them from Europe, most Christians saw this as the same thing as traditional Christian policies. Genocide was another matter. But the Nazis concealed this project, and those who got wind of it were generally content to turn their heads.

We should state emphatically that Christian anti-Judaism was not genocidal. This is clearly stated in my book (pp. 185-186). Those who have wondered loudly how it is that the Jews were able to survive in Christian Europe if "what Rosemary Ruether had said is correct" have not bothered to read very carefully what I have written.⁷ Christianity demonized the Jew religiously, not racially. It believed the Jew as rejector of Christ to be reprobate and wished the Jews to manifest this status before God in evident misery and non-success. But it just as jealously desired to preserve them, physically and even religiously, that they might be converted. Once converted such persons were Christians, not Jews. Although a racial interpretation of Jewishness was first defined in Spain following the crisis of mass, forced conversions of Jews, this is a bastardization of the Christian understanding of conversion. Properly speaking, a Jewish convert is fully a Christian. Theologically, the Church's view did not support a racial view of the Jews.

But we must realize equally that these distinctions escaped the simple minds of most Christians. Normal human psychology could not grasp the peculiar Christian dialectic of hate as unrequited love. Most ordinary Christians heard it said over and over again that the Jew was the Devil incarnate. They experienced Jews as persons segregated into unpleasant roles as merchants and tax collectors, and they hated them straight out, without any abstruse desire to preserve them for a later conversion. This ordinary Christian Jew-hate need not be analyzed as secret anti-Christianity either. Hitler and his ilk represent a special kind of insanity that rose in the conflict between destroying and restoring pre-Enlightenment Europe. Ordinary Christian antisemites simply found in the Church's vilification of the Jews a sanctioned target for loading upon a group of beleaguered strangers all the angers of a frustrated existence. Plagues, famines, high taxes, unexplained misfortunes of all types could be blamed on the Jews. The Jews were, for Christian culture, the personalized expression of evil. One could strike back at trouble by falling upon them.

The Church must take responsibility for creating this cultural role of the Jews, even though its murderous results were contrary to its strict intentions. Century after century the Church nurtured the demonic image of the Jews with theological vituperation that fed these murderous instincts, yet also tried to protect the Jews from the pogroms of the mobs. The Jewish community learned to adjust to this strange set of affairs by

appealing to popes, bishops and Christian princes to save them from the mob. As long as the Christian theological perspective was intact, the Jews could expect some restraints (not always very successful) against the murderous rampages of the mob to come from Christian leadership. The weakening of the Christian perspective also weakened these restraints. The Russian leaders of the late 19th century still used the rhetoric of "Christkiller" against the Jews, but they thought in racial terms. They also had discovered a new fact; namely, that Jew-hate could be a convenient tool to divert the masses from revolutionary struggles against their true exploiters, the ruling classes. It was then that Jewry could no longer look to Christian leaders for protection against the mobs. The leaders were themselves fomenting and organizing the pogroms.

In Christian terms, the final solution to the Jewish question was conversion. It demanded preservation of the Jews until such time. The final solution in racial terms could only be extermination. The demonic character of Jewishness was no longer a mode of belief that could be changed, but a biological being that would not be redeemed. Human vermin are not convertible. If a group of humans are louses they can finally only be de-loused out of existence. In Nazi race rhetoric, a Slav or a Negro was an animal, but animals are useful. They can be worked. Jews are not even animals for Nazis. They are a disease. They are a contagion. Contagions can only be destroyed. What more logical than to use as the fitting means of killing them a strong dose of the same prussic acid that had originally been developed to de-louse prisoners?

The Church had thought of Jewishness *as a religion* as a demonic contagion, but the Jew as person as redeemable. But it helped prepare the minds of Europeans for the confusion of the two long before the rise of Nazism. It fomented a popular Jew-hate that did not understand the theological distinctions of Christian anti-Judaism any more than it understood the anti-Christian intentions of Nazi Jew-hate. This ordinary Jew-hate simply heard both the Church and the Nazis say that the Jews were despicable. It found, then, the basic Nazi message that the Jews were to be robbed, expelled and "done away with" perfectly in accord with long held "Christian" assumptions.

Rethinking Christology and Christian Practice: Douglas Hall and Terence Anderson.

Although many of the authors of this collection have put out feelers for a christology without anti-Judaism, in theological or scriptural terms, Douglas Hall most clearly grasps the heart of the issue in a new *theologia crucis*. The crucified messiah was, I believe, the heart of the original

Christian dilemma that, wrongly interpreted, fostered anti-Judaism. A christology without anti-Judaism must return to this question of the crucified messiah. The crucifixion of the messiah by the unredeemed forces of history cannot be overcome by the proclamation of Easter and then transformed into a secret triumph. Easter gives no license to vilify those who cannot "see it." Indeed, we must see that Easter does not cancel the crucifixion at all. There is no triumph in history. Easter is hope against what remains the continuing reality of the cross. The crucified messiah is the paradigm of messianic hope under the conditions of unredeemed human history. If we reaffirm messianic hope against the cross we reaffirm it in the teeth of the continuing reality of unresolved bloodshed. It would make more sense to question God about the death of the messiah than to blame the Jews, who, never having expected that he would be the messiah in his lifetime, had no need to make a resurrection reversal out of his death. The resurrection is as much a way by which the Church exculpated God from the sin of abandonment of the messiah as it is a way of canceling his abandonment by his disciples.

The question that arises from the cross is one of theodicy. Jesus's cry from the cross, "My God, my God, why have you abandoned me?" continues to ring out, even as we try to drown it out with the pealing of Easter bells. It is not insignificant for our times that the same question arises for Judaism from the Holocaust. Pilloried for twenty centuries by the Christian translation of the cross into an instrument of triumph and persecution, the cry echoes again from the death pits: Our God, our God, why have you abandoned us! The Jewish answer to this cry is not a delusion that those who died did not really die.

The Resurrection

One day they will assemble in the valley of bones—
Ashes sifted out of furnaces, vapors from Luneburg,
Parchments from some fiend's books, cakes of soap,
Half-formed embryos, screams still heard in nightmares.
God will breathe upon them. He will say: Be men.

But they will defy Him: We do not hear you. Did you hear us?
There is no resurrection for us. In life it was a wondrous thing
For each of us to be himself, to guide his limbs to do his will.
But the many are now one. Our blood has flowed together,
Our ashes are inseparable, our marrow commingled,
Our voices poured together like water of the sea.
We shall not surrender this greater self.
We the Abrahams, Isaacs, Jacobs, Sarahs, Leahs, Rachels
Are now forever Israel.

Almighty God, raise up a man who will go peddling through the world.
 Let him gather us up and go through the world selling us as trinkets.
 Let the peddler sell us cheaply. Let him hawk his wares and say:
 Who will buy my souvenirs? Little children done in soap,
 A rare Germanic parchment of the greatest Jew in Lodz
 Men will buy us and display us and point to us with pride:
 A thousand Jews went into this and here is a rare piece
 That came all the way from Crakow in a box car.
 A great statesman will place a candle at his bedside.
 It will burn but never be consumed.
 The tallow will drip with the tears we shed
 And it will glow with the souls of our children.
 They will put us in the bathrooms of the United Nations
 Where diplomats will wash and wash their hands
 With Polish Jews and German Jews and Russian Jews.
 Let the peddler sell the box of soap that once was buried
 With Kaddish and Psalms by our brothers.

Some night the statesman will blow upon the candle
 And it will not go out.
 The souls of little children will flicker and flicker
 But not expire.
 Some day the diplomats will wash their hands and
 find them stained with blood.
 Some day the citizens of the German town
 Will awake to find their houses reeking
 With all the vapors from all the concentration camps,
 From Hell itself, and the stench will come from the
 Soap box.

Then they will all rise up, statesmen, diplomats, citizens
 And go hunting for the peddler: You who disturb our rest
 And our ablutions, you who haunt us with your souvenirs,
 You who prick our conscience, death upon you!

But the peddlers shall never cease from the earth
 Until the candles die out and the soap melts away.¹

If there is an answer to the Holocaust, it is for Jews the state of Israel. This is an answer tinged with messianic hope, but a historical, not an eschatological answer. Jews rise from the death pits to summon up energy for a heroic historical project of reaffirmation of their humanity, of their peoplehood. Perhaps God is helping them. Perhaps God is not. Perhaps some think it no longer matters. But Israel, being historical and not eschatological, cannot be shielded from history. Messianic times are again postponed. Historical fallibility breaks out on all sides. Cold military might replaces ecstatic visions. One longs for a final unambiguous answer to abandonment and death in messianic fulfillment and divine favor. But the vision is broken on the rock of reality. Indeed even its modest

historical goodness more and more depends on admitting its non-messianic nature. One must forget the Diaspora identification of Return with messianic fulfillment and return to the prophetic demand for righteousness in the land. The state of Israel puts the Jews, not in the Zion of messianic times, but in the Zion of unfinished history, in the long tedious search to rescue the human project from disaster by bringing it into harmony with justice.

If we are to answer Terence Anderson's question about Christian ethics in relationship to Israel after the Holocaust, we must say that Christians should not collaborate with a Jewish triumphalist delusion, any more than Jews should have collaborated with a Christian triumphalist delusion. But our criticism of this cannot be one of righteous judgment, but of sympathetic sorrow. The crucifixion, the Holocaust, are for each of us our intimate knowledge of divine powerlessness before the evils of history. Christendom, Israel, are for each of us our lived experience of the ambiguity of human efforts to build the new and better world in the teeth of divine powerlessness and the reign of Powers and Principalities. Each fail utterly and turn to the demonic to the extent that we refuse to accept their fallibility and partiality and insist on erecting them into an absolute against our fellow humans.

We have risen from the disaster. We have fought back against destruction. But the heavens have remained silent. God has not intervened decisively. The human condition remains unchanged. In unredeemed times the messiah can only appear as the Victim. This is the meaning of the crucified messiah. The Church which turned the cross into an instrument of triumph and persecution must now meet the Jews, the messiah-people, after the Holocaust. The Church which fomented a cultural myth about the Jew as Christ-killer must now meet itself as Jew-killer. Those who pursued the Jews as deicides must know themselves as the ones who laid the ground for genocide. If Christians are to find the Holocaust as the contemporary image of the cross, as Paul Van Buren would do,⁹ they cannot do this by portraying themselves as the innocent aggrieved ones. In this drama we are the crucifiers, the heel of Roman power.

We should not expect a Christian identification of the Holocaust with the cross to be particularly meaningful or healing for Jews! This is at best an intra-Christian self-accusation, not a means of creating Jewish-Christian "dialogue." Jews do not need the cross of Jesus to know about destruction and divine abandonment. The Holocaust needs no interpretation by the cross for them. It is unmediated reality. But the Holocaust may also be a final demise of those rabbinic strategies of securing the Jewish people against the vicissitudes of history by building a wall around the Torah-people. In the Holocaust, history breaks in and strips the people naked before human hate and divine silence. In Israel, the Jewish people

lay themselves open once again to history and its inconclusiveness. Though they may cry "Never, never again," yet they cannot reach the decisive victory over the Holocaust, that divine Shalom which is *peace without victims*.

For the Christian, the crucified messiah and the Easter faith; for the Jews, the Holocaust and the state of Israel are our paradigms of the crisis of the human condition and our struggle against unredeemed times. Messianic hope appears only to be hung on the cross. The messianic return leaps all obstacles only to be mired in endless inconclusive warfare. We have refused to accept destruction as the final word, but the decisive Word has not yet been spoken. If Christians are to read their own experience of the crucified messiah aright, they must first get over their triumphalistic delusions about what this means. If we are the followers of the crucified, then we must take our stand with the victims. We cannot use the cross to be crucifiers of others. If we take our stand with the victims, we cannot do this in a self-mystifying way, but today only in deepest shame and repentance of our historical reality as the victimizers. Solidarity with the victim today can only be truthful for us when we have passed through the bitter knowledge of our long sojourn on the other side. Solidarity with the victims in the midst of divine abandonment means that we must refuse to abandon anyone to victimization. This means first of all we have to question the continuing structures of our own reality that perpetuate the slaughter.

For the Jewish people, the answer flung into the teeth of the Holocaust is "never, never again." Does this mean only that "never, never again" will the Jews be the victims? Or does this mean more, that never, never again will anyone be victims, Jews, but also Palestinians? Palestinians are not just innocent victims. They have their absolutes of hate and return that rule out peace and mutual acceptance. Jews need not be asked to purchase acceptance of a Palestinian peoplehood at the price of their own victimization. They cannot even be blamed for choosing self-affirmation first, given the present inability to affirm both. All that can be asked is a dissatisfaction with that, a continuing search for that better righteousness of *Shalom* without victims. If it is true that "if I am not for myself, who will be for me," it is equally true that "if I am only for myself, what kind of human being am I, and if not now, when?"

If Palestinians must be victims so that Jews will not be, we do not even have a foretaste of messianic hope. We have only grubby, mean, human success under sinful conditions. Is this the best we can do? Even if we do not know how to achieve something better, one cannot be at ease in Zion under these conditions. In that sense the quest to be a nation like all other nations is an abandonment of Israel's election. Annoying and

unwelcome as they will be, new prophets must rise from Israel and declare that divine election means that Israel's survival, unlike that of all other nations, depends on reaching beyond the conditions of survival of other nations, reaching beyond to those redemptive conditions that elude us but which we cannot allow the world to make us forget; to that *Shalom* without victims. Only thus does Zion remain the Promised land. Those who abandon this vocation must eventually hear the voice of judgment arise from the holy land itself in outrage against its defilement:

Do not defile yourselves by any of these things, for by all these the nations I am casting out before you defiled themselves, and the land became defiled, so that I punished its iniquity and the land vomited out its inhabitant. But you shall keep my statutes and my ordinances and do none of these abominations, either the native or the stranger who sojourns with you. . . . Lest the land vomit you out as it vomited out the nation that was before you.

(Lev. 18: 24-28).

What is the abomination that is proscribed in *Leviticus*? Is it not that of offering our children to Moloch, to the god of the wealth-and-war-machine? To answer fire with fire, power with power, is indeed the way of the nations that were in the land before, the worshipers of Moloch. Not Christians, but only Jews, have a right to summon up from their identity a higher vocation. Is to do this to sacrifice the wisdom of "survival"? Perhaps the awesome vocation of this land and People of Israel means that the worldly wisdom of survival must eventually turn to self-destruction. Only the struggle for the higher wisdom of divine *Shalom* can create the conditions of even survival. Concretely this means each accepting less than their full dreams, accommodating the absoluteness of their dreams to one another, so each can dwell in part of the land of Promise. Those who have tasted the joys of Return will have them turn to ashes in their mouths if they deny the right of return to their sister-nation. Only when each can accept something less than the whole can both succeed. Each nationalism is validated only by affirming the equal validity of the nationalism of the other. Here and now, in unredeemed times, the foretaste of God's *Shalom* lies under the shadow of the crucified messiah. We can taste its first fruits only when each are willing to sacrifice something of our own so that the other may live.

Christians can hope that prophets will rise in Israel to say this word to their people with power. But they cannot well imagine that they themselves are those prophets. As the crucifixes drenched with Jewish blood drop from our hands, we stand impotent and wordless before this tragedy of Israel and Palestine. The sign of the crucified messiah, which should link us profoundly and sympathetically to Israel, divides us from

them utterly. We have used the figure of human tragedy to deny the reality of tragedy and to proclaim ourselves the triumphant victors over it. Now we stand mute, as our victims turn and declare "never, never again." There is no sign to be given this generation but the sign of Jonah, the sign of the crucified messiah, the beggar at the gates of Rome, buried at Auschwitz, resurrected in a camp in the Gaza strip. Each of us must discover the secret key to divine abandonment—that *God has abandoned divine power into the human condition utterly and completely, so that we may not abandon each other*. When the chorus of human compassion rises like a mighty flood to the heavens, then the God who has become powerless for our sake will regain divine might and break the silence to speak that healing deed that can transform the insufficiencies of human deeds. In the name of the crucified messiah, we must struggle against the conditions which make history a trail of crucifixions. Only then, in solidarity with Jews and Palestinians, can we dream of messianic times, of a *Shalom* without victims.

Notes

1. Gershom Scholem, *The Messianic Idea in Judaism* (New York: Schocken, 1971,) pp. 49-77 and *passim*.

2. Augustine *Epp.* 56, 67, 117; Jerome, Ep. 112.4: see R. E. Taylor, "Attitudes of the Fathers toward Practices of Jewish Christians," *Studia Patristica* 4 (1961), pp. 504-511.

3. Arthur Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews* (New York, N.Y.: Columbia U.P., 1968), pp. 286-313.

4. The Nazi view of their ultimate intentions toward the churches is spelled out in a confidential memorandum from Martin Borman to the district party leaders in 1942; (see George L. Mosse, *Nazi Culture*. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1966), pp. 244-247.

5. See Hertzberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 273-276.

6. Guenter Lewy, *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 268-308.

7. I refer specifically to the article by Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi in the collection *Auschwitz: Beginning of a New Era*, Eva Fleischner. (Ktav: 1974), pp. 97-107 and the recent misuse of this article by Christians who take it as a "Jewish" endorsement of Christian innocence of any genocidal results of their religious anti-Judaism. See for example, (Paul Van Buren, *JAAR*, Dec., 1977), pp. 492-493.

8. "The Resurrection" by David Polish: From *High Holy Day Book*, published by the Jewish Reconstructionist Foundation. (Quoted from Emil Feckenheim, "The People Israel Lives," *Christian Century*, May 6, 1970), pp. 565-566.

9. See (Paul Van Buren, *The Burden of Freedom: Americans and the God of Israel*, (New York: Seabury, 1976). Also his article in N.I.C.M.: Journal for Jews and Christians in High Education. Spring, 1976, vol. 1, no. 2.

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No one would disagree with the assessment that Christians, over the centuries, have been guilty of antisemitism, sometimes with barbarous results. The real question is not whether individual Christians have been antisemites, but whether antisemitism is somehow ingrained in the very roots of Christianity, in its very essence. Rosemary Ruether has declared that antisemitism is the "other side of Christology," the inevitable fallout of placing Jesus at the right hand of the Father.

The contributors to this volume consider that larger question from several vantage points. Their findings are vitally important for Christians and Jews alike. Not only do they explore the beginnings of Christian antisemitism, they help us understand the dynamics of the religious impulse for all peoples and all times.

The contributors to this volume include John C. Meagher, Douglas R. A. Hare, Lloyd Gaston, John T. Townsend, David Efroymson, Monika K. Hellwig, Gregory Baum, John T. Pawlikowski, Douglas J. Hall, Alan T. Davies, Terence R. Anderson, and Rosemary R. Ruether.



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